Through Three Campaigns: A Story of Chitral, Tirah and Ashanti

by G. A. Henty

  Chapter 7: Tales Of War.

  As soon as it became evident that the Afridis were up, and thatthere would be stern fighting, the conversation in the mess roomnaturally turned on past expeditions against the wild tribesmen.Two or three of the officers had exchanged into the regiment, whentheir own went home. Having been two or three years on thefrontier, they had many tales of hill fighting to tell; and thesewere eagerly listened to by all the younger officers, as they feltcertain that they too would, ere long, be taking part in suchstruggles.

  "A fine instance of defence," one of the junior captains said, "wasthat of Thobal in 1891. As you all know, I am a ranker, and Ireceived my commission for that business. I was with a mere handfulof men, thirty Ghoorkhas and fifty rifles of the 12th BurmahInfantry. We were commanded by Lieutenant Grant. I was with him asquartermaster sergeant, and general assistant. The Ghoorkhas hadsixty rounds per man for their Martini rifles, the Burmah men onehundred and sixty rounds per man for their Sniders. They were apretty rough lot, only twenty of them being old soldiers, the restrecruits.

  "One morning we received news that Mr. Quintin with four civilofficers, and an escort of seven British officers and four hundredand fifty-four Ghoorkhas, who had gone up to Manipur, had beenmassacred. Happily the news was exaggerated, but a treacherousattack was made upon the party, and Mr. Quintin and many otherskilled. Grant thought that this was probably the case, anddetermined to push on with his little force, in the hope ofrescuing some survivors.

  "The distance from Tamu to Manipur is about fifty-five miles. Westarted at half-past five, on the morning of the 28th. Thedifficulties were so great that we only moved at the rate of a milean hour. At two in the morning we started again, and marched aboutten miles; in the course of which we were occasionally fired at bythe enemy. The moon rose at eleven, and the advance was continued.

  "The resistance now became severe. The telegraph wires had beencut, taken down from the poles, and twisted about the road; andtrees had also been felled across it. While we were endeavouring toclear away the obstacles, a heavy fire was poured into us. Smallparties were therefore sent out to disperse the enemy, and thisthey did most successfully, capturing three guns and a good deal ofammunition.

  "Pushing on, we issued, at six in the morning, on the hills. Beforeus was the village of Palel, which was garrisoned by two hundredManipur soldiers. You must remember that Manipur had been a sort ofsubsidiary state, and had a regular army, drilled by Europeans.However, Grant attacked them at once, and drove them out with loss.

  "After halting at Palel for some hours a start was made, at eleveno'clock at night; and at daybreak we came upon some villages, eachhouse in which was standing alone in a large enclosure, surroundedby a wall, ditch, and hedge. We went at them and carried them, oneby one, without any great loss to ourselves. Issuing on the otherside, we came upon a plain about a thousand yards across. Beyondthis was a bridge, on fire. The enemy were strongly posted intrenches and behind hedges.

  "Grant decided to attack, and to try and save the bridge. Headvanced across the plain with two sections of ten men each,supported by another section of the same strength. The rest of hisforce, consisting of forty men, he kept in reserve.

  "I own that it seemed to me a desperately risky thing; for, fromwhat we could see, we judged that the enemy were about a thousandstrong. Grant himself led the party, and he put me in charge of thereserve. A very heavy fire was opened by the enemy; but Grant andhis men steadily advanced, and succeeded in getting within ahundred yards of the enemy. Here I came up with him; and we dashedinto the river, carried the enemy's trenches at the point of thebayonet, and hunted them out, from enclosure to enclosure, tillthey all drew off.

  "By the side of the bridge was the village of Thobal; and as, withso small a force, it was impossible to advance against theoverwhelming numbers that would meet us before we got to Manipur,fifteen miles away, Grant determined to hold Thobal; where hecould, he thought, defend himself, and afford refuge to any who hadescaped the massacre. As soon as the enemy had retired, we all setto work to prepare a defensive position; by setting fire to thecrops, so as to prevent the enemy from creeping up unseen, and bymaking an abattis.

