The Walls Have Ears

by Helen Fry

  On the morning of departure, Cramer was escorted to Paddington Station by an unnamed British army officer. Driving through Regent’s Park past many aircrew cadets, Cramer kept muttering: ‘What a pity! What a pity! It is a scandal that these fine young men should be killed for the mistakes of the mad Führer.’ The journey is recorded in the intelligence report for that week:

  All he [Cramer] hoped was that the war would be over without any necessity for us to invade. An invasion would cost rivers of blood to both sides, but the Allies were still bound to win as Germany could not hope to defeat the whole world. He intended to have a long talk on all this with his great friends Korten (of the GAF) and Dönitz. Cramer was not looking forward to his inevitable interview with Hitler.46

  At Paddington Station, the British officer explained to a policeman that they would have to drive in because he had a German prisoner in the car. Out of vanity, Cramer took exception to that and told the British officer that he could at least have said there was a German general in the car.47 The German batman who was with them got into the compartment of the train but Cramer objected to sharing a compartment with either his batman or a British private with a rifle. He was politely reminded that he was still a prisoner of war.

  Given Cramer’s anti-Nazi views, was it safe for him to be repatriated to the Third Reich? Rumours suggest he might have gone back on a secret mission, but no evidence has ever emerged. Cramer arrived back in Germany and was duly arrested by the Gestapo for his involvement in the July assassination attempt on Hitler.48 He was held until 5 August 1944 at Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse prison, Berlin. From there, he was taken to Ravensbrück concentration camp. Due to an act of mercy, he was released to a hospital in Berlin, then placed under house arrest. After Allied forces crossed into Germany, he was taken up by the British army as Commander-in-Chief of all German POWs in Holstein.

  After Cramer’s departure from Trent Park, Crüwell decided to try to make himself ill enough to qualify for repatriation. He took cold baths every morning, which apparently ‘made him very nervous’, and he scratched the eczema on his legs in a hope that it would extend all over his body.49 But there would be no repatriation for this pro-Nazi general before the end of hostilities.

  That same week, Major Topham was posted to another camp, and a new commandant arrived. Before Topham left, he bade farewell to the generals in the common room. It was noted that von Arnim behaved very well during the meeting:

  He thanked the commandant for his very reasonable treatment and efforts to lighten their lot. He then presented him with a picture as a token of their esteem. This had been painted in oils by von Liebenstein and framed by Bassenge. The whole business has led to one of the periodical uproars in the camp. The Nazis, led on by Crüwell, think it was below their dignity to assemble en masse for any British Major. They also object to the picture as they say that it makes it look as if they were currying favours.50

  Von Arnim and Crüwell said that assembling to meet a commandant could not happen again and they summoned a British army officer and told him so. He took the wind out of their sails by stating that the new (unnamed) commandant wished to say a few words to them in the common room. Von Arnim replied that the commandant should visit each of the generals in their rooms instead. Von Thoma was furious at von Arnim’s attitude and told the British officer that the commandant would be quite within his right to issue an order and the generals must obey. Bassenge told the British officer ‘to tell the commandant that he must, on no account, give in to von Arnim’s stupidity’. The intelligence report for the day concluded: ‘Needless to say, the anti-Nazis consider that both Crüwell and von Arnim are ripe for the madhouse.’51

  Within days, the generals had other matters to worry about. The Russian advance through Europe was considered a danger to everyone, and one that had been caused by the Allies supplying Russia with war material.52 They discussed how Britain must now restore the balance of power in Europe. Von Thoma even expressed the belief that Britain might accept Germany as an ally against Russia before the war was over.

  It was clearly von Arnim’s intention, so the other generals believed, to try to gain a victory over the new camp commandant by bringing up all the old complaints about life in the camp.53 The result was a memorandum, drawn up and signed by all the generals, except Crüwell, complaining about von Arnim’s attitude towards the British.

