by Demosthenes
Now if any of you, Athenians, seeing Philip’s good fortune, considers him a formidable and dangerous opponent, he is exercising a prudent forethought. For fortune is indeed a great weight in the scale; I might almost say it is everything in human affairs. And yet in many respects our good fortune is to be preferred to Philip’s. [16] For our prosperity is inherited from our ancestors, and is of an earlier date than the prosperity not only of Philip, but, roughly speaking, of all the kings that have ever reigned in Macedonia. Those kings actually paid tribute to Athens, but Athens never paid tribute to any power in the world. Moreover, we have a more secure claim than Philip upon the favour of heaven, in so far as our conduct has always been guided by greater regard for religion and for justice. [17] Why, then, was he more successful than we in the late war? I will be frank with you, men of Athens. It is because he always takes a personal share in the hardships and dangers of the campaign, never neglects a chance, never wastes any season of the year; while we — for the truth must out — sit here idle; we are always hanging back and passing resolutions and haunting the market-place to learn the latest news. Yet what more startling news could there be than that a Macedonian should insult Athenians, daring to send us such a letter as you have heard read a moment ago? [18] Philip’s resources include mercenary soldiers, and also, observe! certain mercenary orators here among us, men who are not ashamed to devote their lives to his service, thinking that they are carrying home his bribes, but blind to the fact that they are bartering all the interests of the State, and their own as well, for a paltry profit. We, on the other hand, make no attempt to foment a revolution in his kingdom, we decline to hire mercenaries, we shrink from taking the field. [19] It is not a strange thing, then, that he has gained ground at our expense in the late war, but rather that we, performing no single duty of a nation at war, think that we are going to defeat one who does everything that a grasping ambition demands. [20]
Bearing this in mind, Athenians, and reflecting that it is not even in our power to pretend that we are at peace, for Philip has already issued a declaration of war and followed it up by active hostilities, it is necessary to spare no expense, public or private, to take the field eagerly and in full force, wherever the opportunity occurs, and to employ abler generals than before. [21] For none of you must assume that the same policy that weakened the power of Athens will suffice to restore and advance it, nor suppose that, if you are as half-hearted as before, others will be zealous in defence of your interests. Reflect, rather, what a disgrace it would be if your fathers faced many hardships and great dangers in fighting the Lacedaemonians, [22] but you should refuse to defend with vigor those advantages which they justly won and bequeathed to you; what a disgrace if one, with only the tradition of Macedonia behind him, so cheerfully courts danger that, in the task of extending his sway, he has been wounded in every limb on the battle-field, but Athenians, whose ancestral boast it is in war to yield to none and conquer all, should renounce, through indolence or cowardice, alike the deeds of their ancestors and the interests of their fatherland. [23]
Not to detain you longer, I say that we must be prepared for war, and must urge the Greek states, by our action rather than by our appeals, to join our alliance; for all words divorced from action are futile, especially words from Athenian lips, in proportion as we are reputed to be more ready of speech than all other Greeks.
PHILIP’S LETTER
Translated by C. A. Vince and J. H. Vince
Philip to the Council and People of Athens, greeting.