  "The night passed off quietly. At six in the morning the enemy wereseen advancing in force, but Lieutenant Grant sent out thirty mento the farthest wall of the village, some four hundred yards inadvance of the enclosure; and their fire checked the enemy, andforced them to retire. At three in the afternoon the enemy advancedin great force, their line being over a mile long. Grant againoccupied the front wall, and held his fire till the enemy reached apoint which had been carefully marked as being six hundred yardsaway. Fire was then opened, the muskets being sighted for thisknown range. The tribesmen fell in great numbers, and drew backunder the protection of their artillery, who now opened fire at arange of about a thousand yards. In half an hour they werecompletely silenced.

  "They then withdrew to another hill, five hundred yards farther off but,even at this range, we got at them with our Martinis, and they soonbegan firing wildly. The infantry advanced several times, but werealways driven back as soon as they reached the six-hundred-yards limit.

  "It was now becoming dark, and the enemy were working round on ourflank. We therefore fell back on the entrenched position and,though the enemy kept up a heavy fire till two in the morning,ammunition was too scanty to allow us to waste a cartridge, and noreply was made. At three we set to work to strengthen the defences,using baskets filled with earth and sacks filled with sand, as wellas adding to the abattis.

  "In the course of the day the enemy sent in a flag of truce,offering to allow us to retreat. This Grant refused to do, till allprisoners still in the hands of the Manipuris were delivered overto him. In order to deceive the enemy as to his strength, Grant puton a colonel's badge and uniform and, in his communications withthe enemy, spoke and behaved as if he had the whole regiment underhis command in the village. The enemy were undoubtedly misled, andwasted three days in negotiations.

  "Then fighting recommenced and, at daybreak, the enemy made adetermined attack upon the advance, with artillery. By eighto'clock they had pushed the attack home, and passed the line ofwalls and hedges a hundred yards from our position. The situationwas growing serious when, leaving me in command, Grant went outwith ten Ghoorkhas, crept along unobserved to the end of one of thewalls and, turning this, made a sudden attack upon the enemy frombehind. Taken wholly by surprise they fled, leaving six or sevendead behind them.

  "At eleven o'clock they were again pressing hotly and, encouragedby the success of his first sortie, Grant determined to makeanother. This time he took me with him. With six Ghoorkhas he haddriven the enemy from one hedge, when he discovered a party ofabout sixty men behind a wall, twenty yards distant.

  "'Now, my lads,' he said, 'we have got to run the gauntlet, but youneed not be afraid of their fire. Seeing us so close to them, it issure to be wild.'

  "Then, with a cheer, we dashed across the open. The enemy blazed atus, but their fire was wild and confused; and we were among thembefore they could reload, killing a dozen, and sending the rest tothe right about, many of them wounded.

  "On returning to the camp, we found that there were only fiftyrounds left for the Snider rifles, and thirty rounds each for theMartinis. Strict orders were therefore given that no one was tofire till the enemy were within close range. However, there was nodoubt that the fight was all taken out of them, by the spirit withwhich those two little sorties had been made. They kept up a steadyfire till nightfall, but took good care not to show themselves; andthey retired, as soon as they could do so, in the darkness.

  "That was really the end of the fighting. Three days passed, andthen a letter arrived from the officer in command of theexpedition, ordering him to fall back to Tamu, whence a detachmenthad been despatched to meet him. This order had fallen into thehands of the enemy. They no doubt informed themselves of itscontents, and were so utterly glad to get rid of us, withoutfurther loss, that they gladly sent it
in to us. That night therewas a heavy thunderstorm, with a tremendous downpour of rain, andunder cover of it we withdrew quietly, and before long were met bythe relieving force."

  "That was a splendid resistance."

  "Magnificent! You certainly earned your commission well, Towers.

  "Now, Major, let us hear the story of the battle of Ahmed Kheyl,where you met the fanatics in force. I doubt whether the Afridiswill fight in the same way; but they may and, at any rate, thestory will be instructive."

