Why Nationalism
Page 1
Why Nationalism
Why
Why
Nationalism
Yael Tamir
Princeton University Press
Princeton and Ox ford
Copyright © 2019 by Princeton University Press
Published by Princeton University Press
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6 Oxford Street, Woodstock, Oxfordshire OX20 1TR
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All Rights Reserved
Library of Congress Control Number: 2018953761
ISBN 9780691190105
British Library Cataloging- in- Publication Data is available
Editorial: Rob Tempio and Matt Rohal
Production Editorial: Mark Bel is
Text Design: Leslie Flis
Jacket Design: Layla Mac Rory
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Copyeditor: Dawn Hall
This book has been composed in Arno Pro
Printed on acid- free paper. ∞
Printed in the United States of America
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This book is dedicated
with much love and admiration
to my great teacher and mentor
Sir Isaiah Berlin
Contents
Foreword b y Dani Rodrik ix
A Personal Note xiii
Part I: The Return of History
1 The New Nationalism 3
2 Never Say Never 13
3 Untidy Compromises 22
4 The Two Faces of Janus 26
5 Nutopia 33
Part II: Love and Marriage:
The Virtues of Nationalism
6 Living beyond Our Psychological Means 43
7 Nation Building 52
8 National Creativity 61
9 This Place We Call Home 68
vi i • Contents
10 La Vie Quotidian 72
11 Subjects into Citizens 77
12 A Short History of the Cross- Class Coalition 85
Part III: A Divided House
13 The Breakdown of the Cross- Class Coalition 93
14 One Nation, Divided, under Stress 102
15 The Elephant in the Room 108
16 The Birth of a Nationalist 119
17 The Nationalism of the Vulnerable 127
18 The Nationalism of the Affluent 142
Part IV: A New Social Contract
19 Liberal Nationalism 155
20 This Is the Time 166
21 A Race to the Bottom 172
Notes 183
Index 199
Foreword
Nationalism is one of those words that evokes a knee- jerk, in-
variably negative response in polite company. Associated with
military aggression, genocide, and ethnic cleansing, it is tainted
by the worst horrors of the twentieth century. Our present- day
demagogues in the United States and Europe— Donald Trump,
Marine Le Pen, Viktor Orban, and others— are further reinforcing
this image by fanning the flames of nativism, xenophobia, and
religious bigotry in its name.
Yael “Yuli” Tamir sees the destructive forces that nationalism
can unleash. But she also sees something else that few liberals do
these days: a modern democracy needs nationalism— or the
nation- state— as much as it needs liberalism. As she explains in
this fascinating book, decades of economic prosperity and appar-
ent political consensus over liberal democratic principles have
blinded us to the work nationalism was doing beneath the surface.
Professor Tamir’s bold thesis is that this work was, for the most
part, constructive. The spread of economic opportunity, education,
and political equality were all the products, she says, of an “alliance
between the nation and the state.” No institution has done better
than the nation- state, and there are no alternatives yet in sight.
Bolder still is Yuli Tamir’s call for a return to a nationalist
ethos. Is “Putting America First?” a fascist slogan, she asks. Her
answer: not necessarily. To be sure, she is not defending the
xenophobic nativism of Donald Trump. Nationalism need not
mean a sense of supremacy vis- à- vis other nations. It can serve
instead “a desire to regenerate a sense of commitment among
fellow nationals.” Liberals must relearn the indispensable unify-
ing role that a shared, cross- class cultural narrative plays.
x • Foreword
The uncomfortable fact for many liberals and socialists alike
is that “no social contract and no system of distribution can func-
tion as an open political framework”— that is, without borders
and rules on who belongs, who doesn’t. The nation and the state
depend on each other. Tamir emphasizes here the cultural, psy-
chological content of nationalism— the meaning- creation as-
pect that ties us to each other. I would emphasize equally the
economic aspects. The nation, however constructed, needs
the state to provide what an economist would call public
goods— education, infrastructure, law and order. The state in
turn needs the nation for legitimacy, interpersonal trust, and a
sense of common fate.
