Goering
Page 45
Goering, back once more under direct examination by Stahmer in connection with Dahlerus’ evidence, did his best to retrieve the situation. But the damage was done, and Goering seemed now to be floundering:
GOERING: During all these negotiations it was not a question, as far as I was concerned, of isolating Poland and keeping England out of the matter, but rather it was a question, since the problem of the Corridor and Danzig had come up, of solving it peacefully, as far as possible along the lines of the Munich solution. That was my endeavor until the last moment. If it had been a question only of eliminating England from the matter, then, firstly, English diplomacy would surely have recognized that immediately—it certainly has enough training for that. However, it did enter into these negotiations. And, secondly, I probably would have used entirely different tactics. [IX, p. 234]
He dismissed the personal impression of himself, Hitler and Ribbentrop in the latter section of The Last Attempt as purely subjective, and the ambiguity of his own position as that of a soldier who was also acting as a diplomat.
It was my firm determination to do everything to settle in a peaceful way this problem that had come up. I did not want the war; consequently I did everything I possibly could to avoid it. That has nothing to do with the preparations which I, as a matter of duty in my capacity as a high-ranking soldier, carried out. [IX, p. 236]
After this interlude, Jackson resumed his cross-examination in the later afternoon with some questions relating to the Reich Defense Council and the occupation of the Rhineland. Again he complained of Goering’s attempt to avoid answering questions directly by entering at once into lengthy explanations which obscured the issues involved by adding new ones. Then followed the incident which became world news overnight: Goering made Jackson openly lose his temper in court.
JACKSON: Well, those preparations were preparations for armed occupation of the Rhineland, were they not?
GOERING: No, that is altogether wrong. If Germany had become involved in a war, no matter from which side, let us assume from the east, then mobilization measures would have had to be carried out for security reasons throughout the Reich in this event, even in the demilitarized Rhineland; but not for the purpose of occupation, of liberating the Rhineland.
JACKSON: You mean the preparations were not military preparations ?
GOERING: Those were general preparations for mobilization, such as every country makes, and not for the purpose of the occupation of the Rhineland.
JACKSON: But were of a character which had to be kept entirely secret from foreign powers?
GOERING: I do not think I can recall reading beforehand the publication of the mobilization preparations of the United States.
JACKSON: Well, I respectfully submit to the tribunal that this witness is not being responsive, and has not been in his examination, and that it is—[The witness interposes a few words here.] it is perfectly futile to spend our time if we cannot have responsive answers to our questions. [The witness interposes slightly here.] We can strike these things out. I do not want to spend time doing that, but this witness, it seems to me, is adopting, and has adopted, in the witness box and in the dock, an arrogant and contemptuous attitude toward the tribunal which is giving him the trial which he never gave a living soul, or dead ones either. [IX, pp. 242—43]
Jackson had flung down his earphones in a rage, and there was a moment of acute tension and embarrassment. This loss of temper destroyed for the moment the dignity of the prosecution, and the president felt obliged to announce an adjournment. Goering was highly pleased with himself and said to the other defendants, “If you all handle yourselves half as well as I did, you will do all right.” The following day Jackson continued his complaints at length about Goering’s reference to the United States, until eventually the president suggested that though it was, of course, wrong for Goering to have made this remark, “it is a matter which I think you might well ignore.”
The principal phase of the cross-examination that followed this diversion was concerned with Goering’s actions against the Jews. Here evasion became more difficult; he was too directly involved in the documents offered in evidence against him. It was now that the minutes of the notorious Cabinet meeting on the Jewish problem following the pogrom of November 1938 were quoted at length, with every callous remark by Goering read aloud in court. Goering tried to explain away his crudity by saying that it was an expression of his ill-temper with Goebbels. But Jackson continued to read the minutes of this meeting, pressing home every point at which Goering was openly conspiring to use the machinery of state to rob the Jews of their property, including even the insurance on the goods which had been looted from Jewish stores. He read the statement Goering had made at the meeting in which his exasperation at the thought of the huge losses involved in the pogrom was expressed in the remark to Heydrich that he wished two hundred Jews had been killed rather than so many valuable things lost.
JACKSON: Do I read that correctly?
GOERING: Yes, this was said in a moment of bad temper and excitement.
JACKSON: Spontaneously sincere, was it not?
GOERING: As I said, it was not meant seriously. It was the expression of spontaneous excitement caused by the events, and by the destruction of valuables and the difficulties which arose. Of course, if you are going to bring up every word I said in the course of twenty-five years in these circles, I myself could give you instances of even stronger remarks. [IX, p. 262]
Goering now had to face further damning records of his persecution of the Jews, in particular his decrees designed to eliminate Jewish trade in Austria and the confiscation of art treasures formerly owned by Jews. He had to answer for his requisitioning of labor from among prisoners of war and Russian civilians in the occupied areas, and his anger rose when he was held to account for an order in his name which seemed to imply that German commando forces to hunt partisans should be recruited from among “those with a passion for hunting, who have poached for love of the sport,” and that they could “murder, burn and ravish.” Goering objected strongly to the suggestion of rape.
