Massena certainly gained a reputation as a miser in the army and Marbot recorded one amusing incident to support this. The staff argued that the civilian coach drivers who had risked their lives at Wagram driving Massena over the battlefield deserved a reward. Though he eventually complied, he reacted badly when Marbot asked if this constituted an annual payment:
The eyes of a tigress who sees her young attacked by the hunter are not more terrible than were Massena’s on hearing me speak thus. He leapt from his chair, exclaiming: ‘Wretch! Do you want to ruin me? What! An annuity of 400 francs? No, no, no; 400 francs once for all!’90
However, Marbot had grown to dislike his commander and somewhat overplayed his hand, claiming that during the following arguments the marshal careered about the room in a rage, knocking furniture about and screaming abuse. Notwithstanding, Massena’s reputation for meanness appears to have had some foundation.
Massena’s second weakness is less ambiguous. Though devoted to his wife and family, he was unable to endure long periods of campaigning without female company. This was certainly not unusual in the French army and Napoleon said of his future brother-in-law: ‘What faults Murat committed in order to set up his headquarters in châteaux where there were women! He needed one every day so I have always allowed my generals to take a strumpet along with them in order to avoid this trouble.’ 91 Nevertheless, this was at the time of Marengo and, when the old revolutionaries became marshals, dukes and princes during the imperial period, many assumed airs compatible with their new status in society. With his background, Massena saw no need to change his ways and remained true to his principles, or lack of them, his appetite for women remaining as insatiable as his indiscretion. During the Piedmont campaign, Massena openly maintained a mistress in the form of Silvia Cepolini, the widow of an Austrian Consul, their liaison lasting five years. Hundreds of prostitutes followed in the wake of the army and were frequently the cause of indiscipline. Knowing this, Bonaparte prohibited high-ranking officers from keeping mistresses, believing it set a bad example, but met with limited success, especially with Massena. Massena viewed his career as a means of continuing his vices in direct contrast to Wellington’s attitude. Wellington gave up his interests in music and gambling, fearing the disapproval of others, but it is difficult to imagine Massena giving up anything in the hope of improving his image.
In 1809 Massena was over fifty and in failing health. He wished to retire to his estates and enjoy his wealth, but the Emperor still needed his services in the Peninsula. Here his abilities and experience would be pitted against Britain’s foremost general. They shared some character traits, but hailed from very different backgrounds. On one side was Wellington – meticulous in preparation, prepared to adapt to circumstances and with one eye fixed on his political future. Very much a product of the upper classes, he hoped to fend off encroaching change and protect the old order. On the other side, Massena had risen from humble origins but probably set glory and personal gain above his Republican ideals. Unlike Wellington his baggage contained no case of books detailing the country and its culture, but he was an old campaigner with a wealth of experience. Cautious, patient and always on the lookout for anything he could turn to his advantage, he hoped that Portugal would provide a great victory to end a distinguished career.
Chapter 4
The Key to Portugal
Austria had been defeated, but Napoleon knew the Continent was seething with resentment and that many states were biding their time, waiting for a chance to challenge his Empire. He hoped to end the long series of wars by allying with the Austrian royal family and, having divorced the Empress Josephine, he married Marie-Louise, daughter of Francis I, in 1810 to cement the alliance. Following so much bloodshed, it would still require skilled diplomacy to win the Austrians over, along with the more pleasurable task of providing the Empire with an heir. Therefore Napoleon felt unable to return to Iberia and complete its subjugation. He needed someone to send in his stead and in any case believed the Spanish were on the verge of defeat and would crumble if the British were forced out.
With twenty-two marshals of France on the active list, finding a replacement should have been easy, but this was not the case. Whilst some were too old, the majority had been chosen more for their political compliance than their military capability, and had little experience of commanding a force beyond the level of a single army corps. Davout would have been perfect, but he was needed in northern Europe, where Russia’s intentions were still unclear. Soult and Junot had both failed in Portugal and Ney was too impetuous for an independent command. Massena appeared to be the only real choice but, when offered command of the Army of Portugal, he protested bitterly, citing his recent injury and sicknesses. Having sneered at Massena’s achievements over the years, there was little affection between them but now Napoleon managed to win him over with charm and patriotic appeals.
