The Ruling Elite

by Deanna Spingola

  Hitler viewed Czechoslovakia as a fraudulent state that violated international law and the law’s emphasis on nationalism and self-determination. The Germans, Slovaks, Hungarians, Ukrainians, and the Poles were not interested in a merger with the Czechs. Hitler accused Beneš, in his “regime of terror,” of attempting to gradually exterminate the Sudeten Germans. Since its creation, officials had forced over 600,000 Germans, out of three-and-a half million, out of their homes under the threat of starvation if they did not leave. 608

  Beneš, an experienced internationalist and politician, figured that Britain and France would side with him if Germany ever challenged his government. After all, it was officials from those countries that initially created Czechoslovakia. Beneš decided to manage the Sudeten issue internationally, with input from like-minded diplomats. He thought that if he conceded to the Germans, who were merely seeking equal treatment, then other minorities in the country would pressure the government for concessions. Czechoslovakia’s biggest political party was the Czech Agrarians and they disavowed any kind of connection with Communism, preferring Hitler to Stalin. The Czechoslovak army had thirty-four divisions as opposed to Germany who was wholly unprepared for war. 609

  Although the British had no treaty obligations to Czechoslovakia, the French did and would use that alliance to intimidate the British into joining with them to fight against Hitler. If the British failed to accept the bait, then others would accuse them of not standing up to what the media claimed was a tyrant. A crisis was bound to erupt, which would necessitate a response from the British who really were unaffected by the situation in Czechoslovakia but nonetheless had to weigh in on the problem as they wanted to avoid a European war. They assumed they could resolve the insoluble Sudeten German issue through negotiation and compromise. The British did not create the Czech crisis but some of them certainly exploited it. 610

  Robert Vansittart, Anthony Eden, Orme Sargent, and Ralph Wigram advocated a military build-up to intimidate Germany. Vansittart stated that this would not prevent Germany’s aggression. In June 1936, Vansittart warned the Defence Policy and Requirements Committee (DPR) that Germany might invade Czechoslovakia in late 1936 or early 1937. In November 1936, Eden would tell the Cabinet this might occur in spring 1937 or thereafter. Vansittart characterized Hitler, Göring and Ribbentrop as lunatics and suggested using economic difficulties and mass propaganda to force Hitler’s hand. 611

  On July 22, 1936, in London, Winston Churchill, during a small private dinner with a group known as The Focus, had agreed to use his oratorical skills against Hitler and Germany. In exchange for his support in their crusade, the group, led by Sir Robert Cohen, managing Director of the Royal Dutch Oil Company would pay Churchill £50,000. 612 Years before, Churchill accused the Jews of being the “the principal inspiration and driving power behind Bolshevism.” “He would have been ill-advised to repeat these obsessive claims in… , and it was little wonder that he now adopted the opposite line. Inspired by his robust line against Hitler, the wealthy and influential flocked to become his friends. The South African gold mining industrialist Sir Henry Strakosch started furnishing to him his own data on German raw material imports; Strakosch estimated that Hitler had spent £1,600 million on armaments since July . . .” 613

  David Irving, in Churchill’s War, said that Strakosch was a Czechoslovakian-born Jew. 614 Arthur R. Butz wrote, “The question of Strakosch’s ethnicity is only important in relation to the question of what political forces were acting, during the thirties, to destroy Hitler. If he was a Jew, then political motivations that would explain his conduct would be obvious. If he was not a Jew, then the question of motivation arises. Why was he out to get Hitler?” In 1935, Strakosch had published a booklet arguing for the restoration of an international gold standard. Butz continues, “The Nazi economic policies were notoriously successful, and have been called The Nazi Miracle . . . The important point is that we see the motivations that Strakosch brought to the campaign against Germany. Hitler was on the way to proving him wrong.” Butz said, “If he had been a Jew, I still would not have described him as Irving did. I would have written ‘a Jewish South African gold miner campaigning for restoration of the international gold standard.’” 615

  While Churchill did not have a large following in the House of Commons in the 1930s, the government allowed him a lot of leverage and special privileges. Many, viewing him as an alternative leader and a real presence among elite politicians, consulted him on a number of important issues and regularly received confidential information. Beginning in 1932, Major Desmond Morton, per consent by Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald (1929-1935) gave him intelligence on German air power. In 1934, Lord Swinton, Secretary of State for Air, with Prime Minister Baldwin’s approval, gave Churchill access to official and secret materials. In June 1936, he organized a delegation of senior Conservatives who shared his views in order to visit Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin (1935-1937). Many shared his pro-war mentality and promoted rearmament and a more aggressive foreign policy.

