Adopted Son

by David A Clary

  The commander in chief sent out conflicting accounts of his plans, intended to fall into enemy hands. They baffled Lafayette, who alternately thought the New York attack was off and that it was on and he would be left out of it. But he solved his desertion problem, first by hanging a deserter, then by promising the troops that they would see action. If any of them did not want to follow him, he offered passes back to their home units. None took him up on it, and the desertion ended. Meanwhile, he heard from Steuben and Greene that the situation in Virginia and the Carolinas was growing worse by the day. Leaving his artillery and baggage to follow, commandeering horses and wagons so his men could alternately walk and ride on the forced march, Lafayette pressed into Virginia. He asked Jefferson to send him food, and sent an aide ahead to collect food and rum at Fredericksburg, which he reached on April 25, his men hungry and worn out.33

  There the marquis received another message from Washington. “Though the situation of southern affairs would not permit me to recall your corps to this army,” he told him officially, “yet it was with great reluctance I could resolve upon seeing you separated from head quarters. My friendship for you makes me desirous of having you near me.” He would have summoned Lafayette back alone, he said, except that he was sure the young general would not want to turn his corps over to someone else, especially when there would not likely be a command for him in New York. Then Washington dropped a delicious hint. “I shall have one consolation, which is that from the present aspect of things it is perhaps most probable the weight of the war this campaign will be in the southern states, and it will become my duty to go there in person where I shall have the pleasure of seeing you again. Of this I would not have you to say anything. Adieu my dr. marquis wherever you are, assure yourself of my unalterable friendship & affection.” In a separate, private letter, he affirmed, “The only cause of hesitation in my mind about sending your corps to the southward was a separation from you.”34

  Lafayette did not have time to figure out what his adoptive father was telling him. Phillips was marching on Richmond, leaving fire and destruction in his wake, and taunting the marquis. “The stile of your letters sir obliges me, to tell you,” Lafayette replied, “that should your future favors be wanting in that regard due to the civil and military authority in the United States…I shall not think it consistent with the dignity of an american officer to continue the correspondence.” Phillips became more polite, not because of that letter but because of something else that happened on April 30, 1781.35

  Lafayette hustled most of his little army, about 800 men, to Richmond, which he reached on April 29. He planted his men and some militia on the heights overlooking the town and gazed south. Phillips approached the next day, but when he saw the American force, Lafayette told Greene, “he declined engaging.” He marched down the James River to his transports and floated back to Petersburg. The British general had expressed “his surprise at the rapidity of our march. It is lucky we did so for my cannon and baggage could not leave Alexandria untill the 30th.”36

  “I request you will receive my affectionate acknowledgement for your kind letters,” Lafayette began a report to Washington. “Every mark of friendship I receive from you adds to my happiness, as I love you with all the sincerity and warmth of my heart, and the sentiment I feel for you goes to the very extent of my affections.” He explained that if he had not left his artillery behind and pushed forward, Richmond would have been lost. When Phillips “was going to give the signal to attack he recconnoitred our position Mr. Osburn who was with him says that he flew into a violent passion and swore vengeance against me and the corps I had brought with me.”

  He was uneasy, the marquis confessed, because he did not know what the public would think of his conduct. “The little dependance we put upon the militia I cannot expose in an official letter. I cannot say that no boats, no waggons, no intelligences, not one spy could be obtained.” If Phillips had ever gained an advantage over him, “a defeat would have scattered the militia, lost the few arms we have and knocked down this hand-full of Continental troops.” Jefferson’s government was still no help.

