Membership of the marshalate was as much a civil honour as a military one and the Emperor intended to allow the army some political influence through its creation and increase his power base. However, the military and political capabilities of his appointees varied considerably. As a dictator, the Emperor wished to maintain strict control of his subordinates and feared to raise anyone capable of outshining him to prominence. After all, a king had recently been deposed because of the people’s dissatisfaction and it could easily happen again. The Republic had taught France that merit alone was sufficient for success, and if Bonaparte’s talent waned then so would his power if they had a viable alternative. Out of the twenty-six marshals eventually appointed only Massena, Davout and Suchet could be classed as great commanders, and Bonaparte was consequently wary of them. Likewise, he was not going to allow them to unite against him and he deliberately fostered jealousy and mistrust between them.71
1805 saw Massena return to the Army of Italy and fight once again in the north. He eventually won the three-day Battle of Caldiero of 28–31 October, but there is reason to believe that the Austrians only withdrew due to their losses in Germany, as Bonaparte simultaneously pursued his great campaign that terminated at Austerlitz. The fighting continued into 1806, Massena entering Naples in February and capturing the city of Gaeta on 18 July after a prolonged siege. In 1807, although Massena commanded a Corps of Napoleon’s Grand Army, he saw relatively little action, but the rigours of the campaign in Poland had a crippling effect on his health and he was compelled to take nearly a year off due to sickness. He was now forty-nine, beginning to feel his age and convinced that his days of active campaigning were numbered.In March 1808 the Emperor created him Duke of Rivoli in acknowledgement of his outstanding performance during that campaign, but his health was not improved by a hunting injury he sustained later that year. Attending a shooting party at Fontainebleau, Massena was struck in the face by birdshot fired by the Emperor. Reputedly a poor shot, Napoleon characteristically made Berthier take the blame for the incident, which blinded Massena in his left eye.72 Publicly he accepted this explanation, no doubt encouraged by his dislike for Berthier, but it could not have improved an already strained relationship.
Massena was now beginning to slow down, but showed some signs of his former brilliance in the Danube campaign of 1809. Though the French dominated Europe, the Austrians decided to challenge the supposedly invincible Napoleon yet again, the Archduke Charles leading an invasion of Bavaria on 6 April without a formal declaration of war. In spite of the reforms Charles had imposed on the Austrian army, the Austrians were soon in retreat, being defeated at Abensberg and Eckmühl. Massena’s Corps was heavily committed and the enemy was obliged to retire across the vast Danube River and abandon their capital. Violating one of his own principles, Napoleon then captured Vienna before inflicting a conclusive defeat upon the enemy, which made it vital to bring the Archduke to battle as swiftly as possible.
The French entered Vienna on 14 May to find that the city garrison had crossed the Danube and destroyed the bridges behind them. Undeterred, Napoleon ordered an extensive reconnaissance to find other crossing points and decided to bridge the river at the island of Lobau, a few miles south of the capital. A pontoon bridge to Lobau and a second from the island to the eastern bank were constructed but, although pains were taken to conceal their preparations, the Austrians were soon aware of the move. As the French began to cross and occupy the villages of Aspern and Essling, Austrian pioneers began to float tree trunks and stone-filled boats downriver to damage the bridges. Massena’s force garrisoned the village of Aspern but no preparations were made to fortify it. At that night’s council of war, Napoleon argued that the Austrian army would have to be sought out beyond the Marchfeld plain and the one dissenting voice was Massena’s, who alone suspected that the enemy was closer than they thought.
The following day Archduke Charles sprang his trap, mounting a huge attack on the two villages. Only 24,000 French had crossed and the Austrians strongly outnumbered them with around 83,000 men. The two sides fought over the villages throughout the day and Aspern changed hands several times, with Massena in the thick of the fighting. That night, following petty disagreements during the battle, marshals Lannes and Bessières nearly came to blows:
…old Massena, interposing between the adversaries, sought to calm them, and not succeeding, he took the high tone in his turn.’I am your senior, gentlemen; you are in my camp, and I shall not permit you to give my troops the scandalous spectacle of seeing two marshals draw on each other, and in the presence of the enemy. I summon you, therefore, in the name of the Emperor, to separate at once.’ Then adopting a gentler manner, he took Marshal Lannes by the arm, and he led him to the further end of the bivouac…73
The role of peacemaker was unusual for Massena, but the French had other foes to fight and the following day Marshal Lannes was mortally wounded, becoming the first of Napoleon’s marshals to die in action.
In an aggressive counter-attack, Massena completely ousted the Austrians from Aspern and his troops fought hard for it during the desperate fighting that ensued. However, Bonaparte had made the key mistake of relying on a single line of supply and, when a huge burning hulk crashed into the first bridge, it was severed for hours, shattering any hopes of reinforcements. Although the French had managed to reinforce their bridgehead they were still vastly outnumbered and the disaster meant that they had to adopt a defensive strategy. Great losses were inflicted on both sides, the Austrians having over 292 guns from which they amassed a huge battery to enfilade the French centre. Eventually Aspern fell and the way to the bridge was open. Potentially the French could be cut off at Essling and the rest of the army pressed against the river and annihilated. Yet Charles was cautious and unwilling to risk losses against a cornered enemy and the French were able to withdraw in the night. Massena organised the rearguard and retreat and made some show of being the last man to cross the bridge to Lobau island.