  "Well, it is seventeen years ago, now," the major said, "and I wasa junior lieutenant. I was, as you all know, marching from Kandaharto Kabul under Sir Donald Stewart; and at Ahmed Kheyl, twenty-threemiles south of Ghuzni, we met the Afghans in force, estimated atfifteen thousand foot and a thousand horse. For several days we hadknown that they were in the neighbourhood. Their cavalry scoutscould be seen marching parallel to us, about eight miles away, onthe right flank.

  "On the 19th of April we marched at daybreak. The advance guardconsisted of seven hundred rifles, seven hundred and fifty cavalry,and six guns; the main body of somewhat over a thousand rifles,three hundred and forty-nine sabres, and ten guns; then came thetrains and hospitals, guarded by strong detachments on each flank;while the rear guard was fourteen hundred infantry, three hundredand sixteen cavalry, and six mountain guns. The length of thecolumn was about six miles.

  "Its head had marched about seven miles, when the cavalry inadvance caught sight of the enemy, in position, three miles ahead.Preparations were made for receiving an attack and, at eighto'clock, the march was resumed. Half a squadron of Bengal Lancerswere sent to cover the left front of the infantry brigade, whichwas now close to a range of low hills that ran parallel to the lineof march for some distance, then made a bend to the east. The enemywere seen in position, covering the point of passage through thehills, and also upon the hills flanking the road by which thedivision would advance.

  "When within a mile and a half of the enemy, two batteries movedout and took up positions to shell them in front; while theinfantry deployed, the line on the left facing the enemy on thehills. The 2nd Punjab Cavalry were on the right of the guns, whoseescort consisted of a squadron of 19th Bengal Lancers, and acompany of Punjab Infantry.

  "It was the general's intention to advance to the attack but, atnine o'clock, before his dispositions were completed, the wholecrest of the hills held by the enemy seemed to be swarming withmen. Scarcely had the guns opened fire, when the enemy swept downfrom the hills, in successive lines of swordsmen, stretching outfar beyond either flank of our force. At the same time a large bodyof horse rode along the hills, threatening the left flank.

  "As the swordsmen swept down on the infantry and guns, the Afghanhorse came out of two ravines, and charged the Bengal Lancersbefore they could acquire sufficient speed to meet them fairly. TheLancers were forced back, disorganizing the 3rd Ghoorkhas, whocomposed the left battalion of the line. The colonel of theGhoorkhas threw his men into company squares, and they stood theirground; but the Lancers could not be rallied until they had sweptalong almost the whole rear of the infantry.

  "In the meantime the swordsmen on foot swept down with fanaticalfury, and it became necessary to bring up the whole reserve intothe fighting line. The two batteries of artillery on the right werenow firing grape shot, at close range, into the mass of Afghans;but neither this, nor the fire of the infantry supporting them,could check the advance of the enemy. The batteries, having used upall their case shot, were compelled to retire two hundred yards;and the right of the infantry line was also forced back.

  "The situation at this moment was horribly critical: both ourflanks were turned, and the troops were a good deal shaken by thesuddenness and fierceness of the attack. The enemy's horsemen,however, pushing round to the left flank, were checked by thefirmness of the 3rd Ghoorkhas--who stood their ground bravely--andby the fire of the batteries on that flank. On the right the 2ndPunjab Cavalry charged and drove back the enemy, thus giving timefor the two batteries to take up their fresh position, and againcome into action.

  "The infantry on the right also recovered from the confusion intowhich they had been temporarily thrown, and poured a withering fireinto the Afghans. In the centre the 2nd Sikhs maintained, throughout the fight, a steady and unyielding front. The steady andwell-directed fire of the whole line, aided by the batteries, wascreating terrible havoc among the enemy and, after an hour'sgallant and strenuous exertion on both our flanks, their effortsbegan to slacken and, before long, the whole of them were inflight, leaving a thousand dead and wounded on the ground.

  "It was calculated that they had at least two thousand casualties,while our own loss amounted to only one hundred and forty-one. Theywere not pursued, as the cavalry were required to guard thebaggage."

  "It was a grand fight, Major," the colonel said; "but you were atMaiwand also, were you not?"

  "Yes; and it would be hard to find a greater contrast to the fightI have just described. The two British forces were attacked underalmost precisely similar circumstances. One was splendidlycommanded; and the other, it must be confessed, was badly led.

