The Ruling Elite
Page 35
Potocki, undeniably anti-Semitic, like most Poles, assumed that Americans based their attitude on Jewish influence without understanding that FDR and his cronies regarded World War I as beneficial and they were hostile towards people who were cynical about American militarism and exceptionalism following his quarantine speech on October 5, 1937 in Chicago, calling for an international “quarantine of the aggressor nations” as an option to American neutrality and non-intervention. In the 1920s, FDR had advocated peacetime military conscription, an unconstitutional standing army. FDR, due to his very militant mentality, favored an aggressive attitude toward Germany and was now advocating the recruitment of men to fight her. He exploited the Jewish issue to validate antagonism toward Germany while manipulating compassion for the ostensibly oppressed in any given circumstance, a contemporary tactic used by most American politicians. 952
While FDR was quite willing to squander American lives and plotting to get the nation involved in war against Germany, his accomplices, the same people who advocated warfare, devised a way to enable their fellow religionists to avoid jeopardizing their lives in warfare. The Central Committee of the American Jews at the 47th Annual Conference, which they held on June 26, 1937, disseminated the “Exemption of Jews from military service. According to the “highest interpretation of Judaism” the circular stated, “Our Talmud tells us ‘When you go to war, do not as the first but as the last, so that you may return as the first.’” 953 Given the date of the meeting and the distribution of the circular, they evidently had information that American citizens were not privileged to have.
Further, it said, “Why should we, the only truly international people, be concerned with the… interests of Goyim nations? We must do everything… to help the great president who has helped us so greatly in establishing control. Support the draft law… Support England and France, for they are fighting Judah’s greatest enemy, the Goyim German State… . We can repeat our triumphs of 1918 if we maintain our united front and the goyim will fight while we profit, with the aid of our friend in Washington. Powerful Jews will be on all Draft Boards, and Jewish physicians will protect you from military service… in case religious exemption cannot be prepared in time. You are warned to renounce, abjure, repudiate and deny any of this information if questioned by Gentiles, even under oath, as outlined in the Talmud and justified for the preservation of our race.” 954
Behind the scenes, in 1938, Bernard Baruch had told General George C. Marshall, “We are going to lick that fellow Hitler. He isn’t going to get away with it.” Of course, the talk of potential warfare was centered on German totalitarianism without so much as a hint of the Soviet’s two decades of murder, genocide in the Ukraine, and the killing of thousands of people who might have opposed Stalin’s brutal regime if they had lived. It was not totalitarianism but the fact that Hitler rejected high-interest foreign loans and threw the international bankers out of the country. That is the real reason that Britain suddenly opposed Germany. Long before Poland became an issue, Churchill told General Robert E. Wood that Germany was getting too strong and that they would have to “smash her.” 955
Beck sought to establish alliances with France and Britain. Germany was still Poland’s most vital market until the “international instigators” voiced their opinion. The politicians were still irked over losing Czechoslovakia, but they discovered another troublesome situation they could exploit—Danzig, the medieval city that they had summarily amputated from Germany. Its German citizens clamored for reunification. 956 On October 24, 1938, German authorities approached Polish officials seeking to reunite the city-state of Danzig to Germany. Lipski told Ribbentrop that the highly-propagandized Polish population would never approve of the transfer of Danzig, given the resumption of the anti-German media campaign. 957
Hitler had formed relations with Britain through Ribbentrop, Germany’s Ambassador to Britain (1936-1938) as he believed that friendly relations between the two countries were crucial. He even offered Britain the use of fifteen German army divisions and the entire naval fleet to support the British anywhere in the world. 958 Hitler was willing to relinquish Upper Silesia, which included the industrial areas of Posen and West Prussia, German territories for centuries. At least one million Germans resided there. He also offered a twenty-five year non-aggression pact. On October 31, Warsaw officials confirmed Lipski’s viewpoint but agreed to guarantee the minority rights of Danzig’s Germans, which totaled ninety-six percent of the city. 959
