Wellington Against Massena

by David Buttery

  We aided the Portuguese government by our influence to purchase corn from the Barbary States and at Malta. But in point of fact the inhabitants of Lisbon were never in want, excepting what was occasioned by the speculations of those who monopolised the sale of grain.213

  Regardless of how much expense Wellington had accrued, the occupants of Lisbon had suffered severe deprivation, with thousands dying from lack of food alone. With the loss of around two percent of their population during the third invasion, arguments over how much had been spent on the minimal provisions provided for Portuguese refugees were tasteless in the extreme. However, the money spent on the Lines of Torres Vedras had been justified. More than anything else they had stopped the French invasion in its tracks and prevented the sack of Lisbon and the loss of Britain’s Continental base. If the lines had not been constructed and Lisbon had fallen, it is likely that the same critics would have damned Wellington for not taking such precautions. Wellington’s ruthless defensive strategy had proved effective despite the cost in revenue and the despoilment of the countryside.

  The failure of the third invasion of Portugal had grave implications for French efforts in the Peninsula. Massena had achieved next to nothing strategically and had lost between 20,000 and 25,000 men, along with vast amounts of equipment and supplies. It was not entirely his fault. Hampered from the outset by Napoleon’s refusal to clearly establish his position as commander-in-chief, he had been beset on all sides by insubordination and outright refusals to obey his orders that would have crippled a lesser general. Though he managed largely to overcome these problems, he should not have been obliged to fight his own officers in addition to the enemy, a disadvantage caused by the Emperor’s paranoia as much as his own actions.

  A key error, mainly brought about by Napoleon’s own orders, had been to spend so much time and effort taking the frontier fortresses. With the benefit of hindsight, Ney’s advice to mask the strongholds and to march directly against Lisbon would have shortened the campaign and reduced the time Wellington had to prepare his famous defences. Enduring the long period before the lines (October 1810 to March 1811) had been a considerable achievement and even Massena’s enemies acknowledged that only a man so well acquainted with the horrors of siege warfare could have tarried so long in the wilderness without his forces crumbling and dispersing through want of food and shelter.

  Busaço had been a clear defeat, but Massena learned from his mistakes and, following this setback, he made relatively few serious errors of judgement. He manoeuvred his force skilfully and could not be blamed for Wellington’s refusal to march out from his lines to meet him on equal terms. In Wellington’s place he would have done exactly the same, as witnessed by his defensive strategy at Zurich. In terms of numbers the Army of Portugal was inadequate to force the Lines of Torres Vedras, but Massena had tried his best to circumvent them and Napoleon’s failure to reinforce him sufficiently or compel Soult’s support doomed them to failure. He subsequently attempted the next best strategy with his attempt on Oporto, which largely failed through his subordinates’ unwillingness to comply.

  Massena’s one major error had been to pause and investigate the unrealistic possibility of following the southern bank of the Tagus to Lisbon, a reckless move that undoubtedly cost lives. Nevertheless, once he had discovered its impracticality he managed to extricate his army from a very difficult situation and bring it back to Spain. The mauling that II Corps suffered at Sabugal can be placed squarely on Reynier’s shoulders and, largely due to Ney’s accomplished handling of the rearguard, it was remarkable that the army did not suffer greater losses during a hazardous retreat. Few commanders would have fared so well in an undeveloped country with poor roads, constantly harried by guerrilla raids and obliged to forage for supplies in a virtual wasteland. With all the problems Massena encountered during the campaign it is a tribute to his abilities that he saved so many of his men. Thiebault summarised his difficulties succinctly:

  …he was constantly disserved: first by the Emperor, who only gave him half the troops he required for success, and, to assist him, men who knew nothing of subordination… secondly, by those who had to guide him, and who, led by the Marquis of Alorna, led him all astray at Busaco… lastly by his generals, above all by Reynier, one of the most able men whom we had left, but who at Sabugal took no notice of his warning…214

  On the other side Wellington, already an experienced commander, emerged as a truly great general during this campaign. His handling of the army at Busaço was masterful and, despite being outflanked, his withdrawal to Lisbon was executed with great skill. Often accused of excessive caution, it should be remembered that his main concern was to preserve his small army and limit casualties – always the primary motivation of a decent general. The swift construction of an almost insurmountable barrier greatly assisted him in this. It has to be borne in mind that many generals would have balked at the scale of the task and not even considered such an operation. If he had merely tried to defend the city of Lisbon itself, the outcome of the campaign would have been less certain.

  In contrast to Massena, Wellington’s army had few generals experienced in the command of large numbers of troops, like Ney and Junot, and many were learning their trade at this level of operations. Indeed he was forced, often by political obligation, to endure lacklustre generals such as Erskine and Slade, whose efforts often hampered his operations whilst pursuing the French. In addition to Slade’s poor leadership of the cavalry arm, Horse Guards had not permitted him sufficient cavalry, a deficiency keenly felt during the retreat. Furthermore, Wellington suffered political interference and meddling, which, while not as grave a handicap as Massena’s problems, added to the burdens of his command. In the final analysis, the French had been rudely ejected from Portugal when authorities on all sides had predicted another victory for Napoleon’s armies.

