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Index
Absolutism
activism
Adullamites
African National Congress (ANC)
concessions made by
demonstrations by
guarantees for whites by
political institutions of
agents
categories of
ideal points of
agrarian society
agriculture
Argentina’s
democracy and
quality of products in
Alfonsin, Raúl
allocations
economic
of political power
of resources
allocative efficiency
Amerindians
ANC. See African National Congress
apartheid
application of
collapse of
philosophy/structure of
Argentina
agricultural exports of
Conservative administrations of
coup in
democracy’s history in
dictatorship’s collapse in
Gini coefficient for
globalization and
inequality in
male suffrage in
military elite of
Radical Party of
Aristotle
Arrow, Kenneth J.
Asquith, Herbert
Assembly of Russian Workers
assets
coups influenced by
endowments of
redistributing
assumption
convexity
international trade
authoritarian regimes
backward induction
Barisan Sosialis (BS)
Barro, Robert J.
Beard, Charles A.
Bellman equations
benefits
coup’s
individual’s
redistribution’s
revolution’s
Black Death
Black, Duncan
bliss point, political
single-peaked preferences and
Bollen, Kenneth A.
Botha, Louis
Botha, P. W.
Botswana,
bourgeoisie
favoring of
Britain
colonial policies of
concessions of
democratic origins of
feudal institutions of
Guatemala compared to
institutional changes in
male suffrage in
nineteenth century
redistribution and
seventeenth century
BS. See Barisan Sosialis
Burma (Myanmar)
Bushnell, David
Cape Colony
political institutions of
capital. See also human capital
elasticity of
flight
foreign
industrialists and
inflows
influence of
intensity
mobility
physical
relationship-specific
substitution
taxation on
capital-in
democracy and
capital-out
capture, political
partisan politics and
Catholic church
caudillismo
Cayman Islands
Ceausescu, Nicolae
Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences at Harvard
Central America
democratization in
landed elite in
changes
income
institutional
regime
Chartist movement
Chavez, Hugo
Chile
Real Stock Market Index of
Chinese Communist Party
choices
collective
individual’s economic
social
citizens
de facto power of
democracy desired by
elites v.
excluding of
maturity of
nondemocracy’s disenfranchisement of
policies altered by
political institutions needed by
political power of
preferences of
punishment by
redistribution’s benefits to
revolution’s attraction to
single-peaked preferences of
value functions for
civil society
democratic consolidation and
democratization of
Civil War (of 1642-51 )
class, socioeconomic
political conflict and
rankings in
closed economy
coalition, middle class-rich
Cobb-Douglas production functions
coffee
homestead acts
Cold War
end of
collapse
apartheid’s
of Argentina’s dictatorship
democracy’s
Germany’s economic
collective action
disenfranchisement
and
engaging in
problem
revolution and
technology of
transitory nature of
collective decision-making
Arrow’s study of
model
Colombia
Comunero Rebellion in
elites of
inequality in
universal suffrage in
commitment
credible
political power and
commitment(s). See also commitment problems
contracts and
convergence and
credibility of
device
elite’s
institutions and
political power and
social life influenced by
commitment problems. See also problems
Markov perfect equilibria
natural form of
nondemocracy’s
resolving
communist revolution
comparative statics
equation for
equilibrium’s
importance of
inequality and
influencing
competition, political
Downsian model of
Comunero Rebellion
concave functions
concessions
ANC’s
Britain’s
elite’s
failure of
insufficiency of
nondemocratic regime’s
policy
political power and
revolution and
rich’s use of
trade-offs and
conflict
deaths during
distributional
globalization and
of interest
intra-elite
intra-poor
landowner-industrialist
noneconomic group’s
political identities and
political institutions and
rich v. poor
social
socioeconomic class
sociopolitical
targeted transfers and
conflict, political
democratic consolidation and
economy’s influence on
in Mauritius
socioeconomic class and
transition to democracy and
Congo
constraints. See also revolution constraint
coup
government’s budget
incentive-compatibility
nondemocracy’s
continuation
game
value
contracts
commitment and
enforcement of
games and
convergence
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy Page 56