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Wellington Against Massena

Page 11

by David Buttery


  By 29 June a serious breach was beginning to appear near the cathedral but the Spanish kept repairing the damage, despite the heavy fire raining down upon them. Major Couche, Ney’s principal engineer officer, advised him that heavy calibre shot was running low and smaller artillery pieces must be used until a fissure large enough to be exploited was made. Ney approved his plan and sent a report to Massena before consulting him. Massena, furious at being passed over, ordered that Colonel Valazé be appointed to take charge of the engineers. Angry at this interference, Ney sent a strongly worded and insubordinate letter, refusing to comply. Once again the two marshals clashed over a relatively trivial matter, which ended with Massena inviting the insolent Ney’s resignation unless he obeyed orders. Reluctantly, Ney backed down.101

  Massena’s disapproval of Couche’s proposals was largely founded on the fact that it would take longer to breach the defences. He was dismayed when, after making a careful appraisal, Valazé submitted a report stating that it would take at least eight days to batter a wide enough breach and crown the counterscarp, permitting the assaulting infantry easier access. It was all taking too long, and Massena had placed too much faith in tales told by Spanish deserters of low morale within the town. He had hoped that Herrasti would submit after the sufferings of the town and the beginnings of a breach developed. His letters to Berthier revealed his increasing frustration and a desire to make an example to discourage such resistance when he went on to besiege Almeida: ‘I will make another summons and if they refuse a capitulation, I will take it by force and put the garrison to the sword without sparing the inhabitants who are the most stubborn.’102

  Massena also suffered a lucky escape around this time. Marbot was bringing the marshal important news and had fallen from his horse into the Agueda when it slipped crossing the ford. Already feeling ill, the cold water accelerated his fever and Marbot was ailing when he delivered the dispatch. Massena, in the company of General Fririon, then returned to observing the fortress. To Marbot’s horror, a howitzer shell exploded right next to them. Both were covered in earth and badly bruised. Massena’s remaining eye was also so filled with sand that he was practically blinded. Luckily Marbot managed to get him out of range: ‘…as he was small and thin, I managed, ill though I was, to take him on my shoulders and carry him out of reach of the enemy’s shot.’103 The marshal’s injuries proved slight, but the garrison had come very close to killing two high-ranking officers purely by chance.

  Massena believed that a handful of fanatics, largely amongst the priesthood, were compelling the garrison to hold out against their own wishes. By the rules of war a garrison risked their right to quarter if they resisted an assault after rejecting terms. It was rare that an attacking force would massacre everyone inside a besieged city, but not unheard of, and many soldiers viewed the orgy of looting, drunkenness and rape that followed a storming as their just reward. In addition, enraged after enduring the concentrated fire poured into the confined breach, their officers would be powerless to restrain them.

  Many of the buildings within Ciudad Rodrigo had been reduced to piles of rubble and ash and Herrasti knew that the town could not resist much longer. It was still possible to send word to Wellington with increasingly desperate pleas for aid. Initially Wellington had been sceptical over how long the town could withstand, but their tenacity had impressed him. However, he would not hazard his army to gain what could only be a temporary respite for the town, the chances of defeating the French on the plain while outnumbered two to one being poor. Wellington tried to compromise by sending stronger probes against them to harass their operations. Several clashes occurred, notably at Gallegos and Villar de Puerco, but these had little real effect on French operations.

  The siege was now progressing more swiftly. Valazé’s engineers successfully undermined the counterscarp and placed barrels containing 800lb of gunpowder beneath it. The resulting explosion brought a large section of earth and rubble into the ditch for the storming party to cross and blasted a twenty-five foot gap in the wall. Forty Spanish workmen were killed whilst trying to repair previous damage. Sustained cannon fire was concentrated on the breach and it was soon considered practicable for an assault. On 9 July men were massed in the trenches preparing to storm the breach. For days the soldiers had talked of little other than exacting their revenge on the stubborn defenders who had caused them so much hardship, fatigue and privation. As Pelet recalled, even Ney thought sacking the town might prove beneficial: ‘The Marshal said he had learned to know the Spaniards and the war could be ended only with the most terrible examples. I replied by indicating that Europe and France would react with abhorrence to such brutality.’104

  However, when an advanced party of volunteers ascended the breach they met with no resistance and, as more troops clambered up, a white flag was raised. Herrasti had finally accepted the inevitable after a seventy-two day defence and surrendered rather than see the town sacked. Though he had threatened dire consequences during weeks of uncertainty, Massena permitted the garrison the honours of war and congratulated the Governor on his gallant resistance. At least 1,800 people had died within the town, most of them civilians, and Herrasti believed he had been betrayed: ‘The valour, the fortitude, and the sacrifices of the garrison and the inhabitants deserved a better fate. They have had the misfortune of not being supported by the armies of our allies.’105 Indeed, Wellington received criticism from many quarters for not doing more to relieve Ciudad Rodrigo, not least from the officers in his own command. How much could have been achieved by risking the Allied army is questionable, and a reverse would have been catastrophic, but the Spanish were slow to forgive his inaction. Yet he violated no promises and preserved his army while the garrison had won valuable time for the Allies.

