by Hilal Ahmed
Muslims in this framework were also seen as a recognizable group who struggle to protect a few Muslim issues. This is exactly what Indira Gandhi had said. Addressing a public meeting in Fatehgarh on 14 February 1974, she argued that if Muslims voted for the Muslim League or any other Muslim party, Hindu communal forces such as the BJS would be strengthened. In her opinion, ‘Muslim League’s tactics could only help the Jana Sangh and not the Muslims.’ Muslim votes would be divided and help the BJS win the election in a triangular contest. Her resolve was simple: all Muslims must vote for the Congress in order to defeat the ‘communal politics of Jana Sangh’.14
In order to consolidate Muslim votes, Indira Gandhi also encouraged what is often called ‘fatwa politics’. The statement issued by Muslim leaders to support political parties were called political fatwas. It began in 1967, when the leading Islamic institution, the Deoband, issued official advice to Muslims to support the Congress in the Lok Sabha elections. However, it was Abdullah Bukhari, the imam of Jama Masjid, who legitimized fatwa politics in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1977, he supported the JP; in 1980, he campaigned for the Congress; in 1984, he was again with the Congress. The story of the imam’s fatwa politics, interestingly, is absorbed in the narratives of communalism/secularism in later years. Bukhari’s claim to represent the political aspirations of India’s Muslims was somehow accepted uncritically in popular political discourse.15 We shall discuss this point in the next section of this book.
Let us conclude by identifying the three key elements of the Muslim vote bank:
Muslims as a ‘defined national community of voters’: The formation of communities of voters at the constituency level is an important aspect of Indian electoral politics. Muslim communities also form localized caste/biradari-based coalitions for electoral purposes. The Muslim communities of voters, however, are always imagined as a homogeneous national political entity. All political parties subscribe to this position. Even the BJP (which argues for ‘secularism of equality’ and opposes special privileges given to religious minorities) and communist parties (which used to believe in the centrality of class thesis!) tend to define Muslims as a closed community of voters.
A package called ‘Muslim issues’: It is established that there are a few, specific, all-India Muslim issues, which can either be transformed into electoral promises or denied as Muslim appeasement. This formulation has evolved gradually over the years. Nehru’s reassurance to Muslims that they were legitimate political stakeholders in India in the mid-1950s; the appeal of non-Congress parties, including the BJS (the predecessor of the BJP) to create a social alliance of Muslim Dalits and backward Muslims in the name of anti-Congressism in the late 1960s and early 1970s; the rise of a ‘secular camp’ in the wake of the Shah Bano and Babri Masjid controversies in the late 1980s and 1990s; and finally the proposal for Muslim reservation by UPA 1 and 2 have contributed to the making of a few Muslim issues.
Muslims always vote for Muslim issues: It is asserted that the Muslims of India are more concerned about those common issues and concerns that affect them as a religious minority; therefore, their voting behaviour is contingent upon the adequate packaging of Muslim issues. This expectation is not completely imagined. Political parties approach Muslim individuals as well as institutions as intermediaries to create a favourable equilibrium. The presence of a few Muslim faces in almost all parties is a good example to illustrate this point.
The Muslim vote bank, thus, turns out to be a logical outcome of these three formulations. Political parties evoke the constitutional identity given to Muslims to make a few political proposals. Issues which are related to the administrative discourse, such as violence against Muslims, Muslim backwardness and reservation, find a clear political overtone, and Muslim voting eventually becomes merely an object of political bargain!
Muslim voting patterns, on the contrary, demonstrate that there is no Muslim vote bank. Muslim participation in electoral politics primarily depends on issues such as employment and education. However, political parties are not keen on recognizing this fact. The BJP wants Muslims to vote as Indians, as if these are the only two ultimate identities; the Bahujan Samaj Party is not interested in Pasmanda Muslim politics, as if the question of Muslim caste is politically relevant; left parties have not yet taken up the question of the Muslim artisan classes, as if Muslims need to vote for them only for the sake of secularism; and the Congress and the Samajwadi Party are misreading the question of OBC reservation, as if reservation is given on religious lines!