  THE FÜHRER’S BIRTHDAY

  Within the camp, bitterness was never far from the surface and even spilled into arguments about how the generals would celebrate the Führer’s birthday on 20 April 1944 – all recorded by the secret listeners. Crüwell suggested that he could make a short speech at dinner, after which they would toast the Führer’s health. ‘Pity it has to be English beer,’ he remarked, ‘but that can’t be helped.’54 He fretted about the possibility that von Thoma might refuse to participate in the toast and Bassenge might not make proper arrangements.

  Crüwell decided that if Bassenge’s preparations for the Führer’s birthday were inadequate and von Thoma refused to toast, they would be expelled from the Officers’ Corps and prohibited from eating in the Officers’ Mess at Trent Park. This suggests that the generals believed that they were running the camp, with their ‘puppet British minders’ in the background. When the day arrived, the intelligence report gave a summary:

  It was obvious on the morning of 20 April that this was not an ordinary day. The German batmen were dressed in their Sunday best – the officers were not! At 12.30 hrs, General von Arnim, supported by Captain Meixner, visited the batmen’s dining room and a toast was drunk to Hitler, and von Arnim made a speech. Von Arnim also made a short speech during the officer POW’s lunch, when a toast was drunk.55

  The generals discussed not only Hitler and the Nazi leaders, but others too, both military and political. Von Thoma and Sponeck even showed admiration for British Prime Minister Churchill and contrasted him with their leader:

  THOMA: Imagine, a 70-year-old man like Churchill travelling in a destroyer! He’s a real soldier at heart.

  SPONECK: Yes.

  THOMA: He is personally appreciated everywhere. Hitler just sticks inside his fox-hole.

  SPONECK: Actually, it would be the natural action of any decent thinking man to pay an immediate visit to a bombed town, as the King does over here.

  THOMA: Whenever any … the Queen arrives and enquires after the pets etc. What could be more touching!

  SPONECK: If Hitler were at least to visit a divisional HQ up at the front, in order to see for himself the way the battle is being conducted. As it is, he speaks about the whole affair merely from the perspective of a runner in the Great War. One can’t be a supreme commander and yet have no idea how things are going.56

  The generals listened to a British broadcast of past speeches made by Hitler, Goering and Goebbels. Sponeck remarked to the other officers that it would be fine propaganda for Churchill if his speeches of a year ago were broadcast to Germany. Sponeck remarked that British statesmen had never made ‘boastful promises or talked such rubbish as their German counterparts’.57 The political analyses proved useful to British intelligence as a gauge to understand the regime and its weaknesses.

  There was always the danger that information passed from MI19’s intelligence sites to the army, Admiralty or air force might be disregarded. That sometimes happened with information gained from POWs on new German technology which could be deemed so advanced as not to be scientifically possible. But ignoring any kind of intelligence could naturally have consequences. One such example was given by US interrogator Heimwarth Jestin, who was working at Wilton Park. Ahead of D-Day, through careful interrogation, he established the location of a particular German fighting unit outside the tiny rural Normandy town of Carentan, not far from Cherbourg. He forwarded the intelligence to the War Office to pass to the relevant British forces who would be landing in that area after D-Day. Unfortunately, the information was dismissed as unreliable. Jestin commented: ‘After D-Day, when the Allies
reached Carentan area, they were attacked by Germany’s 6th Paratroop Division (airborne unit) and we sustained very high losses.’58 It is an example where the stakes in analysing whether intelligence was reliable or not, or failing to act on it, could cost lives.

  The division was commanded by Major von der Heydte who would eventually be captured and brought to the ‘special quarters’ at Trent Park.

  GENERAL KREIPE

  Life at Trent Park was rarely dull. Soon to arrive was Major General Heinrich Kreipe, kidnapped from Crete in a daring mission by SOE on 26 April 1944.59 His story has become the subject of several books and a film, Ill Met by Moonlight. Kreipe’s personal MI19 file gives scant details of the kidnap: ‘He was held up at night at a cross-roads by two traffic control sentries wearing German uniform. These were British officers who had carefully planned the whole operation. They kept him in hiding in Crete for 18 days before taking him to Cairo.’60 MI19 considered him to be ‘a rather unimportant and unimaginative anti-Nazi; rather weak character and ignorant’.61

  Kreipe, born in Niederspier, Thüringen in 1895, had served as a regular soldier in the First World War. In 1941, as commander of 209 Regiment, 58 Division, he had served on the Russian northern front and been awarded the Ritterkreuz for sealing off Leningrad by thrusting forward to Oranienbaum.62 He remained in Russia until April 1942, and by 1 September the following year was Commander of 79 Division. At the end of February 1944, he was transferred to Crete.

