by Demosthenes
The Complete Works of
DEMOSTHENES
(384–322 BC)
Contents
The Translations
ON THE NAVY BOARDS
FOR THE PEOPLE OF MEGALOPOLIS
FOR THE LIBERTY OF THE RHODIANS
FIRST PHILIPPIC
THE OLYNTHIACS
FIRST OLYNTHIAC
SECOND OLYNTHIAC
THIRD OLYNTHIAC
ON THE PEACE
SECOND PHILIPPIC
ON HALONNESUS
ON THE CHERSONESE
THIRD PHILIPPIC
FOURTH PHILIPPIC
ANSWER TO PHILIP’S LETTER
PHILIP’S LETTER
ON ORGANIZATION
ON THE TREATY WITH ALEXANDER
ON THE FALSE EMBASSY
ON THE CROWN
AGAINST LEPTINES
AGAINST MEIDIAS
AGAINST ANDROTION
AGAINST ARISTOCRATES
AGAINST TIMOCRATES
AGAINST ARISTOGEITON 1
AGAINST ARISTOGEITON 2
AGAINST APHOBUS 1
AGAINST APHOBUS 2
AGAINST APHOBUS 3
AGAINST ONETOR 1
AGAINST ONETOR 2
AGAINST ZENOTHEMIS
AGAINST APATURIUS
AGAINST PHORMIO
AGAINST LACRITUS
FOR PHORMIO
AGAINST PANTAENETUS
AGAINST NAUSIMACHUS AND XENOPEITHES
AGAINST BOEOTUS 1
AGAINST BOEOTUS 2
AGAINST SPUDIAS
AGAINST PHAENIPPUS
AGAINST MACARTATUS
AGAINST LEOCHARES
APOLLODORUS AGAINST STEPHANUS 1
APOLLODORUS AGAINST STEPHANUS 2
AGAINST EVERGUS AND MNESIBULUS
AGAINST OLYMPIODORUS
APOLLODORUS AGAINST TIMOTHEUS
APOLLODORUS AGAINST POLYCLES
ON THE TRIERARCHIC CROWN
APOLLODORUS AGAINST CALLIPUS
APOLLODORUS AGAINST NICOSTRATUS
AGAINST CONON
AGAINST CALLICLES
AGAINST DIONYSODORUS
AGAINST EUBULIDES
AGAINST THEOCRINES
APOLLODORUS AGAINST NEAERA
THE FUNERAL SPEECH
THE EROTIC ESSAY
The Greek Texts
LIST OF GREEK TEXTS
The Dual Texts
DUAL GREEK AND ENGLISH TEXTS
The Biographies
PARALLEL LIVES: DEMOSTHENES by Plutarch
INTRODUCTION TO DEMOSTHENES by Arthur Wallace
DEMOSTHENES by T. W. Lumb
The Delphi Classics Catalogue
© Delphi Classics 2015
Version 1
The Complete Works of
DEMOSTHENES
By Delphi Classics, 2015
COPYRIGHT
Complete Works of Demosthenes
First published in the United Kingdom in 2015 by Delphi Classics.
© Delphi Classics, 2015.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of the publisher, nor be otherwise circulated in any form other than that in which it is published.
Delphi Classics
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The Translations
Ancient Athens — Demosthenes was born in 384 BC, during the last year of the 98th Olympiad or the first year of the 99th Olympiad.
The Naos Zoodochos, in the centre of Paeania — Demosthenes’ father, who belonged to the local tribe, Pandionis, and lived in the deme of Paeania in the Athenian countryside, was a wealthy sword-maker. Aeschines, Demosthenes’ greatest political rival, maintained that his mother Kleoboule was a Scythian by blood — an allegation disputed by some modern scholars.
ON THE NAVY BOARDS
Translated by C. A. Vince and J. H. Vince
Demosthenes’ first political oration was delivered in 354 BC, at a time when the Athenian Assembly had convened to consider a rumoured threat against Athens by the Great King of Persia, Artaxerxes Ochus. In On the Navy Boards, the orator urges his fellow citizens towards moderation, advocating the need to avoid any provocation. Nevertheless, Demosthenes proposes a well-organised preparation in case of war. For this reason he supports the reform of the “symmoriai” (boards) through which the Athenian fleet was funded. Unfortunately, in his first political intervention the young politician did not accomplish his goals.
Some of the themes that recur continually in Demosthenes’ later speeches are prominent in On the Navy Boards, including the futility of rhetorical appeals to past glories, without readiness for personal service, and the need of a thorough organisation of the forces. Although the speech indicates signs of a stilted, over zealous preparation, it demonstrates a characteristic mastery of minute detail that would become a hallmark of the orator’s later masterpieces.
Bust of Demosthenes, Louvre, Paris
Artaxerxes III Ochus (c. 425 BC – 338 BC) of Persia,as depicted on his Tomb at Persepolis.