  Washington had smartly maneuvered Lafayette into staying at his post, by hinting that he might see him in Virginia, and knowing that he would prefer a small command to none at all. “How happy I would be to see you I hope I need not to express,” the young man gushed. “As you are pleased to give me the choice, I frankly shall tell my wishes. If you cooperate with the french against the place you know, I wish to be at head quarters. If some thing is cooperated in Virginia I wil find myself very happily situated.” For the present, he would stay with his “separate and active command tho’ it does not promise great glory.” He admitted wistfully that he wished a French fleet would come into the bay. “Had I but ships my situation would be the most agreable in the world.”37

  Lafayette’s situation was going to become more “agreable” than he could imagine. Greene welcomed him to Virginia with “a mixture of pain and pleasure.” He gave him command of troops in the state, and authority to keep Wayne’s Pennsylvanians in Virginia rather than send them on to the Carolinas. He added, “I have only one word of advice to give you (having entire confidence in your ability zeal and good conduct), that is not to let the love of fame get the better of your prudence and plunge you into a misfortune, in too eager a pursuit after glory. This is the voice of a friend, and not the caution of a general.” Washington could not have put it better.38

  IT IS NOT MY TONGUE THESE GENTLEMEN WILL CUT OFF

  Washington knew that his young friend required constant reassurance. When he learned that Lafayette had resupplied his troops with his own credit, Washington said that it must entitle him to “all their gratitude & affection…. For my own part, my dear marquis, altho I stood in need of no new proofs of your exertions & sacrifices in the cause of America; I will confess to you, I shall not be able to express the pleasing sensations I have experienced at your unparallel’d & repeated instances of generosity & zeal for the service, on every occasion. Suffer me only to pursue you, with my sincerest wishes, that your successes & glory may always be equal to your merits.”39

  On May 1, Lafayette proclaimed victory in the battle that did not happen at Richmond, marched his men through the capital, and called on Jefferson to raise men, horses, wagons, and supplies. They had much in common, these skinny redheads with freckles. They talked in French and Latin, discussed philosophical matters, and got nowhere on having the state help fight the enemy. Lafayette had told his supply officers to impress horses and goods. Jefferson thought that kind of thing was tyrannical, but it did not mar their friendship.40

  Lafayette knew that Virginia would do little to defend itself. He tried to change that by sending Steuben to lobby the legislature, the state’s deputy quartermaster to buy or impress supplies, and Brigadier General George Weedon to recruit men for both the Continental Army and the militia. This exercise in frustration gave him an unsupported army of fewer than 1,000 men to face about 7,000 resupplied redcoats and Hessians. When the state assembly lit out for Charlottesville at the middle of the month, with Jefferson in its wake, any hope for official cooperation vanished with it. Jefferson blamed the counties for not doing their part.41

  As Phillips retired downriver, Lafayette shadowed him. When he learned that Cornwallis was on his way, he tried to beat the enemy to Petersburg, but he got there too late, lobbed a few cannonballs in Phillips’ direction, and retired to the capital. “There is no fighting here unless you have a naval superiority or an army mounted upon race horses,” he complained to Washington. “I am going to get beaten by both armies or each of them separately.” He told La Luzerne that his situation was “a bit confining,” with two British armies coming after him. “To complete the farce, I hear from all sides that General Clinton is coming to join the party. Thus I am proscribed by this triumvirate but, not being so eloquent as Cicero, it is not my tongue these gentlemen will cut off.”42

  Phillips died of a fever on
May 13, leaving Arnold in command. The turncoat sent Lafayette a message requesting an exchange of prisoners; the marquis refused to answer it. Washington told him that his “conduct upon every occasion meets my approbation, but in none more than in your refusing to hold a correspondence with Arnold.” When the enemy commander threatened to ship his prisoners to the West Indies, Lafayette reminded him that they could not arrange exchanges until Greene and Cornwallis set up a protocol. Arnold asked one of Lafayette’s messengers, “What do you think the Americans would do with me if they should succeed in making me a prisoner?” That officer replied, “We should cut off the leg which was wounded in the country’s service, and we should hang the rest of you.”43

