by Aristotle
the other; and upon the one it follows that it is desirable, while
upon the other it follows that it is objectionable. The sequence,
therefore, in the latter case also is direct; for the desirable is the
contrary of the objectionable. Likewise also in other cases. The
sequence is, on the other hand, converse in such a case as this:
Health follows upon vigour, but disease does not follow upon debility;
rather debility follows upon disease. In this case, then, clearly
the sequence is converse. Converse sequence is, however, rare in the
case of contraries; usually the sequence is direct. If, therefore, the
contrary of the one term does not follow upon the contrary of the
other either directly or conversely, clearly neither does the one term
follow upon the other in the statement made: whereas if the one
followed the other in the case of the contraries, it must of necessity
do so as well in the original statement.
You should look also into cases of the privation or presence of a
state in like manner to the case of contraries. Only, in the case of
such privations the converse sequence does not occur: the sequence
is always bound to be direct: e.g. as sensation follows sight, while
absence of sensation follows blindness. For the opposition of
sensation to absence of sensation is an opposition of the presence
to the privation of a state: for the one of them is a state, and the
other the privation of it.
The case of relative terms should also be studied in like manner
to that of a state and its privation: for the sequence of these as
well is direct; e.g. if 3/1 is a multiple, then 1/3 is a fraction: for
3/1 is relative to 1/3, and so is a multiple to a fraction. Again,
if knowledge be a conceiving, then also the object of knowledge is
an object of conception; and if sight be a sensation, then also the
object of sight is an object of sensation. An objection may be made
that there is no necessity for the sequence to take place, in the case
of relative terms, in the way described: for the object of sensation
is an object of knowledge, whereas sensation is not knowledge. The
objection is, however, not generally received as really true; for many
people deny that there is knowledge of objects of sensation. Moreover,
the principle stated is just as useful for the contrary purpose,
e.g. to show that the object of sensation is not an object of
knowledge, on the ground that neither is sensation knowledge.
9
Again look at the case of the co-ordinates and inflected forms of
the terms in the thesis, both in demolishing and in establishing it.
By co-ordinates' are meant terms such as the following: 'Just deeds'
and the 'just man' are coordinates of 'justice', and 'courageous
deeds' and the 'courageous man' are co-ordinates of courage.
Likewise also things that tend to produce and to preserve anything are
called co-ordinates of that which they tend to produce and to
preserve, as e.g. 'healthy habits' are co-ordinates of 'health' and
a 'vigorous constitutional' of a 'vigorous constitution' and so
forth also in other cases. 'Co-ordinate', then, usually describes
cases such as these, whereas 'inflected forms' are such as the
following: 'justly', 'courageously', 'healthily', and such as are
formed in this way. It is usually held that words when used in their
inflected forms as well are co-ordinates, as (e.g.) 'justly' in
relation to justice, and 'courageously' to courage; and then
'co-ordinate' describes all the members of the same kindred series,
e.g. 'justice', 'just', of a man or an act, 'justly'. Clearly, then,
when any one member, whatever its kind, of the same kindred series
is shown to be good or praiseworthy, then all the rest as well come to
be shown to be so: e.g. if 'justice' be something praiseworthy, then
so will 'just', of a man or thing, and 'justly' connote something
praiseworthy. Then 'justly' will be rendered also 'praiseworthily',
derived will by the same inflexion from 'the praiseworthy' whereby
'justly' is derived from 'justice'.
Look not only in the case of the subject mentioned, but also in
the case of its contrary, for the contrary predicate: e.g. argue
that good is not necessarily pleasant; for neither is evil painful: or
that, if the latter be the case, so is the former. Also, if justice be
knowledge, then injustice is ignorance: and if 'justly' means
'knowingly' and 'skilfully', then 'unjustly' means 'ignorantly' and
'unskilfully': whereas if the latter be not true, neither is the
former, as in the instance given just now: for 'unjustly' is more
likely to seem equivalent to 'skilfully' than to 'unskilfully'. This
commonplace rule has been stated before in dealing with the sequence
of contraries; for all we are claiming now is that the contrary of P
shall follow the contrary of S.