  "There was a good deal against us. The day was in July, andterribly hot and, at every step the troops took, they found thepower of the sun increasing, until the heat became intense. Asolitary traveller, in such circumstances, would make but poortravelling; and of course it was vastly worse for troops, advancingheavily laden and formed in column. The 66th Foot had had tea, anda light breakfast before starting; but the native troops had hadnothing to eat since the night before. One regiment, indeed, had nowater; but the others had managed to fill their canteens during thehalt at half-past nine.

  "The brigade, at the end of the march, were again ordered to changefront. The Grenadiers, which was a pivot regiment, did not slackentheir pace and, consequently, the centre were greatly exhausted intrying to keep up with it, and were certainly in no condition totake part in the battle at midday.

  "The whole thing was a hideous mistake. General Burrows had broughthis line into such a position that behind him lay a great nullahand, during the course of the battle, the enemy were enabled tobring guns up to within five hundred yards on front and flank. Itwas a ghastly day. Both flanks were driven back, and the linebecame bent into the form of a horseshoe. The two cavalryregiments, whose support should have been invaluable, behaved badlyand, early in the fight, left the field.

  "After the first line gave way, everything went badly. Some of thetroops stood and died on the ground they held, others soon became amob of fugitives. The loss, as long as they held their positions,was comparatively slight; but the grand total mounted up, duringthe retreat.

  "It was a hideous business, and one that I do not like to recall.Men staggered along, overpowered by heat and thirst; falling, inmany cases without resistance, under the sabre of the pursuingenemy. Had these fought properly, it is probable that not a singleman, except the cowardly cavalry, would have reached Kandahar totell the tale."

  "Thank you, Major. You were also, I believe, in two or threedashing affairs before Maiwand?"

  "Yes, Colonel. Certainly one of the most successful was that whichCavagnari, who was afterwards murdered at Kabul, made. It was notmuch of an affair, but it shows what can be done with dash.

  "In 1877 we were making a canal, to tap the Swat river at a pointwhere it enters British territory. Naturally, the Swat villagers onthe other side of the frontier considered that the operation was adeep-laid plot for injuring them; and it was at the village ofSappri that the chief went down, with a number of desperate men,and murdered all the coolies engaged in the work. Cavagnari issuedorders that the chief must pay a heavy fine, in money and cattle;and that the actual murderers must be tried for their crime. TheKhan, however, took no notice of the demand.

  "Forty miles southeast of Sappri was the British cantonment ofMurdan, where the corps of Guides is permanently quartered. Thegreater portion of these were, however, absent on anotherexpedition; and there remained available a few s
quadrons ofcavalry, and eleven companies of infantry.

  "Cavagnari kept his plans a profound secret. He did not even givethe slightest hint of his intentions to their commanding officer,Captain Wigram Battye. So well, indeed, was the secret kept, thatthe officers were playing a game at racket when they were calledupon to start. The first intimation that the men had of themovement was the serving out of ball cartridge, when the gates ofthe fort were closed in the evening. The old soldiers were wellaware that this meant that fighting was at hand; and they gave agreat shout, which was the first intimation to the officers thatsomething was on foot. We were as glad as the men.

  "Mules had been got in readiness, and the small detachment set offon its long night march. The mules were picked animals and in goodcondition, and were able to keep up with the men. After coveringthirty-two miles in seven hours, we halted at the frontier fort ofAbazai, seven miles south of Sappri.

  "Beyond this point the country was impracticable for cavalry; andthe force, now consisting of two hundred and twelve men, dismountedand marched forward on foot. After seven miles of severe toil, theyarrived in the vicinity of the hostile village; and Captain Battyeplaced his men on the surrounding high ground, so as to completelycommand the place, and cut off all retreat. His disposition hadbeen completed without arousing the enemy and, in a short time, daybroke.

  "Cavagnari immediately sent in a demand, to the Khan, to surrenderthe outlaws and pay the fine. The Khan refused to comply with theterms. There was a short but desperate fight, in which the Guideswere victorious, the Khan and many of his leading men were killed,and the village captured. The fine was then exacted, and the troopsmarched back to Fort Abazai.