  British officials were deeply troubled about Germany’s thriving economy as compared to their country’s economic situation. Hitler’s appointee as ambassador to Britain, Ribbentrop, arrived there in October 1936 in order to gain support, warn the British against the Communist menace and to negotiate some kind of an alliance against Bolshevism. Anthony Eden, in a speech on November 20, said that there would no such alliance outside of the British-sponsored “general settlement,” meaning the Versailles Treaty which Hitler was attempting to slightly and justifiably revise. Winston Churchill, of the “war party” was already spewing anti-German propaganda and referring to Germany’s “terrible war machine.” He claimed that Hitler wanted to take over much of Eastern and Southern Europe. 616

  Hitler began economically rejuvenating Germany on February 1, 1933 and within three years, the country experienced prosperity. In 1936, Churchill said, “We will force Hitler into the war, whether he wants it or not.” In November 1936, he told General Robert E. Wood, “Germany is getting too strong, and we must smash her.” In 1937, he told Carl J. Burckhardt, the High Commissioner for Danzig for the League of Nations, that “Germany was again getting too strong, the Germans were only impressed by power; in the event of an armed conflict, the excessive encroachments of National Socialism would help the British to a strong system of alliances.” In the summer of 1937, he told Joachim von Ribbentrop, “If Germany gets too strong, she will be crushed again (as in 1914).” 617

  Churchill, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, criticized Chamberlain’s appeasement policy regarding Hitler. Churchill said in a speech to the House of Commons, “You were given the choice between war and dishonour. You chose dishonour, and you will have war.” On May 28, 1937, when Chamberlain became prime minister, he did not give Churchill a government position. He told Leslie Hore-Belisha that if he had made Churchill a part of the Cabinet “he will dominate it. He won’t give others the chance of even talking.” However, on September 3, 1939, Chamberlain would appoint Churchill as the First Lord of the Admiralty, just a couple of days after Germany invaded Poland. He would function in that capacity until May 11, 1940.

  Germans residing elsewhere wanted to be part of their homeland. The Locarno Treaty, because of the post-war treaties, allowed Allied occupation until 1935. On May 21, 1935, Adolf Hitler stated “In particular, they (the Germans) will uphold and fulfill all obligations arising out of the Locarno Treaty, so long as the other parties are on their side ready to stand by that pact.” The Germans reoccupied the Rhineland in February 1936, and on March 7, the German Army marched in, remilitarizing the Rhineland, the first time since World War I that German troops had been in the Rhineland. Chamberlain praised Churchill’s speech of March 9, in which he opposed Britain and France’s intervention in the Rhineland. The issue divided the Warmongers who did not want Germany to know they were preparing for war, when in fact they were.

  On July 11, 1936, Austrian and Ger
man officials informally discussed the idea of Austrian annexation by Germany. On November 5, 1937, Germany officially viewed Austria for annexation. 618

  Nevertheless, they would allow the citizens of each country to vote on the potential annexation. On March 9, 1938, Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg announced a plebiscite on Austrian independence in four days to take place in a month. Re-unification with Germany meant the termination of the offices of president and chancellor. On March 11, Schuschnigg left office and two days later President Wilhelm Miklas relinquished his position. On April 10, 4,460,778 Austrians voted 99.73% and 44,872,702 German citizens voted 99.02% for Anschluss or Austrian reunification with the Germany, as it was before the Versailles Treaty. 619 On March 13, Germany annexed the German-speaking country of Austria, a nation in dire economic straits and anxious to be part of the more prosperous Third Reich.