  On arrival at Wilton Park on 22 May 1944, Kreipe was interrogated. A summary of his interrogation and several conversations with British army officers have survived.63 British intelligence had prepared a number of specific questions for him. For example, did he command the 113 Infantry Division in Russia?64 Was he in France between the time of leaving Russia and going to Crete? If so, did he command a division, and which division? Who commanded the flanking divisions? Was his sector regarded as a likely area for Allied landings? Are landings expected on the west coast or the Mediterranean? Did he come into contact with any preparations for reprisals against England by means of secret weapons?

  On 25 May, Kreipe was transferred to Trent Park. The generals and senior officers immediately gathered in the common room to hear details of his kidnap.65 Later, in conversation with Lord Aberfeldy, he discussed the event and the details were summarised in an intelligence report:

  He said the English major who had taken part in his capture had spent two years on the island [of Crete], with intervals of leave in Cairo, and that there were quite a lot of Britons in Crete, mainly officers and NCO instructors, organising and training the partisan bands. (This he knows only from observation after capture.)66

  During his time at Trent Park, Kreipe discussed the secret weapon with the senior German officers, and reiterated his belief that its existence was not a bluff and that Hitler intended to bring the English to their knees with it.67

  Kreipe was one of the few generals whom Kendrick entertained personally at his home ‘Woodton’ in Oxshott, Surrey. His wife Norah played the perfectly discreet hostess on the general’s arrival. Grandson, Ken Walsh, remembered Kreipe coming to the house:

  I have vivid memories of Kreipe being entertained at my grand-father’s house in Oxshott where I lived with my mother and sister for over a year and where we also spent our school holidays. General Kreipe took a liking to me and made a little crane complete with a cab, a jib and a bucket. One of the cranes had an operator’s revolving cabin on a strip used to seal fish paste jars. Kreipe was not the only General at my grandfather’s house. The others were very relaxed and friendly. I suppose the idea was to bring them to a place with a family atmosphere and make them feel at home so they would open up.68

  Kreipe enjoyed his visits to Kendrick’s private home and came to respect him. It was said that they struck up a good rapport, even an amicable relationship.69 Little did Kreipe know that ‘Colonel Wallace’, as Kendrick was known, was the spy who had been expelled from the Third Reich in 1938.

  Discussions about an Allied invasion of the continent often featured in the generals’ conversations.70 Bassenge was of the opinion that the German air force was stronger than the Allies had reckoned, and they were all waiting for the signal to transfer to the Western Front to repel an Allied invasion attempt. Kreipe replied: ‘I doubt whether the Allies really intend to invade.’71 Lower-rank prisoners, too, discussed the likelihood or otherwise of the Allies making a landing and clearly believed it could not be successful. Prisoner A4188 (a bomber observer, captured 24 February 1944), commented to his cellmate (a bomber gunner):

  They will never beat us from a military standpoint. We still occupy half of Russia, the whole of France, the Baltic countries, Holland, Belgium and everywhere. What have the English got? They have their island; and when they come they will come with their whole military power, and if we throw them out, then we’ve won the war.72

  CHAPTER 11

  Saga of the Generals

  We are not suffering an undeserved fate. We are being punished for letting a national resurrection which promised so well, go to the devil.