Moreover, look at the modes of generation and destruction of a
thing, and at the things which tend to produce or to destroy it,
both in demolishing and in establishing a view. For those things whose
modes of generation rank among good things, are themselves also
good; and if they themselves be good, so also are their modes of
generation. If, on the other hand, their modes of generation be
evil, then they themselves also are evil. In regard to modes of
destruction the converse is true: for if the modes of destruction rank
as good things, then they themselves rank as evil things; whereas if
the modes of destruction count as evil, they themselves count as good.
The same argument applies also to things tending to produce and
destroy: for things whose productive causes are good, themselves
also rank as good; whereas if causes destructive of them are good,
they themselves rank as evil.
10
Again, look at things which are like the subject in question, and
see if they are in like case; e.g. if one branch of knowledge has more
than one object, so also will one opinion; and if to possess sight
be to see, then also to possess hearing will be to hear. Likewise also
in the case of other things, both those which are and those which
are generally held to be like. The rule in question is useful for both
purposes; for if it be as stated in the case of some one like thing,
it is so with the other like things as well, whereas if it be not so
in the case of some one of them, neither is it so in the case of the
others. Look and see also whether the cases are alike as regards a
single thing and a number of things: for sometimes there is a
discrepancy. Thus, if to 'know' a thing be to 'think of' it, then also
to 'know many things' is to 'be thinking of many things'; whereas this
is not true; for it is possible to know many things but not to be
thinking of them. If, then, the latter proposition be not true,
neither was the former that dealt with a single thing, viz. that to
'know' a thing is to 'think of' it.
Moreover, argue from greater and less degrees. In regard to
greater degrees there are four commonplace rules. One is: See
whether a greater
degree of the predicate follows a greater degree
of the subject: e.g. if pleasure be good, see whether also a greater
pleasure be a greater good: and if to do a wrong be evil, see
whether also to do a greater wrong is a greater evil. Now this rule is
of use for both purposes: for if an increase of the accident follows
an increase of the subject, as we have said, clearly the accident
belongs; while if it does not follow, the accident does not belong.
You should establish this by induction. Another rule is: If one
predicate be attributed to two subjects; then supposing it does not
belong to the subject to which it is the more likely to belong,
neither does it belong where it is less likely to belong; while if
it does belong where it is less likely to belong, then it belongs as
well where it is more likely. Again: If two predicates be attributed
to one subject, then if the one which is more generally thought to
belong does not belong, neither does the one that is less generally
thought to belong; or, if the one that is less generally thought to
belong does belong, so also does the other. Moreover: If two
predicates be attributed to two subjects, then if the one which is
more usually thought to belong to the one subject does not belong,
neither does the remaining predicate belong to the remaining
subject; or, if the one which is less usually thought to belong to the
one subject does belong, so too does the remaining predicate to the
remaining subject.
Moreover, you can argue from the fact that an attribute belongs,
or is generally supposed to belong, in a like degree, in three ways,
viz. those described in the last three rules given in regard to a
greater degree.' For supposing that one predicate belongs, or is
supposed to belong, to two subjects in a like degree, then if it
does not belong to the one, neither does it belong to the other; while
if it belongs to the one, it belongs to the remaining one as well. Or,
supposing two predicates to belong in a like degree to the same
subject, then, if the one does not belong, neither does the
remaining one; while if the one does belong, the remaining one belongs
as well. The case is the same also if two predicates belong in a
like degree to two subjects; for if the one predicate does not
belong to the one subject, neither does the remaining predicate belong
to the remaining subject, while if the one predicate does belong to
the one subject, the remaining predicate belongs to the remaining
subject as well.
11
You can argue, then, from greater or less or like degrees of truth
in the aforesaid number of ways. Moreover, you should argue from the
addition of one thing to another. If the addition of one thing to
another makes that other good or white, whereas formerly it was not
white or good, then the thing added will be white or good-it will
possess the character it imparts to the whole as well. Moreover, if an
addition of something to a given object intensifies the character
which it had as given, then the thing added will itself as well be
of that character. Likewise, also, in the case of other attributes.
The rule is not applicable in all cases, but only in those in which
the excess described as an 'increased intensity' is found to take
place. The above rule is, however, not convertible for overthrowing
a view. For if the thing added does not make the other good, it is not
thereby made clear whether in itself it may not be good: for the
addition of good to evil does not necessarily make the whole good, any
more than the addition of white to black makes the whole white.
