Delphi Complete Works of Demosthenes

by Demosthenes

  There are two traits, men of Athens, that mark the disposition of the well-meaning citizen; — that is a description I may apply to myself without offence. When in power, the constant aim of his policy should be the honor and the ascendancy of his country; and on every occasion and in all business he should preserve his loyalty. That virtue depends on his natural disposition: ability and success depend upon other considerations. [322] Such, you will find, has been my disposition, abidingly and without alloy. Look at the facts. They demanded that I should be given up; they arraigned me before the Amphictyonic Council; they tried me with threats, they tried me with promises; they set these miscreants to worry me like a pack of wolves; but through it all I never renounced my loyalty to you. At the very outset of my career I had chosen once for all the path of political uprightness and integrity, and resolved to support, to magnify, and to associate myself with the honor, the power, and the glory of my native land. [323] I do not perambulate the marketplace, gaily exulting in the good fortune of the alien, holding out my right hand, and telling the glad tidings to anyone I think likely to send word over yonder. When I hear of my country’s successes, I do not shudder, and sigh, and hang down my head, like those blasphemers, who traduce Athens, forgetting that thereby they are traducing themselves; who turn their eyes abroad, and, when the alien has prospered by the distresses of Greece, applaud his good fortune, and declare that we must try to preserve it for ever. [324]

  Never, O ye Powers of Heaven, never vouchsafe to them the fulfillment of that desire. If it be possible, implant even in them a better purpose and a better spirit; but, if their malady is incurable, consign them, and them alone, to utter and untimely destruction by land and sea, and to us who remain grant speedy deliverance from the terrors that hang over our heads, and a salvation that shall never fail.

  AGAINST LEPTINES

  Translated by C. A. Vince and J. H. Vince

  Gentlemen of the jury, it is chiefly because I consider that the State will benefit by the repeal of this law, but partly also out of sympathy with the young son of Chabrias, that I have consented to support the plaintiffs to the best of my ability. It is clear, men of Athens, that Leptines and anyone else who defends the law will have nothing fair to say in its favor, but will urge the unworthiness of certain persons who have used their exemption as a means of shirking the public services, and he will take his stand chiefly on that ground. [2] For my own part, I shall forbear to retort that it is unjust to take away this privilege from all because you find fault with some; for that objection has already been partially stated, and you probably realize its force. But I should like to ask Leptines on what grounds, even if not some, but all the recipients had been to the last degree undeserving, he has meted out the same treatment to you as to them; for by the clause “none shall be exempt” he has taken away the privilege from those who now enjoy it, while by the addition “nor shall it be lawful hereafter to grant it” he takes away from you the right to bestow it. For surely he cannot mean that precisely as he thought the holders of this privilege unworthy, so he thought the people unworthy of the right to dispense its own favors to whomsoever it wishes. [3] But perhaps he may object here that he framed his law in this way because the people are so easily gulled. But by parity of reasoning why should you not be deprived of all your rights — of the whole constitution in fact? For there is no single — right which has not been abused in this way. You have often been deceived into passing decrees; you have sometimes been induced to choose weak allies rather than strong; and generally, I suppose, in many of your public proceedings the same thing is bound to happen. [4] Shall we then make a law that hereafter neither Council nor Assembly shall be permitted to deliberate or to vote on any subject? Not so, in my opinion; for we ought not to be deprived of our rights, where we have been misled; we ought to be instructed how to avoid such mistakes, and we ought to make a law, not to strip us of our own authority, but to punish those who mislead us. [5]

  Now if, putting these considerations aside, you would examine the real problem, whether it is more advantageous that you should possess the power of bestowing this privilege, even though you are sometimes duped into bestowing it on a scoundrel, or that by being wholly dispossessed of it you should be unable to grant honors even where they are deserved, you would find the former course the more advantageous. And why? Because the result of rewarding too many citizens is to encourage many to do you good service, but the result of rewarding no one, even if deserving, is to discourage emulation in all. [6] There is also this other reason, that those who reward an undeserving individual may be credited with some degree of artlessness, but those who never requite their benefactors are charged with baseness. Just so far as it is better to be thought artless than unscrupulous, it is more honorable to repeal this law than to enact it. [7]