  Chapter 9

  A Last Chance

  The only French presence remaining in Portugal was General Brenier’s garrison in Almeida. The 6th Division and Pack’s Portuguese Brigade were blockading the town but, until heavy guns were brought up from Lisbon, an effective siege was out of the question. The Army of Portugal, in a very bedraggled state, was now based around Salamanca and Wellington believed that it would be some time before the French would seriously contemplate offensive operations. After the fall of Badajoz, the situation in the south seemed to require his urgent attention and, leaving Sir Brent Spencer in command, he rode along the frontier to Elvas to assess the situation. Despite Beresford’s capability, he felt obliged to see for himself.

  Though he had ordered the Light Division to resume their role as border guardians to monitor French movements and harass the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, Erskine’s suitability for this task was doubtful and he was no match for his predecessor. Though an experienced cavalry commander, he had gained a reputation for recklessness and was beginning to show signs of mental health problems that were slowly becoming apparent to his comrades. Shortly before his departure, Wellington had pulled the Light Division further back, and in his absence the situation deteriorated, with the garrison conducting aggressive probes and actions. Harry Smith summarised the state of affairs on the frontier: ‘The Duke had gone into the Alemtejo, and Sir Brent Spencer commanded – a regular old woman, who allowed the French to commit all sorts of extravagances under our noses, when a rapid move on their rear from Espeja would have punished them.’215

  In contrast, the garrison of Almeida appeared securely hemmed in. This was unsurprising, since Brenier had less than 1,500 men ranged against the 13,000 camped outside his walls. Following the disaster that had befallen the town in 1810, his time was largely consumed by the need to continue repairs and guard against an assault, even though the Allies lacked artillery. Indeed, the besiegers constantly interfered with his defence: ‘The garrison had no means of providing for their cattle, but by turning them out to graze upon the glacis; and we sent a few of our rifles to practice against them, which very soo
n reduced them to salt provisions.’216 Wellington believed that Almeida was poorly provisioned and that a blockade alone might force their capitulation. He was mistaken in this as the garrison possessed adequate food stocks, but their position was a precarious one nonetheless.

  Meanwhile Massena was encountering great difficulties in Salamanca. The reverses his forces had suffered in Portugal infuriated the Emperor and he gave Pelet a stormy reception when he arrived in Paris. Napoleon kept repeating that a mere 30,000 men under Wellington had repelled the Army of Portugal, comprised of over 60,000. Pelet replied that Massena had never possessed that many troops, citing only 40,000 at best (a gross underestimate) and reminding him that the British were supported by at least 15,000 Portuguese regulars, not to mention the Ordenanza and other irregulars. Yet Napoleon refused to countenance this and during a long interview confronted him with the information brought by Foy from Santarém. He spoke derisively of Massena’s performance during the campaign, remarking: ‘What would have become of you if, on the day following the battle of Busaço when you were making your movement right, Wellington had fallen upon you with a victorious army?’217 Pelet loyally defended his commander, but it seemed clear that Napoleon was firmly set against him. Furthermore, though he listened politely to Pelet’s account of Ney’s actions, he never issued more than a slight reprimand to the marshal and soon gave him another appointment.

  General Thiebault, one of Massena’s former aides, was military governor of Salamanca and the arrival of the Army of Portugal presented him with many difficulties. The ragged force required accommodation, food and clothing in enormous amounts and Massena expected Thiebault and Marshal Bessiéres, Duke of Istria, to provide it. Napoleon, sick of the rivalry and inefficiency of his governors, had created the Army of the North under Bessiéres in January 1811 to unite the northern provinces. This was an enormous task for 70,000 men, including elements of the Imperial Young Guard, demanding the suppression of revolts in mountainous territory ideally suited to guerrilla activity, guarding the coastline against raids from the British Navy and containing upwards of 16,000 regular Spanish troops in the north-west. Now he was expected to assist Massena’s forces, its commander insisting:

  The Army of Portugal is not a territorial army. Its business is to face the English army, and fight it wherever met with. It has retreated to Salamanca in order to save Rodrigo, and if possible Almeida, and to cover the Army of Northern Spain itself; and therefore it ought to be fed by the Army of the North, since Spanish Estremadura is part of that army’s territory.218

  Massena had a right to demand this, but French resources were already stretched without the presence of over 40,000 half-starved soldiers to add to their problems. Yet Thiebault venerated his former commander and was overjoyed to see him, providing a warm welcome in Salamanca. However, the presence of his mistress distressed him:

  I had heard of this folly and regretted it, since it had the worst possible effect in the army; besides, the marshal was really old enough to dispense with this kind of camp furniture. My interest in him and his reputation made this person’s presence painful to me, and it was awkwardly enough that I allowed myself to be presented to the fair dame, who was in truth nothing much to look at.219

  Nevertheless, Thiebault endeavoured to be a good host and entertained the couple at a formal dinner. Yet, having tactfully accepted the presence of Massena’s concubine, he was appalled when, without warning, his guest’s sordid reputation for embezzlement suddenly arose, with Massena requesting:

