Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
Page 58
King Richard
kleptocratic regimes
Kuhn-Tucker form
Kusnetz curve
countries experiencing
labor
abundance of
activism
dictatorships and
forced
income and
markets
production, substitution, and
role of
share
taxation on
Labour Party
Laffer Curve
Lagrangean functions
land
abundance of
coups cost on
elite’s investments in
inelastic supply of
landowners and
redistribution of
society and
substitution
landowners
aristocratic
conflicts of
dictatorships and
industrialists v.
land held by
utilities of
Langrangean functions
Latin America
coups in
democracy’s decline in
democratization of
dictatorships in
experience of
fiscal policy in
fiscal volatility in
male suffrage and
voting rights established in
leaky bucket
Lee Hsien Loong
Lee Kuan Yew
Legitimists
Liberal Democratic Party of Japan
liberalization
democratization and
French
political
Liberal Party
Lindman, Arvid
Lipset, Seymour M.
lobbying
The Logic of Collective Action (Olson)
López Pumarejo, Alfonso
Lord Derby. See Stanley, Edward
losers/winners
policies of
Luddite Riots of 3
majoritarian policy
electoral systems and
globalization and
Malthusian cycle
Mandela, Nelson
constitutional court appointed by
prison release of
manufacturing
income and
quality of products in
markets
distortion of
labor
Markovian strategies
nature of
non-
restrictions to
revolution averted by non-
Markov perfect equilibria
advantage of
characterization of
commitment problems
focus on
pure strategy
Marshall, Alfred
Mauritius
democratic consolidation in
political conflict in
media
PAP’s control of
median individual
median voters
ideal point of
middle class
model
MVT and
preferences of
taxation and
trade-offs for
Median Voter Theorem (MVT)
argument behind.
median voters and
policy predictions of
single-peaked preferences and
Michels, Robert
middle class. See also bourgeoisie
as buffer
democratic consolidation and
democratization and
disenfranchisement
enfranchisement
importance of
median voter
redistribution favored by
relative wealth of
repression’s use by
rich’s coalition with
strengthening of
taxation and
Tory party and
military
coup
elites and
governments
junta
politics
Mitre, Bartolomé
mobility
capital
social
model(s)
collective decision-making
democratization’s
direct democracy
Downsian
full-dynamic
game-theoretic
Heckscher-OIin
infinite horizon
median voter
open economy
political-economy
probabilistic voting
pure redistribution
redistributive politics
reduced-form
revolution
static
three-class
trade
two-class
workhorse
modernization theory
O’Donnell’s attack of
Moore, Barrington
bourgeoisie emphasized by
MVT. See Median Voter Theorem
Myanmar. See Burma
Napoleon
Nash equilibrium
subgame perfect
uniqueness of
nature
decision by
taxation reset by
networks, buyer/supplier
Nicaragua
dictatorship of
nineteenth century
Britain in
democratization’s start in
disenfranchisement in
inequalities rise in
nondemocracy
challenges to
citizen’s disenfranchisement by
commitment problem in
constraints in
democracy v.
destabilization of
disenfranchised citizens in
divergent paths of
egalitarian nature of
elites and
equilibrium policies
Germany and
inefficiency of
living conditions in
policy determination in
political power in
regimes in
repressive
Singapore’s
South Africa’s
taxation and
transitions to
normalization
North, Douglass
Occam’s razor
appeal to
preferences and
reliance on
October Manifest (Witte)
O’Donnell, Guillermo
OECD. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
Olson, Mancur C.
one-dimensional policies
one-shot deviation principle
Ongania, Juan Carlos
open economy model
Orange Free State
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
organizations, economic
Orleanists
oscillations
equilibrium
society’s
Palmerston, Henry John Temple
Panama
PAN. See Partido Autonomista Nacional
PAP. See People’s Action Party
Pareto criterion
Paris Commune
parliamentary democracy
presidential v.
partial democracy
emergence of
full to
poor’s rights in
rich’s choosing of
Partido Autonomista Nacional (PAN)
partisan parties
electoral competition, probabilistic voting, and
paths
equilibrium
nondemocracy’s divergent
political development’s
political institution’s
payoffs
coup’s
dictatorship’s
elite’s
expected
repression’
s
revolution’s
Peasants Revolt of 1381
People’s Action Party (PAP)
media control by
voting influenced by
Perón, Isabel
Perón, Juan Domingo
first government of
Peru
Tupac Amaru Rebellion in
Peterloo Massacre
philosophy
apartheid’s
political
physical capital
Pinochet, Augusto
constitution of
Plato
pluralistically-based society
policy. See also majoritarian policy
Britain’s colonial.
citizen’s altering
concessions
concessions of
convergence
educational
equilibrium
institutions v.
labor-market policies
majoritarian
one-dimensional
politicians noncommitment to
pro-citizen
winners/losers
Policy Convergence with Partisan Politics
Policy Nonconvergence with Partisan Politics and No Commitment
Policy Nonconvergence with Partisan Politics and Probabilistic Voting
political-economy model
Political Parties (Michels)
politicians
noncommitment of
politics
conflictual nature of
military
redistributive
Polity index
poor
conflict within
partial democracy and
revolution of
rich v.