ON THE NAVY-BOARDS
Those who praise your ancestors, men of Athens, seem to me to choose an acceptable theme, which yet fails to do any real service to those whom they eulogize; for when they attempt to speak about achievements to which no words could possibly do justice, they earn for themselves the reputation of clever speakers, but leave their hearers with a lower estimate of the merits of those famous men. Indeed, I think the best testimony to their merits is the length of time that has elapsed, during which no other men have been able to surpass their achievements. [2] For my own part, however, I shall confine myself to pointing out how you can best prepare for war. For this is how things stand. Even if all of us who are to address you should prove capable speakers, you would, I am sure, be no better off; but if someone, whoever he may be, could come forward and point out convincingly the nature and size of the force that will be serviceable to the city, and show how it is to be provided, all our present fears will be relieved. This is what I will try to do, if only I am able, first giving you briefly my views about our relations with the Great King. [3]
I admit that he is the common enemy of all the Greeks; yet I would not on that account advise you to undertake a war against him by yourselves apart from the rest, for I observe that the Greeks themselves are by no means common friends of one another, but that certain of them repose more confidence in the King than in some of their neighbors. From this state of things I conclude that it is to your interest to be careful that your grounds for entering on war shall be equitable and just, but to proceed with all the necessary preparations, making that the foundation of your policy. [4] For I believe, Athenians, that if there were clear and unmistakable signs of the King’s hostile intentions, the other Greeks would join with us, and would be deeply grateful to those who would stand up for them and with them against his attacks; but if we force on a war, while his aims are still obscure, I am afraid, men of Athens, that we shall be obliged to encounter, not only the King, but also those whom we are minded to protect. [5] For the King, suspending his designs — if he really intends to invade Greece — will distribute money among them and tempt them with offers of friendship, while they, anxious to bring their private quarrels to a successful issue and keeping that object in view, will overlook the common safety of all. Into such a welter of confusion and folly I beseech you not to plunge our country. [6] For indeed,
as regards your policy towards the King, I see that you are by no means on the same footing as the other Greeks; for many of them it is, I suppose, possible to pursue their private interests and abandon the cause of their countrymen, but for you, even when wronged by them, it would not be honorable to exact such a penalty from the wrong-doers as to leave any of them under the heel of the barbarian. [7] But as long as this is so, we must take care that we are not involved in war at a disadvantage, and that the King, whom we believe to have designs against the Greeks, does not win the credit of appearing as their friend. How then can this be ensured? If we make it plain to all that our forces are already marshalled and equipped, but equally plain that our policy is founded on sentiments of justice. [8] To your rash advisers, who are so eager to hurry you into war, I have this to say, that it is not difficult, when deliberation is needed, to gain a reputation for courage, nor when danger is at hand, to display skill in oratory; but there is something that is both difficult and essential — to display courage in the face of danger, and in deliberation to offer sounder advice than one’s fellows. [9] I believe, men of Athens, that the war with the King is a difficult undertaking for our city, though any conflict which the war involved might prove easy enough. Why so? Because the first requisites for every war are necessarily, I suppose, fleets and money and strong positions, and I find that the King is more fully supplied with these than we are; but for the actual conflict I observe that nothing is needed so much as brave soldiers, and of these we and those who share the danger with us have the better supply. [10] That is why I advise that we should not on any grounds be the first to plunge into war, but for the conflict we must be properly equipped from the start. If indeed there were one kind of force suitable for defence against Persians and another for defence against Greeks, then we might reasonably be suspected of marshalling ourselves against the King; [11] but when all preparation for war is on the same lines and the main objects of an armed force are the same — to be strong enough to repel the enemy, to assist one’s allies, and to preserve one’s own possessions-why, having open enemies enough, must we be looking out for another? Let us rather make our preparations against them, and then we shall defend ourselves against him too, if he ventures to molest us. [12] Moreover you are now calling on the Greeks to join you; but if you refuse to do their bidding — and your relations with some of them are not cordial — how can you expect any of them to answer your call? “Because,” you say, “we shall warn them that the King has designs on them.” But seriously, do you imagine that they cannot detect that for themselves? I am sure they can. But as yet their fear of Persia is subordinate to their feuds with you and, in some cases, with one another. Therefore your ambassadors will only go round repeating their heroics. [13] But later on, if what we now deem probable comes to pass, surely no Greek community has such a good conceit of itself that when they see that you have a thousand cavalry and as many infantry as one could desire and three hundred ships, they will not come as our suitors, feeling that with such support their safety is assured. Therefore to invite them at once means that you are the suppliants and, if unsuccessful, have failed utterly, but to wait and at the same time complete your own preparations means saving them at their request, and being well assured that they will all join you. [14]