The key question is: who are the people? Liberals and na-
tionalists differ in what Tamir calls their “ethos of formation”:
nationalists stress history and fate while liberals believe in
voluntarism. But, as she points out, true voluntarism is an option
for only a lucky few. Only a tiny minority of skilled professionals
and wealthy investors has the luxury to roam the world in pur-
suit of wider social networks and expanded economic oppor-
tunities. These cosmopolitan globalists— citizens of nowhere, in
Theresa May’s evocative language— have managed to revoke
their responsibilities within their home nation without in fact
taking on corresponding obligations anywhere else. The result-
ing economic and social polarization within nations makes it
much more difficult to construct a “unifying narrative.” With the
elites having absconded thanks to globalization, the political
playing field is now wide open for nativist extremists.
Tamir recognizes that nationalism can be exclusionary and
turn nasty when it is coupled with violation of minority groups’
rights. She argues that this can be overcome by accepting the
right to be different and fostering empathy for citizens who are
cultural outsiders. In the end, she acknowledges that her brand
Foreword • xi
of nationalism is a compromise among liberal and national prin-
ciples, an “untidy mix.” What Tamir argues for, in the title of her
earlier book, is liberal nationalism; hers is a conditional defense
of nationalism.
Many liberals will no doubt think this goes too far toward glo-
rifying some majority “identity” and “culture” at the expense of
minorities. Stil , they will have to answer the challenge Tamir has
put to them. Xenophobia and nativism have little justification,
but this does not mean that the demand for recognition and dig-
nity
of those left behind by neoliberal globalism is without
moral value.
Like almost every ideology, nationalism can be taken in de-
structive or constructive directions. The great value of Tamir’s
book is to show us that there is indeed a positive direction.
The book goes much beyond bowing to the obvious reality that
the nation- state is back; it presents a principled case for why we
need it politically. Tamir argues we can and must harness nation-
alism for the good of society. We better listen to her message
before it is too late to fend off the extremists and save national-
ism from the fascists.
Dani Rodrik
A
Personal
Note
I am a strange political creature; I have been a labor activist all
my adult life, a fully committed human rights activist (one of the
founders of the Israeli peace movement and for a while the chair
of the Israeli Human Rights Association) and a liberal political
theorist. In my private life I was fortunate enough to be some-
what of a global trotter. Hence it seemed only natural that I’d be
a firm supporter of globalism and the set of values that comes
with it: open borders, free trade, and free movement. But liber-
alism always seemed to me missing the human point. A political
theory should be attuned to human needs and aspirations, and
liberalism has been adjusting itself to a very particular kind of
life experience.
It was probably my upbringing that made me attentive to na-
tional claims. For many years my pro- nationalism views were
seen, at best, as irrelevant, a relic of a troubling past that should be
transcendent. At times my academic friends turned a blind eye; at
others they hoped I’d grow out of it. But when everybody was
rejoicing the victory of liberalism I went the other way. Maybe
because of my years in politics (serving in two Israeli govern-
ments, first as minister of immigration [1998– 2001] and then as
minister of education [2006– 9]), I realized that the pull of the
liberal argument was class- based— my class. I also followed,
with great worry, the way members of other classes turned the
other way. I could feel the earth trembling under liberal feet. It
wasn’t due to the well- orchestrated joy of the liberal victory
party—it was because the liberal party was restricted in scope;
though all my friends were attending, many stayed outside the
fence.
xiv • A Personal Note
In 2001 I ended a paper titled “Class and Nation” with the fol-
lowing words:
Defensive- regressive nationalism threatens those who are eager
to ride the waves of global open markets. For them nationalism
is no more than a set of burdensome sentimental recollections,
for all the rest it is still the most profitable socio- economic op-
tion. It is thus rational, for the immobile classes to try and force
the mobile classes to participate in the nationalist game— they
can easily be tempted to do so by exerting political pressures
and quite often by means of social and political violence. When
members of the mobile classes try, in order to loosen the social
bonds, to either ignore or solve the conflict they are accused of
non- patriotic tendencies. The class conflict has been translated
into national terms.
Marx was, then, wrong about the century in which class strug-
gles will take place. If such struggles will erupt they will be in the
twenty first century. And they will not feature the international soli-
darity of the proletariat. They will be struggles in which the im-
mobile classes fight against each other as well against their own
mobile elites. Members of the middle classes for whom globaliza-
tion is no less threatening are likely to join the immobile, making
them a social power that cannot be ignored.