To the embassies that I have repeatedly dispatched to ensure the observance of our oaths and agreements you have paid no attention, so that I am forced to send you a statement of the matters in which I consider myself wronged. But you must not be surprised at the length of the letter, for I have many charges to prefer, and it is necessary to put them all clearly and frankly. [2]
In the first place, when Nicias, my herald, was kidnapped from my territory, you not only failed to bring the law-breakers to justice, but you kept the victim a prisoner for ten months, and the letters from me, of which he was the bearer, you read before your Assembly. Next, when the Thasians opened their harbor to the Byzantine war-galleys and to any pirates that chose to touch there, you ignored the incident, in spite of the clauses expressly denouncing such acts as hostile. [3] Furthermore, about the same date, Diopithes attacked Crobyle and Tiristasis and enslaved the inhabitants, laying waste the adjacent parts of Thrace. But his crowning act of lawlessness was the arrest of Amphilochus, the ambassador sent to negotiate for the captives; he subjected him to the severest torture and wrung from him a ransom of nine talents. And this he did with the approval of your Assembly. [4] Yet violation of the rights of heralds and ambassadors is regarded by all men as an act of impiety, and by none more than by you, if I may judge from the fact that, when the Megarians arrested Anthemocritus, your Assembly went to the length of excluding them from the celebration of the mysteries, and actually erected a statue before the city gates to commemorate the outrage. Yet is it not monstrous that you are now yourselves notoriously guilty of acts which, when you were the victims, excited in you such detestation of the perpetrators? [5] Again, your general, Callias, captured the cities on the Pagasaean Gulf, every one of them, though they were protected by treaty with you and were in alliance with me all merchants sailing to Macedonia he regarded as enemies and sold them into slavery. And for this you passed him a vote of thanks! So I am at a loss to say what difference it will make if you admit that you are at war with me, for when we were openly at variance, then too you used to send out privateers, enslave merchants trading with us, help my adversaries, and lay waste my territory. [6]
Not content with this, you have shown your contempt for right and your hostility to me by actually sending an embassy to urge the king of Persia to declare war on me. This is the most amazing exploit of all; for, before the king reduced Egypt and Phoenicia, you passed a decree calling on me to make common cause with the rest of the Greeks against him, in case he attempted to interfere with us; [7] and today you have such a superabundance of hatred for me that you negotiate with him for a defensive alliance. Yet I am given to understand that your fathers of old punished the sons of Pisistratus for inviting the Persians to invade Greece. You are not ashamed to do what you have always made a matter of indictment against your tyrants. [8]
But there is more to come. In your decrees you order me in so many words to leave Thrace to the rule of Teres and Cersobleptes, because they are Athenians. But I am not aware that these two had any share with you in the terms of peace, or that their names were included in the inscription set up, or that they are really Athenians. On the contrary, I know that Teres fought with me against you, and that Cersobleptes was quite ready in private to take the oath of allegiance to my ambassadors, but was prevented by your generals, who denounced him as an enemy of the Athenians. [9] And yet is it fair and right that, when it suits your convenience, you should call him an enemy of your state, but, when you want to bully me, the same man should be described as your fellow-citizen; and that on the death of Sitalces, on whom you did confer your citizenship, you should at once cultivate the friendship of his murderer, and pick a quarrel with us to shield Cersobleptes? And all the time you know perfectly well that of those who receive such honors at your hands not one cares a jot for your laws or your decrees. [10] However, if I may mention two instances to the exclusion of the rest, you gave your citizenship to Evagoras of Cyprus and to Dionysius of Syracuse, to them and their descendants. Now, if you can persuade either of these peoples to restore their exiled tyrants, then you may apply to me for as much of Thrace as was ruled by Teres and Cersobleptes. But if you have not a word to say against those who overthrew Evagoras and Dionysius, but persist in harassing me, have I not a perfect right to defend myself against you? [11]
Now I prefer to pass over many complaints that I might justly make, but I admit that I am helping the Cardians, for I was their ally before the peace, and you r
efused to submit your claim to arbitration, though you were often pressed to do so by me, and not infrequently by the Cardians. Should I not be utterly contemptible if I threw over my allies and paid more regard to you, who are harassing me in every way, than to those who have always been my staunch friends? [12]
