The Camden Expedition of 1864

by Michael J Forsyth

  31. Crawford, Kansas in the Sixties, 122–123; Noah Andre Trudeau, Like Men of War, 198; and OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 735–736 and 811.

  32. Crawford, Kansas in the Sixties, 124; Burke, Official Military History of the Kansas Regiments, 428; and Lonnie J. White, ed., “A Bluecoat’s Account of the Camden Expedition,” AHQ (Spring 1965), 88.

  33. Crawford, Kansas in the Sixties, 124; and Dudley Taylor Cornish, The Sable Arm, 177.

  34. Crawford, Kansas in the Sixties, 126–127. (Emphasis in original.) Crawford’s times in this paragraph are slightly mistaken as he entered the fray closer to 10:00 A.M.

  35. Cornish, The Sable Arm, 177.

  36. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 671.

  37. Ibid., 697.

  38. Ibid., 697 and 725.

  39. Ibid., 698 and 725.

  40. Ibid., 698, 725, 730, 735, and 808; and Buckalew, “Hillsboro’s Soldier-Citizen: Horatio Gates Perry Williams,” AHQ (Spring 1972), 48–49. Darnall received a severe wound before Dengler arrived to drive the Confederate regiment back.

  41. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 690.

  42. Blessington, Walker’s Texas Division, 249–250; and Walker, “The War of Secession West of the Mississippi River,” 62–64.

  43. Walker, “The War of Secession West of the Mississippi River,” 64.

  44. Ibid.

  45. Ibid.; and OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 817.

  46. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 817; Walker, “The War of Secession West of the Mississippi River,” 64–65; and Johansson, “Peculiar Honor: A History of the 28th Texas Cavalry (Dismounted),” 194–195.

  47. Bearss, Steele’s Retreat From Camden, 152; Walker, “The War of Secession West of the Mississippi River, 65; and OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 817–818.

  48. Ibid.; and Walker, “The War of Secession West of the Mississippi River,” 65–66.

  49. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 670 and 690.

  50. Ibid.

  51. Ibid., 691, 759, and 787–788; and Burke, Official Military History of the Kansas Regiments, 429. Both armies’ casualty reports are incomplete since Thayer, in the Union army, and Walker, in the Confederate, did not file reports.

  11

  Steele Loses a Campaign but Saves an Army

  Although there were still a few days left before the campaign would actually conclude, in reality the six-week Camden Expedition had already ended. On the surface this minor action in 1864 appears as little more that a footnote in Civil War historiography. In reality it had an effect far out of proportion to the resources committed by the Union authorities. A full analysis of the facts in context with corresponding events in the Red River Valley and subsequent actions east of the Mississippi reveals the great opportunity that the Confederates allowed to slip from their grasp. Before an analysis of the expedition in full light however, a discussion of the final days of this exhausting campaign is in order.

  The Federal army had successfully defeated three major assaults by the Confederate army at Jenkins’ Ferry. Further, they brought off all their trains and artillery. Yet, the Federals were still in great danger since Fagan’s 4,000 cavalry lurked somewhere between the Arkansas River and the Ouachita. Of greater danger was the debilitating effect that hunger was wreaking on man and animal. The soldiers were certainly suffering from lack of food, but the draft animals were literally starving. The horrid weather conditions compounded the problem by making an already tough march more exhausting as the army struggled through deep, sticky mud. Steele had made it north of the Saline, but could he continue the retreat any farther with desperately weak horses and mules?

  On the afternoon of the 30th of April Steele sent scouts forward to determine the condition of the road between Jenkins’ Ferry and Little Rock. Having deployed the scouts, Steele moved the army down the road a short distance to ensure that the force was beyond direct observation of the Rebels. As darkness began to fall, the scouts reported their findings and the information was foreboding. The road ascending out of the Saline Bottom eastward was a veritable morass of deep mud, and even when the army reached higher ground it did not promise relief from backbreaking toil. The scouts believed that “the road had become impassable for trains and artillery.” If true, the draft animals could simply not pull the wagons out of the bottom. Therefore, Steele decided to abandon low priority wagons and equipment in order to use the remaining animals to double up the teams on the vehicles considered more important. In accordance with this decision, Steele issued orders designating select vehicles for destruction. He placed his trusty quartermaster, Captain Henry, in charge of the operation with instructions to destroy all excess transport. Those vehicles protected from the directive included all army headquarters wagons, ambulances, and artillery. Further, the order limited each division to only five vehicles to carry ordnance. All other wagons would be put to the torch. Henry was to commence the operation when details from the divisions reported for duty.1

