Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

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Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy Page 57

by Daron Acemoglu

commitment and

  policy

  convexity assumption

  Corollary 6.2

  intuition behind

  Corollary 7.1

  Corollary 9.2

  Corollary 10.1

  cost

  of coups

  of democracy

  of redistribution

  of repression

  of taxation

  Costa Rica

  coup(s)

  anti-democracy

  Argentina’s

  asset’s influence on

  attractiveness of

  benefits from

  causes of

  constraints

  cost of

  defensive

  democratization’s influence on

  disruptions of

  economy’s influence on

  financial integration and

  games

  incentive for

  income influenced by

  institutional solutions to

  Latin American

  mechanisms leading to

  military

  mounting of

  payoffs to

  political integration and

  powerin

  static model of

  targeted transfers and

  taxation and

  unlikeliness of

  waves of

  Cranborne, Viscount

  credible commitment

  crises

  dealing with

  democratic consolidation

  economic

  culture, political

  Dahl, Robert

  democratization theory of

  dataset, Denninger and Squire’s

  decision calculus

  defensive coups

  de Klerk, L. W.

  democracy. See also democratic consolidation; democratic transitions; nondemocracy; partial democracy

  agriculture and

  Argentina’s history of

  basic characteristic of

  Britain’s developing

  burden of

  capital-in and

  capitalist development and

  changing nature of

  citizen’s desire for

  collapsing of

  commonalities in

  costs of

  coups against

  creation of

  destabilization of

  determinants of

  dictatorship’s manipulation of

  differences in

  direct

  education and

  efficiency of

  emergence of

  evolution of

  France and

  future of

  Germany and

  growth of

  income ( 1990s) and

  inequality and

  instability of

  institutional features of

  investments in

  labor share and

  Latin America’s declining

  majoritarian policies of

  measuring

  nondemocracy v.

  patterns of

  political equality and

  power in

  preferences for

  presidential v. parliamentary

  pro-citizen policies of

  redistributive nature of

  representative

  repression and

  rewards of

  Schumpeter’s definition of

  semiconsolidated

  South Africa and

  Sweden and

  targeted transfers and

  taxation and

  Venezuela’s reinstatement of

  waves of

  wealth and

  democratic consolidation

  civil society’s

  debate on

  elites and

  globalization and

  inter-group inequality and

  Mauritius and

  middle class and

  in a picture

  political conflict and

  political institutions and

  shock/crises and

  wealth and

  democratic society

  democratic transitions. See also transitions

  capital, land, and

  game

  income and

  nondemocracy and

  political conflict and

  democratization(s)

  avoiding

  baseline model of

  Central American

  civil society’s

  coup’s influence on

  Dahl’s theory of

  defined

  delaying of

  economic prosperity and

  educational reforms and

  efficiency promoted by

  elites and

  forces leading to

  game

  Germany’s

  globalization and

  income sources and

  incremental

  inequality and

  inter-group inequality and

  Latin American

  liberalization and

  mass

  middle class and

  model of

  nineteenth century start of

  nondemocratic elite and

  patterns of

  in pictures

  political institution’s

  political power transferred via

  process of

  redistribution influenced by

  repression or

  revolution prevented by

  rich’s options for

  social unrest and

  South Africa’s

  static model of

  theory of

  timing of

  trade-offs and

  United States

  waves of

  wealth and

  demonstrations

  Denninger and Squire dataset

  Des Forges, Alison

  development

  America’s

  democracy and capitalist

  development, political

  conjectures about

  four paths of

  Singapore’s

  deviation. See one-shot deviation principle

  dictatorship(s)

  Argentina’s

  democracy’s manipulation by

  Guatemala’s

  labor’s role in

  landowners and

  Latin American

  Nicaragua’s

  opponents of

  of proletariat

  vulnerabilities of

  Zaire’s

  differentiation, implicit

  Director’s law of income redistribution

  discontent, social

  disenfranchisement

  citizens, nondemocracy and

  collective action and

  enfranchisement v.

  middle class

  nineteenth century

  Disraeli, Benjamin

  Gladstone v.

  minority administration of

  Radical reform of

  reform opposed by

  Tory party under

  disruption

  coup’s

  revolution and

  distributional conflict

  divergence

  Downsian competition

  Downsian model

  Downsian Policy Convergence Theorem

  Downsian political parties

  durability

  Dutch East India Company

  Dutch settlements

  East India Company

  An Economic Interpretation of the U.S. Constitution (Beard)

  economy

  allocations in

  capital-intensive

  closed

  coups influenced by

  Germany’s

  globalized world

  income distribution and

  open

  political conflict influenced by

  redistributive politics and

  revolution influenced b
y

  education

  democracy and

  democratization and

  policies

  universal

  Education Act of 1870

  efficiency

  allocative

  democracy’s

  nondemocracy’s in-

  egalitarian society

  elasticity

  capital’s

  taxation’s

  electoral competition

  partisan parties, probabilistic voting, and

  electoral systems

  elite(s). See also rich; wealth

  Argentina’s military

  Central American landed

  citizens v.

