by Hilal Ahmed
Although these oversimplified and straightforward conclusions have been criticized as an imagined phenomenon, the Muslim vote bank seems to function as a dominant mode of explanation for interpreting Muslim engagements with electoral politics. This portrayal of Muslim politics is based on a strong conviction that the Muslims of India as a political community are fully conscious of their political interests and legal rights and, as a result, are sincerely involved in political action.
This assumption raises a few complicated questions:
Does it mean that Muslim electoral politics could only be understood as the Muslim vote bank, which as a form of separatism simply goes against the collective national wisdom of politics as development/empowerment?
Or does it mean that non-BJP political fronts do not have any conception of Muslim empowerment in the true sense of the term and are mainly engaged in nurturing vote-bank politics (or the Muslim vote bank), which eventfully destabilizes the pace of national growth?
If this is the case, does it also mean that non-BJP political parties are involved in what is often called Muslim appeasement?
Finally, do all Muslims believe in vote-bank politics? Or are there Muslims who oppose political separatism and believe in the development/empowerment of all? In other words, are there ‘good Muslims’ versus ‘bad Muslims’?
These questions revolve around three key metaphors in Muslim politics: the Muslim vote bank, Muslim appeasement and good Muslims/bad Muslims. Interestingly, these metaphors are used as self-explanatory templates, as if the meanings of the terms vote bank, appeasement and good Muslims are fixed and defined. This may be the reason why we are often asked to take a clear-cut position with regard to them.
This chapter aims at explicating the changing meanings of these metaphors in postcolonial India by tracing the genealogy of the idea of the Muslim vote bank.
Vote banks as ‘communities of voters’
The story of the term ‘vote bank’ is inextricably linked to the debate on the nature of Indian democracy itself, which began immediately after Independence. To understand the debate, we must first look at the institutional architecture of the election system in India.
The Constitution formally accepted the ‘first past the post post’ (FPTP) system of elections for the lower house of Parliament, known as the House of People and later as the Lok Sabha. All adult citizens (aged eighteen years or above) of the republic of India were given a right to vote for the first time. The entire country was also divided into electoral constituencies.
However, there were a few practical problems. It was found that the 1941 census was quite old for the purpose of designing the electoral constituencies for the first general election. To deal with this problem, the census commissioner was asked to prepare population estimates so that (a) A rational delimitation of all constituencies could be worked out and (b) Electoral constituencies could be divided into general seats and reserved seats for SC and ST communities.2
On the basis of these provisional estimates, electoral rolls were prepared and a total of 489 Lok Sabha constituencies were marked. To accommodate reserved seats (seventy-two seats were reserved for SC and twenty-seven for ST), three types of constituencies were also created:
314 single-member constituencies (where only one candidate, who would get the maximum numbers of votes polled, was to be declared as the winner).
Eighty-six double-member constituencies (where there were two slots—one for general candidates and the other for SC and ST candidates. Each voter had two votes. The two candidates [one general and one from ST/ST] who would get the maximum numbers of votes polled were to be declared the winners).
One three-member constituency (the seats where there were three slots—one general, one SC and one ST).3
Although it was a complicated system, there was an argument in favour of it. The political elite, especially the leaders of the Congress, were not keen on reviving the colonial electoral model based on the propositional representation on communal lines. This was one of the reasons why the reservation of seats for religious minorities in the lower house of Parliament was not accepted by the Constituent Assembly.
But the open competition based on the FPTP at the constituency level was also seen as a problematic proposal. This debate began in the early 1950s. A few senior socialist leaders, such as J.P. Narayan (popularly known as JP), forcefully argued that the parliamentary form of electoral democracy might not be suitable to achieve the goals of people’s participation.
In a letter to Nehru, JP raised the issue of the multi-member constituency. He argued that the proposed Indian electoral system based on open competition would lead to centralization of power at the local level.
JP was particularly concerned about the exclusion of minorities. He suggested that every consistency should have three members, with a cumulative vote as the first choice.4 This suggestion was based on the imagination that the single-member or even double-member constituencies cannot ensure real representation of the most marginalized members of society, who had not yet obtained individual citizenship rights so far.
However, Nehru was not in favour of these proposals. He defended the single-member constituency as the most effective mode of safeguarding the principles of democratic participation. Rejecting the proportional representation (PR) systems, he said:
I could understand a complete system of proportional representation by a single transferable vote and plural constituencies. That is physically impossible as it is very intricate [. . .] If we introduced PR that would make it absolutely impossible, both from [the] organizational point of view, and [from] that of the voter, who will not understand its intricacies.5
In another letters, Nehru elaborated this idea. He says: ‘Democracy originally was thought of in smaller terms and was presumably effective. I just do not know what our elections will lead us or the country to, but the simpler they are, the better.’6
Nehru’s strong views on the FPTP received overwhelming support after the success of the 1952 elections. It not only gave him the confidence to argue that a parliamentary form of democracy was suitable for the country but also legitimized his assertion that the FPTP system of elections could be the most appropriate mode of determining the popular participation of voters in India.
