Wellington Against Massena

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Wellington Against Massena Page 28

by David Buttery


  118. Craufurd, op.cit. p39. Craufurd’s entire letter appeared in The Times, 21 November 1810.

  119. Fortescue, J.W., Volume VII, p484.

  120. Howard, Pelet, op.cit. pp90-91.

  CHAPTER 5 - THE THIRD INVASION

  121. Howard, Donald D., Napoleon and Iberia, London, Greenhill Books, 1994, p253. Though British troops were occasionally used to force the peasantry from their lands, the bulk of such work was allotted to Portuguese troops and militia. Wellington knew full well that the Portuguese acceptance of their allies could swiftly evaporate if his troops became associated with such actions.

  122. Ibid. p291.

  123. Ibid. p253.

  124. Ibid. p258.

  125.126. Marshal-Cornwall, James, Marshal Massena, London, Oxford University Press, 1965, p193.

  126. Howard, Donald D. (Ed.), The French Campaign in Portugal 1810-1811 – An Account by Jean Jacques Pelet, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1973, pp110-111.

  127. Ibid. p121.

  128. Ibid. pp121-122.

  129. Ibid. pp122-123.

  130. Ibid. p306.

  131. Butler, Arthur John, The Memoirs of Baron de Marbot, London, Cassell & Company Ltd, 1929, p252.

  132. Fortescue Volume VII, p498.

  133. Wellington’s Dispatches, Volume VI, p588. Wellington believed that it might have been possible to extricate them without committing his army to a major engagement, though it would have been difficult to achieve.

  134. NAM 7403-155 Colonel John Elley, Assistant Adjutant General of Cavalry in Spain, – personal letters and reports.

  135. Butler, Marbot, op.cit. p253.

  136. Howard, Pelet, op.cit. p136.

  137. Ibid. p135.

  138. Warre, Lieutenant-General Sir William, Letters from the Peninsula 1808-1812,London, John Murray, 1909, p145.

  139. Fortescue, Volume VII, p504. Trant had enough men to overcome the escort, but their determined approach and disciplined fire unnerved the militiamen and they withdrew after destroying some artillery caissons and capturing prisoners. The rescue of the convoy was a lucky escape for the French and further proof of the ill-advised choice of their route.

  140. Brindle, Rosemary (Ed.), With Napoleon’s Guns, London, Greenhill Books, 2005, p95.

  141. Butler, Marbot, op.cit. p254.

  CHAPTER 6 - BUSAÇO RIDGE

  142. Oman, Charles, A History of the Peninsular War, Volume III, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1908, pp341-342. The majority of the Ordenanza dressed in civilian garb though some occasionally possessed militia uniforms.

  143. Fortescue, J.W., A History of the British Army, Volume VII, London, Macmillan & Co. Ltd, 1912, p506.

  144. Schaumann, A.L.F., (Ed. & trans. by Ludovici, Anthony), On the Road with Wellington, London, William Heinemann Ltd, 1924, p249.

  145. Fortescue, Volume VII, p511.

  146. Butler, Arthur John, The Memoirs of Baron De Marbot, London, Cassell & Company Ltd, 1929, p256.

  147. Oman, Volume III, op.cit. p368. As a former member of the Army of Italy, Massena clearly still remembered the rivalry between the two armies.

  148. Butler, Marbot, op.cit. p258. This tale of Marbot’s should not be accepted with-out caution. Though no source directly questions his involvement, he seems to have possessed an uncanny knack for being in the right place and the right time on numerous occasions. Notwithstanding, it is a believable theory over why Massena was contented with such a poor reconnaissance.

  149. Howard, Donald D. (Ed.), The French Campaign in Portugal 1810-1811 – An Account by Jean Jacques Pelet, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1973, p175. Considering the rugged nature of the countryside it is likely that Ney’s cavalry simply missed the road in question and since few locals had stayed in the vicinity to be questioned by the French this is understandable. However, Massena’s supposed failure to order further checks to be sure of the ground does appear to be out of character with his reputation for amassing careful intelligence.

  150. Howard, Donald D., The Battle of Bussaco, Florida, USA: The Florida State University, 1965, p81.

  151. Brindle, Rosemary (Ed.), With Napoleon’s Guns, London, Greenhill Books, 2005, p99.

  152. Grattan, William, Adventures with the Connaught Rangers 1809-1814, Edinburgh, R&R Clark Ltd, 1902, p33.

  153. Ibid. p37.

  154. Girod de l’ Ain, Maurice, Grands Artilleurs: Drouot – Senarmont – Eblć, Paris, Berger-Laurault, 1895, p104.

  155. Oman, Volume III, p380.

  156. Ibid. p385.

  157. Grattan, op.cit. p41.

  158. Schaumann, A.L.F., (Ed. & trans. by Ludovici, Anthony), On the Road withWellington, London, William Heinemann Ltd, 1924, p250. In contrast the Spanish and Portuguese did not share this professional attitude, with even their regular armies succumbing to a hatred of the French invaders. The French knew that those of their wounded left lying on the field were likely to be murdered by the peasantry to settle old scores.