The following affront also should not be passed over. Though formerly you confined yourselves to the charges I have mentioned, your arrogance is now such that, when the people of Peparethus complained of the latest “outrage,” you instructed your general to demand redress from me on their behalf. I actually punished them less rigorously than they deserved, for they seized Halonnesus in time of peace and refused to restore either the fortress or the garrison in spite of my repeated remonstrances. [13] But you, with full knowledge of the facts, ignored their offences against me, and only considered their punishment. Yet I robbed neither them nor you of the island, but only the pirate chief, Sostratus. Now, if you say that you handed it over to Sostratus, you admit that you employ pirates; if he captured it against your wishes, why this indignation against me for taking it and making the district safe for traders? [14] In my regard for the interests of your city, I offered you the island, but your statesmen urged you to refuse it as a gift and demand it as an act of restitution, in order that, if I submit to their dictation, I may thereby confess that I have no right to the place, but if I do not give it up, I may arouse the suspicions of your democracy. Conscious of this, I challenged you to submit our claims to arbitration, so that if the island was adjudged to be mine, I might give it to you; if yours, then I might restore it to your people. [15] I repeatedly demanded a trial, but you paid me no attention, and the Peparethians occupied the island. What, then, was I to do? Was I not to punish those who had violated their oaths? Was I not to take vengeance for such a wanton outrage? For if the island belonged to the Peparethians, what right had the Athenians to demand it back? If it was yours, why are you not angry with the Peparethians for seizing the territory of others? [16]
Our mutual hostility has become so acute that, when I wanted to convey my fleet to the Hellespont, I was compelled to escort it with my army through the Chersonese, because your settlers there were at war with us in accordance with the decree of Polycrates, backed up by your resolutions, and your general was inciting the Byzantines and publicly announcing that your orders were to make war on me, if he got the chance. In spite of this provocation, I kept my hands off the fleets and the territory of your state, though I was strong enough to seize most, if not all, of these, and I have not ceased to appeal to you to have the points in dispute between us settled by arbitration. [17] Yet consider which is the more honorable — to settle the dispute by arms or by arguments, to be yourselves the umpires or to win the verdict from others. Also reflect how unreasonable it is that Athenians should force Thasians and Maronites to submit to arbitration about Stryme, but should not themselves in this way settle with me the points on which we are at variance, especially when you realize that, if you lose the verdict, you will sacrifice nothing, and if you win it, you will gain territory which is now in my possession. [18]
But the crowning absurdity, I think, is that, though I sent ambassadors from all my allies to attend as witnesses, and was willing to come to a just agreement with you in the interests of the Greek world, you turned a deaf ear to the representations of the ambassadors, when you might perfectly well have relieved the fears of those who attributed sinister motives to me, or else have proved me beyond all doubt the most worthless of mankind. [19] Such a course was indeed in the interests of your people, but it would not have paid your talkers. For those who have any experience of your constitution say that to the orators peace means war and war means peace; because they always manage to make something out of the generals either by backing them up or by blackmailing them, and also, by abusing from the Public platform your most prominent citizens and the most esteemed of your foreign residents, they win a reputation with the mob for democratic zeal. [20]
Now it would be easy for me, at a trifling expense, to stop their abuse and set them singing my praises. But I should be ashamed if I were known to purchase your goodwill from men who, besides their other faults, have reached such a height of impudence that they even venture to dispute with me about Amphipolis, to which I think I can advance a far better claim than my rivals. [21] For, if it belongs to the original conquerors, have not we a right to hold it? It was my ancestor, Alexander, who first occupied the site, and, as the first-fruits of the Persian captives taken there, set up a golden statue at Delphi. Or if anyone disputes this and claims it for its later owners, here again the right is mine, because I besieged and captured the city, after its inhabitants had expelled you and accepted the Lacedaemonians as their founders. [22] Yet we all of us occupy our cities either by inheritance from our ancestors or by right of conquest in war. But you, who were not the first to take Amphipolis, who do not possess it today, and who made the briefest sojourn in that district, now lay claim to the city, and that in spite of your own most solemn assurances in my favour. For I wrote to you again and again on the subject, and you acknowledged that I was in the right by making peace with me at a time when I was in occupation of the city, and subsequently by concluding an alliance with me on the same terms. [23] Yet what stronger title to possession could there be than that the city was originally inherited by me from my ancestors, was again captured by me in war, and thirdly was conceded to me by you, who are in the habit of claiming even that to which you have no shadow of a right?
