Savarkar

by Vikram Sampath

  Madame Bhikaji Cama wrote protest letters to the French newspaper, Le Temps , which in its issue dated 19 July 1910 added:

  It would seem, according to international law, that Savarkar ought to be brought back to France in order that the French authorities should have cognizance of this case firstly because the British Government did not warn the French Government that a political offender would be brought into the port of Marseilles, and secondly that (British) Government lost its rights over Savarkar by the fact of his having escaped on to French soil. 8

  The Journal des Debates dated 25 July 1910 argued that the British could not retain Vinayak under these circumstances:

  Had he escaped from England and reached Calais or Boulogne no application for his extradition would have been entertained. Great Britain, therefore, cannot take advantage of the blunder committed by a French policeman, and Savarkar ought to be sent back to France and there restored to liberty. 9

  The French socialists looked to their counterparts in other countries to rally support. The case was soon blowing up into an international controversy. The Indian revolutionaries in France reached out to French socialist leader Monsieur Jean Jaurès for his support. The Daily Press rued that the entire episode would have gone unnoticed had it not been for ‘a vigilant compatriot’ of Vinayak’s who brought pressure on the French government and its political leadership that the very principle of the right of asylum that Great Britain lays so much stress on has been violated in this case. ‘There is bitterness in the taunt,’ noted the Daily Press , ‘and it was intended to strike home against the nation which played so conspicuous a part on the occasion of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes.’ 10

  That Jaurès pressured the French government sufficiently is evident in the report that the London Daily News carried:

  The arrest of the Indian revolutionary Savarkar at Marseilles, after his escape from the liner that was taking him to India under police surveillance, has been the subject of correspondence between the French Minister of Justice and the English Government. The Minister has informed M. Jaurès, the Socialist Leader that the French Government has begged the British Government to suspend judgment until it has been placed in possession of all the documents. The French Socialists, who have taken up the case, argue that the handing over of Savarkar to the English detectives by the sergeant of the gendarmes who had arrested him after he swam ashore was illegal. ‘The Libertè ’ this evening states that the French Government has addressed to the British Foreign Office a Note asking that Savarkar should be set at liberty or else handed over to the French authorities. ‘Hitherto’, continues The Libertè, ‘the British Government appears to have taken the view that the arrest of Savarkar, effected by the French gendarmes in the port of Marseilles, might be illegal, but that the consequences of this illegality were no concern of theirs. In law however, Savarkar could not be arrested or pursued on French territory. He was apprehended and handed over to the English detectives through an error on the part of the gendarmes with regard to his position as a political prisoner. It may be remarked that in analogous cases the British Government always demands that its territory should be respected; and we are justified in expecting that, making all reservations for Savarkar’s personality and role, the Foreign Office will favourably receive the French Government’s protests in principle. 11

  James Keir Hardie, Scottish socialist, politician and trade unionist and the founder of the Labour Party, too lent his support. At the Socialist Congress of 1910 in Copenhagen, he reminded those present of the British liberal traditions, which had often aided radical ‘outcasts’ in the past. He named Garibaldi, Mazzini, Lajos Kossuth and Karl Marx as examples. If one allowed the Savarkar case to go through as the British intended, Hardie believed it would create a bad precedent, which might undermine revolutionary work across Europe. He therefore proposed a resolution demanding Vinayak’s restoration to France. This was carried unanimously. Interestingly, Jaurès, an ardent supporter of Vinayak’s cause, who was also present at the Copenhagen Congress, did not participate in the voting of the resolution. He had ‘gone for a walk in the fresh air’ because of a bad ‘headache’. 12

  The Indian revolutionaries were ‘delighted with the excitement which the Savarkar affair . . . aroused in the press of France, England and other European countries’. They were, however, aware that this stemmed ‘more from feelings of national pride than from any desire to help Savarkar that the French’ took so much interest in the case. 13 Virendranath Chattopadhyay voiced his ‘strong belief that they would have Savarkar back among them again’ and the Indians in Paris had apparently ‘already planned Savarkar’s reception after his return’. 14

  On 18 October 1910, nearly 200 Indians in England participated in the Dussehra celebrations in London. There were tableaus of the Ramayana construed as being symbolic of Indian victory over the British. Quite suggestively, the tableaus had figures of ‘white slave girls’. The French anthem Marseillaise was played and ‘heartily applauded’. This too symbolically indicated the appreciation of French support for Vinayak’s repatriation. The British police present at the venue were further affronted when a proposal to play the British national anthem was ‘ruled out of order’. 15

  The British press, by and large, dismissed the event as a mere mishap, and also castigated its French counterparts for exceeding their brief. The Evening Telegraph stated that it was impossible to conceive of surrendering Vinayak to France as ‘such an act would have an extremely harmful effect in India and would be seized upon by the revolutionary leaders as an indication of the weakness of the British authorities’. 16

  Vinayak who had already faced an extradition trial and appeals in London, was now heading towards two more trials—one questioning his recapture in France as part of The Hague arbitration that created a diplomatic row between two sovereign nations, and back home in India for the ‘Nasik Conspiracy Case’.

