The combined Anglo-Spanish forces outnumbered Victor’s when they approached his base thirty miles west of Talavera. The operation opened well with the British advanced guard pushing French units back as Victor began to deploy his army to make a stand at the Alberche River. The enemy had left a trail of destruction behind them partly in reprisal for guerrilla activity, but also to denude the countryside of sustenance for the Allies:
…after skirmishing for a short time the enemy withdrew from Talavera to behind the Alberche and as usual in his retreat signalized himself by the most wanton acts of cruelty. All the detached houses and convents were burnt and whole fields of standing corn were set fire to by his order, which in this country, being without enclosures, extended many miles.54
However, Cuesta refused to attack the next day, complaining his army was too tired to fight. The British, who were ready for the assault on the morning of 23 June, were outraged since their troops had marched over similar distances, yet appeared ready for the confrontation. They were forced to postpone their plans till the next day, by which time Victor had slipped away.
Now Cuesta wished to pursue the French, but it was Wellesley’s turn to object. The area was devoid of supplies, having been swept recently by the French, and his men had been on half rations for days. Wellesley refused to join the advance, but the Spanish soon returned with the French in pursuit. An army under Sebastiani had reinforced Victor and King Joseph had arrived to assume overall command. The French now outnumbered the Allies and Wellesley drew up his men in a defensive position. The centre of the Allied position was on the plain but the right flank was anchored against the town on the Tagus River.
In his eagerness, Victor ordered a night attack without consulting his new commander-in-chief on 27 July. Ruffin’s division was committed and several British units, preparing for the night, were taken unawares, sustaining severe losses and making a rapid retreat. However, the darkness also hindered the French and the entire 24th Léger went astray, taking little part in the struggle. Though some casualties were sustained, the Allies swiftly recovered from their surprise and drove back the assault. Wellesley was dismissive of the inconclusive affair. It confirmed his belief that night attacks were difficult to conduct and prone to mishap.
Victor easily overcame the inexperienced King Joseph and, despite the objections of Marshal Jourdan, decided to attack the Medellin hill sector of the British line. Jourdan pointed out that the British had reinforced that area after the failed night attack and suggested another point to no avail. A large artillery bombardment was mounted to prepare for the assault. Though most of men on the Medellin were partially protected on the reverse slopes, those on the plain had to endure heavy cannon fire:
…shots and shells were falling in every direction – but none of the enemy were to be seen – the men were all the while lying in the ranks, and except at the very spot where a shot or shell fell, there was not the least motion – I have seen men killed in the ranks by cannon shots – those immediately round the spot would remove the mutilated corpse to the rear, they would then lie down as if nothing had occurred and remain in the ranks, steady as before…55
Following a heavy cannonade, the French sent forward skirmishers to prepare a way for their attack columns, which advanced steadily through the valley as the British artillery played upon them. These huge columns, sixty men across and twenty-four deep, lost dozens of men as the British round shot ripped into their ranks, but they neared the Medellin’s ridgeline. Here the British infantry, in lines two men deep, advanced to the crest to confront them. Every man could fire his musket when in line, while the French could reply only with their first few ranks. It would be a different matter if the column reached the line, but the Allied infantry was unbroken by the cannon fire or skirmishers and the British infantry were some of the best drilled in the world. Firing volleys by company or platoon, they inflicted devastating losses on the densely packed columns, firing at a rate of three or four times a minute. After a brief firefight the columns broke and were chased down the hillside.
Marshal Victor was amazed at their repulse, having expected the bombardment and skirmishers to weaken the Allied line sufficiently for the columns to break through. It took disciplined troops to stand the intimidating sight of an approaching French column and, believing that the British were weakened, he decided to attack again in greater force. Jourdan argued that they should now distract and occupy the troops on the Medellin and in the centre, whilst mounting an assault on the left, but Victor scorned such caution. Fearing his brother’s anger if he failed to take decisive action, Joseph let the impetuous marshal have his way. However, these assaults met a similar fate and, though they suffered a fearful pounding from the artillery and the columns inflicted grievous losses, the British infantry stubbornly held their line. As the last attack was beaten off, a cavalry charge by the 23rd Dragoons and 1st KGL Hussars on the withdrawing French infantry effectively ended the battle. As the French pulled back across the Alberche River, the Allies were too exhausted to pursue them. Nevertheless, Talavera was a significant victory, with twenty French guns captured and 7,000 French casualties.
Wellesley had ridden from point to point throughout the battle, trying to supervise everything in person. Whilst this showed dedication, it also revealed a refusal to delegate responsibility. The final cavalry attack had been pressed too far, suffering losses when the French infantry assumed defensive square formations and their own cavalry counter-charged. This kind of incident renewed Wellesley’s conviction that his subordinates could only be relied upon to an extent, and he must intervene at all levels to ensure his commands were carried out. It was both a strength and a weakness. Fearing his anger, his subordinates aspired to greater efforts but resented his constant checks and lack of trust. This style of leadership also meant that he was constantly on the move, increasing the physical and emotional burdens of command. Although there were obvious limits to what he could personally oversee, his method was largely effective.