  General Bruhn at Trent Park

  On 6 June 1944, the Allies mounted the largest ever invasion of Europe, landing over 150,000 troops on the Normandy beaches in a single day.1 D-Day became one of the greatest military triumphs of the Second World War. Prisoners were captured after the landings as Allied forces moved through France. The MI9 War Diary records that, in June 1944, 13,742 POWs from Operation Overlord (the invasion of Normandy) arrived via MI19’s interrogation cage at Kempton Park.2 This number was exclusive of wounded POWs in hospital. Each prisoner had to be interrogated and debriefed for intelligence, especially to establish the locations of Hitler’s crack Panzer divisions and troops. Those thought to have strategic engineering or scientific information were transferred for detailed interrogation and accommodation at one of CSDIC’s UK listening sites. Joining CSDIC’s team of interrogators two days after D-Day was Hugh John Colman, a banking and export merchant who had lived in West Africa in the pre-war years. He was fluent in German, having been born in Germany in 1915.3 In July 1943, he transferred from the Royal Artillery to the Intelligence Corps.4 On 8 June 1944, he was formally attached to CSDIC as an interrogator.

  In July 1944, 18,082 POWs arrived at Kempton Park, and in August there was a new intake of an additional 24,731. During September, the new arrivals amounted to 48,444. In October 1944, the intake was a staggering 69,493 prisoners, now shared across the cages at Kempton Park and Devizes5 where they were assessed and, if thought to have special intelligence, transferred to the CSDIC sites.

  The Naval Intelligence section at Latimer House, under Lieutenant Commander Cope, continued to soften up its most valuable naval prisoners by taking them out to the Ritz Hotel. It caused a scandal and Cope received a letter from the Admiralty, complaining about the amount of money that was spent on the prisoners at the Ritz:

  Although this expenditure was sanctioned by the DNI [Director of Naval Intelligence], it is to be emphasised that care must be exercised as to how these funds can be used to the best advantage … There are several items which are objectionable, viz: entertaining at the Ritz and purchase of considerable quantities of gin. If these facts became generally known, there might be good cause for scandal. Furthermore, I and many others are quite unable to enjoy these luxuries and it is out of all proportion that our enemies should.6

  Successful campaigns in Normandy in the weeks and months after D-Day brought more generals and high-ranking commanders into captivity. In June alone, 490 German prisoners came through Kendrick’s sites; the following month 587, and a new intake of 558 in August.7 From D-Day to 31 August 1944, just over 1,600 POWs had come through Wilton Park and Latimer House – 523 of them were officers. Dealing with the intelligence side was a massive undertaking.

  In total, 98 senior German officers would soon be held at Trent Park, 59 of them generals.8 They were a diverse and colourful bunch who required careful handling. Their inc
arceration afforded British intelligence a detailed insight into the mind-set and strategy of the enemy. Amongst them were Admiral Walter Hennecke, the commander of all German sea defences in Normandy; General Lieutenant Karl von Schlieben, the commander at Cherbourg; his second in command, Colonel Walter Köhn; General Lieutenant Ferdinand Heim, the commander of Boulogne; Colonel Andreas von Aulock, the commandant of the fortress of St Malo; and Eberhard Wildermuth, commandant of Le Havre. August 1944 saw the arrival at Trent Park of General Dietrich von Choltitz – the commander of Paris.9

  ADMIRAL HENNECKE

  As commandant of German sea defences in Normandy, Admiral Hennecke was a very valuable captive for the Allies. He was so important that the then Director of Naval Intelligence, Rear Admiral Rushbrooke, came out to Trent Park to see him on 21 July.10 As the interview with Rushbrooke progressed, Hennecke became increasingly depressed about the threat of Russia and Communism. Rushbrooke noted: ‘He is obsessed with the idea that there are hundreds of thousands of potential communists in Germany who are waiting to fall into the lap of the Russians.’11

  Hennecke confided in Rushbrooke that, when he saw the vast resources the Allies had at their disposal during the invasion, he was convinced that Germany had lost the war. He and German forces in the region had been bitterly disappointed by the overwhelming Allied air superiority. He told Rushbrooke that he had not expected the invasion to begin before August and had expected to be able to repel it once their gun sites and defences had been completed along the Normandy coast. He revealed that he had been ill supplied with intelligence.

  Rushbrooke asked him about the secret weapon programme and rocket sites along the Cherbourg peninsula. Hennecke had no information regarding these developments because only a few scientists were privy to that knowledge.