The notion of the Muslim vote bank, it seems, will continue to survive, until and unless Muslim plurality is recognized as a political reality. However, its effective functioning depends on another crucial metaphor of Muslim politics—good Muslims versus bad Muslims.
Who are the good Muslims?
Elaborating on the title of his autobiography, Sarkari Musalman, retired Lt General Zameer Uddin Shah, the former VC of Aligarh Muslim University, argues:
Sarkari Muslaman [. . .] meaning those who worked for the government [. . . ] I faced this phrase [. . .] when I was a young Second Lieutenant. I saw a few excellent riders from Aligarh Muslim University playing Polo [. . .] I went to them and asked, ‘Please join the army. We need good riders. You will also get to play polo.’ As they were leaving, I asked them again, ‘Will you join the army? This is the last bastion of secularism. You will never be discriminated for being a Muslim.’ No answer came from them but one of them said, ‘You are a Sarkari Musalman, so you will say that.’16
General Shah’s explanation makes us aware of the fact that the Sarkari Musalman should not be seen merely as the provocative title of a book. It is an explanatory template by which the attitudes, responses and actions of Indian Muslims, especially those who have become part of the so-called mainstream society of the nation, are described and evaluated.
This term is also used to make a distinction between favourable/acceptable Muslims and non-acceptable Muslims—the latter being the bad guys of the community.
Good Muslims, we are told, would join the mainstream, while bad Muslims would continue to raise sectarian demands and disrupt the progress of the nation. A number of different phrases are used interchangeably to describe good Muslims—secular Muslims, cultural Muslims, nationalist Muslims, and so on, to counter the bad guys—communal Muslims, separatist Muslims, pro-Pakistan elements and, more recently, terrorist Muslims.
In this sense, the Sarkari Musalman refers to an acceptable and trustworthy agent of the state/government.
The story of good Muslims versus bad Muslims is inextricably linked to the debates on postcolonial Muslim identity. It is worth noting that Hindu right wing groups—the Hindu Mahasabha as well as the BJS—did not show any interest in evoking the good versus bad Muslim binary in the 1950s. They treated all Muslims as a homogeneous entity and asked them to Indianize their identity and religion and demonstrate their loyalty and patriotism.
It was Nehru who introduced this distinction to legitimize his policies towards minorities and oppose Hindu communal politics. In a letter to Ravishankar Shukla in 1954, Nehru wrote:
There are all kinds of trends among the Muslims in India and some of them are undoubtedly objectionable. I think, however, that we should not be led away by these and we should try to judge the broad situation objectively.17
The more elaborated conceptualization of ‘good Muslims’ may be found in his letter to chief ministers in 1961. He said:
Recently, there was a Muslim convention in Delhi [. . .] My own reaction to this [. . .] was against it. Later, I came to the conclusion that it would not be right to try to stop it [. . .] I do not regret that it was held, even though I dislike much that happened there. The resolutions were not so bad, but the tenor of the speeches made was definitely bad. But, good or bad, it represented widespread feeling, and we have to recognize that and try to get rid of it. It is that feeling of frustration which leads to narrow-mindedness and reactionary thinking.18
Being
a serious political observer, Nehru emphasized more on the reasons, which forced a section of Muslims to feel isolated after the Partition, especially in north India. But the vocabulary of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ contributed significantly to set out nationalist expectations.
After Nehru’s death, a new imagination of ‘good Muslims’ began to take shape. More broadly, three categories of good Muslims may be underlined.
English-educated, middle-class professionals, who have/had some association with left-liberal politics, are the first type of Muslims, recognized as ideal community leaders. It is argued that this section would infuse a progressive impulse in the community and Muslims would be able to join the mainstream in the national strata. Author Khwaja Ahmad Abbas and diplomat Muhammad Yunus, are examples of this type.