  On March 13, German Ambassador Hans-Heinrich Dieckhoff visited the U.S. State Department to discuss the annexation. Secretary of State Cordell Hull was not critical nor did he express disapproval of Anschluss. On March 12-13, the American press did not criticize Germany. However, on March 14, Dieckhoff recalls, a “sudden change took place.” The media sharply denounced the annexation and characterized it as “a breach of treaty, as militarism, as the rape of defenseless little Austria by her big neighbor bristling with arms.” 620 On the same day, the Guardian reported, “On the day on which she was to have voted on her freedom and independence, Austria was last night officially proclaimed a ‘State of the German Reich.’ The Anschluss has been brought into being. A month hence the Austrian people will be asked to say what they think of it.” 621

  Dieckhoff got the impression that Roosevelt “intervened personally and gave instructions to both the State Department and the press.” He thought that both the State Department and the media “were probably, from the very outset, thinking less of Austria than of Czechoslovakia, with all the possible complications.” On March 14, 1938, Dieckhoff again spoke with Hull who was very courteous. However, Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles was quite the opposite. On March 15, Dieckhoff sent a dispatch to the Foreign Office complaining about Welles. Dieckhoff had given him a copy of the decrees incorporating Austria into the Reich and expressed approval over Anschluss. Dieckhoff mentioned the sudden turn of events in the media, which he said were “lies” and asked Welles why the State Department permitted the Jews “to dominate the press and public opinion.” 622

  While Anschluss was occurring, the French ambassador called Lord Halifax to discuss it. Halifax asked him if France planned to respond to the emerging problem in Czechoslovakia. The British sent word to the French government reminding them that it was bound by the Locarno Treaty, signed in London on December 3, 1925, by Britain, France and Germany, which allowed Germany to join the League of Nations. According to Halifax, Britain would only offer economic sanctions or a blockade, if Germany were to occupy Czechoslovakia, in the event that France and the Soviet Union opposed Germany. Therefore, the Czechoslovakian government had to find a solution that was acceptable to the German minority. Halifax felt the timing was disadvantageous to Britain’s plans for warfare and told the French ambassador that the French would have to decide for themselves what to do. 623

  Obviously, after the Anschluss, Hitler would look at Czechoslovakia in his efforts to rescind the Versailles Treaty. Ethnic Germans sequestered elsewhere felt that if Austria could participate in Nationalist Germany, then why not them. However, they certainly were not ready to pull up stakes and relocate from where they had lived for generations. Czechoslovakia was isolated, and her immediate neighbors, Poland, Romania, and Hungary, were antagonistic. The lawyers and politicians at the postwar Peace Conference in Paris created Czechoslovakia, which was a conglomeration of minority nationalities: Slovaks, Hungarians, Ruthenes, and three million Sudeten Germans. The Czechs were the only authentic Czechoslovaks and expected to centralize their new country based on the Czech character. 624

  The Military Intelligence Service warned the British about Germany’s potential invasion of Czechoslovakia so it was no surprise. Chamberlain accepted the positive messages the British ambassador in Berlin gave him. However, the British population was apprehensive because of negative media reports about the validity of the Munich Pact. Meanwhile, the Labour Party tried to escalate a feeling of dissatisfaction regarding appeasement, which alarmed Chamberlain, especially among members of his side of the House. Some MPs thought Chamberlain should either leave office or repeal his policies. 625

  Hitler advocated for the Germans living in Czechoslovakia, but had no intentions of forcing any kind of annexation. On March 24, 1938, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain said that Britain was unwilling or ready to defend Czechoslovakia against unprovoked aggression, even though no one even hinted at such an approach. In the February 1921, there were 3,123,000 Germans in Czechoslovakia—23.4% of the total population. In 1930, there were 3,231,688, representing 22.3% of the population. In 1939, the West German Statistisches Bundesamt would show that there were 3,477,000 Germans there. If Germany invaded Czechoslovakia, Britain would not respond. However, it was possible that political pressures might coerce the British to join a struggle against oppression. 626

  Chamberlain believed that the Versailles Treaty had created the Sudeten issue and did not object to allowing Germany to alleviate the current treaty-related problems. Lord Halifax had discussed the issue with Hitler in November 1937. Chamberlain wanted Germany to use diplomacy instead of force with Czechoslovakia. In exchanged, Britain vowed not to force to avert the adjustments that Germany wanted to enact. Further, Chamberlain did not oppose the annexation of Austria. Chamberlain went to Germany to discuss this situation with Hitler and then, at the Munich Conference obliged Hitler. In September 1938, Britain seemed unconcerned about the balance of power in Europe. 627