  Henry began methodically assembling the mass of transports in the early evening darkness just off the Military Road. As the order reached the division and brigade commanders, they authorized the formation of details to assist Captain Henry. After some time, all the work parties reported to the chief quartermaster and he quickly set about the business of destroying the wagons. Soon after midnight Henry had an enormous bonfire blazing in the early morning twilight. The fire drew many spectators who were fascinated by the extent of the conflagration. Private Sperry, placed on the work party, commented that the most interesting aspect of the task was rummaging through the contents of the wagons. Many of the soldiers took great delight in exchanging their tattered uniforms for the “glossy coats with shining buttons” of the officers before torching the train. After taking what they wanted, the privates set the wagons aflame. Sperry reported that “mess-chests, company-boxes, etc., made excellent fuel.” Before assembling for a 4:00 A.M. start of the retreat, the soldiers used the blaze to boil their coffee and cook their “poor pretense of a breakfast.”2

  Promptly, in accordance with Steele’s orders, the VII Corps mustered to commence the final leg of their journey to Little Rock. The ambulances with the wounded and the trains led the column followed by Salomon’s 3rd Division. Thayer’s fresher Frontier Division assumed duties as the rear guard protecting the army should Kirby Smith succeed in throwing infantry across the Saline in pursuit. Shortly after starting the Federals came upon the intersection of the Military and Pine Bluff roads. Here, Steele sent the ambulances and a small escort down the Pine Bluff Road while he, with the main body continued on to Little Rock. Steele, in sending the wounded to Pine Bluff, reasoned that this would get these poor souls to hospitals sooner since Pine Bluff was half the distance compared to a march to Little Rock. Also, Pine Bluff was closer to the Mississippi River meaning transports could evacuate these men to hospitals in the north sooner. Additionally, Steele still believed that Fagan was somewhere between him and Little Rock. Should Fagan turn up in a blocking position on the Military Road, Steele would have to fight his way through the roadblock, further delaying medical care for the wounded. Steele’s judgment proved correct as the ambulances arrived in Pine Bluff that evening after an uneventful passage.3

  Steele’s fear of interference by Fagan, however, was unwarranted, as events would show. Smith had frantically attempted to move Fagan into position to stop the Federal retreat for some time after the Federals left Camden. Finally, late on April 29 one of Smith’s couriers reached Fagan informing him of the situation. Fagan was some 34 miles away from Jenkins’ Ferry by now and, more frustrating, Fagan was on the west side of the Saline. Therefore, the erstwhile cavalry commander was in no position to block Steele’s retreat. In essence, the Union army had a free pass to Little Rock once they spanned the Saline. Fagan now belatedly flew into action issuing orders for an early start on the 30th to join Smith in the fight with Steele. Fagan furiously drove his men that day arriving at the Jiles’ farmhouse around four in the afternoon. On Fagan’s reporting to Smith, the disappointed commanding general instructed his s
ubordinate to provide a brigade to reinforce Greene’s troopers who were pursuing the Federals to the bridgehead. By the time the cavalry reached the near bank of the Saline, the Federals were taking up the final planks of the bridge ending any thought of pursuit.4

  Fagan went back to Smith to plead for permission to swim the river to keep pressure on the Federals. Smith balked at this suggestion fearing it too risky to swim the flooded Saline. Already disgusted by Fagan’s poor performance and the repulse of the army in battle, Smith decided to suspend operations for the day. Many in the Rebel ranks expressed deep regret that Smith allowed the Federals to withdraw unmolested. John Walker believed that had Smith authorized Fagan’s request “the greater portion of Steele’s army would have been captured or destroyed.”5 Blessington recorded sarcastically that apparently Smith “was satisfied with the laurels he had already won.”6

  On closer examination though, Smith’s decision appears proper for several reasons. First, Smith was correct in denying Fagan’s request to swim the river. The high level of the stream and swift current would certainly have resulted in unnecessary deaths from drowning. Second, the Rebels were fast becoming destitute of supplies. Finally, the Confederates were simply in no condition to pursue the Federals. The army had suffered 17 percent casualties in the fight, had no safe means of crossing the raging Saline, had no supplies on hand, and were exhausted by forced marches. In light of these factors Smith’s decision seems reasonable. Therefore, Steele would enjoy an uncontested retreat in the final leg of a most frustrating campaign.

