Wellington Against Massena

by David Buttery

  The second line blocked the four main routes into Lisbon via the valleys of Mafra, Montachique, Bucellas and Alhandra. A total of 447 guns were provided by the Lisbon garrison and considerable exertions were necessary to drag them up the hillsides:

  It was gratifying to observe… by what persevering and patient labour the peasantry, with their rude means of transport… succeeded in transporting 12-pounders into situations where wheels had never before rolled, and along the steep sides of mountains where horses would have been useless.175

  Enormous effort was required to manhandle the guns into the redoubts, but the Portuguese proved equal to the task. Even the supply of food stocks and water proved difficult. The broken countryside was hard to travel over at the best of times, and the labourers, working in the heat, required large amounts of water that was heavy and awkward to carry in barrels.

  The final line was based on the fort of St. Julien along the coast west of Lisbon. In addition to the fort itself, eleven redoubts mounting eighty-three guns protected the embarkation area for the British Army. Though confident of his preparations, Wellington was well aware that things could go wrong and, in the anticipation of a possible reverse, he made careful plans to evacuate his forces. As the Earl of Liverpool had written to him in November 1809:

  In the mean time you are aware that it must be our policy to remain in Portugal as long as we can remain there without risking our army. But we must secure the return of the army if a serious attack is made by the French upon the country. The delicate question will be as to the time of the embarkation…176

  Wellington had no wish to desert his Allies, but he knew that Britain would never forgive the loss of their small, professional army and hoped to avoid a repetition of the undignified scramble to the beaches that occurred during the retreat to Corunna. Considerable time and effort had been expended on finding a suitable evacuation point. Fletcher had surveyed several sites, including the small rocky outcrop of Peniche. This sea fortress situated on a narrow isthmus was perfect for defence and was considered a second Gibraltar. Unfortunately it lay forty miles north of Lisbon and outside the lines, so the beach behind Fort St. Julien was eventually chosen. On completion of the outer works, Fletcher wrote to Wellington, claiming:

  As long as this work could be held, its fire, aided by that of the fort would render it impracticable for an enemy to attack the troops assembled for embarkation, though they might suffer from the effects of a distant cannonade. The principal objection to this ground seems to be the confined space on which the army must remain while waiting to embark…177

  The site was not perfect but it would serve. Though the locals considered the surf to be particularly rough at this point, Fletcher constructed three jetties to aid a potential naval operation. To the locals’ surprise, they withstood the elements for many years. Hopefully, they would never have to be used.

  The River Tagus proved a very wide barrier for the French to cross, but Wellington feared an amphibious attack, which could potentially outflank the lines. To counter this possibility he insisted on regular patrols by naval gunboats along the riverbanks and concentrated numerous vessels moored at various strategic points along the Tagus to oppose any river-borne raid. Should Marshal Soult overcome the fortress towns of Badajoz and Elvas to march upon Lisbon, a small chain of redoubts had been constructed on the far side of the Tagus immediately south of the city. However, British naval domination, along with the width of the Tagus, made this a doubtful French strategy. A long-range bombardment of Lisbon’s docks could be mounted from the south, but it seemed that Soult’s forces remained fairly inactive and Massena would have to cross the Tagus in force to try such a move.

  In addition to huge logistical challenges, Wellington encountered considerable political opposition to his plans. The wealthy Sousa family and their political faction, which dominated the Portuguese Government, resented having policies dictated to them and had not forgiven British refusals to even attempt to confine hostilities to the border region. In truth, the conflict would have wrought far less damage to the wealth and people of Portugal if such a course had been attempted and it took some effort to persuade them that Wellington’s strategy was sound. Charles Stuart was foremost in representing British interests in Lisbon and considerable political tension arose when, as a foreigner, he was made a minister in the Government.

  Luckily, Stuart was a diplomat of considerable skill, but he encountered serious problems, especially from José Antonio de Menezes e Sousa, who was very influential in the anti-French party within the Government. He was not alone in believing that the British withdrawal strategy had proved demoralising to the people and he lamented the huge cost and practicality of the fortifications. Though most of the redoubts were earthworks, they were eventually reinforced with stone to strengthen and preserve them against the elements. The eventual cost of the Lines of Torres Vedras was in the region of £200,000, a massive sum for the time. Though the British contributed to this, enormous manpower was used in their construction that was needed elsewhere. The age-old enmity between Portugal and Spain was also a factor, with the Government demanding the return of Olivenza, seized by the Spanish in 1801, a dispute that threatened the tenuous alliance. Luckily, memories of Junot’s dictatorship and the fact that the Portuguese were relying on the British for national survival aided Stuart’s cause.178 Nevertheless, both he and Wellington were constantly badgered with enquiries and demands, adding to their already heavy workload.