On November 19, 1938, in Washington, Bullitt had a meeting with Jerzy Potocki to discuss European issues. Bullitt brought him up to date with what he had discussed with the Count’s relative, Joseph Potocki, in November 1937 in Warsaw. On November 21, Potocki reported the details of his conversation with Bullitt to the Polish Foreign Ministry. He said that Bullitt hated Hitler and Germany and that only military force, involving America, France and Britain would prevent German expansion. Bullitt thought that these countries needed two years to complete their arms plan to fight Germany. 960 FDR stated that “the Germans understand only force.” 961
On November 21, Jerzy Potocki cabled Lipski and other Polish diplomats, after Bullitt informed them that FDR was committed to having America enter into the next European war, apparently acknowledging that there was going to be a long war, perhaps as long as six years, in the not too distant future, a war from which Germany could never recover. Potocki, not exhibiting the same fervor for war as Bullitt and FDR, wondered how they could incite such a war because Germany had no reason or intentions of assaulting Britain or France. Bullitt assured Potocki that America, providing that Britain or France initiated the war, would intervene against Germany, even in an inevitable Soviet-German war. Bullitt expected that Germany, after fighting Russia, would surrender to the Allies. Potocki assured him that Poland would oppose Germany rather than allow Germany to alter her western borders. Bullitt knew he could count on Poland to strongly oppose Germany.962
In October 1938, Ribbentrop had initiated a discussion with Lipski about Danzig as Germany wanted the German-speaking city returned to Germany and offered to compensate Poland with access to the Danzig harbor as well as the construction projects previously mentioned. The Polish government rejected all propositions and halted any further negotiation. Since Bullitt’s intervention, Polish politicians had a different attitude towards Germany. On December 1, following Potocki’s report, Poland became concerned about the autonomy of the Ukrainians, almost as if taking her cue from Bullitt. 963
In November, after the delegates agreed on peaceful resolutions during the Munich Conference, Lipski met with Ribbentrop in Berlin to deliberate the Danzig and Corridor issues. Beck already directed Lipski to discourage any kind of legitimate resolution to these issues. On November 22, Lipski left for Poland, promising Ribbentrop that he would discuss the Danzig situation, which he had no intention of doing as Poland had already decided she would make no concessions. On November 10, Lipski had argued that there would never be a Franco-German friendship treaty, something that Hitler had offered French leaders, because of the anti-Jewish demonstrations. However, Ribbentrop would sign such a declaration in Paris on December 6. 964
Beck was willing to negotiate with Ribbentrop until Britain arbitrarily withdrew its support of Hitler. Britain, by their renewed support of Poland, encircled Germany. 965 Warmongering Britain, while pretending to befriend Germany, deceptively interceded with Polish officials regarding Hitler’s requests. 966 He viewed this as a hostile act and “turned from friendship to bitter enmity.” Thousands of Germans lived under Poland’s subjugation and they had been the object of abuse and ethnic liquidation for two decades. The most recent outrage was the castration of six young men. The Germans had freed Poland from the Soviets and then the Allies deprived them of territory through the Versailles Treaty. Certain Polish officials elected this way to repay the Germans. 967
On December 2, 1938, Carl J. Burckhardt, the High Commissioner to Danzig, ha
d a conversation with Anthony J. Biddle, the U.S. Ambassador to Poland. Biddle was an international banker with connections to the Morgan bankers. He was friends with Bullitt and ideologically supported Roosevelt. Biddle told Burckhardt that Poland was ready to wage a war over Danzig. In April, there would be a new crisis in Poland which would put public pressure on Daladier and Chamberlain. He called it a holy war. That event would be Britain’s promise to Poland on March 31, 1939 and the White House would support it. 968