  As General Salomon spent most of the 30th fending off repeated attacks by Smith’s Rebels, Eugene Carr relentlessly drove his cavalry division toward Little Rock. Carr had the dual mission of reconnaissance of the Military Road and logistic relief. Carr made an early start in the pre-dawn hours and the march was uneventful until the column reached a place called Whitmore’s Mill. Here, the van came in contact with elements of the 1st Missouri Cavalry Battalion. Part of Fagan’s force, the Missourians had been scouting east of the Saline. The battalion had expected to link up with Fagan a day earlier but failed to find Fagan at the appointed place. At mid-morning pickets from the 1st Missouri exchanged shots with Carr’s troopers. The Rebel pickets, realizing the strength of the Yankee horsemen, gave ground falling back to their bivouac site. Upon reaching the mill the pickets reported to their commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Elliot. Elliot sent forward two companies of cavalry to confirm the intelligence provided by the nervous pickets. Rather than attacking Carr’s column, the Rebels prudently shadowed the Yankees as they continued on to Little Rock. Elliot estimated Carr’s force at around 2,000 mounted men; he made a futile attempt to report this information to Fagan.7

  The brush with the Missourians seemed to confirm in Carr’s mind that Fagan, indeed, was lurking somewhere between Jenkins’ Ferry and Little Rock. With added urgency Carr sought to press his men to move faster. A way to gain more speed was to abandon the division train. Carr, therefore, ordered the cavalry wagons—some 200 of them—destroyed on the spot in order to pick up the pace of the retreat. Shortly, Carr had all his transport wagons set ablaze as his troopers drove on for Little Rock. As darkness began to blanket the Arkansas landscape, the weary troopers expected to halt for the evening, but Carr had other plans. Carr knew that Steele was in desperate need of rations for the infantry and animals and decided to continue the march through the night. Undoubtedly, the decision must have caused a great deal of grumbling among the cavalrymen, but Carr’s determination to succor his commander kept them in the saddle through a miserable night.8 Though Carr’s men loathed the decision, the infantry divisions would greatly appreciate Carr’s sacrifice.

  The Federal cavalry division reached Little Rock at 5:00 A.M. on May 1. Carr’s arrival did not curtail his activity though. Within minutes of releasing his troopers for a deserved rest, Carr turned and rushed over to the garrison commander’s headquarters. Brigadier General Joseph West had assumed command from Nathan Kimball only days before Carr clattered into Little Rock and had little information of the whereabouts of Steele. Upon receiving the news of Steele’s dire lack of provisions, West, a man of great energy, flew into action. Carr had informed West that Steele would set a course to Pine Bluff. Therefore, West telegraphed Brigadier General Christopher Andrews at that location ordering him to organize a relief train with 30,000 rations that would meet Steele on the road. To guard against Rebel raiders, Andrews assigned the reliable Powell Clayton with two infantry regiments, a battery, and cavalry escort to carry the train through to Steele. By mid-afternoon, Andrews had the train assembled and on its way to relieve the gaunt infantry of the VII Corps.9

  Unfortunately for the ragged Yankees in Steele’s column, the commanding general had decided to stay on course for Little Rock meaning they would have to wait a little longer to obtain any food. Until then the men would have to drive on through another monotonous day of marching. At one point during the trek the army came upon a “pine swamp of four miles’ width.” Already inundated, the tramp of thousands of soldiers “now cut [the swamp] into almost unfathomable softness.” This forced the army to corduroy more of the Arkansas lowlands to get the remaining trains and artillery through. Sperry observed that the train “still stretched out … two or three miles” even after the details destroyed hundreds of wagons in the Saline Bottom. Many of the remaining wagons stuck in the thick mud and soldiers simply unhitched the teams burning them where they stopped. Finally, after a couple of hours in the swamp, the army moved up onto some high ground making progress somewhat easier. Only rumors of impending Rebel ambushes broke up the relentless monotony of the retreat.10