Massena arrived to assume command at Valladolid on 10 May 1810. Determined not to exert himself, he had brought a large staff with fourteen aides de camp. Among these was Captain Renique, whose sister Henriette Leberton (née Renique) was Massena’s current mistress. He was surprised when Junot and a party of other generals met him on the road in their eagerness to greet the new commander. As Junot’s wife recalled, this led to some embarrassment:
Massena rode first in a small uncovered Calèche, and at his side was seated a very boyish officer of dragoons, decorated with the Cross of the Legion of Honour. As this badge of distinction was then very sparingly distributed, its appearance on the breast of so very young an officer attracted general remark.92
Observing their approach he tried to draw up the carriage’s hood, but was not quick enough as the generals rode up. Junot was puzzled that both men appeared ill at ease during the ensuing pleasantries but then: ‘…could scarcely refrain from laughing outright, for at that moment someone whispered in his ear that the Marshal’s military companion was a young lady!’93 Knowing that Junot had brought his wife with him, Massena was reluctant to share the Palacio Real at Valladolid with them, but eventually consented. Madam Junot came to know Massena fairly well during his stay but the arrival of his travelling companion was something of a social slight. She recorded: ‘As to the lady, she immediately retired to her own apartment, and during the three months which the Prince d’Essling passed at Valladolid, I never caught a glimpse of her but once. She had strict orders to keep herself concealed.’94 The arrival of a mistress was not a major scandal, though her uniform and medal were highly irregular, but to commit a social faux pas as soon as he arrived did not portray the new commander-in-chief in a good light.
When Massena addressed his new command they were dismayed by his first speech to them that betrayed his discontent:
Gentlemen, I am here contrary to my own wish; I begin to feel myself too old and too weary to go on active service. The Emperor says that I must, and replied to the reasons for declining this post which I gave him, by saying that my reputation would suffice to end the war. It was very flattering no doubt, but no man has two lives to live on this earth – the soldier least of all.95
Although obviously resentful of being forced into the role, and perhaps doubtful over what could be achieved in Iberia, it was extremely unwise of Massena to share his doubts so openly. This was hardly an inspiring beginning for what promised to be a difficult campaign. His two foremost commanders both believed they should have been appointed in his stead and it was folly to provide them with such information. He gave a poor first impression at this meeting, as General Maximilien Foy, who had served under him in Switzerland, recalled:
He is no longer the Massena of the flashing eyes, the mobile face, and the alert figure whom I knew in 1799… He is only fifty-two but looks more like sixty; he has got thin, he is beginning to stoop; his look, since the accident when he lost his eye by the Emperor’s hand, has lost its vivacity. The tone of his voice alone remains unchanged.96
Though he had a force of at least 50,000 men, the ar
my required some attention with sickness and low morale. Massena once again offended Ney by interfering with his staff and his inspections and changes caused some consternation. However, though this was his role and he made some progress regarding the troops, Ney resented it. The way the Emperor handled his marshals was the root cause of such problems. He had deliberately left his authority ill defined, fearing to create a potential rival. The trouble was that few of the generals viewed Massena as a true commander-in-chief and regarded the Emperor as their only real superior. This was particularly true of Ney, who never really obeyed anyone’s orders except Bonaparte’s. Furthermore, Major General Fririon, Massena’s chief-of-staff, was highly competent, but Massena largely ignored his advice in favour of Major Pelet. As a member of the engineer-topographer’s corps, Pelet was highly skilled though lacked experience in staff work. He would prove a great help to him, but the corps commanders, feeling that Massena disregarded their views, resented his influence.