  Various departments in the governments of both England and France were activated after the ‘Savarkar episode’. On 18 July, the French minister for foreign affairs, Monsieur Stephen Jean-Marie Pichon, informed the British embassy in Paris that in view of the facts of Vinayak’s escape and recapture at Marseilles becoming public knowledge, there had been a huge political outcry and media coverage about the incident. Jean Jaurès had notified Prime Minister Briand that he intended to raise serious questions on this issue in the Chamber. The French government had momentarily managed to postpone the issue by citing lack of complete information on the case to avoid embarrassment. But it was imperative on the British government, given the sensitivity of this issue and the involvement of international laws, that the prisoner should not be brought to trial in India until the question that had arisen was suitably settled between the two governments. 17

  Five days later, on 23 July, French ambassador to Britain, Pierre Paul Cambon, sought Vinayak’s extradition back to France from where the British had captured him without the French government’s consent. This demand was in accordance with the Convention between Britain and France for Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals, 14 August 1874.

  Lord Viscount Morley, the British Secretary of State for India, was annoyed by these demands. On 26 July 1910, he informed the Foreign Office and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, that the issue of the trial in India was not something that the executive could decide; it was entirely up to the judiciary to arbitrate on. Hence, it would be impossible for the India Office to give any formal assurance to France that Vinayak would not be tried till the matter was settled between the two countries. However, all he could say was that the Government of Bombay had been instructed to apply for a postponement of the trial in court and that it was now up to the wisdom of the lordships to decide the course of trial. 18 The trial in Nashik was postponed temporarily even though the governor of Bombay was of the view that ‘delay will be inconvenient legally, and gravely disadvantageous politically’. 19

  Morley also suggested that given the mann
er in which this matter was escalating, a meeting of the India Office, Home Office and Foreign Office with himself, Winston Churchill and Edward Grey would help in formulating a coordinated response to the repeated requests from France. Morley nominated Sir William Lee-Warner, member of the Council of India, and Sir Herbert Risley, secretary of the judicial and public department to represent the India Office in this vexed matter. 20

  Accordingly, the interdepartmental committee met on 29 July 1910. Louis Mallet of the Foreign Office contended that in the interests of maintaining friendly relations with France, the British could consider handing over Vinayak to them. The British government could then pursue the normal course of extradition of a fugitive criminal, namely, handing over a legal copy of arrest warrant and an application through their ambassador in France. Churchill opined that ‘nothing’ was of ‘greater importance’ than the fact that Britain should show herself as a nation that accepted the law of nations. ‘The petty annoyance,’ he added, ‘of a criminal escaping may have to be borne.’ 21

  But the India Office was unrelenting. They stated that given the political importance of the case back in India and Vinayak’s alleged seditious involvement in spearheading a widespread conspiracy across the country, there was no other option but to have him tried. They suggested that the French be informed that the accused was now in Nashik to face trial and the British government was powerless, having to merely wait for the proceedings to conclude. The executive had no power in the courts and it could be conveyed that the Indian court refused to surrender a criminal who had come under their jurisdiction. If Vinayak was acquitted by the Indian court, the question of extradition itself did not arise because he would be a free man. The spirit of the convention of 7 March 1815 was cited whereby European powers had agreed to extradite criminals of other governments. Several past precedents of similar nature were discussed and dissected.

  The committee also read and reread the correspondence between the British government and the French Sûreté in which the latter had been informed about an ‘important political prisoner’ being on board the Morea while it docked at Marseilles. Sir Edward Grey, however, opined that the reports suggested that the two native head constables had played a much more important role in his recapture, and Parker and Power were shown in very poor light. Their report could hardly be construed as the complete truth, and someone could pass it off as hearsay, as they were themselves being investigated by the police department. Further, the testimonies of the Indian head constables that they caught Vinayak bolstered the French annoyance, conveyed by the French chargé d’affaires in London, Émile Daeschner who contended that the British government had ousted the French police from the proper discharge of its functions and interfered in its work. Could it be the case that the native constables were simply highlighting their own chivalry to magnify their share in the recapture of Vinayak and it was in reality the French gendarme who contributed to his capture? If such a narrative could be craftily constructed, it would give them the advantage. This new angle put the entire committee into a tizzy and they dispersed after agreeing to elicit the facts from India and also have the Law Office draft the case details well. 22

  As Sir Grey had feared, the French government was increasingly feeling the heat of the episode that had by now broken out in full public view. On 3 August, it sent a note to the British seeking both an apology and Vinayak’s extradition to France. The apology was because of the reports that the action of the Indian head constables on French territory constituted a flagrant violation of French sovereignty. Who were they to run behind a fugitive who was seeking asylum in France or capture him? A baffled Foreign Office replied that it was after all a French policeman who handed Vinayak back to the Morea , personally delivering him to Power’s custody. Assuming that the French policeman acted stupidly and in contravention of the known procedures of extradition, the onus was certainly not on the British government to set his mistake right. When French minister Pichon made his first representation on 18 July, he merely asked for a postponement of the trial till the matter was settled between the two countries, not for extradition. At that time, had a request for extradition been made, it might still have been possible to consider because Vinayak was still on high seas. But once he reached India, he automatically came under the control of the court there and the British government had no power over him till the court so ruled.