  As the sun began to hang low in the west, Steele called a short halt. Many soldiers hoped that they would be allowed to bivouac for the night, but Steele had other ideas. Instead of rest, details set about lighting fires along the sides of the road. This meant that the commanding general intended to make a night march. Steele had already made the mistake of failing to press the retreat before Jenkins’ Ferry. This had afforded Kirby Smith an opportunity to catch the Federals and deal a severe blow. Steele determined not give Smith another chance and soon had the weary soldiers moving again. “We were now almost at the limits of human powers of endurance,” Sperry remembered. Many a soldier struggled to keep up with the column. Sperry claimed that some of the troops “actually slept while marching.”11 True or not, the long hard march moved the Yankees closer to relief as the sun rose on May 2.

  The Federals made no stop on the morning of May 2 because the army was now out of provisions outside of coffee. Hunger began to take its toll on the men as straggling picked up and some became desperate. Andrew Sperry witnessed a man pay two dollars for a solitary piece of hardtack while another traded away a silver watch for the hard bread. The march continued onward in spite of the hunger pangs. Spirits rose in the late afternoon as the column passed the Benton Road, less than days’ march from Little Rock. Within an hour the army encamped on the very ground of the first night of the expedition. “How we contrasted the two nights!” Sperry exclaimed, “and how long seemed the times between them.”12

  The sun began to set on May 2 as the exhausted soldiers milled about preparing bedrolls and boiling coffee when excitement gripped the camp. Rations had arrived from Little Rock. When Brigadier General West realized that Steele was not headed for Pine Bluff he assembled a train of his own and sent it down the Military Road. Escorted by the 54th Illinois, pickets sighted the train coming and lifted an elated shout that relief had arrived. Word raced through the bivouac as excited Yankees rejoiced at the thought of eating a full meal for the first time in weeks. Pleased with Carr and West’s efforts, Steele ordered the rations distributed for immediate consumption. Grateful soldiers distributed the fare in record time and soon all enjoyed a filling dinner of “hard-tack and sow-belly.” On other days the men would have complained mightily at such provisions, but tonight every soldier was pleased. On this, the last night of t
he expedition, the bluecoats would get a fitful rest with full stomachs.13

  The night of May 2 was unseasonably cold, but it did not seem to matter. After 48 hours without sleep and a full meal the Union soldiers quickly fell asleep wrapped in woolen blankets despite the elements. Reveille sounded before dawn and the men wasted no time in preparing for the last few miles’ march. After downing a breakfast of hardtack and coffee, the army fell in line “renewed with better hope and vigor.” The pace was considerably faster than on the days previous to May 3 as the thought of rest and recuperation pushed the army to greater exertions. Then at about 10:30 A.M. the outlying fortifications of Little Rock came into view. The army called a short halt “to form better order” before reentering into the city. Then the army smartly started forward with fife and drums keeping sharp cadence as if they were a victorious army entering a conquered city. In reality the VII Corps was a beaten army lucky to make it back to Little Rock in the shape that it did. After parading past Steele’s headquarters the Yankees reoccupied their old campgrounds as if they had never left.14 In some strange way Little Rock had become a home away from home and all hands were happy to be back. The Camden Expedition was over for Steele’s weary army.

  The Confederates had done little more than lick their wounds following the nasty fight at Jenkins’ Ferry, but there were many good reasons for this fact. First, dead and wounded Rebels and Yankees littered the field. Beleaguered southern doctors attempted to ease the suffering, but a meager supply of medicines and austere conditions made their efforts difficult. Local citizens offered their services in helping with the grisly business of gathering in the human wreckage and nursing the wounded. In spite of the help, the casualties numbering over one thousand overwhelmed the Confederate medical system.15

  Compounding the problem of caring for the wounded was the now serious subsistence situation. The Confederate commissary department was in no better shape than their opponents in the Camden Expedition. Hunger was beginning to plague the Rebels just it had the Yankees. The Confederate quartermasters issued what they had to give after the battle amounting to a miserable ear of corn and two ounces of bacon per man, but this was entirely inadequate. It seemed unlikely that the Confederate army could move forward from Jenkins’ Ferry to pursue the Federals in light of the lack of provisions. Rather than pursuit, it seemed more realistic that the Rebels would have to retreat back to Camden to obtain sufficient foodstuffs.16