  "This was a fine example of a punitive expedition thoroughly wellmanaged. The movements were made with secrecy and rapidity. Horses,men, and mules were all in readiness. The cavalry were, on anemergency, prepared to perform the role of infantry; while thelittle party of infantry were ready to ride thirty miles, on mules,with the cavalry. In this raid the Guides covered forty-eightmiles, without a halt; but the perfect success that attended theexpedition is not often attained, especially when, as in this case,the force is unprovided with guns. Two or three little mountainguns make all the difference in expeditions of this kind for,though the Afridis will stand musketry fire pluckily enough, theybegin to flinch as soon as guns, however small, open upon them.

  "There is no more awkward business than an attack upon hill fortsthat are well held, for some of them are really formidable. I waspresent at the storming of Nilt fort, and the fight nearChillas--both of them awkward affairs--and in the fight atMalandrai. There had, for some time, been a state of hostilitiesbetween Malandrai, two miles across the border, and Rustam on ourside of it. Information was received that several of the mostimportant of the enemy's raiders, and a considerable number ofcattle would, on a certain night, be at Malandrai; and it wasarranged that two companies of Guides should start in the afternoonfor Rustam, twenty-five miles distant, which they would reach afterdark. At this place they were to take a short rest, and were thento follow the difficult tracks through the hills, and appear on acommanding spur in the rear of the village, at dawn. The frontalattack was to be made by six companies, who were to arrive beforethe bridge in the small hours of the morning. A squadron of Bengalcavalry were to move independently, and to cut off any of the enemywho might escape from the frontal attack.

  "The turning party arrived after a march of eighteen hours, througha terribly rough country. The main body, unfortunately,miscalculated their distance and, instead of halting in the gorgeleading to the village, in which it was known that pickets had beenplaced, they came suddenly upon the enemy's outposts. These fired avolley, killing the colonel and some of the men. The surprise,therefore, as a surprise failed; but an attack was made in themorning, the village taken, and the turning party extricated fromits dangerous position. That is a good example of the difficulty ofattacking a hill fort.

  "Another instance is the attack upon Nilt fort. The place was oneof great natural strength; the fort, which was a large one, facedthe junction of three precipitous cliffs, several hundred feethigh, where a great ravine runs into the Hunza river. Owing to thenature of the ground, the fort could not be seen till the force waswithin three hundred yards of it; and fire could not be properlyopened upon it until within two hundred and fifty yards.

  "The walls of the fort were of solid stone, cemented by mud, andstrengthened by strong timbers. They were fourteen feet in height,and eight feet in thickness; and were surmounted by flanking towersand battlements, which afforded the defenders a perfect cover. Infront of the main gate was a loopholed wall, completely hiding thegateway; and in front of this again was a very deep ditch, filledwith abattis; while a broad band of abattis filled the spacebetween the ditch, and a precipitous spur from the adjacentmountain. This spur was, unfortunately, inaccessible for guns and,though our infantry mounted it, their fire had no effect upon theenemy, sheltered as they were behind their battlements.

  "It was therefore necessary to make a direct attack, and storm thefort on a front of only sixty yards. After a vain attempt to makesome impression on the forts with mountain guns, the order wasgiven to advance; and the Ghoorkhas, two hundred strong, and acompany of sappers dashed forward into the ravine facing the westwall. A few of them managed to force their way into a weak point ofthe abattis, under a heavy fire from the fort; and worked round toa gateway. This was soon hacked down, and then they burst into thecourtyard.

  "Captain Aylmer, R.E., set to work to place a charge of gun cottonagainst the main entrenchment of the fort. After repeated failures,the fuse was lighted and the gate blown in. Captain Aylmer wasseverely wounded, in three places; and several of the men killed.

  "So far the attack had been so astonishingly bold and quick thatthe main body were unaware of the success; and Colonel Duran,thinking the explosion was caused by the bursting of one of theenemy's guns, continued steadily firing at the fort. The positionof the twenty men and three officers was precarious, indeed, asthey were thus exposed to a heavy fire from behind, as well as infront. With splendid heroism, however, they held on to theadvantage they had gained till some reinforcements came up; andthen, pressing on through the shattered gate, they captured thefort.