The workers of the world will never unite. They have no real
interest to do so. Nationalism is therefore here to stay. Yet it might
turn from the vision of the elites into their nightmare. It will join
hands with every ideology that fosters closer and justifies exclusion.
Xenophobic nationalism, the kind fostered by Le- Pan, Jorg Hider,
the late Pim Fortuyn, by advocates of transfer policies in Israel as
well as by supporters of White Australia or White California, will
become more popular. It is not, however, as many have suspected,
a nationalism driven by irrational forces. It is a rational nationalism
A Personal Note • xv
driven by the self- interest of the masses to protect them from a
global dream they cannot share.
Can these developments be avoided or slowed down? The pres-
ent global crisis provides an opportunity for change. The terrorist
attack on September 11 made members of the mobile and affluent
classes in America, and elsewhere, much more aware of their sus-
ceptibility to life- threatening risks. The present economic crisis
makes them aware of their economic vulnerability . This may inspire,
in the upper classes, a will to come back home in order to form a
new “risk pool” which will defend their interests, as well as the in-
terests of lower classes. If this will be the outcome of September
11th events then they will enhance national solidarity and delay the
class struggle. If, however, the different classes keep marching on
different routes, a moment of confrontation will arrive.1
Needless to say, in the seventeen years since 9/11, things
haven’t gotten any better; in fact, they have gotten worse. Many
now realize it is time for change. This book is written with the
hope that the present melancholy and sense of defeat among
liberals will be replaced with a new political awareness that
might lead to fresh political ideas and some better political
arrangements.
In order for such changes to happen, liberals should acknowl-
edge that their theoretical and political mistakes were grounded
in a misinterpretation of one of the most basic notions of all—
human freedom. Freedom was never just about the ability to
move or trade freely; it was about the ability of individuals to
govern their life, make meaningful choices, and live productively.
For several decades liberals consistently ignored the fact that
these kinds of freedoms were restricted not only by race or gen-
der but also by transgenerational poverty associated with one’s
place of birth. The marginalization of class talk and the reluctance
xvi • A Personal Note
to turn the fight against poverty into a major motivational po-
litical force channeled the liberal progressive debate away from
questions that are relevant to the sinking middle. Members of
the middle classes thus lost trust in the ruling liberal elites and
questioned their wil ingness to protect the interests of the different
social classes.
We are therefore facing a unique historical moment character-
ized by a decline in social trust and the erosion of liberal-
progressive leadership. Libera
l democrats are asked to answer
questions typical of constitutive moments: Who are we? What
defines our common political identity? Why should we trust one
another? And how can we work together to create a safer future?
Unfortunately, they have no adequate answers.
Nationalism has a long tradition of answering these same
questions, and it is therefore back, yet without the balancing
power of liberalism and democracy it can easily turn destructive.
In order to prevent it from going astray, the three- way partner-
ship among nationalism, liberalism, and democracy must be
renewed. It has given the twentieth century some of its finest
hours and could become the savior of the twenty- first century.
The much- discussed crisis of modern democracies is inherently
associated with the breakdown of this partnership. Democracy
cannot be restored as a purely utilitarian project, only as a na-
tional one— as a framework that provides meaning and reasons
for mutual care and responsibility. Self- centered individualism
must therefore be replaced with a more col ectivist spirit that
nationalism knows how to kindle. This book is an attempt to
offer a middle ground that can restore the power of the nation-
state, making it more profitable for the many, not only for the few.
Part I
The Return of History
Hope is certainly not the same thing as optimism. It is not the
conviction that something will turn out wel , but the certainty
that something makes sense regardless of how it turns out.
Vaclav Havel, Distur bing the Peace (1986)
1
The New Nationalism
It has been a long time since streets were crowded with people
waving national flags; now people are marching all over the
globe: in Barcelona, Britain, Austria, and France, in the main
streets of Kurdistan, in the United States, and in the public
squares of Istanbul. Flag waving for and against political causes
is back in fashion. Nationalism is everywhere.
The reemergence of nationalism has taken the world by sur-
prise. This was supposed to be a liberal and democratic century;
history was about to end and the flat world promised to bring
the inhabitants of the globe closer together. Liberals believed that
their century (starting from 1945) would see the end of wars, the