Though he had made a poor start with his subordinates, the Army of Portugal was a cohesive force and much could be achieved if the campaign was approached with vigour and forethought. Napoleon’s general instructions to Massena were as follows:
The Prince of Essling will have 40,000 infantry and 9,000 to 156 cavalry… which will give him an army of 50,000 men, with which he will besiege first Ciudad Rodrigo and then Almeida, and will then prepare to march methodically into Portugal, which I do not wish to invade until September, after the hot weather and in particular after the harvest.97
The Army of Portugal comprised II Corps under General Jean Reynier, VI Corps under Marshal Ney and VIII Corps under General Junot. Ney approached Massena with a plan to mask the two fortresses and seek battle with the British, but Massena rejected his suggestions in favour of the Emperor’s instructions. After experiencing both sides of siege warfare at Genoa and Gaeta, he was well versed in this kind of conflict and felt confident of reducing the town. Indeed, he immediately set about the investment of Ciudad Rodrigo, allowing Ney and VI Corps to continue with operations there. Ney would repay his confidence with obstinacy and disrespect.
The importance of fortresses had lessened during the Napoleonic wars, with far greater emphasis placed on seeking and destroying the main enemy army in a decisive battle. However, their relevance was increased in the Peninsula with the pressing need to dominate wide swathes of the country to gain supplies and guard communication routes. Both Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida were modelled along eighteenth-century lines and fell into the generic term ‘star fortresses’. This design followed the principles set out by the famous military engineer Sebastien Vauban (1653–1707), who matched modern developments in artillery by creating low set forts capable of matching a besieger’s firepower.
In brief, a star fortress comprised a low curtain wall with artillery bastions established at various points and preceded by a deep stone-lined ditch. Placed at intervals within the ditch lay ravelins, triangular-shaped artillery platforms, usually backed by a wall known as a tenaille providing further protection for the inner defences. Before the ditch lay a long slope known as a glacis, the purpose of which was to deflect enemy cannon shot over the walls. The angular design of the structure allowed the converging fire of artillery batteries to be concentrated against a force attempting to storm the structure. In order to break these defences the besiegers would have to dig trenches very close to the fortification, placing batteries within range, and batter a breach in the walls to allow an assault. This was difficult, time consuming and placed the besiegers in great danger both from the fort’s guns and the possibility of sallies by the garrison to interfere with their operations. Huge amounts of powder and shot were required to effect this, along with heavy calibre artillery, digging equipment and copious amounts of manpower. Such fortresses could be reduced with persistence but they were costly and time consuming to overcome.
The fortress and town of Ciudad Rodrigo were built on an eminence adjacent to the Agueda River. The town was dominated by two hills – the great and little Teso of San Francisco. Suburbs had been built fairly close to the walls of the fortress and the French considered its defences relatively weak. The garrison comprised around 6,000 men and though many were militia they were bolstered by the presence of regular Spanish troops and irregulars under the famed guerrilla chief Don Julian. The town was well armed with at least a hundred cannon of various calibres, eighteen howitzers and large quantities of muskets and ammunition.
Addressing the town junta in January, the sixty-nine-year-old Governor, Andrés Perez de Herrasti, proclaimed: ‘The Supreme Junta, the Council of War and I have decided to defend this place to the death… The strength of the fortress and the thickness of its walls are all prepared for the defence. Providence and fortune will serve us.’98 The garrison and the townsfolk were confident of withstanding a siege, at least until the Allied army came to their assistance. In constant communication with Wellington, Herrasti believed that the British would eventually march to his support rather than let the fortress fall.
On 31 May, French reconnaissance determined that the most vulnerable sector of the defences was a stretch of the north-western wall near the cathedral, which looked down over much of the town. The French soon surrounded Ciudad Rodrigo, taking the two Teso hills and fighting off sorties from the garrison. Herrasti was determined to resist and tried to interfere with every stage of their operations but gradually the ring around the town drew in tighter and by June siege trenches were being sapped towards the walls. On the first night of these operations, Ney set troops lying down in formation to cover his sappers as they dug the first parallel trench. These were to stand and fight off any sally made by the garrison when they realised what was going on. Meanwhile, distraction attacks were made on the outlying suburbs and the trench was two and a half feet deep before the defenders realised what the French were attempting and turned their cannon against them. By 20 June trenches were gradually snaking towards the intended point of attack and artillery was being established in the works.