On January 5, Hitler told Beck that he would not deprive Poland of access to the sea. Beck rejected all of his concessions. 969 On January 10, Biddle informed FDR and Hull about his talk with Beck and his conversations with Hitler and Ribbentrop just a few days before. Hitler was upset over FDR’s message to Congress on January 4 during which he referred to Hitler as an aggressor and to a potential European war. Biddle’s report also mentioned that Poland and France had to decide about their stance against Germany. Bullitt had introduced anti-German sentiments among the Polish officer corps which grew in intensity. Biddle anticipated Polish rhetorical attacks against Germany designed to provoke a confrontation. Polish officials, even Beck, per Biddle, expressed increasing disdain against Germany, which soon spread to the population. 970
On January 12, Potocki reported on America’s domestic situation saying that the Jews perpetuated propaganda which caused an increasing hatred of Hitler. He said that the Jews controlled almost 100 percent of the media including film, radio and the press, accusing the Germans of engaging in persecution. Potocki also admitted that the Germans were incarcerating the Jews in camps. While it was black propaganda, it nevertheless was very effective in igniting animosity in the population who, because of the fabricated news reports emanating from Europe were utterly ill-informed of the actual situation. Americans regarded Hitler as the “greatest danger threatening the world.” Immigrants from Germany and Czechoslovakia, many of them Jewish, praised American freedom, which they compared to the tyrannical countries they left, which served to arouse hostility. 971
In December 1938, Anthony Eden had visited New York, ostensibly to deliver an address to the National Association of Manufacturers. He actually intended to visit FDR in some kind of unofficial capacity to discuss Europe and get his support. On January 31, 1939, the U.S. Senate Military Affairs Committee met secretly with FDR to discuss the war. At least eighty percent of the American citizens were against foreign entanglements. Poland was getting stronger which displeased Stalin but he had a good friend in London. Yet, the only way that Chamberlain would pledge his aid to Poland is if he had American support. Soviet agents were working day and night since their incursion into the State Department. 972
On February 1, 1939, in Warsaw, Beck told Ribbentrop that Poland wanted to integrate Ukraine as they wanted land access to the Black Sea. Poland actually planned to decrease Soviet power. None of their aspirations had anything to do with resisting National Socialism nor did it concern Germany’s foreign policies. Poland repeatedly stated their longtime objectives, to drive out and replace the East Germans. From Poland’s recreation in 1918, she had been battling her neighbors and disputing the border in an attempt to initiate a war. Germany tried to maintain friendly relations with a very hostile Poland and refrained from attempting to negotiate a revision of the Versailles Treaty with reference to Danzig. 973
In the 1920s and 1930s, in their efforts for independence, some Poles developed nationalism, unlike either Marxist or Zionist socialism. They disseminated literature promoting a flamboyant, menacing, aggressive mentality, including the threat of warfare against the Germans and the Soviets, both of which were numerically superior. Polish officials, prior to the war’s outbreak in 1939, claimed that they would ultimately determine the negotiations with Hitler in Berlin. 974
On February 25, 1939, Sir Howard Kennard told Lord Halifax that Poland, igniting deliberate disorder, was terminating ethnic Germans working in agricultural or industrial positions. Despite their individual strengths, along with the mentality of the country, Moscicki, Kwiatkowski and Beck ultimately failed their country. The catered to Kennard’s demands and the influence of Leon Noel, the French ambassador who collaborated with willing Poles who sought to “sabotage the policy of friendship with Germany.” Kennard and Noel flattered the Poles into thinking that they had British and French support against Germany. 975
The Poles forced the closing of all German schools. 976 Poland’s agenda was obvious when representatives from both countries met in Berlin on February 27, to talk about issues concerning ethnic minorities. Hitler tactfully and repeatedly approached Polish officials seeking a settlement of the Danzig question and the territorial link between East Prussia and the Reich. Beck indicated that he was not going to cooperate with, or pay reparations, or rescind any aspect of the Versailles Treaty or make adjustments on Germany’s eastern boundary. Further, he authorized the reinforcement of the Polish policy towards the German minority, including promoting an intensified bias against Germans in the press.