taxation and
possibility/impossibility theorem
postrevolutionary society
power, political
allocation of
attainment of
citizen’s gaining
commitment and
concessions and
credibility and
de facto
defined
de jure
democracy/democratization, and
distribution of
fight for
gaining of
institutions and
locking in
loss of
maintaining
monopoly of
nondemocracy and
nonusage of
political institutions and
shift in
transitory nature of
working classes and
predictions
Heckshcer-Olin model
MVT
Proposition 150
preference-aggregation problems
preferences. See also single-peaked preferences
aggregation of
citizen’s
for democracy
elite’s
induced
median voter’s
modeling
Occam’s razor and
partisan
political institutions and
regime
relative worthiness of
for revolution
society’s
tax rate
presidential democracy
parliamentary v.
pressure, social
Principles of Economics (Marshall)
probabilistic voting
electoral competition, partisan parties, and
existence of equilibrium and
model
swing voters and
Probabilistic Voting Theorem
problems
breaking down of
maximization
organizing revolutions
preference-aggregation
social-choice
production
capitalist
domestic factors of
labor, substitution, and
structure of
programming, dynamic
promises
credibility of
elite’s
incentive-compatible
of lower taxation
noncredibility of
redistribution
regime’s
reneging on
revolution and
proportional representation
Proposition 4.1. See Median Voter Theorem (MVT)
Proposition 4.2. See Downsian Policy Convergence Theorem
Proposition 5.1
Proposition 5.2
Proposition 5.3
alternative form of
prediction of
Proposition 5.4 v.
strategies described by
Proposition 5.4
Proposition 5.3 v.
Proposition 5.5
revolution’s avoidance and
Proposition 6.1
conclusion drawn from
Proposition 6.2’s similarities with
Proposition 6.5’s similarities with
Proposition 6.2
Proposition 6.1’s similarities with
Proposition 6.3
Proposition 6.4
Proposition 6.5
Proposition 6.1’s similarities with
Proposition 6.6
Proposition 7.1
Proposition 7.2
Proposition 7.3
Proposition 8.1
Proposition 8.2
Proposition 8.3
Proposition 8.4
Proposition 8.5
Proposition 9.1
Proposition 9.3
Proposition 9.4
Proposition 9.5
Proposition 10.1
globalization and
Proposition 10.2
globalization and
Proposition 10.3
Proposition 10.4
Proposition 10.5
Proposition A1. See Probabilistic Voting Theorem
Proposition A.2. See Grossman-Helpman Lobbying Equilibrium
Proposition A.3
Proposition A.4. See Policy Convergence with Partisan Politics
Proposition A.5. See Policy Nonconvergence with Partisan Politics and Probabilistic Voting
Proposition A.6. See Policy Nonconvergence with Partisan Politics and No Commitment
Propositions 10.1
globalization and
Propositions 10.2
globalization and
prosperity, economic
democratization and
Prussian Junkers
Public Safety Act of 1953
punishment
citizens and
elite’s
revolution as
strategies
Putilov Iron Works
racial domination
Radical Party
Argentina’s
Raffles, Stamford
rational choice
Real Stock Market Index
redemocratizations
redistribution. See also Director’s law of income redistribution
asset
benefits of
Britain and
cost of
democratization’s influence on
determinants of
Director’s law of
elite’s giving
incentive-compatible promises and
income
inequality and
international trade and
land
limiting
middle class favoring of
models of pure
politics and
promise of
repression and
revolution’s influence on
rich promise of
surplus reduced by
taxation and
temporary
variability
Redistribution Act of 1885
redistributive politics
median voter model of
two-class model of
red
uced-form model
reforms
Disraeli’s
First Reform Act of 1832
French political
Sáenz Pefia’s
Second Reform Act
Third Reform Act of 1884
regime(s)
arising of
authoritarian
challenging
changes
classification of
Germany’s nondemocratic
kleptocratic
nondemocratic
preferences over
promises of
transitions of
Rendel Commission
Representation of the People Act of 1918
representative democracy
repression
Cold War and
cost of
democracy and
democratization or
desirability of
elites and
failure of
implications of
income influenced by
industrialist’s cost of
middle class and
nondemocracy and
payoffs from
redistribution and
resources wasted by
rich’s use of
situations of
softliners v. hardliners and
success of
value of
resources
allocation of
elites transfer of
repression’s wasting of
revolution. See also revolution constraint
avoidance of
benefits of
citizen’s attraction to
collective action and
communist
concessions in face of
constraints
democratization and
disruption and
economy’s influence on
elite’s prevention of
equilibrium
inequality, political instability, and
inter-group inequality and
long-term influence of
models of
nature of
net gain from
non-Markovian strategies influence on
payoffs
preference for
problems organizing
promises and
Proposition 5.5 and
as punishment
redistribution influenced by
returns from
tax-smoothing and
threat of
value of
Vietnamese
Zimbabwe’s
revolution constraint
binding
inequality and
nonbinding
rich. See also wealth
concession’s use by
democratization options of
middle class coalition with
partial democracy chosen by
poor v.
redistribution promised by
repression’s use by
riots
The Rise and Decline of Nations (Olson)
Rokkan, Stein
role
of inter-group equality
labor’s
of political institutions
of proletariat
Russell, John
Russia. See also Assembly of Russian Workers
Russian Revolution
Rwanda
Sáenz Peña Law
Sáenz Peña, Roque
male suffrage established by
manipulations by
reforms under
Sandinista Revolution
Sarmiento, Domingo
Schumpeter, Joseph