These grand, idealistic observations of Nehru, however, do not entirely represent the changing nature of everyday politics in the 1950s. The traditional power structure at the constituency level amalgamated well with the requirement of electoral competition and led to the formation of a highly localized elite. This local elite began to function as a link between political parties and the voters. The creation of such vote banks was an important political phenomenon in the 1950s. I take two examples to elaborate this point.
Sociologist M.N. Srinivas conducted fieldwork-based research in a village called Rampura in the Mysore region (in Karnataka) in 1953. Srinivas discovered the existence of some patrons, mainly from the ‘dominant castes’, who worked as mediators between the political competitors and the voters. He writes:
A patron’s following can be made to yield him economic and other benefits. Patrons from the dominant caste can secure a larger number of followers than patrons from non-dominant castes. The rural patrons are ‘vote banks’ for the politicians, and during elections they are approached for votes. In return, patrons expect favours—licenses for buses and rice-mills, and seats in medical and technological colleges for their kinsfolk. The existence of such links between patrons and politicians establishes a continuum between rural and urban forces, making each responsive.7
Srinivas also noted that the competitive politics of vote banks also strengthened the powers of dominant groups in the rural environment. He informed:
The numerical strength of a caste influences its relations with the other castes. The capacity to muster a number of able-bodied men for a fight, and reputation for aggressiveness, are relevant factors. Considerations of power do prevail. The members of the non-dominant castes m
ay be abused, beaten, grossly underpaid, or their women required to gratify the sexual desires of the powerful men in the dominant caste. The patrons from the dominant caste are ‘vote banks’ for the politicians.8
F.G. Bailey, sociologist and researcher, who did his fieldwork in rural Orissa (now Odisha) in the late 1950s, also found a similar kind of political manoeuvring by the rural elite. He, however, tells us another vote-bank story. According to Bailey:
There [. . .] are small, tightly-knit caste associations, seldom extending to the width of even one constituency. These organizations have a council and leaders who lay down rules of ritual behaviour, settle marital disputes, hear cases of conduct considered prejudicial to the good name of the caste, and organize meetings and celebrations. These organizations sometimes have a strong sense of solidarity, and this, combined with the people’s ignorance of what is at stake in an election, makes it possible for an astute candidate to gain the votes of the whole group merely by winning over its leaders. This is, in other words, a vote bank.9
This observation is slightly different from the Mysore case study. Here, a caste association is organizing itself not merely in cultural and sociological terms but also in direct political fashion. The notion of caste solidarity, in this sense, may also be seen as an outcome of electoral competitiveness. ‘Vote bank’, for Bailey, therefore, symbolizes (a) The power of the caste elite to create solidarity in the group as committed voters and (b) The bargaining capabilities of the rural elite to work out favourable equations with political parties. This is exactly what political sociologist D.L. Sheth observed. He writes:
Political parties and activists put a premium on the mechanisms of electioneering rather than on the discussion of critical issues, policy choice and problems of governmental performances. They [. . .] depend on ‘local bosses’ and ‘miracle men’ of the polls than on patient cultivation of voter support, based on the record of their work. Relying on vote banks and bargainers who are supposed to control the vote banks, they tend to extend the system of patronage and spoils. The voters, in turn, come to interpret elections as providing opportunities to extract individual and group benefits.10
It is worth mentioning that the use of the term ‘vote bank’ was not entirely restricted to serious academic discussions. JP’s seminal essay titled A Plea for Reconstruction of Indian Polity, which was published in 1959, also underlined these anxieties at the national level. Although JP did not directly use the term ‘vote bank’ in this text, his description of the election process as an ‘experience of demagoguery’ in India is very illuminating. He says:
The need to catch the votes create an unlimited opportunity for indulging in half-truths, even outright lies sometimes; for exciting passions, more often than not, the base passion; for arousing false hope by making dishonest but pleasing promises. Hardly any issue of public policy is presented to the people in its true light [. . .] In the short period of twelve years we have had sufficient experience of demagoguery and the harm it has done to the national interest.11
JP’s observation adds another crucial dimension to the vote-bank idea. By describing the electoral process as demagoguery, he pinpoints the manipulative approach of the national political elite who actually fought elections in the name of nation-building and democracy.
JP seems to envisage the centralization of power, an outcome of vote-bank-based demagoguery, as a highly multilayered phenomenon. The rich and powerful caste/class leadership at the constituency level bargained with the politicians in the name of ‘community interest’. This local elite employed the traditional solidarity and caste association to form a ‘community of voters’, who were used to make winnable coalitions at the local level.
On the other hand, political parties adjusted themselves to accommodate these localized vote banks. Poll promises were redefined, manifestos were carefully crafted and religious and caste factors were taken into consideration in distributing tickets. Consequently, a few favourable communities of committed voters at the national level emerged in the 1950s.