  "For a fortnight after this the force remained inactive, for no wayof ascending the great ravine was known. At last, however, anenterprising sepoy discovered a way, and on the 19th of December ahundred men, under two lieutenants, were ordered to leave Nilt fortunder cover of darkness, drop silently down into the bed of theravine, and there await daylight.

  "The portion of the enemy's position that had been selected forattack was on the extreme left, on the crest of a cliff which rose,without a break, fifteen hundred feet from the bed of the ravine.Another force, a hundred and thirty-five men and six Britishofficers, with two guns, was to cover the advance of the stormingparty. At eight o'clock in the morning, fire was opened upon theenemy, as it was anticipated that the storming party were well upthe cliff by this time; but unfortunately, after ascending theprecipice halfway, they reached a point where the cliff wasabsolutely impracticable, and were obliged to descend again intothe ravine.

  "At two o'clock, having discovered a more practicable way, theyascended again, foot by foot; their commander working his way upwith admirable judgment, moving from point to point, as opportunityoffered, between the showers of stones. The enemy were now fullyaware that the precipice was being scaled, and it was only thewell-directed fire of the covering party that prevented them fromissuing from their defences, and annihilating the party with rocksand boulders.

  "The summit was reached at half-past eleven, and the first of theenemy's works captured. They rushed sangar after sangar, takingthem in rear and driving out the enemy pell mell, killing many andcapturing a large number of prisoners. At last the passage of thegreat ravine was gained, and the British force enabled to moveforward again.

  "The greatest credit was due to Lieutenant Manners-Smith; whoseconduc
t, in storming the height in broad daylight, was simplymagnificent; and the result showed the manner in which even youngofficers can distinguish themselves, and how the native troops willfollow them, unhesitatingly, through dangers which would well appaleven the bravest.

  "It is possible, however, to demand too much from our troops; aswas shown in the defence of Chillas. The post was held, in '93, bythree hundred men of the Kashmir Maharajah's bodyguard, under thecommand of two British officers, Major Daniels and LieutenantMoberley. For some time, Daniels had been warned that he might beattacked on the night of a Mohammedan feast. It was understood thatthis was on the 3rd of March and, when the night passed quietly, itwas considered that the alarm had been a false one. During the nextnight, however, a determined attack was made, by about a thousandmen; but was repulsed by steady volleys.

  "Major Daniels then determined to take the offensive and attack theenemy, who were swarming in great numbers into a neighbouringvillage. At half-past three Moberley, with thirty-five men, wentout to attack the village. After severe fighting, and some loss, heeffected a lodgment in an outer line of houses; but being himselfbadly wounded, and finding the village too strongly held for asmall party to make any further progress, he retired with hisdetachment to the fort.

  "The enemy continued a heavy fire until half-past eight, when MajorDaniels determined to attack them again; although their numberswere now swollen to between four thousand and five thousand men. Hehad with him only a hundred and forty available men, a number beingrequired to garrison the fort. Dividing his little force, however,he attacked the village on two sides. The fight went on for twohours, during which one of the two attacking parties gained apartial footing in the village; but wounded men began to struggleback to the fort, and reported that Major Daniels and many men hadbeen killed; and the remnants of the attacking party were broughtback, by a native officer, at half-past eleven. The casualties inkilled and wounded were very heavy, including the two Britishofficers, four native officers, and forty-six rank and file.Fortunately the natives; believing, no doubt, that reinforcementswould arrive, scattered to their homes without further action.

  "Here was a case in which the native troops were ordered to performwhat verged on the impossible. The houses in these native villagesare almost always fortified; and to take a hundred and fifty men,to attack a place held by five thousand, was asking more than thebest British soldiers could be expected to achieve.