Again, any predicate of which we can speak of greater or less
degrees belongs also absolutely: for greater or less degrees of good
or of white will not be attributed to what is not good or white: for a
bad thing will never be said to have a greater or less degree of
goodness than another, but always of badness. This rule is not
convertible, either, for the purpose of overthrowing a predication:
for several predicates of which we cannot speak of a greater degree
belong absolutely: for the term 'man' is not attributed in greater and
less degrees, but a man is a man for all that.
You should examine in the same way predicates attributed in a
given respect, and at a given time and place: for if the predicate
be possible in some respect, it is possible also absolutely. Likewise,
also, is what is predicated at a given time or place: for what is
absolutely impossible is not possible either in any respect or at
any place or time. An objection may be raised that in a given
respect people may be good by nature, e.g. they may be generous or
temperately inclined, while absolutely they are not good by nature,
because no one is prudent by nature. Likewise, also, it is possible
for a destructible thing to escape destruction at a given time,
whereas it is not possible for it to escape absolutely. In the same
way also it is a good thing at certain places to follow see and such a
diet, e.g. in infected areas, though it is not a good thing
absolutely. Moreover, in certain places it is possible to live
singly and alone, but absolutely it is not possible to exist singly
and alone. In the same way also it is in certain places honourable
to sacrifice one's father, e.g. among the Triballi, whereas,
absolutely, it is not honourable. Or possibly this may indicate a
relativity not to places but to persons: for it is all the same
wherever they may be: for everywhere it will be held honourable
among the Triballi themselves, just because they are Triballi.
Again, at certain times it is a good thing to take medicines, e.g.
when one is ill, but it is not so absolutely. Or possibly this again
may indicate a relativity not to a certain time, but to a certain
state of health: for it is all the same whenever it occurs, if only
one be in that state. A thing is 'absolutely' so which without any
addition you are prepared to say is honourable or the contrary. Thus
(e.g.) you will deny that to sacrifice one's father is honourable:
it is honourable only to certain persons: it is not therefore
honourable absolutely. On the other hand, to honour the gods you
will declare to be honourable without adding anything, because that is
honourable absolutely. So that whatever without any addition is
generally accounted to be honourable or dishonourable or anything else
of that kind, will be said to be so 'absolutely'.
Book III
1
THE question which is the more desirable, or the better, of two or
more things, should be examined upon the following lines: only first
of all it must be clearly laid down that the inquiry we are making
concerns not things that are widely divergent and that exhibit great
differences from one another (for nobody raises any doubt whether
happiness or wealth is more desirable), but things that are nearly
related and about which we commonly discuss for which of the two we
ought rather to vote, because we do not see any advantage on either
<
br /> side as compared with the other. Clearly, in such cases if we can show
a single advantage, or more than one, our judgement will record our
assent that whichever side happens to have the advantage is the more
desirable.
First, then, that which is more lasting or secure is more
desirable than that which is less so: and so is that which is more
likely to be chosen by the prudent or by the good man or by the
right law, or by men who are good in any particular line, when they
make their choice as such, or by the experts in regard to any
particular class of things; i.e. either whatever most of them or
what all of them would choose; e.g. in medicine or in carpentry
those things are more desirable which most, or all, doctors would
choose; or, in general, whatever most men or all men or all things
would choose, e.g. the good: for everything aims at the good. You
should direct the argument you intend to employ to whatever purpose
you require. Of what is 'better' or 'more desirable' the absolute
standard is the verdict of the better science, though relatively to
a given individual the standard may be his own particular science.
In the second place, that which is known as 'an x' is more desirable
than that which does not come within the genus 'x'-e.g. justice than a
just man; for the former falls within the genus 'good', whereas the
other does not, and the former is called 'a good', whereas the
latter is not: for nothing which does not happen to belong to the
genus in question is called by the generic name; e.g. a 'white man' is
not 'a colour'. Likewise also in other cases.
Also, that which is desired for itself is more desirable than that
which is desired for something else; e.g. health is more desirable
than gymnastics: for the former is desired for itself, the latter
for something else. Also, that which is desirable in itself is more
desirable than what is desirable per accidens; e.g. justice in our
friends than justice in our enemies: for the former is desirable in
itself, the latter per accidens: for we desire that our enemies should