The second are the favourable ulema and religious elite, who are also treated as good Muslims. Although this tradition began with Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, the manner in which controversial leaders, such as the imam of the Jama Masjid, Abdullah Bukhari, were promoted is quite astonishing. Indira Gandhi’s letter to Bukahri, which she wrote in 1979, is an example of this form of politics. She wrote:
Some incidents, including the 1975 Jama Masjid incident, which took place in the past and during the Emergency, resulted in stress and strain, and I am sorry that they left an atmosphere of misunderstanding and bitterness. Let this past be forgotten so that we can begin on a note of harmony and cooperation [. . .] We agree that all derogatory references to religious leaders should be deleted from textbooks. Our party is committed not to interfere in Muslim personal law [. . .] Urdu would be recognized as a second language to be used for official purpose in some areas.19
The outcome of this letter was quite obvious. The imam did not only support Indira Gandhi in the 1980 elections but also legitimized his controversial fatwa politics, which we discussed in the previous section.20
The rise of the BJP in recent years has led to the third category of good Muslims—nationalist (Rashtravadi) Muslims. Unlike the progressive Muslims of the Congress/left, these Muslims offer uncritical support to the basic premises of the Hindutva project. They take a pro-BJP position on controversial issues by emphasizing their religious identity as Muslims.
This is what Zafar Islam, a new Muslim face in the BJP and a staunch supporter of Prime Minister Modi, says:
Who is keeping the Muslims out of power? It’s the Muslim community which is responsible for making its votes valueless and redundant by becoming a captive vote bank for the Congress and a few other parties, but completely ignoring the BJP which is a ruling party and works in a non-partisan manner.21
Faith in the scientific temperament of ancient Indian/Hindu philosophy is another quality of good Rashtravadi Muslims. The celebrated ideal of A.P.J. Abdul Kalam (a veena player, a Gita reader, a Sanskrit lover, and yet a Muslim scientist!) is a good example. This may be the reason why he was preferred over Aurangzeb—the bad Muslim—for commemorating ideal Muslimness in contemporary India.
This version of good Muslims—either as Sarkari Muslims or as nationalist ones—signifies a very specific norm of Indian politics. All political parties need Muslims for electoral survival—not merely to address, at least symbolically, the highly diversified Muslim community as voters but also to assert political influence over other social constituencies.
Good Muslims, in this framework, are shown as ‘lived examples’ who can fulfil the standard expectations set out for all Muslims. Thus, when Mohan Bhagwat says that Hindutva without Muslims is meaningless, he does not entirely aim at reaching out to Muslims. Instead, he is addressing common Hindus who still do not approve of Hindutva’s anti-Muslim rhetoric.22
The ‘good Muslims’ of the BJP/RSS—such as Zafar Islam and Zafar Sareshwala—seem to rectify this message silently through their symbolic presence in the party.
So what are the criteria for being a good Muslim in India? This discussion illustrates three aspects of good Muslims:
Cultural capital: As part of the elite—religious and/or modern—he/she should have cultural capital (lineage, education, political–economic background) that may be used to demonstrate his/her status as a Muslim leader/representative. His/her access to political power is an additional qualification in this regard.
Acceptability: He/she should be able to satisfy the ideal expectations set out for all Muslims.
Political correctness: He/she should always adhere to a politically correct line.
Muslim appeasement
Muslim appeasement is the third metaphor of Muslim politics. Although the term originated in colonial India—especially to describe Congress’s attitude toward the Muslim League in the 1940s—it survives as a metaphor in post-1947 politics with very specific political connotations.
Broadly speaking, Muslim appeasement refers to at least two aspects of politics with regard to Muslims: biased institutional apparatus and unfair political practices.