  "At any rate, the stories I have told you will give you some ideaof the work we have before us. We may quite assume that such aforce as is now being collected can be trusted to defeat theAfridis, if they venture to meet us in open fight; but if theyresort solely to harassing tactics, we shall have our work cut outfor us. It must be remembered, too, that the Afridis are far betterfighters, more warlike, and of far better physique than the menengaged in the fights that I have been speaking of. They aresplendid shots, and are almost all armed with breech-loadingrifles, Sniders and Martinis. Their country is tremendously hillyand, although it is wholly unknown to us, we do know that there areravines to be passed where a handful of men could keep an army atbay."

  "I was with the Sikhim expedition, in '88," one of the captainssaid. "At that time I was in the Derbyshires. In this case it wasthe wildness of the country, rather than the stoutness of thedefence of the Thibetans, that caused our difficulty. The forceconsisted of a mountain battery of four guns, two hundred men ofour regiment, four hundred of the Bengal Infantry, and sevenhundred men of the 32nd Pioneers. The men were all picked and ofgood physique, as it was known that the campaign would be a mostarduous one. In addition to the usual entrenching tools, a hundredand twenty short swords were issued to each regiment, and fifty percent of the followers were also supplied. These swords were to beused for clearing away jungle. The country was very rugged, and thework had to be done at the altitude of twelve thousand feet, wherethe mountains are mostly covered with forest trees and undergrowth.

  "The base from which we started was thirty miles northeast ofDarjeeling, and the first objective of the expedition was the fortof Lingtu, forty miles distant. The advance was made in twocolumns; the first consisting of two mountain guns, a hundred menof the Derbyshires, and three hundred of the 32nd Pioneers, whichwere to make for Lingtu; while the rest were to operate towardsIntchi, where the Rajah of Sikhim resided, and thus preventreinforcements from being sent to Lingtu.

  "The latter column met with no opposition and, after accomplishingtheir work, retired. The first column came across the enemy atJeluk, five miles short of Lingtu. Here the Thibetans had erected astrong stockade, at the top of a very steep ascent; and hadbarricaded the road with stone breastworks.

  "The position was attacked, at seven in the morning, by a hundredmen of the 32nd Pioneers; supported by seventy-eight men of myregiment. The guns had had to be left behind. The advance was slowand, owing to the dense bamboo jungle through which we had to pass,and the steepness of the road, great caution was necessary.

  "When we had reached a spot within a few hundred yards of thestockade, fire was suddenly opened on the Pioneers. These, however,moved on steadily, without replying till, having worked their wayclose up to the stockade, they fired a volley; and then, with aloud cheer, charged with bayonets fixed. The Derbyshire detachmentmoved up into support, and the position was captured after a sharpstruggle.

  "A small turning party, under Captain Lumsden, had been detached tothe left but, after proceeding a short distance, they found thatthe road had been cleared to where it passed round a precipice; andthat it was defended by a party of the enemy, behind a stonebreastwork, at ten yards' range. Captain Lumsden and several of hismen were knocked over, and the party were brought to a completestand. So thick was the jungle that they did not know what wasgoing on, on either side; and the first intimation they received,of the capture of the fort, was the descent of a party ofDerbyshires in the rear of the breastworks.

  "The stockade, when it was examined, turned out to be a mostformidable one; about two hundred yards long, both flanks restingon impassable precipices. It was constructed of logs laidhorizontally, with a thick abattis of twelve trees.

  "Next morning the advance on Lingtu was continued, in a dense mist.Information was obtained, from a prisoner, that they would have tocross a spot where there was a stone shoot, down which an avalancheof rocks could be hurled by the defenders. They therefore advancedwith great caution, while a party of the Pioneers crept along thecrest of the ridge, and attacked from the rear the party gatheredat the head of the stone shoot. The road was steep and broken, andthe partially-melted snow lay two feet deep on it. The Pioneerscaptured the stone shoot without loss, and then pushed on over thehills and, without firing a shot, charged straight at the fort; andburst their way through the main gate, before the astonishedThibetans had realized what was happening.

  "Of course, as it was against an enemy of such poor fightingquality as the Thibetans, this little affair affords no idea of theresistance that we can expect in the Tirah; but it does show whatcan be accomplished by our men, in the face of immense naturaldifficulties."