Though Talavera was an undoubted victory, the campaign had lost its impetus. The Spanish had let their Allies down over supplies, and there were large numbers of wounded to care for. The British had lost a quarter of their fighting strength and Marshal Soult was approaching from the south with a fresh army. It was time to withdraw across the border and many wounded, placed in Cuesta’s care, were left behind and captured. Wellesley ended the campaign with a poor view of the Spanish command: ‘The Spaniards make excellent soldiers. What spoils them is that they have no confidence in their officers – this would ruin any soldiers – and how should the Spaniards have confidence in such officers as theirs?’56
Talavera was celebrated in England, and on his return to Portugal Wellesley received three new titles – Baron Douro, Viscount Wellington and Wellington. Though pleased by such recognition, by September 1809 he had become convinced that a third invasion of Portugal was inevitable. During the Talavera campaign the French had been occupied on two fronts, with Napoleon concentrating his efforts on central Europe rather than the Peninsula. After the Austrian defeat at Wagram the treaty of Schönbrunn was signed in October, leaving the French free to reinforce Spain. The British Government was aware of this, the Earl of Liverpool sharing Wellington’s view that Austria’s fall heralded a major new offensive:
We know nothing as yet of the terms, but there can be very little ground to doubt of the fact, and we may presume that the conditions are as humiliating to Austria as Bonaparte could venture to make them. This event must have a powerful influence upon our situation and policy in other quarters, and especially inthe Peninsula of Spain and Portugal. The whole military efforts of France will probably in a short time be directed against Spain…57
London viewed events in the Peninsula with trepidation, and Perceval’s Government was criticised on both sides of the House over its strategy. Some of the Whigs denounced the Talavera Campaign, claiming that while a battle had been won, Wellington had failed to exploit it and had been
forced into retreat. They argued for a complete withdrawal, citing the cost of pursuing the war and the potential for a ruinous defeat. The Tories believed that Wellington was being starved of money and resources and was expected to achieve too much with such a small army. Opinions were deeply divided throughout Parliament and, although Wellington enjoyed some influential support, a serious reverse could have a catastrophic effect on British policy. Napoleon was aware of these divisions and did his best to foster them through propaganda in Le Moniteur, deriding Wellington as a ‘Sepoy General’ whose forces would crumble when the Emperor arrived to drive the British into the sea.
Contemplating these factors, Wellington decided to adopt a cautious strategy, planning a meticulous defence of Portugal. In communications with London, he reluctantly conceded that his Spanish allies were unreliable and argued that he could not protect both Lisbon and Seville with the troops at his disposal. Even if his army were raised to 40,000 men, he preferred to concentrate on the defence of Lisbon and leave the Spanish to maintain their tenuous hold in southern Spain with limited British support.58 On the map Portugal appears to be a difficult country to defend, but, as numerous wars between the Portuguese and Spanish demonstrate, this is hardly the case. The border region is mountainous and four realistic invasion routes for a large army were available to the French. Spain never fell entirely to the French and the Spanish held the territories of Galicia and Seville, effectively blocking the northern and southern routes. Therefore the central routes into Portugal were preferable, though fortresses on both sides of the border would have to be reduced.
Three rivers flow through Spain into Portugal – the Douro, Tagus and Guadiana. Looking at these rivers from the map alone they appear to offer support for an invading force, but this impression is deceptive. All three flow through deep gorges and roads are not planned in conjunction with them, making them dubious supply routes. Additionally, roads were infrequent in the region, poorly constructed and of limited assistance to large armies with transport wagons and artillery. Incredibly, no major road existed between the Spanish capital of Madrid and Lisbon, due to age-old animosity between the two countries. Following numerous wars, the Portuguese increasingly came to rely on oceanic trade and commercially the state faced outwards towards the Atlantic rather than inward toward its Spanish neighbour.59 This meant that wealth was concentrated along the coastal regions and inland the country was sparsely populated and poor.
Despite the difficulties facing the French, Wellington knew they were likely to seriously outnumber the Allies and believed they would eventually overcome his border defences and march into the interior:
There are so many entrances into Portugal, the whole country being frontier, that it would be very difficult to prevent the enemy from penetrating; and it is very probable that we should be obliged to confine ourselves to the preservation of that which is most important – the capital.60
However, the region was perfect for fighting defensive actions and the enemy could be delayed in a barren country where living off the land would prove difficult. Wellington estimated that the French would need at least 100,000 men to totally subjugate Portugal, and the fortification of Lisbon would present them with severe difficulties. Wellington’s main concern was preserving his army and if he could retain the capital he might outlast them. He had some difficulty in convincing the Government that his theories were sound. The views of his predecessor, Sir John Moore, were unhelpful since he had believed the country indefensible. Wellington tactfully pointed out that the situation that the late national hero had been familiar with had now changed drastically.61
Wellington’s plan to defend Portugal divided into three main areas. Firstly, the fortification of Lisbon and improvement of existing strongholds. Secondly, the raising, training and efficient supply of a regular Portuguese army. Thirdly, starving the enemy of supplies by devastating the land before them. As Wellington began the hard work of implementing his plans, he knew there was little time before the French would be upon him.