The constitutional provisions related to the rights of religious minorities, which offer legal protection to autonomous bodies, such as Islamic endowments known as waqf, Muslim personal law and educational institutions, such as Aligarh Muslim University, are seen as problematic and unfair. It is asserted that that minority rights given in the Constitution go against the spirit of religious equality and secularism based on rule of law. An article titled ‘Minorities Problems and Its Solution’, written by Balraj Madhok, one of RSS’s well-known intellectuals, outlines the relevant problematic aspects of the Constitution. He says:
Articles 21, 30 and 370, which are discriminatory, being in favour of minorities, should be abrogated from the Constitution of India. Such provisions [should] be made in the Constitution that no discrimination between the citizens of India will be made by the Government on the basis of religions or methods of worship [. . .] Article 44 of the Constitution should at once be implemented for the purpose. Such provisions contained in the Muslim personal law which go against the Constitution of India and humanity [should] be declared illegal, unlawful and unconstitutional [. . .] Such Muslims and other minorities who are not prepared to abjure their separatist tendencies should be declared foreigners, and they should be divested of the right of franchise.23
Muslim appeasement is also used to denote specific forms of political practices. The assurance given to Muslims by political parties with regard to educational and/or economic empowerment, the distribution of tickets to Muslim candidates in elections for legislative bodies and even declaration of holidays for Muslim religious festivals are treated as Muslim appeasement. A resolution passed by the RSS in 2005 is an example of this critique:
The Akhil Bharatiya Karyakari Mandal (ABKM) decries the return of the demon of minority appeasement under the present UPA government. Its earlier decision to provide 50 per cent reservation for Muslims in Aligarh Muslim University and its attempts now to go in appeal against the HC order on the minority status of Aligarh Muslim University is a standing proof of its appeasement policy [. . .] Also reprehensible is the reported directive given to all the chief ministers of the Congress-ruled states to emulate [the] Andhra Pradesh government in extending reservations to Muslims.24
This Hindutva imagination of Muslim appeasement is also based on the notion of Muslim homogeneity, which we have discussed in the previous chapters of this book. All Muslims of India are envisaged as beneficiaries of minority rights and policies of the so-called secular parties. As a result, we are told, a feeling of separatism among them strengthened.
Interestingly, the secular critique of Hindutva’s imagination of Muslim appeasement does not propose any alternative conceptualization. Although it tends to talk about the multilayered structure of the Muslim community and its relative marginalization, the possibilities of appeasement, its meanings, forms and impacts are not given any serious intellectual/political attention. Muslim appeasement is simply refuted as Hindutva propaganda. Even those scholars who are critical of Hindu as well as Muslim communalism could not produce any significant
analysis of Muslim appeasement.
Mushirul Hasan’s assessment of the Shah Bano moment in Indian politics is a good example to underline this confusion. He writes:
Debates on the Uniform Civil Code have gone on ceaselessly since Independence. Muslim orthodoxy was unequivocally opposed to change, and the liberal view became increasingly blurred because of the unhappy intervention of Hindu ideologues as vocal proponents of reform in Muslim personal law [. . .] The government dare not change its strategy for fear of losing Muslim votes [. . .] Rajiv Gandhi imposed a ban on Salman Rushdie’s book, The Satanic Verses, and his successor V.P. Singh declared Prophet Mohammad’s birthday a national holiday. Finally, Muslims were willfully appeased by the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, and through official reluctance to enact a Uniform Civil Code.25
It is certainly clear from this passage that Hasan is condemning Hindutva politics, which appropriated the UCC debate. He is equally critical of Islamic orthodoxy, which was supported by the state in the Shah Bano case. Yet, Hasan fails to specify his reading of ‘Muslim appeasement’ and we are left with a few puzzling questions: Does Muslim appeasement only mean the political moves of the Rajiv Gandhi government? Or does it mean that all Muslims were going to vote for Rajiv Gandhi in the election because they were ‘wilfully appeased’ in the Shah Bano case? If this is the case, how is Hasan’s notion of Muslim appeasement different from the RSS’s conceptualization?