  There were only two ways Lafayette could get out of his trap. One would be if Wayne arrived with his troops and supplies. The other would be for Washington to recall him. “I am not strong enough even to get beaten,” he told his adoptive father. Until the Pennsylvanians arrived, “we are next to nothing” against so strong an enemy. Washington was too far away to help him, and still could not tell him why he was in Virginia. Worse, enemy reinforcements, about 2,000 men, had left New York for Virginia. “Your determination to avoid an engagement, with your present force, is certainly judicious,” he reassured the young general. He hoped the Pennsylvanians had begun their march, but he had no news on that account. As for returning to New York, “it would be unnecessary for you to be here at present, and I am sure you would not wish to leave your charge while you are so near an enemy.” He as much as said that the next main effort would aim at New York. That misled the British patrols he expected to intercept a copy of the letter; it also left Lafayette wondering what was afoot.44

  The marquis sent frantic appeals to Wayne. “Should you arrive before Cornwallis,” he told him, “I hope we may beat his army.” If the Pennsylvanians force-marched the way he had made it to Richmond, the Americans might have a chance to keep Cornwallis from conquering Virginia. Lafayette complained to Washington that he had not heard from Wayne, and without reinforcement by the Pennsylvania troops he could not risk an engagement. Wayne was still at York, but finally he wrote, promising to march south on May 23.45

  Mad Anthony had troubles aplenty. The men who had remained after the mutiny were in an uproar because they had not received their back pay, as promised. New troops were soon rebellious as well. They did not want to march south, because they believed that southern air was unhealthy for northerners, and had heard a yarn about Lafayette being warned that, with his thin hair, the Virginia sun could kill him. They mutinied, and Wayne had a dozen ringleaders shot. “The sight must have made an impression on the men,” an officer observed; “it was designed with that view.”

  Wayne marched them out late in May but could not push them too hard, or they all might run off. Bad weather, muddy roads, and river crossings also held up progress, which was further delayed by too many hard-drinking officers who were hung over every morning. When they entered Virginia, they stepped up their griping. Wayne was on his way, but his brigade was not a bit happy about it.46

  Lafayette had a mutiny of his own, among the militia of Hampshire County. He turned to his old friend Daniel Morgan, at home recuperating from illness. “I do very much want your assistance,” he pleaded, because Morgan’s influence could achieve more than orders from the governor. The Old Wagoner joined Lafayette in June, but he had as much trouble recruiting men as all others did in that state.47

  On May 20, 1781, Cornwallis arrived in Petersburg and assumed command over Arnold. Lafayette pulled his tiny force of about 900 Continentals, with some reluctant militia, back into Richmond. The town was almost deserted, so he shipped its military stores upstream to Point of Fork, and put others on the road to Fredericksburg. If Cornwallis came after him, he would fade back, covering the stores. “For the love of God,” the marquis pleaded with La Luzerne, “let me know what has become of the Pennsylvanians…. Their junction with us would make our little army a bit more respectable. We would be beaten but at least we would be decently beaten.”48

  Lafayette remained obsessed with his reputation. “If more is not known about our situation I fear I shall be judged severely, even unjustly,” he wailed to Noailles. “I hope you will communicate what you know about [the situation] to our friends, so that if I am condemned, it will at least be only to the extent that I deserve it.”49

  The marquis told Greene that, “as I expect people…will find it very strange that I have not yet beaten the ennemy to pieces, my comfort will be in the approbation of the General, yours, and that of a few friends.” He begged Hamilton to “write me if you approve of my conduct.” He was so outnumbered that he had to suppress his own fighting instincts, he said.50

  Nobody’s approval meant more to Lafayette than his adoptive father’s, and he begged for it again on May 24. “Had I followed the first impulsion of my temper, I would have risked some thing more—But I have been guarding against my own warmth.” The fact that most of his manpower was unreliable militia meant that any engagement with the enemy would invite disaster. He would have risked attack only if the Pennsylvanians had joined him, but they had not. When Cornwallis marched upriver, Lafayette would be forced to abandon Richmond because he did not have enough men to defend it. “Was I any ways equal to the ennemy, I would be extremely happy in my present command—but I am not strong enough even to get beaten. Governement in this state [has] no energy, and laws have no force.”51