Aspern-Essling was one of the bloodiest battles of the Napoleonic wars up to 1809, each side sustaining around 20,000 casualties. It was Bonaparte’s first clear defeat and the Austrians expected him to sue for peace. However, Bonaparte was an inveterate warmonger and thirsted to avenge the stain on his military reputation. Learning from previous errors, he constructed multiple bridges to span the Danube at Lobau and crossed the Marchfeld to meet the Archduke’s army on the hills edging the plain.
The Battle of Wagram was fought on 4–5 July and was an even greater slaughter than its predecessor. Massena had suffered a severe fall from his horse shortly before the battle and was unable to ride. Unwilling to relinquish command, he had himself driven in an open-topped carriage over the field: ‘The marshal was in his carriage and the enemy, noting it with its four horses in the middle of the line, guessed that its occupant must be a person of importance, and poured a storm of shot upon it.’74
The Austrians had been surprised at the speed of the French manoeuvre, having expected a renewed attack at the former crossing point. Nevertheless, Charles did not panic but made a determined attempt to turn his enemy’s left flank on the second day, coming close to cutting the French off from Lobau. Despite his handicap, Massena performed the complicated move of disengaging from the enemy and marching to support the threatened flank. In conjunction with artillery support from the island he secured the French left. Wagram was Napoleon’s last truly decisive victory and Massena hoped this would be his last campaign. The Austrians eventually agreed a peace with the Treaty of Schönbrunn on 14 October and shortly afterwards Massena was created Prince of Essling for his efforts.75
The highlights of Massena’s military career only give a partial insight into his personality. To gain some understanding of his true character it is necessary to examine how others viewed him, particularly as he left no memoirs and was considered mysterious even by some contemporaries. Napoleon had a chequered relationship with this man who, it must be admitted, he saw as a potential rival
. In the early Italian campaigns he wrote: ‘He had a strong constitution and would ride tirelessly, night and day, over rocks and through the mountains; that was the kind of war he specialised in and understood thoroughly. He was decided, tough, fearless, full of ambition and self-esteem; his outstanding quality was doggedness, he was never discouraged.’76 Perhaps thinking this overly generous, Napoleon qualified this remark by denigrating his ability for instilling discipline and organising attacks, but admitted that his talents shone brighter than ever when under fire. Indeed the Directory removed Massena from command of the garrison of Rome in 1798 due to his inability to deal with mutinous troops. Nevertheless, his expertise in mountain warfare was unmatched in the French army and Thiebault recalled Massena’s reaction when a captive officer informed him that the mountains ahead were virtually impassable: ‘Tell General Lusignan from me that, after having shown him, the day before yesterday, how to attack a village, I shall show him, today, how to cross the mountains.’77
However, Bonaparte never gave Massena due recognition for his achievement at Zurich, probably due to jealousy and the fact that it rivalled his own achievements. His controversial abandonment of his army in Egypt also appeared in a worse light since Massena had saved the Republic in his absence, the ostensible reason for his return. A dukedom or principality for Zurich would have been appropriate for Massena, but the Emperor only awarded him titles for actions associated with his own campaigns, thereby sharing the glory. Napoleon alternated between praise and derision with bewildering frequency regarding his marshals, no doubt by design. In 1800 Massena was at the pinnacle of his career and therefore more dangerous to his master’s imperial ambitions, so it came as no surprise that he scarcely acknowledged his tenacity in Genoa and actively criticised his performance. He claimed that he should have concentrated on defending the city instead of trying to keep the road to Nice open simultaneously, could have held out for longer and should have marched to his aid at Marengo after the capitulation.78
This was grossly unfair. Genoa was incapable of supporting a larger garrison and the troops guarding communications with France were performing an important task. The garrison resisted as long as humanly possible, with considerable loss of life, and Massena won better terms from the besiegers than could have been predicted. Furthermore, the addition of a half-starved and mutinous garrison would have provided dubious assistance to Bonaparte had the tattered force been able to march to reach him. In direct contrast, Thiebault observed:
Words cannot express the electric influence and almost supernatural power which he exercised on the troops by the quickness of his decisions… and by the lightning speed with which he imposed their execution. General Massena was everywhere, and took charge personally, even in minor operations; he usually left nothing to be done by his subordinates…79
It is claimed that Massena’s hair turned grey at Genoa and, had the garrison capitulated earlier, Bonaparte might have suffered a disaster at Marengo.