  Colombia’s

  commitments of

  concessions of

  conflicts of intra-

  decisions of

  democratic consolidation and

  democratization by

  divisions within

  heterogeneity of

  high threat state of

  incentive-compatibility constraint of

  income of

  indifference of

  inter-group inequality and

  investments of

  losses of

  military and

  nondemocracy and

  options for

  payoffs to

  political institutions and

  power of

  preferences of

  promises of

  punishment of

  redistribution by

  repression and

  resources transferred by

  revolution prevented by

  South African white

  taxation and

  trade-offs for

  welfare function of

  El Salvador

  end game

  endowments

  enfranchisement

  disenfranchisement v.

  middle class

  Enlightenment

  envelope theorem

  equality, political

  democracy and

  Singapore’s

  society and

  equations

  Bellman

  comparative static

  equilibrium. See also subgame perfect equilibria

  actions

  characterizing of

  comparative statics of

  Markov

  nondemocracy and

  oscillations

  path

  policy

  political

  probabilistic voting and

  revolutions

  specific

  strategies

  structure-induced

  types of

  ethnicity

  Europe

  fiscal policy in

  South Africa and

  events, timing of

  exclusion

  using of

  experiments, thought

  extensive-form games

  factor endowments

  factor price equalization

  Heckscher-Olin model and

  failure

  of concession

  of repression

  Falklands (Malvinas) War of 1982-3

  fascism

  financial integration

  coups and

  globalization and

  influence of

  First Reform Act of 1832

  fiscal policy

  European

  Latin American

  fiscal volatility

  inequality and

  Latin American

  FMLN. See Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberación Nacional

  foreign capital

  taxation and

  France

  authoritarian phase of

  flourishing democracy in

  inequality’s rise in

  Jacobin’s rise in

  liberal phase of

  political reforms of

  Second Empire of

  Second Republic of

  Franco-Prussian War

  Freedom House index

  GDP v.

  French Revolution

  Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN)

  functions

  Cobb-Douglas production

  concave

  indirect-utility

  Lagrangean

  utility

  value

  Galtieri, Leopoldo

  game(s)

  continuation

  contracts and

  coup

  democratization

  Disraeli v. Gladstone

  dynamic

  end

  enfranchised v. disenfranchised

  extensive-form

  infinite horizon

  interactions

  of promises

  repeated

  static

  theoretic models of

  theory

  three stages of

  transition to democracy

  gap

  inequality

  rich v. poor

  Gapon, Georgi

  GDP. See Gross Domestic Product

  genocide

  George, Lloyd

  Germany

  democracy’s beginning in

  economy’s collapse in

  nondemocratic regime of

  Social Democratic Party in

  three-class voting system in

  welfare state in

  World War I and

  Gini coefficient

  Argentina’s

  Gladstone, William

  Disraeli v.

  globalization

  Argentina and

  class conflict and

  democratic consolidation and

  democratization and

  dimensions of

  financial integration and

  influence of

  majoritarian policies and

  political integration and

  pre-World War 1

  Propositions 10.1.2, and

  trade integration and

  upsurges in

  world economy’s

  Glorious Revolution of 1688

  Goh Chok Tong

  Gómez, Juan Vicente

  governments

  budget constraints of

  military

  Grey, Earl

  Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

  Freedom House index v.

  labor income in

  tax revenues in

  Grossman-Helpman Lobbying Equilibrium

  growth

  democracy’s

  income’s

  Guatemala

  Britain compared to

  dictatorship of

  forced labor in

  hardliners

  identity of

  softliners v.

  Harvard’s Center for Basic Research on the Social Sciences

  Heckscher-Olin model

  factor price equalization and

  prediction of

  technology’s influence on

  heterogeneity

  elite’s

  sources of

  history-dependent strategies

  Hobbes, Thomas

  homestead acts

  horizon, infinite

  House of Commons

  House of Lords

  human capital

  importance of

  international trade and

  Human Rights Watch

  Hutus

  ideal points

  median voter’s

  of types of agents

  identities, political

  alternative

  class and

  conflict and

  formation of

  implicit differentiation

  implicit function theorem

  impossibility/possibility theorem

  incentive-compatibility

  constraints

  promises

  income

  changes in

  coup’s influence on
>
  democracy ( 1990s) and

  distribution

  elites and

  exogenous

  growth of

  increasing share of

  labor and

  manufacturing and

  redistributing

  repression/coups influence on

  sources of

  taxation and

  transition to

  index

  Freedom House

  Polity

  indifference

  elite’s

  indirect-utility function

  individual(s)

  benefits to

  economic choices of

  interests of

  median

  providing benefitsto

  taste differences of

  induction, backward

  industrialists

  capital held by

  conflicts of

  landowners v.

  new breed of

  repression’s cost to

  utilities of

  Industrial Revolution

  inegalitarian society

  inequality. See also inter-group inequality

  Argentina’s

  Colombia’s

  comparative statics and

  decreases in

  democracy and

  democratization and

  fiscal volatility and

  France’s rise of

  gap

  intermediate levels of

  limited

  19th century rise of

  political

  redistribution and

  revolution constraints and

  revolution, political instability, and

  Singapore’s

  in society

  South African

  Sweden’s rise of

  taxation and

  variability and

  infinite horizon models

  instability, political

  inequality, revolution, and

  institutions

  British feudal

  commitment value of

  designing

  economic

  policies v.

  political power and

  institutions, political

  ANC’s

  Cape Colony’s

  citizen’s need for

  commitment problems and

  conflict over

  democratic consolidation and

  democratic v. nondemocratic

  democratization of

  durability of

  economic consequences of

  elites and

  importance of

  inter-group inequality and

  paths of

  political power regulated by

  preferences over

  role of

  integration, financial. See financial integration

  integration, political

  coup’s costs and

  globalization and

  influence of

  inter-group inequality

  democratic consolidation and

  democratization and

  elites and

  increasing

  political institution and

  repression and

  revolution and

  role of

  international trade

  assumptions about

  implications of

  redistribution and

  skill-biased technology and

  investments

  democracy and

  elite’s

  in skills

  Iron Law of Oligarchy (Michels)

  Jacobins

  Japan

  Liberal Democratic Party of

  Khoikhoi

 

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