  ’My dear general, here is a statement of 80,000 francs arrears of pay due to me. Kindly have them paid to me out of the fund that you have just received. On this occasion I reckon upon your old friendship.’ The perspiration stood on my forehead. ‘Prince,’ I replied, ‘this fund is destined for a special purpose; it belongs to the subsistence of your army.’220

  Despite Thiebault’s protests the marshal was implacable and browbeat him into a promise to yield the funds at the first opportunity. The Governor was mortified and distressed that a man he respected would make such a demand, writing: ‘…never did my conscience exact a more painful sacrifice.’221 Massena may have been owed the money, but with the sufferings of his army this appeared unpatriotic and selfish to say the least and, considering the reverence his former aide clearly held him in, the tale is almost certainly true. Yet the Emperor was clearly displeased with him and he probably suspected his replacement was imminent unless he rapidly restored the military situation. He probably doubted that Napoleon would honour the debt if he were removed from command due to the uncertain relationship between them. However, in the light of Napoleon’s usual generosity towards his marshals, this seems unfair.

  Letters from Berthier, conveying the Emperors’s wishes, were constantly arriving in Salamanca berating Massena and demanding action. The Emperor wanted the army to relieve Almeida and to slight the fortress, rendering it useless. This would remove a formidable obstacle for another invasion, but what Napoleon really wanted was the defeat of the Allied field army, and he hoped such an attempt would draw it out. The letters were full of criticism, claiming, amongst other things, that Massena should have occupied Coimbra before withdrawing from Santarem. However, Berthier also wrote:

  The Emperor hopes that you will soon find an opportunity to take a striking revenge. The Emperor has not forgotten your fifteen years of success and he has complete confidence in you… We appreciate all the difficulties of your position, and hope that you will find the Duke of Ragusa easier to handle than Marshal Ney.222

  Marmont, Duke of Ragusa, was travelling to take command of VI Corps, and this letter implied that Massena had a last chance to restore himself to favour. Just as there was no excuse for failure in military thinking; a major battlefield success would pardon all former sins. Fortunately, many conscripts and invalids were present in Valladolid and Salamanca to bolster his force and he had been able to replace most of the 6,500 horses he had lost in Portugal. Massena also asked Bessières to provide 8,000 infantry and replacement artillery.

  However, Marbot, still recuperating from his wounds, recorded that when the reinforcements were observed approaching on 2 May, the troops mistook them for an advance guard. Only 1,500 cavalry, six guns and thirty gun teams accompanied Marshal Bessières, who received a frosty reception from Massena. Seeing his fellow marshal’s dismay, Bessières protested that recent revolts made it impossible to reduce his army any further, but this failed to placate him. Massena was so angry that, careless of who overheard him, he told his staff: ‘He would have done much better to have sent me a few more thousand men with ammunition and provisions, and to have remained at the centre of his province than to come examining and criticising what I am to do.’223 He believed Bessières had come in person in order to undermine his authority and he had no need of another commander to confuse the army hierarchy even further.

  Thiebault was equally scathing and believed that Bessières’ failure to bring adequate reinforcements endangered the enterprise, the marshal having initially promised to provide at least 10,000 men. The Army of the North had its own battles to fight, but a conversation with the marshal implied that Massena’s suspicions were well founded:

  ’…I am come, like a French cavalier at the head of a handful of heroes.’ At these words I looked at him; it did not need his accent to remind me of his origin, and I feared to detect some second thought concealed behind his chivalrous gasconade. Next moment he betrayed it by saying that to collect the infantry division of which Massena had spoken would have taken too much time.224

  Nevertheless, Massena had between 47,000 and 48,000 infantry, thirty-eight guns and around 4,500 cavalry. He was going to honour his obligation to Almeida’s stranded garrison, but his true intent was to force the Allied army back over the Côa and inflict a decisive defeat upon it if possible. In a rousing address to his troops on 2 May he appealed to them:

  ’…the enemies of Napoleon the Great have the audacity to blockade a fortress which
they durst not previously attempt to defend. Soldiers, if your valour then intimidated their columns, will not your valour now punish them for their temerity; will you not bring to their recollection that you are still the same brave fellows… who drove them to their trenches at Lisbon?’225

  In the south, Wellington had examined Elvas’s fortifications and conferred at length with Beresford. The southern fortresses were far greater in size and armament than their northern counterparts and the task of regaining Badajoz seemed daunting when he reconnoitred the place on 22 April. However, his reconnaissance revealed how edgy the garrison was, when the garrison sent out three battalions to cover the withdrawal of a 200-man working party after spotting Wellington and his small escort.226 Wellington intended Beresford to move against Badajoz shortly and entertained hopes of retaking the city. Useful as this visit had been, Wellington was alarmed to hear news of ominous movements around Ciudad Rodrigo and cut short his stay. Many in the Anglo-Portuguese Army were pleased when Wellington rejoined them after a long and hurried ride:

  As a general action seemed now to be inevitable, we anxiously longed for the return of Lord Wellington… as we would rather see his long nose in the fight than a reinforcement of ten thousand men any day… I’ll venture to say that there was not a heart in that army that did not beat more lightly, when we heard the joyful news of his arrival…227