  Though the town was not sacked, many soldiers indulged in looting the evening after its fall and were even joined by Spanish prisoners. Pelet recalled how difficult it was to restore order:

  When I entered the city, I realised there was no way of imposing restraint except by sabre thrusts. A few other officers and I struck right and left at the pillagers, no matter who they were – my eyes were impervious to distinctions of rank, and if I recognised anybody I only hit harder.106

  Massena did his best to stop the looting and the situation was only serious for one night. After the tension building up to the assault, it was not surprising that the troops needed to vent their frustrations and the townspeople later credited Massena with having spared them from the full horrors that could have resulted. Even so, the town was ruined:

  I went into the fortress to take a look. It was dreadful. We entered by the breach. Everything adjoining it had been crushed, pounded and destroyed. The ruins and devastation extended to the middle of the city. At every step one could see collapsed or burned houses.107

  Massena ordered the silver from the churches to be confiscated, but very little of any worth was found within the town. He also ordered a levy of 500,000 francs imposed on the town to pay for its repair. Disappointingly the garrison’s food stocks were low and would not go far to support the advance into Portugal. However, a substantial amount of munitions had been captured and a symbolically important fortress had fallen. Strategically, its possession was more useful for an army invading or defending Spain, but the way to Portugal was now open.

  While the French garrisoned Ciudad Rodrigo and brought up supplies, both sides expected a rapid advance into Portugal. Wellington had placed the Light Division under General Robert Craufurd between the Côa and Turones rivers to monitor the frontier, prevent French incursions and to maintain communications with the fortress of Almeida for as long as possible. Craufurd was a lowland Scot with a fiery temper and a deserved reputation as a martinet. Unpopular with many of his officers for his fanatical imposition of discipline, he was nonetheless respected for his competence and determination. The Light Division had carried out the bulk of outpost duties during the recent siege and were now based in the region of Almeida.
r />   After the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo, the French had increased the strength and frequency of their patrols and the British gradually fell back across the frontier. Though the Light Division had performed an invaluable service, its position was now untenable and Wellington decided to withdraw them to the western side of the Côa. In preparation, Craufurd slighted Fort Concepcion near Almeida to deny its use to the enemy, but was uncertain over the timing of his withdrawal. Wellington had forbidden him to fight a serious engagement, but nevertheless it would be folly to leave Almeida to be besieged until the enemy made their appearance in great strength. He finally received clear orders from Wellington:

  I order two battalions to support your flanks; but I am not desirous of engaging in an affair beyond the Coa. Under the circumstances, if you are not covered where you are, would it not be better that you should come to this side with your infantry at least?108

  However, although this letter was dated 22 July, it is uncertain whether Craufurd received it before the following night and in the meantime the French had been making plans of their own. French reconnaissance had revealed the position of the Light Division and, knowing of the defile that lay in their rear, Ney hoped that he could trap the force against the river and annihilate it.

  According to the invasion plan, it was important to take Almeida before September and Ney was ordered to mount a reconnaissance with a view to securing the area around the town. The Light Division occupied rising ground on the edge of the plain south of Almeida, their left flank nearly reaching the town where the 95th and the 43rd Regiments were positioned and their right anchored on the Côa itself where the 52nd were placed. The Portuguese 1st and 3rd Caçadores lay in the centre with cavalry and artillery in support. The ground was broken, covered in many places with stone walls, and sloped sharply down towards the river. The river was in spate and contained in a deep gorge, a single stone bridge being the only easy means of crossing.

  It had rained heavily in the night and the early dawn found the men mustering in the expectation of pulling back across the river when firing broke out on the advanced picket line. The cavalry vedettes briefly exchanged pistol and carbine fire with the French, but soon fell back, with fifteen squadrons of French cavalry approaching rapidly. These were elements of the 15th Chassseurs and the 3rd Hussars. Large numbers of infantry were observed crossing the plain towards them and Craufurd could have chosen to retire across the Côa with little risk at this point. Uncertain of the French strength, Craufurd now made the fateful decision to stand and fight. Ney was advancing with 24,000 men against only 4,000–5,000 Allied troops.

  It took an hour for the French to deploy, during which time they sent swarms of voltigeurs against the Allied light infantry skirmish line, which was hard pressed. As their infantry marched forward in column, the Allies met them with well-disciplined volley fire, but the sheer weight of French numbers soon began to tell, along with the French superiority in artillery. As the fighting raged, the French 3rd Hussars made a determined attempt to turn the British left, charging within range of the guns of Almeida, who fired upon them. A Company of the 95th was caught in the open, many being cut down or captured:

  … a cry of ‘The French cavalry are upon us/ came too late as they charged in amongst us. Taken thus unprepared… our men were trampled down and sabred, on every side. A French dragoon had seized me by the collar, while several others, as they passed, cut at me with their swords. The man who had collared me had his sabre’s point at my breast, when a volley was fired from our rear… which tumbled the horse of my captor. He fell heavily with the animal on his leg, dragging me down with him.109