  159. Butler, Marbot, op.cit. p261.

  160. Ibid. p262.

  161. D’Urban, Sir Benjamin, Major General, (edited by Rousseau, I.J.), The Peninsular Journal, London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1930, p150.

  162. Ibid. p150.

  163. Grattan, op.cit. pp43-44.

  164. Schaumann, op.cit. p254.

  CHAPTER 7 - QUE DIABLE!

  165. Howard, Donald D. (Ed.), The French Campaign in Portugal 1810-1811 – AnAccount by Jean Jacques Pelet, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1973, p205.

  166. Marshal-Cornwall, James, Marshal Massena, London, Oxford University Press, 1965, p210.

  167. Butler, Arthur John, The Memoirs of Baron De Marbot, London, Cassell & Company Ltd, 1929, p264.

  168. Marshal-Cornwall, op.cit. p218. The area north of Lisbon contains numerous large hills and ridges but Massena’s reference to them as ‘mountains’ is an exaggeration, although perhaps pardonable under the circumstances.

  169. Jones, John T., Colonel RE, Memoranda Relative to the Lines Thrown up toCover Lisbon in 1810, East Sussex, The Naval & Military Press Ltd, 2004, p85.

  170. Ibid. pp87-88.

  171. Ibid. p82.

  172. A flèche is an arrow-shaped earthwork open to the rear whereas redoubts are usually enclosed. Abbatis were obstacles formed by felled trees, often cut to present a hedge of sharpened branches and stakes to slow the progress of infantry.

  173. Ibid. p103.

  174. Oman, Charles, A History of the Peninsular War, Volume III, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1908, pp177-178.

  175. Jones, John T., op.cit. p100. The peasantry often had to provide their own farm carts to pull guns or transport food supplies into the lines. Even with the military road guns often had to be manhandled into redoubts by men alone due to their inaccessible locations.

  176. Wellington’s Supplementary Dispatches, Volume VI, p421.

  177. Ibid. p404.

  178. Oman, Volume III, op.cit. pp195-196.

  179. Wellington’s Supplementary Dispatches, Volume VII pp1-2.

  180. NAM 7511-31 Anonymous, Captain in the British Army – memoirs 24 August–16 September 1808.

  181. Fletcher, Ian, The Lines of Torres Vedras, Oxford, Osprey Publishing, 2003, pp25-26.

  182. NAM 1964-04-76 Anonymous, Journal of a Soldier of the 71st Regiment

  183. Butler, Marbot, op.cit. p265.

  184. Marshal-Cornwall, op.cit. pp220-221.

  185. Grattan, William, Adventures with the Connaught Rangers 1809-1814,Edinburgh, R&R Clark Ltd, 1902, p48.

  186.D’Urban, Sir Benjamin, Major-General, (Ed. Rousseau, I.J.), The Peninsular Journal, London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1930, p163.

  CHAPTER 8 - THE RETREAT

  187. Butler, Arthur John, The Memoirs of Baron De Marbot, London, Cassell & Company Ltd, 1929, p271. Marbot claims that this colourful character was later identified as a former smuggler hailing from around Dover who regularly spied for the British using disguise to aid his espionage.

  188. Ibid. p
272. In fairness to Soult, this was not just due to his dislike of Massena and a possible wish to see him fail. He could ill afford to spare 10,000 men and any such march would be opposed by the Portuguese fortress of Elvas, which would have to be taken or masked. They would be marching into unknown territory with two enemy held fortresses at their backs.

  189. The Times, Tuesday 12 February 1811, p3.

  190. Butler, Marbot, op.cit. p268.

  191. Wellington’s Supplementary Dispatches, Volume VII, p1. Indeed Wellington admitted that he would have encountered difficulty in feeding a division in such land under similar circumstances let alone an army.

  192. Fortescue, J.W., A History of the British Army, in 13 volumes, London, Macmillan & Co. Ltd, 1917, p72.

  193. Liddell Hart, B.H. (Ed.), The Letters of Private Wheeler 1809–1828,Gloucestershire, The Windrush Press, 1999, p51.

  194. Grattan, William, Adventures with the Connaught Rangers 1809–1814,Edinburgh, R&R Clark Ltd, 1902, p56.

  195. Liddell Hart, Wheeler, op.cit. pp51–52.

  196. Fortescue, op.cit. p74.

  197. Butler, Marbot, op.cit. p274.

  198. Ibid. p275.

  199. NAM 1964-04-76 Anonymous, Journal of a Soldier of the 71st Regiment.

  200. Butler, Marbot, op.cit. p276.

  201. Summerville, Christopher (Ed.), The Exploits of Baron De Marbot, New York, Caroll & Graf Publishers, 2000, p189.

  202. Grattan, op.cit. p57–58.

  203. Howard, Donald D. (Ed.), The French Campaign in Portugal 1810–1811 – AnAccount by Jean Jacques Pelet, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1973, p492.