GOERING: No, it is not correct. I say this because it is a most significant concept which has always particularly contradicted my sense of justice, for shortly after the assumption of power I instigated a sharpening of the German punitive laws on this matter. I want to show, in the light of this word and this concept, that this entire latter part could not have been uttered by me and I deny having said it. I will absolutely and gladly take responsibility for even the most serious things which I have done, but I deny that this statement, in view of my opinions, could ever have been uttered by me. [IX, p. 279]
Later he said that he never ordered villages to be burned or hostages to be shot, and that he violently opposed the suggestion toward the end of the war that the Geneva Convention should be abandoned so that prisoners of war or flyers descending in parachutes could be shot.
When Maxwell-Fyfe followed, he used methods of cross-examination very different from those of Jackson; his aim was to show that the defendant was lying or evading evidence incriminating to him. He tried to drive Goering into a trap over his knowledge of the shooting of the R.A.F. prisoners who had escaped from Stalag Luft III on the night of March 24, 1944. The shooting went on from March 25 to April 13; Goering claimed that he was on leave when the shootings began, that he was not informed of them at the time, and that he protested violently when at length he learned what had happened.
GOERING: Insofar as escaped prisoners of war committed any offenses or crimes, they were of course turned over to the police, I believe. But I wish to testify before the tribunal that I never gave any order that they should be handed over to the police or sent to concentration camps merely because they had attempted to break out or to escape, nor did I ever know that such measures were taken. [IX, p. 288]
Maxwell-Fyfe surrounded him with documents which seemed to make it impossible for Goering, as Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, not to have known about the matter in time to ta
ke action to prevent it.
MAXWELL-FYFE: You understand that what I am suggesting to you is that here was a matter which was not only known in the O.K.W., not only known in the Gestapo and the Kripo, but was known to your own director of operations, General Forster, who told General Grosch that he had informed Field Marshal Milch. I am suggesting to you that it is absolutely impossible and untrue that in these circumstances you knew nothing about it. . . . What I am suggesting is that both you and Field Marshal Milch are saying that you knew nothing about it when you did, and are leaving the responsibility on the shoulders of your junior officers. That is what I am suggesting, and I want you to realize it.
GOERING: No, I did not wish to push responsibility onto the shoulders of my subordinates, and I want to make it clear—that is the only thing that is important to me—that Field Marshal Milch did not say that he reported this matter to me. And, secondly, that the date when Forster told Milch about this is not established. It is quite possible that, on the date when this actually happened, the Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe might already have conferred with me about it. The important factor is—and I want to maintain it—that I was not present at the time when the command was given by the Führer. When I heard about it, I vehemently opposed it. But at the time when I did hear of it, it was already too late. [IX, pp. 295—96]
He was genuinely angry that he could be thought to be involved in so dishonorable an act. “I myself,” he repeated, “considered it the most serious incident of the whole war.” He went on:
I told Himmler plainly that it was his duty to telephone me before the execution of this matter, to give me the possibility, even at this time, to use my much diminished influence to prevent the Führer from carrying out this decree. I did not mean to say that I would have been completely successful, but it was a matter of course that I, as Chief of the Luftwaffe, should make it clear to Himmler that it was his duty to ring me up first of all, because it was I who was most concerned with this matter. I told the Führer in very plain terms just how I felt, and I saw from his answers that, even if I had known of it before, I could not have prevented this decree.
MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that may be your view, that you could not have got anywhere with the Führer, but I suggest to you that when all these officers that I mentioned knew about it, you knew about it, too, and that you did nothing to prevent these men from being shot, but co-operated in this foul series of murders.
Maxwell-Fyfe reopened the question of Goering’s true motives in his dealings with Dahlerus, and his attitude concerning the violation of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland. In document after document, quoting Hitler’s speeches and the memoranda of meetings at which Goering was present, the prosecutor exposed the opportunism of Hitler in the matter of aggression. He ended this phase of his cross-examination as follows:
MAXWELL-FYFE: Is it not quite clear from that that all along you knew, as Hitler stated on August 22, that England and France would not violate the neutrality of the Low Countries and you were prepared to violate them whenever it suited your strategical and tactical interests? Is not that quite clear?
GOERING: Not entirely. If the political situation made it necessary and if in the meantime the British view of the neutrality of Holland and Belgium had been obtained.
MAXWELL-FYFE: You say not entirely. That is as near agreement with me as you are probably prepared to go.
Goering next tried to fight back over the charge of German aggression in Yugoslavia, claiming that it was linked directly with hostile moves in Russia. Maxwell-Fyfe produced damaging evidence of Goering’s ruthless attitude to the fight against the partisans, and then turned his attention to the concentration camps.
MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the tribunal that you, who up to 1943 were the second man in the Reich, knew nothing about concentration camps?
GOERING: I did not know anything about what took place and the methods used in the concentration camps later, when I was no longer in charge.
MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me remind you of the evidence that has been given before this court, that as far as Auschwitz alone is concerned, four million people were exterminated. Do you remember that?
GOERING: This I have heard as a statement here, but I consider it in no way proved—that figure, I mean. . . .
MAXWELL-FYFE: . . . Assume that these figures—one is a Russian figure, the other a German—assume they are even fifty per cent correct, assume it was two million and one million, are you telling this tribunal that a minister with your power in the Reich could remain ignorant that that was going on?
GOERING: This I maintain, and the reason for this is that these things were kept secret from me. I might add that in my opinion not even the Führer knew the extent of what was going on. This is also explained by the fact that Himmler kept all these matters very secret. We were never given figures or any other details.
MAXWELL-FYFE: But, witness, had you not access to the foreign press, the press department in your ministry, to foreign broadcasts? You see, there is evidence that altogether, when you take the Jews and other people, something like ten million people have been done to death in cold blood, apart from those killed in battle. Something like ten million people. Do you say that you never saw or heard from the foreign press, in broadcasts, that this was going on?
GOERING: First of all, the figure ten million is not established in any way. Secondly, throughout the war I did not read the foreign press, because I considered it nothing but propaganda. Thirdly, though I had the right to listen to foreign broadcasts I never did so, simply because I did not want to listen to propaganda. Neither did I listen to home propaganda. Only during the last four days of the war did I—and this I could prove—listen to a foreign broadcasting station for the first time. [IX, p. 310]
Later Maxwell-Fyfe briefly challenged Goering’s loyalty to Hitler in view of these facts.
MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you still seek to justify and glorify Hitler after he had ordered the murder of these fifty young flying officers at Stalag Luft III?
GOERING: I am here neither to justify the Führer Adolf Hitler nor to glorify him. I am here only to emphasize that I remained faithful to him, for I believe in keeping one’s oath not in good times only, but also in bad times when it is much more difficult. As to your reference to the fifty airmen, I never opposed the Führer so clearly and strongly as in this matter, and I gave him my views. After that, no conversation between the Führer and myself took place for months.
MAXWELL-FYFE: The Führer, at any rate, must have had full knowledge of what was happening with regard to concentration camps, the treatment of the Jews, and the treatment of the workers, must he not?
GOERING: I already mentioned it as my opinion that the Führer did not know about details in concentration camps, about atrocities as described here. Insofar as I know him, I do not believe he was informed.
MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not asking about details; I am asking about the murder of four or five million people. Are you suggesting that nobody in power in Germany, except Himmler and perhaps Kaltenbrunner, knew about that?
GOERING: I am still of the opinion that the Führer did not know about these figures. [IX, p. 312]
Maxwell-Fyfe closed his cross-examination with a final scathing challenge to Goering’s credibility under oath. He was using two documents, the second of which was the record of a conference in which Goering heard directly from Lohse, a Reich commissioner for the eastern occupied territories, that the Jews were being “disposed of” in Hungary.
MAXWELL-FYFE: I call your attention to the statement that “there are only a few Jews left alive, tens of thousands have been disposed of.” Do you still say, in the face of these two documents, that neither Hitler nor yourself knew that the Jews were being exterminated?
GOERING: This should be understood: From this you cannot conclude that they have been killed. It is not my remark, but the remark of Lohse. On that question I also answered. The Jews were only left in smaller numbers. From this remark you cannot conclu
de that they were killed. It could also mean that they were removed.
MAXWELL-FYFE: About the preceding remark, I suggest that you make quite clear what you meant by “there are only a few Jews left alive, whereas tens of thousands have been disposed of.”
GOERING: They were still living there. That is how you should understand that.
MAXWELL-FYFE: You heard what I read to you about Hitler, what he said to Horthy and what Ribbentrop said, that the Jews must be exterminated or taken to concentration camps. Hitler said the Jews must either work or be shot. That was in April 1943. Do you still say that neither Hitler nor you knew of this policy to exterminate the Jews?
GOERING: For the correction of the document—
MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you please answer my question? Do you still say neither Hitler nor you knew of the policy to exterminate the Jews?
GOERING: As far as Hitler is concerned, I have said I do not believe it. As far as I am concerned, I have said that I did not know, even approximately, to what degree this thing took place.
MAXWELL-FYFE: You did not know to what degree, but you knew there was a policy that aimed at the extermination of the Jews?
GOERING: No, a policy for emigration, not liquidation, of the Jews. I only knew there had been isolated cases of such perpetrations. [IX, pp. 314—15]
MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you.