  The dark uniforms of the 95th led the gunners in the town to mistake them for Frenchmen as they fired into the confused mêlée. The charge was highly successful and only the stone walls impeding their path prevented the horsemen from riding up the line and threatening its entirety. It was now plain how badly outnumbered the Allies were. When William Napier approached his commander he appeared:

  … overwhelmed with anguish at his own rashness in fighting on that side of the river. I have always thought he was going to ride in amongst the enemy, who were close to us, but that, finding me with a considerable body of men in hand whom he had given up for lost, he changed his design; at all events he was confused and agitated, and very wild in his appearance and manner.110

  This was of course pure speculation on Napier’s part, but the situation was desperate and Craufurd was yet to live down his surrender at Buenos Aires in 1807. Doubtless he feared that a repetition would destroy his reputation, but he kept his head and tried to retrieve the situation. He ordered his cavalry and artillery across the bridge while the infantry fell back in echelon in a fighting withdrawal. The road the horsemen used ran parallel with the river before executing a sharp turn back towards the bridge, providing the necessary gradient for wagons to climb the steep hillside. This meant their route was longer than the infantry’s and the 1st Caçadores made the bridge before them, choking the bridge with their numbers. An artillery caisson also overturned in the road and chaos ensued as men struggled to cross.

  The broken ground and walls slowed the French advance, but also hampered the retreat, and companies from different regiments became mixed in the confused running fight. At one stage a large body of the 43rd was trapped in a high stone-walled enclosure and forced to push down the rear wall to escape. Every few yards British units would turn to defend a wall or rocky outcrop as they fell back, desperately trying to stem the French advance. On the western bank, Craufurd positioned his guns to cover the withdrawal and set riflemen of the 3rd Caçadores on the hillside above the bridge. He instructed Ensign Brunton of the 43rd to stand there:

  On being forced back in some disorder on the narrow and rocky road leading down to the bridge, General Craufurd came up to me, and the other Ensign and desired us to cross the bridge, take up a conspicuous position on the opposite side as near the bridge as possible, and display the colours for the Regiment to rally on. This was done and we remained standing under a tremendous fire of musketry from the opposite side which was ferocious and well within range until the Regiment had passed the bridge and rallied.111

  A rocky knoll overlooked the bridge on the French side and here elements of the 95th and 43rd made a stand until ordered across. As the French took possession of this feature, five companies of the 52nd were observed running frantically along the riverbank towards the bridge. These men had fought on the right flank and were now cut off.

  The French maintained a heavy fire from the knoll but it had to be retaken if the stranded men on the east bank were to be saved. Colonel Beckwith of the Rifles and Major MacLeod of the 43rd made a hurried attack back across the bridge with elements from both regiments. Though the French took a heavy toll as they rushed over the bridge, they recaptured the knoll in a bayonet charge, redcoats fighting side by side with the green jackets:

  No one present can fail to remember the gallantry of Major MacLeod. How either he or his horse escaped being blown to atoms… I am at a loss to imagine. It was one of those extraordinary escapes which tend to implant in the mind some faith in the doctrine of fatality.112

  Though hard pressed, they held the position until the stranded companies could dash across. Supported by fire from the far bank, the attackers now sprinted back across the bridge, though many were shot down as they did so.

  As the battle dwindled to desultory firing over the Côa, Ney rode up and decided to press the enemy’s retreat. So far the Allies had sustained greater losses, but Ney believed that he could turn their withdrawal into a rout if he could carry the bridge. He instructed the 66th regiment to attack and they charged across under heavy fire from the light infantrymen ranged on the hillside above it. The bridge is a three-spanned structure and, crossing the river diagonally, denied the attackers a straight path across, slowing their charge. Totally dominated by the heights, a tremendous volume of rifle fire and musketry rained down upon the leading Grenadier Company, fel
ling dozens of men. Though some made it across to take cover on the western bank, they were effectively pinned down and could make little headway against the men above them on the hillside.

  Unwilling to sacrifice his chance to inflict a crippling blow on the enemy, Ney then ordered the Chasseurs de la Siège across, a new unit of picked men who had distinguished themselves at Ciudad Rodrigo. This assault met the same fate, reportedly suffering 237 casualties in only ten minutes and choking the bridge with bodies. Undeterred, Ney ordered a third attack, but having seen the fate of their predecessors, the men faltered and withdrew when the 66th’s colonel was killed. Seeing that further slaughter was futile, the French agreed to a truce to collect the wounded and those who had made it across the Côa slipped back across the bridge in the night.

  The French had achieved their objective and settled down to besiege Almeida, but what later became known as ‘The Combat on the Côa’ proved to be one of the most controversial actions of the war. Wellington was justly outraged by Craufurd’s decision, writing to his brother: ‘…I had expressed my wish that he should withdraw his infantry to the left of the river; and I repeated my injunction that he should not engage in an affair on the right of the river.’113 However, though he had fought an unnecessary action, Wellington knew Craufurd’s worth, continuing:

 

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