Staff officers often gain valuable insight into their commanding officers, being constantly in their company and observing them under most circumstances. Clearly Massena stood very high in Thiebault’s estimation, but Marbot’s memoirs, as another aide de camp, are more ambiguous. Initially in awe of Massena as a young officer and grateful for his support in various matters, he gradually turned against him. At Wagram he assumed that his chief had overlooked the fact that Prosper Massena (also an aide) was next in line when he asked him to carry a dispatch across the battlefield: ‘But Massena soon destroyed my illusion by saying, in a wheedling tone, “You understand, my friend,why I do not send my son, although it’s his turn; I am afraid of getting him killed. You understand? You understand?” ’80 This drew an angry response from Marbot and Prosper was so ashamed that he accompanied him on the hazardous ride, both surviving to tell the tale. According to Marbot the Emperor personally admonished Massena for his breach of military protocol when he heard of it.81
Marbot had other grudges against his commander. For example, at Genoa when Massena banned funerals, their frequency having ruinous effects on morale, he personally distracted the seventeen-year-old Marbot while his father’s body was smuggled out of the back of the house for secret burial. Though he acknowledged the military necessity of this act, amongst others it led Marbot to refer to Massena as ‘…the wiliest of Italians’82 in later life.
Yet Massena often stood up for his subordinates when he saw them slighted or undervalued. In Italy when he read Bonaparte’s inaccurate dispatch allotting credit to two of his own aides, he wrote angrily to him claiming:
It was Chabran, and no one else, who marched at the head of the grenadiers, and he was there the whole time; Marmont and Leclerc only arrived at the end of the action… I also have cause to complain about your despatches on Lonato and Rovereto, in which you did not give me the credit which I deserved. This neglect is most heart-breaking and discouraging to me. 83
Perhaps the differing accounts that reached him, along with the confusion of battle, may have been to blame rather than any intent to deceive, but Napoleon never took criticism lightly. Yet Massena was no sycophant and was always prepared to contradict him even when he became Emperor. Throughout the army he had a reputation as a capable general whose tenacity and cunning had brought victory to many a desperate field. He was no diplomat, being inclined to speak his mind, which won him few friends, but his ability won him respect.
However, Massena’s reputation was founded on more than his generalship alone. His long career had made him notorious for two vices – an excessive passion for money and sex. During the Napoleonic wars the French Army gained an unenviable reputation for looting and pillaging. During the Italian campaigns, successive revolutionary governments advocated the principle that war should pay for itself and monetary ‘contributions’ were officially extorted, along with art treasures that were shipped back to Paris.84 Along with the unofficial ‘taxes’, the soldiery frequently committed excesses against property and people, leaving a lasting resentment. Napoleon’s famous address to his troops at the start of the campaign in Piedmont is often quoted as an invitation to pillage:
’Soldiers’, he said, ‘you are hungry and nearly naked. The Government owes you much; it can do nothing for you. Your patience and courage do you honour, but cannot procure you either profit or glory. I am come to lead you into the most fertile plains in the world. There you will find rich provinces and great towns. There you will find glory, honour and riches.’85
This attitude continued into the Imperial period and, with such a background, Massena’s reputation for unbridled looting is difficult to reconcile. There are a number of reasons for this. In the early Italian campaigns his chief-of-staff, Jean-Baptiste Solignac, was notorious for extortingm ‘contributions’ in occupied territory and not above using threats and blackmail. He was an inveterate gambler and, having risen from a poor background, possessed an unquenchable thirst for money. Thiebault was astonished when Solignac told his companions that his trunk contained 400,000 francs when they travelled by coach back to Paris.86 Many assumed that Massena endorsed Solignac’s actions and blame was therefore attached to him.
There is also some evidence to suggest that Massena’s enemies used allegations of corruption against him. For example, when both Berthier and Massena wished to gain command in Italy, General Kilmaine wrote to Bonaparte as part of a campaign to discredit him:
The people of Padua claim that at various times they have given Massena three millions of Venetian currency for the use of his division; the division say that only 300,000 francs have been spent on their behalf and that the remainder must have been employed in winning popularity for himself and in stirring people up against you.87
Such malicious hearsay almost certainly denied him the command, though it has to be admitted that he lacked Berthier’s skill in what had become more of an administrative post under the occupation.
Throughout his career Massena was accused of embezzlement and corruption, t
hough the allegations usually lacked any conclusive proof. Solignac was eventually cashiered for his crimes and Massena was certainly at fault for tolerating his excesses. He displayed an uncanny ability to acquire money, but he was far from being the only culprit in the marshalate. Augereau, Brune and Victor were all incorrigible looters and Napoleon considered Soult the worst offender of all, holding entire towns and provinces to ransom.88 Though his associations may have damned him, the fact that Bonaparte increasingly came to suspect him of irregularities implies that there was some substance to the allegations. He wrote several times to Massena questioning his financial practices and eventually warned his brother Joseph:
Massena is no use in a civil administration; and besides it is not easy to secure his devotion. He is a good soldier, but entirely dominated by his greed for money; it is the one thing that influences his conduct, and it is only that which has spurred him on. It began with small amounts; now millions are not enough for him.89
At one time Napoleon took the almost unparalleled step of confiscating three million francs, which Massena had deposited in a Genoese bank, and the fact that he failed to protest implies that their origins were illicit. During his time in Italy, it was even rumoured that he sold trading licences allowing wealthy merchants to contravene Napoleon’s Continental System. Though he may not have been the robber baron that many claimed, to win a reputation for corruption in a regime which had practically stripped Europe bare was a dubious distinction.
Wellington Against Massena Page 9