  204. Ibid. p495.

  205. Fortescue, op.cit. p96. This report was actually untrue with both towns possessing far greater resources. D’Erlon was presumably trying to discourage Massena’s ambitions and save the army from further hardship. Napoleon had in fact made an order placing D’Erlon under Massena’s direct command two weeks earlier though this information did not reach the army until it had withdrawn into Spain.

  206. Grattan, op.cit. p61.

  207. General Soult was the younger brother of Marshal Soult.

  208. Grattan, op.cit. p62.

  209.Butler, Marbot, op.cit. p279.

  210. The Times, Thursday 2 May 1811, p3. Whilst established with the best of intent, these charities could not hope to deal with the scale of the destruction left in the wake of the three invasions. Portugal never truly recovered from the ravaging of her lands.

  211. Wellington’s Supplementary Dispatches, Volume VII, p102.

  212. The Times, Tuesday 5 March 1811, p3.

  213. Wellington’s Supplementary Dispatches, Volume VII, p95.

  214. Butler, Arthur John (Ed. & trans.), The Memoirs of Baron Thiebault, Volume II, London, Smith, Elder & Co., 1896, p330.

  CHAPTER 9 - A LAST CHANCE

  215. Moore-Smith, G.C. (Ed.), The Autobiography of Sir Harry Smith 1787–1819,London, John Murray, 1910, p47. Smith also questioned the abilities of Erskine commanding the Light Division, labelling him ‘…a short sighted old ass…’ p45.

  216. Kincaid, J. Captain, Adventures in the Rifle Brigade, London, Peter Davies Limited, 1929, p53.

  217. Girod de l’Ain, Maurice, Grand Artilleurs: Drouot – Sćnarmont – Eblć, Paris, Berger-Laurault, 1895, pp121–122.

  218. Butler, Arthur John (Ed. & trans.), The Memoirs of Baron Thiebault, Volume II,London, Smith, Elder & Co., 1896, p320.

  219. Ibid. p321. Shortly afterwards, exhausted by the rigours of campaigning, Henriette Leberton returned to France.

  220. Ibid. p322.

  221. Ibid. p322.

  222. Koch, Gćnćral, Mćmoires de Massena, Volume VII, Paris, Paulin et Lechevalier, 1848–1850, pp490–491.

  223. Butler, Arthur John (Ed.), The Memoirs of Baron De Marbot – Late Lieutenant-General in the French Army, London, Cassell & Company Ltd, 1929, p282.

  224. Butler, Thiebault, Volume II, op.cit. p323.

  225. The Times, Monday 27 May 1811, p3.

  226. D’Urban, Sir Benjamin, Major-General, (Ed. Rousseau, I.J.), The Peninsular Journal, London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1930, p204.

  227. Kincaid, op.cit. pp53–54.

  228. Wellington’s Dispatches, Volume VII, p515.

  229. The Times, Wednesday 29 May 1811, p2. Dated 7 May and written in his camp before Fuentes, Massena’s letter to Napoleon was published in the French newspapers on 22 May and subsequently translated and printed by The Times.

  230. The Times, Wednesday 29 May 1811, p2.

  231. Ibid. p2.

  232. Jones, B.T. (Ed.), Napoleon’s Army – The Military Memoirs of Charles Parquin, London, Greenhill Books, 1989, p134.

  233. Ibid. p134. Ney’s enormous popularity amongst the army made Parquin’s attitude commonplace and reveals why Massena tolerated his subordinate’s intransigence for as long as he did.

  234. NAM 6807-461 Lieutenant Colonel Richard Brunton’s (13th Light Dragoons) papers.

  235. Fortescue, J.W., A History of the British Army, Volume VIII 1811–1812,London, Macmillan & Co. Limited, 1917, pp158–159.

  236. NAM 1964-04-76 Anonymous, Journal of a Soldier of the 71st Regiment.

  237. Moore-Smith, op.cit. p49.

  238. NAM 1964-04-76 op.cit.

  239. Ibid.

  240. The Times, Wednesday 29 May 1811, p2.

  241. Ibid. p2.

  242. Grattan, William, Adventures with the Connaught Rangers 1809–1814,Edinburgh, R&R Clark Ltd, 1902, p64.

  243. Brett-James, Antony (Ed.), Edward Costello – The Peninsula and WaterlooCampaigns, London, Longmans, Green & Co. Ltd, 1967, p66. The Portuguese troops were referring to Craufurd’s concern with supplies and, even though he punished looting severely, he was prepared to allow the occasional slaughter of livestock if the men were in severe want as long as some kind of restitution was made. In comparison, most officers in the Division were relieved to see the back of Erskine even though they had mixed views about Craufurd.