  Few efforts had been made to conceal the building of the lines, though Wellington had requested that no reports be made in the Portuguese newspapers. The sheer scale of the operation would have made his intentions obvious to anyone in the region of Lisbon, and the fact that their presence came as such a surprise to the French is an indication of their overconfidence and inefficiency. Furthermore, the depopulation of the lands the French were marching into made intelligence extremely hard to gather and francophobia in the capital rendered espionage difficult to conduct effectively. On the march back from Busaço, some Allied officers were surprised at the extent of the construction work, and many had been unaware of the project. Far from being built under a cloak of secrecy, they had been constructed in a low-key manner, which had done more to deceive observers than any cunning subterfuge.

  In little over a year, Wellington had built a series of formidable barriers to protect Lisbon. However, many officers doubted their strength in the light of supposedly weak garrisons and previous French military achievements. Outwardly Wellington was very confident and had planned his defence in depth. Behind the lines he maintained his field army, initially in the region of Mafra, intending to utilise it as a mobile strike force that would march to counter any French breakthrough. However, he hoped an aggressive defence would prove unnecessary. He did not believe that Massena would risk heavy losses trying to overcome the lines and, writing to his brother William, he claimed: ‘Massena is an old fox, and is as cautious as I am; he risks nothing… Although I may not win a battle immediately, I shall not lose one.’179 His main weapon would be starvation and, should the French try to besiege the lines all he would have to do was wait.

  Regardless of how effective the lines would prove, the cost of their construction and Wellington’s three-tier strategy had been ruinous for the Portuguese people. Large tracts of land had been damaged or deliberately destroyed in the process of creating them. Farming was disrupted, with many vineyards, olive groves and forests destroyed. Though the Government promised compensation, relatively few received it and many farmers had their livelihoods ruined. The devastation of the land meant that this disruption spread far beyond the Lisbon region and the vast influx of refugees to the capital presented a huge problem. Even under normal conditions Lisbon had become a poor city and many British accounts testify to its squalid conditions. One officer recorded how it exacerbated the problems for the sick as far back as 1808:

  …the pestilential vapours of Lisbon, where the atmosphere is impregnated with t
he exhalations from the filth and putrid carcasses of dead animals which are thrown promiscuously in to the streets during the night, which when evaporated by the. heat of the sun renders people in full health subject to serious indispositions; what effect must these have on the delicate lungs of a consumptive patient.180

  Over the following two years Lisbon had become progressively more crowded, with the influx of British troops into the country and men such as Private Wheeler and Ensign Grattan recorded their shock at the state of the capital. In addition, the city was now filled with thousands of people who had fled before the French, due to the policy of depopulating the land before the enemy. The British Navy did their best to bring supplies into the city, but the bulk of these went to the army and the militia. Unsurprisingly, with such a large concentration of people in poor accommodation, sickness and disease spread like wildfire. Thousands succumbed to sickness and starvation with an estimated 40,000–50,000 people perishing during the period that Massena sat outside the lines. This constituted around two percent of the population.181 Building the lines had been an unparalleled military achievement by the standards of the day, but the human cost of their construction had been terrible.

  Wellington disliked the capital intensely and spent as little time there as possible. He maintained a house in the village of Pero Negro, from which he rode daily to inspect the lines and monitor enemy movements. He was well aware of what the people were suffering but did his best to maintain a façade of cold detachment, considering displays of emotion to be a sign of weakness. He cared about the dreadful plight of the Portuguese, but felt obliged to consider the larger picture. If the French overcame his efforts their suffering could be magnified considerably, with a vengeful army rampaging into Lisbon. He was unconcerned about his personal popularity and tried to present an impassive face publicly, concentrating on what he considered best for the nation. A firm opponent of republicanism, he believed that a French victory would spell disaster for Portugal and for Europe. In order to defeat French imperialism Portugal would have to endure.

  Whilst Wellington toured the lines on a daily basis, malicious rumours abounded amongst the French that Massena was diverted by the charms of his mistress at his headquarters in Alemquer. However, he was acutely aware that morale in the Army of Portugal had plummeted upon reaching this forbidding chain of fortifications. With the benefit of hindsight, many believed that he should have tried to turn the British position at Busaço rather than suffer great losses in an ill-advised frontal attack. Some kind of demonstration was required to restore morale and improve the army’s confidence in its leader. On 12 October Junot’s corps began an operation to probe the Allied defences at the village of Sobral.

  The French had determined that Sobral was a weak point in the lines, but it was in fact a false position established with the intent of inviting such an attack. The village itself was held by regular troops and barely fortified with minor barricades. Behind the village lay what the French believed were fairly weak, minor redoubts. However, beyond the reach of French reconnaissance lay a large fortress on Mount Agraço, strongly garrisoned by the Sobral Ordenanza, who were well aware of what the French were likely to do to their village. Initially the attack went well, with the British and King’s German Legion troops yielding the village after a short exchange of musketry. However, as the French began to assault the hills behind Sobral they encountered strong resistance supported by fire from the redoubts.