  Nor again, men of Athens, on reflection does it seem to me reasonable, when finding fault with some on the ground of the rewards they already enjoy, to rob useful citizens of their honors. For if, while these immunities exist, some of the recipients are, as our opponents say, worthless and unprofitable, what result are we to expect when there is no chance whatever of reward for the good citizens? [8]

  Then again, you must consider this point, that in accordance with the existing laws of long standing — laws of which Leptines himself cannot deny the soundness — there is an interval of a year between each public service, so that half the time a citizen is immune. And then, when all citizens, even those who have not benefited you in the least, enjoy a half share in that privilege, are we to take away from your real benefactors the addition that we made to it? Surely not; for that would be dishonorable and, in your case, especially unbecoming. [9] When we have a law which forbids cheating in the marketplace, where a falsehood entails no public injury, is it not disgraceful that in public affairs the same state should not abide by the law which it enjoins on private individuals, but should cheat its benefactors, and that although it is itself likely to incur no small penalty? [10] For we must take account not only of loss of money, but of loss of good fame, which you are more anxious to keep than your money — yes, you and your ancestors also. The proof of this is that when they had accumulated vast sums, they spent all for honor, and when reputation was at stake, they never shrank from danger, but even lavished their private fortunes without stint. As it stands, then, this law reflects on your city not honor but disgrace, unworthy alike of your ancestors and of yourselves; for Athens is incurring the three worst reproaches — that men should think us envious, faithless, ungrateful. [11]

  Next, men of Athens, that it is absolutely contrary to the national character to ratify such a law as this, I will also endeavor to show you briefly by an example of our conduct in the past. The Thirty Tyrants are said to have borrowed money from the Lacedaemonians for use against the patriots in the Piraeus. But when unity was restored to the State and those disputes were settled, the Lacedaemonians sent envoys to demand payment. [12] When the question was discussed and some were for ordering the city-party, who were the real borrowers, to repay, while others claimed that the first sign of reconciliation should be the joint settlement of the debt, they say that the people chose to pay their contribution and bear their share of the loss, so that there should be no breach of the agreement. On that occasion, men of Athens, to avoid a breach of faith, you consented to pay money to those who had injured you, but now, when you might without any expense requite your benefactors by repealing this law, will it not be strange if you prefer to break your faith? I for one cannot approve of it. [13]

  The instance I have quoted, men of Athens, as well many others, will show what our national character is — truthful, honest, and, where money is concerned, not asking what pays best, but what is the honorable thing to do. But as to the character of the proposer of this law, I have no further knowledge of him, nor do I say or know anything to his prejudice; but if I may judge from his law, I detect a character very far removed from what I have described. [14] I say, then, that it
would be more honorable for Leptines to be guided by you in repealing the law than for you to be guided by him in ratifying it, and it would be more profitable for you, as well as for him, that Athens should persuade Leptines to assume a likeness to herself than that she should be persuaded by Leptines to be like him; for even if he is a really good man — and he may be, for aught I know — he cannot excel her in character. [15]

  Moreover, gentlemen, I think that you would come to a sounder judgement in this matter if you would observe this further truth, that the present law removes just the one advantage which the rewards of a democracy have over those of other constitutions. For in the material value to the recipients of the rewards bestowed, a tyranny or an oligarchy has an immense advantage in that they can make anyone they choose instantaneously rich; but in honor and in security of possession you will find that the gifts of a democracy are to be preferred. [16] For not the receipt of a flatterer’s pay with its taint of shame, but to be honored, where speech is free, as one who is deemed worthy — that is true glory; and to enjoy the willing admiration of equals seems better than to accept the richest gift from a tyrant’s hand. For in those communities the fear of tomorrow outweighs the favor of today, but in your city a man could keep what he won without fear of loss, at any rate in time past. [17] So the law which destroys confidence in the rewards takes away the one thing that gives a higher value to rewards which you bestow. And indeed, if from any one of all known forms of government you take away the right of loyal supporters of the constitution to receive favors, you will find that you have deprived those governments of no unimportant safeguard. [18]