Therefore, men of Athens, moved by this and similar considerations, I was unwilling to compose a confident oration or one of futile length, but I have been at very great pains to consider the best and speediest method of completing our equipment. I venture to think that you ought to hear my plan and vote for it, if it satisfies you. Now the first and most important step in our equipment, men of Athens, is that you should be filled with such resolution that everyone shall be willing and eager to do his part. [15] For you will notice, men of Athens, that whenever you have collectively formed some project, and thereafter each individual has realized that it was his personal duty to carry it out, nothing has ever escaped your grasp; but whenever you have formed your project and thereafter have looked to one another to carry it out, each expecting to do nothing while his neighbor worked, then nothing has succeeded with you. [16] But seeing you thus resolved and enthusiastic, I propose that the register of the twelve hundred should be filled up and enlarged to two thousand by the addition of eight hundred names; for if you fix on that number, I believe that you will get your twelve hundred persons, after striking out wards, orphans, settlers in colonies, joint holders of estates, and anyone otherwise ineligible. [17] Then I propose to divide these into twenty boards, as at present, each containing sixty persons. Each of these boards I would subdivide into five groups of twelve men, always attaching to the wealthiest man those who are poorest, to keep the balance. That is how I propose to arrange these persons; you will understand why, when you have heard the whole of the arrangement. [18] Now what about the war-galleys? I propose to fix the total number at three hundred, divided into twenty squadrons of fifteen ships each, assigning to each squadron five of the first hundred, five of the second, and five of the third; and next to allot a squadron of fifteen to each board, and the board must assign three vessels to each of its own groups. [19] When these preliminaries are settled, I propose that your wealth also should be organized, and that as the ratable value of the country is six thousand talents, this sum should be divided into a hundred parts of sixty talents each, and that then five of these parts should be allotted to each of the twenty full boards, and that the board itself should assign one part, consisting of sixty talents, to each of its own five groups. [20] Thus, if you want a hundred war-galleys the cost of each will be covered by the sixty talents and there will be twelve trierarchs for each; if you want two hundred, there will be thirty talents to cover the cost and six persons to serve as trierarchs; if you want three hundred, there will be twenty talents for the cost and four persons to serve. [21] In the same way I propose, men of Athens, that all ships’ gear now on loan should be valued and divided according to the inventory into twenty parts, and then that one part of the debtors liable for it should be allotted to each of the full boards, and that each board should assign an equal share to each of its own groups; and that the twelve members of the group should exact the same from the debtors, and so provide, fully equipped, as many galleys as they are severally responsible for. [22] That, I think, would be the best way of providing and organizing the money, the hulls, the trierarchs, and the calling in of the ships’ gear.
I now proceed to describe a clear and easy way of manning the ships. I suggest that the generals should divide the dockyards into ten areas, so arranging it that there may be dock-room in each for thirty ships, as close together as possible, and that when they have done this, they should apportion two boards and thirty galleys to each area, and then assign the tribes by lot to the areas. [23] And each brigade-commander must divide into three parts whatever area his tribe has taken over, and the ships in the same way, and then he must allot the thirds of his tribe in such a way that of the whole space of the dockyards each tribe may have one area and each third of a tribe a third of an area; so that you can know at once, if necessary, where each tribe and each third of a tribe is stationed, who are the trierarchs and what ships they have, and that so each tribe may have thirty ships and each third of a tribe ten. For if we can only get this started, any detail at present omitted （for it is perhaps difficult to provide for everything） will be discovered by the actual working of the plan, and we shall have a uniform system both for the whole navy and for every part of it. [24]
But as regards money and a ready supply of it at once, I am aware that I am going to make a startling proposal. The proposal shall, however, be made, because I am confident that if you take the right point of view, it will be clear that I alone have told you the truth, as it is and as it will be. My view is that we ought not to talk about money now; for if we need it, we have a source of supply, abundant, honorable and fair; if we look for it at once, we shall fail so utterly to supply it now that we shall conclude that it is not even in reserve for
our future use, but if we leave it alone, it will be there. What, then, is this supply, which is not now, but will be hereafter? [25] That sounds like a riddle, but I will explain. Look at the great city that lies around you, men of Athens. In that city there is wealth, I might almost say, equal to that of all the other Greek cities together. But that wealth is in the hands of men whose temper is such that if all our orators started a scare that the King is coming, that he is close at hand, that the report must be true, and if the orators were backed by an equal number of oracle-mongers, not only would they fail to contribute, but they would refuse to declare or acknowledge their wealth. [26] But if once they saw that what alarms them now as a mere rumor was actually taking place, none of them is so foolish that he would not be the first to pay his contribution; for who will choose to sacrifice life and property sooner than contribute a fraction to ensure his person and the remainder of his wealth? The money, I say, we have when it is really needed, but not before. Therefore I advise you not to seek it out, for the whole sum that you could raise, if you insisted on raising it, would be more ridiculous than nothing at all. [27] For consider; will anyone propose a tax of one per cent now? Then we get sixty talents. Or double it and make it two per cent? Still only a hundred and twenty talents. And what is that to the twelve hundred camels laden, as our friends here tell us, with the King’s treasure? Then would you have me assume that we shall contribute a twelfth of your wealth, or five hundred talents? But you would not submit to such a tax, nor if you paid up, would the money be sufficient for the war. [28] You must therefore make all your other preparations, but let the money remain for the present in the hands of its owners, for it could not be in better keeping, for the benefit of the State; but if ever the threatened crisis comes, then accept it as a voluntary contribution.