  Attorney General Sir William S. Robson gave his considered opinion on the case:

  That before Savarkar was taken by the British authorities into French territory, the assent of the French government was duly obtained to his being kept in custody there by those authorities;

  That an agreement was thereupon arrived at between Great Britain and France, that the French authorities should assist the British authorities to prevent the escape of Savarkar from British custody;

  That in the circumstances this agreement amounted to a stipulation that Savarkar should not be entitled to any rights of asylum on French soil; and

  That in giving him up the French police properly acted in accordance with the instructions given to them under the above agreement.

  He further nitpicked on the action of the Indian head constables in hot pursuit by stating that: ‘. . . there is no rule in International Law which prevents a foreigner in a foreign country from assisting a police officer in the performance of a lawful act of seizure.’ His submission was that the constables were merely assisting the French gendarme; they might have gone a bit overboard, but that could not be construed as a violation of France’s sovereignty. ‘The case therefore,’ Robson concluded, ‘is not of a criminal who has been handed over in violation of the conditions of an extradition treaty, but of an alien who has been excluded from French soil, which he had no right to enter’ in the very first place. 23 He did not think Sir Edward Grey would be justified in promising a surrender of the prisoner to France, nor could the executive interfere with the judiciary at this stage of the proceedings.

  Meanwhile, the Government of Bombay was getting restless about the undue postponement of the case. The governor shot off a telegram to London on 5 August 1910 in which he seemed to contradict the narrative that the Foreign Office was constructing. It said:

  The gendarme to whom Savarkar ran failed to understand what he said; and Savarkar (according to his own statement) was seized first by the constables in pursuit, who were immediately assisted by the gendarme . . . the statement of the other constable is that the pursuers were joined by the gendarme; and that the capture of Savarkar was affected on his stopping partly because hindered by dock employees and partly owing to exhaustion. 24

  The governor was lightly admonished in a return telegram dated 15 August from the Secretary of State for ruining the well-crafted narrative, stating that, ‘it is unnecessary to point out that the question of what happened at Marseilles is to be left for discussion by the two Governments concerned; and that as the publication of the version given in your telegram of the 5th would cause inconvenience, questions relating to these details should be kept out of the Indian courts’. 25

  Subsequent telegrams exchanged between the two conveniently bolster this new narrative and all the previous testimonies of police officials were happily disregarded. Almost confirming Guy Aldred’s accusation of French prime minister Briand’s connivance with the British, the Government of France managed to secure a deposition of Brigadier Pesquié that he single-handedly captured Vinayak by his right hand and that the head constables had little role to play in it. The Secretary of State informed the governor of Bombay by 31 August that further postponement of the trial would not be necessary as they would inform the French government that the proceedings could not be stopped and if required, Vinayak could be restored to them after the Indian court had pronounced its judgment.

  Accordingly, on 10 September, Vinayak was committed for trial before the special tribunal upon charges framed by the magistrate under Sections 121 and 121A of the IPC and also on a charge of abetment of murd
er under Sections 109 and 302. Coincidentally, on the same day as the trial commenced in Bombay, miles away in Copenhagen, the Socialist Conference of Europe that was holding its session in that city demanded Vinayak’s immediate return to France.

  With all the new ‘evidences’, by 24 September 1910, Sir Edward Grey’s narrative was embellished with more details of what transpired at Marseilles. He noted that once the Morea docked on the noon of 7 July, a commissaire spécial of the port, Monsieur Leblé, came on board, showed Parker the letter exchanges between Sir E. Henry and Monsieur Hennion, and also saw Vinayak in the cabin. He then took Parker ashore and introduced him to the officer-in-charge of the police on the quay. There were four or five gendarmes in uniform. Addressing his officers, the commissaire spécial said: ‘Let me introduce you to the English police officer who has an Indian prisoner on board. You must give him any assistance he may require and prevent any strange Indians from assembling on the quay or going on board.’ 26

  Whether these were true or a careful post facto reconstruction of events to suit the British narrative is anybody’s guess. None of the police officers on board the Morea —both British and Indian—had ever brought up this vital detail in the departmental inquiries, and one wonders how Sir Edward Grey managed to unearth these ‘facts’ now. In his sworn testimony of 24 July 1910, Inspector Parker, when asked what happened on arrival at Marseilles, had said: ‘Between our arrival at Marseilles and lunch, I went ashore for five or ten minutes to be introduced to the shore police officials.’ 27 This was as casual as it was made to appear and not as intricate and embellished as Sir Grey’s version. It is incredible that Parker, who gave the minutest of details of their travel in his testimony, would have omitted this important incident.