However, Massena was encountering serious logistical problems at his base in Salamanca. General Michaux, the army Quartermaster-General, experienced great difficulties finding sufficient wagons and caissons to transport the vast amounts of siege equipment and food that VI Corps required. In addition, the roads from Salamanca to Ciudad Rodrigo were extremely poor and required improvement to bear heavy artillery. Michaux complained to Massena when food magazines were raided by troops from VIII Corps and both Junot and Ney exacerbated the problem by issuing extra rations to their troops while loudly bemoaning the scarcity of provisions. Foragers had to search for supplies over a much larger area because there was little to steal or confiscate after years of fighting in the area. General Joseph Daultane was so worried at the lack of supplies and the methods used to acquire them that he wrote to Massena: ‘Confidentially, if Michaux continues to operate the same system he did in Aragon… the province of Avila will soon be abandoned by its people and become a nest of insurrection.’99
The British were keeping an eye on French progress and frequently sent patrols to interfere with their operations, but Wellington was unwilling to make any serious relief attempt. He had over 20,000 men in the border region but nearly half of these were Portuguese and Spanish troops who were relatively untested in battle. By 9 June Massena had allowed Junot to bring up VIII Corps to support and cover Ney’s siege operation and, though Massena deliberately dispersed them over a wide area, Wellington wisely refused to be tempted out, knowing Massena hoped to lure him into an uneven battle. Ney still entertained hopes of going in search of the Allied army and destroying it. He wrote to Junot on 6 June, questioning his commander’s inaction and proposing that they unite their two corps and march on Portugal, claiming the Emperor would back his decision. The plan had some merit in theory, since a serious blow to the Allied army might see the British withdraw entirely from the Peninsula and end the campaign. However, the troops were too poorly supplied to embark on s
uch a bold venture this early, and Junot wisely ignored the suggestion.
Massena was beset by acts of disobedience from high-ranking officers. Some were even insubordinate enough to post orders signing themselves as ‘General in Chief,’ an implied challenge to his authority. Ney was far from the only officer to write to the Emperor with details of Massena’s orders and hint at ways of improving the situation. Consequently, Napoleon wrote to Massena with unhelpful suggestions. The English were the only force to be feared, he argued, and, even with rumours of the Allies fielding nearly 49,000 men, he refused to permit Massena a force of more than 70,000. He dismissed Portuguese soldiers and irregulars as militarily ineffective and refused to include them in his assessment of Allied strength. At first he wavered between ordering an advance into Portugal and continuing the siege, but eventually decided to stick to the methodical approach and delay the invasion until September.
The roads had now dried out sufficiently to allow heavy cannon to be transported to Ciudad Rodrigo and a bombardment would soon be possible. By 24 June Massena decided to assume command of the operation, feeling confident that the siege would soon be over. He wrote to Berthier: ‘We could hope to be masters of this place soon if it were abandoned to its own forces; but the movements made by the English army appears to announce its intentions to defend or delay its reduction.’100 Following weeks of intermittent firing, a serious bombardment was opened on Ciudad Rodrigo at 3am on 25 June. The fire of forty-six guns was trained upon the north-western wall, whilst howitzers lobbed shells into the town and its suburbs, setting large areas alight. The Spanish gunners mounted effective counter-fire and several guns on both sides were dismounted, but on the first day alone around 150 townspeople were killed with 500 wounded. Massena personally inspected some of the damage the next day and ordered heavier guns of sixteen and twenty-four calibres brought up to gain superior firepower and increase the damage inflicted. The glacis was highly effective in deflecting shot over the defences, but the fact that the French had possession of the two hills overlooking the town went some way to negating this. Serious damage was being inflicted and Herrasti was offered terms on 28 June, but rejected them on the grounds that his walls remained unbreached.
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