  244. Wellington’s Dispatches, Volume VII, p529.

  245. Glover, Michael, Wellington as Military Commander, London, Penguin Books, 2001, p147.

  CHAPTER 10 - THE MOST DANGEROUS HOUR OF THE WAR

  246. Jones, B.T. (Ed.), Napoleon’s Army – The Military Memoirs of Charles Parquin, London, Greenhill Books, 1989, p133. A colpack was a bearskin hat sometimes known as a ‘busby’ and some regiments had an ornamental pouch or bag that hung from it, usually red in colour.

  247. NAM 1986-11-33 The Account of Major Thomas, William, Brotherton, 14th Light Dragoons.

  248. Ibid.

  249. Ibid.

  250. Liddell Hart, B.H. (Ed.), The Letters of Private Wheeler 1809–1828, Gloucestershire, The Windrush Press, 1999, p54.

  251. Ibid. p55. The ‘Chasseurs Brittaniques’ were a regiment largely composed of French exiles and deserters whose reputation was patchy and, for obvious reasons, were rarely trusted with outpost work. The battle of Fuentes de Oñoro was one of the few occasions where they distinguished themselves. The smoothbore musket was a weapon of dubious accuracy and firing over friendly troops was extremely risky even at close range. The fact that the Allies resorted to this tactic reveals how hard pressed they were at this point.

  252. Brett-James, Antony (Ed.), Edward Costello – The Peninsula and Waterloo Campaigns, London, Longmans, Green & Co. Ltd, 1967, p67.

  253.Jones, Parquin, op.cit. pp134–135. In the following charge, Parquin revealed how many in his regiment were unhorsed and how General Fournier had his horse shot from under him in the repeated attempts to halt the Allied withdrawal.

  254. Liddell Hart, Wheeler, op.cit. p56.

  255. Fortescue, J.W., A History of the British Army, Volume VIII, London, Macmillan & Co. Ltd, 1899–1930, p162. With the horrific prospect of battle, alcohol was sometimes issued to bolster courage, though not in amounts great enough to impair a soldier’s abilities. However, it is quite possible that some soldiers may have obtained more than their official a
llowance.

  256. Liddell Hart, Wheeler, op.cit. p55.

  257. NAM 1986-11-33, op.cit.

  258. Brett-James, Antony (Ed.), Edward Costello – The Peninsula and Waterloo Campaigns, op.cit. pp67-68.

  259. Liddell Hart, Wheeler, op.cit. p56.

  260. Napier, Major-General Sir W.F.P., History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France, from the year 1807 to the year 1814, Volume III, London, Frederick Warne & Co., 1851, p152.

  261. Mockler-Ferryman, A.F., The Life of a Regimental Officer During the Great War 1793–1815, London, William Blackwood, 1913, pp166–167. Burning the colours was seen as a great shame to the 51st and Mainwaring received a severe reprimand from Wellington. The fact that he resorted to this measure reveals how close he thought his Regiment, and perhaps the Division, were to breaking. Shortly afterwards Mainwaring was wounded at Badajoz and Wellington had him invalided to Lisbon and replaced by Colonel Rice. He did not return to the 51st during its remaining time in the Peninsula.

  262. Butler, Arthur John (Ed. & trans.), The Memoirs of Baron Thiebault, Volume II,London, Smith, Elder & Co., 1896, p327.

  263. Schaumann, A.L.F., (Ed. & trans. by Ludovici, Anthony), On the Road with Wellington, London, William Heinemann Ltd, 1924, p303.

  264. NAM 1964-04-76 Anonymous, Journal of a Soldier of the 71st Regiment.

  265. NAM 6807-461 Lieutenant Colonel Richard Brunton’s (13th Light Dragoons) papers.

  266. The Times, Wednesday 29 May 1811, p2.

  267. Koch, Gćnćral, Mćmoires de Massena, Volume VII, Paris, Paulin et Lechevalier, 1848–1850, pp537–538. Many French historians cite Lepic’s refusal to support the attack at this point as the reason for the French losing the battle.

  268. Scarfe, Norman (Ed.), Letters from the Peninsula – The Freer Family Correspondence 1807–1814, Leicester, University College, 1953, p21.

  269. NAM 6112-33 The Account of Major William Stuart, 30th Regiment of Foot.

  270. Kincaid, J. Captain, Adventures in the Rifle Brigade – in the Peninsula, France and the Netherlands from 1809 to 1815, London, Peter Davies Limited, 1929 pp55–56.

 

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