  Wellington had rapidly been informed of the move and ordered up the divisions of Cole, Picton, Spencer and Campbell once it became clear that the French intended to fight more than a skirmish. The next day almost 30,000 troops were concentrated behind this area of the lines. Junot continued to reinforce the attack and made some troop movements southwards, but soon realised that the defences had been strengthened in that direction. Advancing within sight of Mount Agraço, the French perceived the strength of the position and began to pull back. A private in the 71st recalled the intensity of the fighting. On the second day, after withdrawing from the village, the French rushed his battalion, which was stationed behind a mud wall:

  With dreadful shouts, they leaped over that wall… We were scarce able to withstand their fury. To retreat was impossible; all behind being ploughed land, rendered deep by the rain… It was a trial of strength in single combat; every man had his opponent, many had two. I got one up to the wall… I would have spared him, but he would not spare himself. He cursed and defied me, nor ceased to attack my life, until he fell, pierced by my bayonet. 182

  The 71st eventually got the better of their attackers in the brutal, close-quarter fight and pursued them over the wall for about a mile. The French retired to Sobral and halted the attack. Neither side suffered major casualties, and the affair was essentially a stalemate, but the French had confirmed the strength of the Allied defence. Massena had ridden up to view the lines for himself in the closing stages of the action and received the battle reports with dismay. The French had penetrated the line deeply enough to determine that a second line of defences lay beyond the first and the probe revealed that Wellington’s army could respond quickly and efficiently to such moves.

  Massena was at a loss and a subsequent council of war with his generals revealed deep divisions amongst them. Marshal Ney considered the lines too strong to attack without substantial reinforcements and Reynier was inclined to agree with him. The fact that even the impetuous Ney blanched at the sight of the constructions testifies to their incredible strength. However, Junot and Montbrun urged an all out assault, while the army’s morale was still high. Marbot identified with their arguments: ‘The English entrenchments formed an immense arc round Lisbon, at least twenty French leagues in length. Every officer of the least experience knows well that a position of this extent cannot present the same difficulties everywhere and must have its weak spots.’183

  Marbot had reconnoitred along the lines in person and thought that many reports were exaggerated, believing that some observers imagined seeing a redoubt every time the earth had been disturbed along the line. Though it was true that diversionary attacks at various points, in conjunction with a strong assault, could have carried the forward line, the manoeuvre would certainly have been costly in terms of men, especially if opposed by the Allied field army if it arrived in time to counter the threat. Furthermore, an additional line of defences of indeterminate strength lay behind the first. Massena had underestimated Wellington before and was not about to do it again. This time there was no possibility of outflanking the long chain of forts, and he felt the need for caution after the losses suffered at Busaço.

  After a fortnight of relative inactivity, Massena sent General Foy on a mission to the Emperor to request reinforcements and better assistance from Marshal Soult’s forces in the south. He would have sent Saint-Croix on this urgent mission, but the famed cavalryman had been killed scouting the lines near Alhandra when his party had been fired upon by gunboats on the Tagus. Accompanied by a huge escort of 500 men, to ensure he got through, Foy reached Ciudad Rodrigo by 8 November and entered Paris on the 21st, where Napoleon questioned him for many hours. Prior to Foy’s arrival, the Emperor had realised that Massena must be experiencing difficulties and had already ordered General d’Erlon to march with the 9th Corps to relieve Almeida.184 He was angered by Foy’s tales of the campaign, believing Massena had been reckless at Busaço and negligent in allowing the enemy to recapture Coimbra. However, beyond sending reinforcements, Napoleon had little practical advice to offer and clearly thought that Massena should be capable of overcoming the works protecting Lisbon.

  Meanwhile, weather conditions were helping Massena come to a decision. His army was almost entirely under canvas before the lines and winter was setting in. The troops in the lines and the Allied Army fared little better, most having only tents or makeshift huts to protect them from the elements. As Ensign Grattan recorded: ‘Although our situation was in every respect, better than that of the enemy, we were far from comforta
ble. Our huts, from want of any good materials to construct them, were but a weak defence against the heavy rains which fell at this time.’185 As an officer, Grattan probably enjoyed better accommodation than most of the soldiers, meaning conditions would have been very hard within the lines.

  As far as Massena was concerned his army was suffering for no good reason. It seemed vain to hope that Wellington would march out of the lines to attack him and blockading these hills served little purpose as the enemy was supplied by sea. Though the scorched earth policy had not been as rigidly enforced as Wellington had hoped, supplies were scarce and sickness was spreading through the army in the squalid conditions they were living under. Rather than besieging Lisbon, it seemed that the French were likely to starve long before the Allied forces, safe behind their fortifications. On 14 November Massena moved his army to see out the winter in Santarem on the Tagus, about fifty-five miles north of Lisbon.