On March 10, Stalin delivered a speech to the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. He said, “We stand for peaceful, close, and good neighborly relations with all neighboring countries which have a common frontier with the Soviet Union. We stand and will stand on that position insofar as these countries will maintain such relations with the Soviet Union and insofar as they do not attempt to infringe directly or indirectly the interests, integrity, and inviolability, of the frontiers of the Soviet state.” 977 Stalin intimated that the west could not rely on his support but rather he was open to some kind of a relationship with Germany.
Polish authorities officially recognized the German occupation of a remnant of Czechoslovakia on March 15, 1939, and the resulting independence of Slovakia on March 16. However, the U.S. Government denounced Germany’s actions and her appropriation of Bohemia and Moravia. On March 18, Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles condemned Germany’s actions to the American media and suggested a retaliatory military attack. 978 Had Britain and the United States not interfered, Hitler might have been able to resolve the Danzig issue. On March 21, Ribbentrop told Lipski that he hoped that they could restore Danzig to the Reich. 979
On March 22, Lithuania relinquished Memel, a 700-square mile strip of land in northeastern Prussia, back to Germany. Lithuania had seized the land in 1923 and had begun incarcerating the German residents because they were attempting to retain their heritage. Following the transfer of Memel back to Germany, Hitler sent three army divisions to East Prussia, near the border of Memel. Rydz-Śmigły then accused Germany of trying to forcefully annex Danzig, despite the fact that the German forces were actually moving away from Danzig. This occurred at the same time that Germany occupied Czechoslovakia in mid-March. On March 26, 1939, Lipski, in a memo, rejected Hitler’s Danzig-Autobahn plan. Lipski wrote, “Any further pursuit of these German plans, especially as far as the return of Danzig to the Reich is concerned, will mean war with Poland.” Rydz-Śmigły then began a mobilization against Germany. 980 Later, the Soviets, in the Battle of Memel, October 5-22, 1944 and January 28, 1945, would beat the German forces. The Soviets then transferred Memel to the Lithuanian SSR in 1947.
On March 25, Hitler issued a directive to Brauchitsch, the commander-in-chief, stating that he did not intend to settle the Danzig problem through force and thus compel Poland to approach Britain for help. 981 A. J. P. Taylor wrote, “Hitler’s objective was alliance with Poland, not her destruction. 982 Even Churchill admitted that Germany was not militarily ready for war. Germany viewed any impending war as “only a defensive war,” because “heavy artillery was entirely lacking, tanks were at the test stage and the ammunition situation was catastrophic.” 983 On March 26, the West Marches Society, an anti-German group, had held a public meeting in Bromberg, Polish West Prussia and thousands of Poles from the area attended where they heard rabble-rousing speakers angrily condemn the Germans while the listeners shouted “Down with
Hitler!” or “We want Danzig!” and “We want Königsberg!” After the meeting, energized Polish mobs canvassed the streets and, without any provocation, opportunistically attacked unfortunate Germans who happened to be in the area. 984 On that same day, the Polish officials, per their collaboration with Britain, gave Hitler their answer; they refused to negotiate and rejected his moderate requests.
Rumors ran rampant throughout Poland that war had erupted between Germany and Poland. Polish editors, especially at Polska Zbrojna (The Polish Army) assured its readers that Poland would be triumphant. After all, Polish soldiers were superior and Poland had a powerful military force. They had nothing to fear from the Germans who were, according to one top Polish General, “fatally deficient.” Meanwhile, Ribbentrop was attempting to secure a German-Polish agreement. He met with Lipski again on March 27, at which time he strenuously objected to the Polish persecutions, especially at Bromberg. Polish authorities had no intentions of restoring Danzig. Beck reiterated those intentions to Moltke on March 28. Lipski warned Ribbentrop that German attempts to seize Danzig would result in military action. In the meantime, the British were preparing for war against Germany. 985