Such are the complaints I have to make. As you were the aggressors and, thanks to my forbearance, are making still further attacks on my interests and doing me all the harm in your power, I shall defend myself, with justice on my side, and, calling the gods to witness, I shall bring my dispute with you to an issue.
ON ORGANIZATION
Translated by C. A. Vince and J. H. Vince
In dealing with the sum of money under discussion and the other matters referred to this Assembly, I see no difficulty, men of Athens, in either of two methods: I may attack the officials who assign and distribute the public funds and may thus gain credit with those who regard this system as detrimental to the State, or I may approve and commend the right to receive these doles and so gratify those who are especially in need of them. For neither class has the interest of the State in view, when they approve or complain of the system, but they are prompted respectively by their poverty or their affluence. [2] I myself would neither propose such a distribution of the doles, nor oppose the right to receive them; but I do urge you to reflect seriously in your own minds that while the sum of money you are discussing is a trifle, the habit of mind that it fosters is a serious matter. Now if you so organize the receipt of money that it is associated with the performance of duties, so far from injuring, you will actually confer on the State and on yourselves the greatest benefit; but if a festival or any other pretext is good enough to justify a dole, and yet you refuse even to listen to the suggestion that there is any obligation attached to it, beware lest you end by acknowledging that what you now consider a proper practice was a grievous error. [3] My idea of our duty — do not drown with your clamor what I am about to say, but hear me before you judge — my idea is that, as we have devoted a meeting of the Assembly to the question of receiving the dole, so we ought also to devote a meeting to organization and to equipment for war; and everyone must show himself not merely ready to hear what is said, but also willing to act, so that you may depend on yourselves, Athenians, for your hopes of success, and not be always asking what service this individual or that is rendering. [4] The total revenues of the State, including your own resources, now squandered on unnecessary objects, and the contributions of your allies, must be shared by each citizen equally, as pay by those of military age and as overseers’ fees, or whatever you like to call it, by those beyond the age-limit; and you must serve in person and not resign that duty to others, [5] but our army must be a national force, equipped from the resources I
have named, so that you may be well provided for the performance of your task, and that we may have no repetition of what usually happens now, when you are always bringing your generals to trial and the net result of your exertions is the announcement that “So-and-so, the son of So-and-so, has impeached So-and-so.” [6] But what is to be the result for you? In the first place, that your allies may be kept loyal, not by maintaining garrisons among them, but by making their interests identical with yours; next, that our generals may not lead mercenaries to the plunder of our allies without even coming in sight of the enemy, so that the profit is all their own, while the State at large incurs the hatred and the abuse, but that they may have their own citizens at their back, and may so deal with our enemies as they now deal with our friends. [7] But apart from this, many operations demand your actual presence, and beside the advantage of using a national force in a national quarrel, this is necessary on every other ground. For if you were content to let things slide and not worry about the state of Greece, it would be another matter. [8] But, as it is, you claim to take the lead and to determine the rights of other states; yet neither in the past nor today have you furnished a sufficient force to superintend and secure this claim. On the contrary, it was when you stood utterly aloof and indifferent that the democracies of Mytilene and of Rhodes were destroyed. “Yes, but Rhodes was our enemy,” you may say. [9] But you should consider, men of Athens, that our hostility towards oligarchies, purely on the ground of principle, is stronger than our hostility towards democracies on any grounds whatever. But to return to my point. My view is that you must be brought under a system, and there must be a uniform scheme for receiving public money and for performing necessary services. I have addressed you before on this subject and have described the method of organizing you, whether you serve in the infantry or the cavalry or in other ways, and also how ample provision may be ensured for all alike. [10] I will tell you without any concealment what has caused me most disappointment. It is that though the many reforms proposed were all of them important and honorable, no one remembers any of them, but everyone remembers the two obols. Yet these can never be worth more than two obols, but the other reforms, together with those that I proposed, are worth all the wealth of the Great King — that a city, so well provided with infantry, triremes, cavalry, and revenues, should be duly organized and equipped. [11]