For instance, the Congress, being a coalition of different competing ideological and political interests, began to concentrate on upper-caste/class Hindus, Muslims and Harijan communities. The main Opposition parties, the communists and the socialists, focused entirely on the working-class communities and rural landless farmers; and the rightist parties, such as the Hindu Mahasabha and the BJS, tried to mobilize upper- and middle-caste Hindu and Punjabi communities, especially the refugees. In this context, the idea of the Muslim vote bank also emerged, sustained and survived.
What is the Muslim vote bank?
Muslims, like other social groups, also formed various communities of committed voters at constituency levels throughout the country. However, public perception about the Muslim communities of voters was very different from that of other social groups. The highly diversified Muslim communities of voters were not entirely seen as a localized trend. Instead, Muslim voting was interpreted in national terms. There were two specific reasons behind it.
First, the Partition and the creation of Pakistan created a lasting impact on postcolonial Muslim identity. Common Muslims were held responsible for political separatism and even for the partition of the country. Post-Partition violence also made it difficult for Muslims to participate in public life as full citizens. They were often asked to prove their nationalism and loyalty. In the backdrop of this anti-Muslim atmosphere, Muslim participation at various stages of political processes was recognized as a homogeneous, collective community response.
Secondly, ‘Muslim isolation’—a term frequently used by Nehru to address Muslims—actually became a defining template of Muslim politics immediately after the Partition. Congress leaders, especially Nehru and Azad, used it to assure Muslims that their life and properties were secured in the republic of India; Hindu rightists used it to allege that Muslims had to give up their inward-looking Islamic attitude and participate in the national mainstream as Indianized Muslims; and the Muslim elites used it to bargain with the state on behalf of an isolated Muslim community. Two examples may be given here.
Writing to chief ministers in the early 1950s, Nehru wrote:
We must also remember that Muslims are very poorly represented in our Services today, whether civil or police or military. They have thus a feeling of isolation. Many of our servicemen, however much they may try to be impartial, as they do, may still have some background of prejudice. Because of all this, state governments, district authorities and the police have always to remember this background and to keep wide awake.12
Nehru’s use of the term ‘Muslim isolation’ has a double meaning. He is keen to transform public institutions into completely secular bodies; at the same time, he is also interested in encouraging Muslims to take active part in public life, without being communal.
His vision of ‘nationalist apolitical Muslims’ was not entirely imaginative. Jamiat-Ulama-e-Hind, a traditional collaborator of the Congress, decided to call itself an ‘apolitical entity’ immediately after the Partition. In its annual meeting on 19 April 1949, the Jamiat passed a resolution to ‘concentrate on the religious and cultural uplift of the Muslim masses of India’ as a non-political body. According to a newspaper report:
Speakers supporting the resolution referred to the political role of the Jamiat for over a century and said that its object had been fulfilled after the achievement of freedom. The Jamiat should, therefore, centralize its activities in spheres other than politics. The policy resolution emphasized that Muslims should be persuaded to learn the Devanagari script, and pamphlets and booklets explaining the fundamental principles of Islam be published in both scripts, Devanagari and Urdu, for the development of better understanding among the Indian people. (Noorani, 2003, 79–80)
This ‘apolitical’ gesture of leading Muslim political organizations, especially with regard to so-called Muslim isolation in the 1950s, contributed significantly to the notion of the Muslim vote bank. The Muslim elite created
an impression that the Muslims in India felt secluded after the creation of Pakistan and, therefore, there was a need to give voice to this voiceless community. Since they had already decided to give up politics in the electoral sense, it was easier for them to function as legitimate stakeholders of the Muslim community—at the local level as well as national level.
The outcome of such politics was predictable—political parties began to address Muslims as ‘a national community of voters’. The creation of constituency-level Muslim coalitions was also seen as the local manifestation of national trends. The observation made by political scientist Rajni Kothari on Muslim electoral behaviour in the third and fourth general elections is an illuminating example. Kothari notes:
Although there are no reserved seats for Muslims, by convention Congress and other major parties allot a certain minimum of their party tickets to the Muslims [. . .] Studies of electoral participation in constituencies with sizeable Muslim population also indicate a differentiated structure of support, fractional identities within the communities and coalition-making with other communities, in general as [a] process of secularization [. . .] and all without losing the distinctive Muslim identity.13
This observation must be seen in the backdrop of post-Nehru politics. Political developments in India in 1967, as various studies suggest, mark a deeper institutional crisis of the state. In order to deal with this crisis, particularly to reassert its institutional hegemony, the Indira Gandhi–led Congress government started encouraging controversial and disputed issues of religion and caste in an extraordinary way. Interestingly, established community institutions were disregarded and a few powerful individuals were recognized as representatives of various religious and caste communities by the state. Redefining the political system as a contested arena where the competing interests of various groups and identities could be reconciled, the government assumed ultimate responsibility to resolve these issues.