Chapter 3
Child of Victory
Massena’s upbringing was very different from that of his future rival. He was christened Andrea Massena at Sainte Réparte Cathedral two days after his birth in Nice on 6 May 1758.62At that time Nice lay within the Sardinian kingdom of Piedmont, a northern Italian state ruled by the House of Savoy. Therefore, in common with his future emperor, his heritage was more Italian than French. His father, Giulio-Cesare Massena, was a tradesman in Nice dealing in wine and olive oil. He died in 1764 leaving his wife Marguerite with five children and, when she swiftly remarried, Marguerite virtually abandoned her offspring. From the age of six André was brought up by a series of relatives.
He received very little formal education, but spoke Italian and French fluently and, though he disliked reading, became reasonably proficient in writing both languages. His relatives had great difficulty providing for André and his siblings and he had to start earning from an early age. His Uncle Agostino made him an apprentice in his soap-boiling business, but André disliked it so much that he ran away to sea, becoming a cabin boy on a merchant ship at the age of thirteen. Though used to hardship, life at sea proved arduous and on 18 August 1775 he enlisted in the Regiment Royal-Italien, in which his Uncle Marcel served as a warrant officer (adjutant). Though in French service, most of the soldiery were Piedmontese and the seventeen-year-old André found the military to his liking, his tough and varied upbringing having been an ideal preparation for army life. He soon gained his sergeant’s stripes and his ability at infantry drill and tactics marked him out, leading to his promotion to warrant officer. However, lacking gentle birth and the money to buy a commission, he was very unlikely to rise any further in the army and after fourteen years of service he obtained a discharge.
Only a week after leaving the army, Massena married Marie-Rosalie Lamarre, the daughter of a surgeon from Antibes. Despite her father’s profession, the family was not wealthy and André opened a grocery business on the ground floor of the Lamarres’ residence. The business was unprofitable and it was rumoured that he engaged in smuggling to supplement his income. However, little evidence exists to support these rumours and they probably arose from his investment in a ship that regularly ran cargoes through the British blockade under French licence. His shares in this venture also failed to make much profit. In 1789 the start of the French Revolution made for radical change in society and Massena, who had experienced hardship and squalor, was determined to take advantage of any opportunities it offered.
With the old order swept away, wealth and privilege were no longer required to rise within the military and Massena re-enlisted in the Garde Nationale as an instructor. This was a kind of volunteer militia and both pay and prospects were poor. In January 1791, with war looming, the revolutionary National Assembly desperately needed soldiers and called for 100,000 volunteers to defend France. Massena was able to transfer into the Volontaires du Var as a junior officer and was sent to defend the frontier. The army had become very politicised, with government commissars wielding considerable influence, but this was no obstacle to Massena, whose humble background made him an enthusiastic revolutionary. His fourteen years’ experience in the former Royal Army was a tremendous advantage and when, in true revolutionary style, the regiment elected their officers, he was made Lieutenant-Colonel on 1 February 1792. No longer obliged to rely on the charity of relatives, he had progressed rapidly in the army and with the new system there were no limits to his aspirations.
The execution of Louis XVI in January 1793 along with the brutal reign of terror against ‘enemies of the people’ meant that there was no turning back for the revolutionaries. Europe was alarmed at events in France and a period of perpetual warfare ensued, providing Massena with ample opportunity to hone his military skills. For the next six years he fought with the Army of Italy,63 becoming a Général de Brigade by August 1793. France had declared war against Austria and Sardinia in 1792 and the Italian sector was regarded
as a sideshow by the National Convention, which regarded Germany as the main theatre of the war, consequently allocating the bulk of their resources there.
Mountain warfare dominated the early years of the Italian campaigns and fighting in such difficult terrain, with ragged and poorly supplied troops, was a great test of a commander’s ability. Massena played a major role in the fighting and distinguished himself at the Battle of Loano in 1795. His task was a difficult one, beginning with an assault on prepared Austrian positions on the summits of Monte Guardolia and Monte Lingo. Careful reconnaissance revealed that the Austrian troops in these positions left their trenches at night for the shelter of nearby villages and Massena took advantage of this by ordering a night march and attack, which achieved partial surprise. Stiff resistance and terrible conditions held up the advance, but Massena took personal command when Charlet (one of his brigade commanders) was killed. He also managed to persuade mutinous troops to move, with a mixture of threats and cajoling, when the advance faltered due to the soldiers’ tiredness in the deep snow impeding their march. He managed to reach all his objectives and captured ninety-two guns, which magnified the scale of his success.
The Army of Italy had endured a succession of lacklustre commanders-in-chief and when Schérer resigned in disgust at Paris’s refusal to provide adequate provisions, Massena seemed a likely successor. However, to the surprise of many, Napoleon Buonaparte was given the command. At twenty-seven Buonaparte was ten years Massena’s junior, and though he had some experience of campaigning with the army his main achievements were a remarkable contribution to the siege of Toulon and putting down a royalist revolt in Paris. Very much a political soldier, Buonaparte had won allies in the Directory (which had recently replaced the National Convention) by his ruthless suppression of the royalists. Massena resented being passed over, but was astute enough to welcome this young commander and await events.
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