  The marquis received two replies from Washington. The first, after he had met with Rochambeau, told him that a campaign against New York “was deemed preferable to a southern operation as we had not the command of the water.” He continued, “I shall advise you, every now and then of the progress of our preparations. It would be unnecessary for you to be here at pressent, and I am sure you would not wish to leave your charge while you are so near an enemy…. You will always remember my dear marquis that your return to this army depends upon your own choice.” He let a copy of this letter fall into enemy hands.52

  Then Washington sent Lafayette a secure letter, telling him that he would not attack New York. He had heard that Cornwallis’ troops had marched themselves ragged on the way from the Carolinas, and he needed the marquis to hold the British general, but did not explain why. He told him to keep Cornwallis on the move but warned him not to hazard a general action unless he had “grounds to do it on. No rational person will condemn you for not fighting with the odds against you and while so much is depending on it. But all will censure a rash step if it is not attended with success.”53

  Washington could not have picked a better general for the risky operation in Virginia. Lafayette trusted Washington absolutely and followed his orders even when he did not know why they were put to him. Other generals, believing themselves exiled to a backwater, might have threatened to resign over the perceived insult to their pride, but the marquis would never do that to Washington.

  Cornwallis crossed the river on May 26 and headed toward Richmond. The savage cavalryman Colonel Banastre Tarleton and 800 equally savage horse soldiers were in the van, looting, burning, killing, and raping. “I shall now proceed to dislodge La Fayette from Richmond,” Cornwallis told Clinton when he set out, “and with my light troops destroy any magazines or stores in the neighbourhood.” He was as obsessed with making a trophy of the marquis as Howe had been at Barren Hill. “The boy cannot escape me!” he crowed.54

  THEY RETARDED AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE THE ENEMY PROGRESS

  Lafayette led his 900 Continentals and about 2,000 militia north to Gold Mine Creek on the South Anna River. There he stood between Cornwallis and stores at Fredericksburg. Steuben with a few hundred militia and Continental recruits was northwest of Richmond at Point of Fork, where the Rivanna and Fluvanna join to form the James River. Lafayette begged Wayne to hurry, and told Steuben to move the stores from Point of Fork and head in his direction. Steuben, however, thought that Greene wanted him to go south to join up, because that was the last he had heard fr
om him.55

  When Lafayette evacuated Richmond, Virginians assumed that he had skedaddled, the way a timid man might leave a tavern just before a brawl. This made supply acquisition even more difficult. The militia mutiny in Hampshire had included attacks on supply officers, but Morgan put that down early in June. The most heartening development was the end of Jefferson’s term as governor. He was replaced by General Thomas Nelson, who was more sympathetic to the need for the state to do its part, although responsibility for that rested with county lieutenants, and the state’s coercive powers were nil.56

  This was no skedaddle. Lafayette backed up while shielding Fredericksburg and Albemarle Old Court House, the two main supply depots. He also had to avoid a fight, because his militia would run away at the first shot, and Cornwallis outnumbered his Continentals by about six to one. He led the British on a grueling slog out of Richmond, burning bridges, felling trees across the roads, and sending small parties to snipe at the foe. He drew constant blood, wearing the enemy down. Early in June, however, he did not know just where Cornwallis was headed or what his intentions were. The redcoat commander wanted to take Virginia out of the war and struck out simultaneously at Charlottesville, Point of Fork, and Albemarle Old Court House.

  The first blow fell on June 4, 1781. Tarleton made a long sweep to Cornwallis’ left and descended on Charlottesville, aiming to capture the legislature. All but seven escaped him, and he sacked the town. He missed Jefferson, who had been warned. Redcoats helped themselves to souvenirs at Monticello, cleaning out the wine cellar.57