  As it had in Austria, a German national movement began in Czechoslovakia which created a crisis for Hitler who encouraged it as he wanted to liberate the Germans from this weaponized country, an ally of the Soviet Union, in 1935, when Beneš became president, and France, both of which would not welcome the any kind of a German hegemony. He would not risk French intervention by invading the country. He hoped that France would be preoccupied with Italy in their conflict in the Mediterranean, and then he would try to negotiate with Czechoslovakian politicians while continuing to encourage the national movement. He anticipated the possibilities of the upcoming Munich Conference in September 1938. On March 28, he met with the Sudeten representatives and appointed Konrad Henlein as their leader. Henlein would attempt to negotiate with Czechoslovakian officials, especially Beneš, who, like Stalin, viewed Hitler as an adversary. There was to be absolutely no violence on the part of the Germans. 628

  Henlein led the German minority (800,000 people) in Sudetenland, located in the western regions of Czechoslovakia inhabited mostly by ethnic Germans, especially the border areas of Bohemia, Moravia, and parts of Silesia. Those Germans, like most other peoples, suffered economically due to the worldwide depression. They voted, with a 90% majority, to reunite with Germany which was experiencing prosperity because of its new economic reforms. On May 21, 1938, despite their desires and a legal vote, Czech officials refused to allow the Sudetenland Germans to return to their homeland and actually mobilized military forces against them. Hitler threatened to deploy the Wehrmacht. It became obvious to Hitler that there were forces, within several neighboring countries, which were targeting him. 629

  On September 12, 1938, Hitler spoke about the Sudeten crisis at a rally in Nuremberg during which he denounced the actions of the Czechoslovakian government. 630 On September 15 and again on September 22, Chamberlain met with Hitler and agreed to cede the Sudetenland to Germany. French Prime Minister Édouard Daladier did the same. Benito Mussolini suggested a conference of the major powers in Munich, scheduled on September 29, with Hitler, Daladier and Chamberlain. They signed the Munich Pact, on September 30, 1938, which reve
rsed the consequences of the Versailles Treaty. It also granted Germany’s immediate annexation and military occupation of the Sudetenland, along the country’s borders inhabited by German speakers. The Czechoslovakian government, though not present at the conference, promised to abide by the agreement. Germany would take the Sudetenland between October 1 and 10. Hitler issued an ultimatum—release all of the Germans to return to their homeland by October 1, or Germany would invade. The Munich Pact meant peace for some but for others, the British and the French, it meant preparation for warfare.

  King George VI and the royal family, Chamberlain and his cabinet, and most of the British population had absolutely no interest or desire in war. Chamberlain received a hero’s welcome when he returned from Munich and announced that he negotiated a mutually beneficial agreement with Hitler. Many members of the royal family, including Edward VIII and the Duke of Kent wanted to know how to create the same economic miracle that Hitler had in Germany. The royal family was so pleased with Chamberlain’s accomplishments that they invited him to join them on the balcony of Buckingham Palace to greet the people and accept, along with them, the appreciation of the crowds who had gathered. Chamberlain, besmirched by establishment historians, was the first Prime Minister that the royal family had honored in this manner. Unfortunately, due to a resurgence of World War I-type propaganda, even the pro-German Brits would turn against Germany when war erupted in 1939. 631

  After the Munich Conference, Lord Halifax assumed control of foreign policy from Chamberlain and he initiated a campaign to compel Germany to engage in a war. Franklin D. Roosevelt and his administration were intent on inciting a war with Germany. Assistant Secretary Francis B. Sayre, of the State Department had already negotiated with British Ambassador Sir Ronald Lindsay on September 9, 1938 in an attempt to establish an Anglo-American trade treaty. Sayre was the same person who headed an Interdepartmental Committee that met on April 19, 1937, to “help” Manuel Quezon, President of the Philippines, to decide the readiness of the Philippines for independence. He was insistent that Germany was threatening a war. 632