  Now perhaps Leptines will try to divert your attention from these points and assert that at present the public services fall upon the poor, but that under his law they will be performed by the wealthiest class. At first hearing, the plea seems to have some weight; but examine it strictly and the fallacy will be exposed. For there are, as you know, among us some services that fall upon resident aliens and others that fall upon citizens, and the exemption, which Leptines would remove, has been granted in the case of both. For from special contributions for war or for national defence and also from the equipment of war-galleys, rightly and justly in accordance with earlier laws, no one is exempt, not even the descendants of Harmodius and Aristogiton, whom Leptines has specially named. [19] Let us then see what additional contributors he provides to perform those public services, and how many will be passed over if we turn a deaf ear to him. Now the richest citizens, when equipping a war-galley, are already exempt from the ordinary services, while those whose wealth is insufficient necessarily enjoy exemption and are out of the reach of this tax; so his law will not provide us with another contributor from either of these classes. [20] He may reply that he recruits many aliens for the services. But if he can point to five such, I will eat my words. I will assume, then, that this is not the case, but that if the law stands, both the number of aliens performing public services will be greater, and of the citizens none will be excused because he is equipping a war-galley. Now let us consider what the State will gain if all these perform the services, for it will prove to be no compensation at all for the disgrace it will entail. [21] Put it thus. Of aliens there are exempt — I will assume ten. And by Heaven, as I said before, I do not believe there are five. Moreover of the citizens there are not half a dozen. Sixteen of both, then. Let us call it twenty, or thirty, if you like. How many, pray, are there that annually perform the regularly recurring services — chorus-masters, presidents of gymnasia, and public hosts? Perhaps sixty in all, or a trifle more. [22] In order, then, that we may have thirty more men for the public services, spread over the whole period, is it worth our while to excite the distrust of all? But surely we must know this, that as long as Athens stands, there will be plenty of citizens, without fail, to perform the services, but not a soul will want to do us a good turn, if he sees our previous benefactors wronged. [23] So far, so good. But if there were the most serious shortage of possible contributors, in Heaven’s name, which would you prefer — to organize syndicates for those services as for the equipment of war-vessels, or to rob your benefactors of what you have given them? I think I should prefer the syndicates. By the present law, while each of these thirty is performing a public service, Leptines affords a respite for the others, and that is all; after that, each of them will have to spend as much as before; but in the other case, each would pay a small contribution, proportioned to his means, and none would be hardly treated, even if his property were quite small. [24]

  Now some of our opponents, men of Athens, are so illogical that they make no attempt to answer these arguments, but take a different line, saying for instance how monstrous it is that on the one hand there is nothing left in the Exchequer, but on the other hand private individuals will grow wealthy because they have secured an immunity. But it is not fair to combine both these statements. For if a man has great wealth without doing you any wrong, there is surely no need to look on him with envy; but if they are prepared to say that he has stolen it or gained it in some other disreputable way, there are laws by which he can be suitably punished. But as long as they do not prosecute him, neither have they any right to make this allegation. [25] Further, with regard to the alleged poverty of the Exchequer, you must reflect that you will not be a whit the better off if you abolish these exemptions, for the expenditure on these services has nothing to do with the revenues or the surplus of the State. And apart from all this, of two possible advantages — wealth and credit with the rest of the world — our State today enjoys the latter. But if anyone imagines that because we have no money we need not also keep our honor bright, his judgement is at fault. For myself indeed, I pray Heaven that, if so it may be, our wealth also may increase, but if not, then at least that our reputation for good faith and constancy may remain sure. [26]

  Now take the large fortunes which, according to our opponents, some citizens will amass if relieved of the services, but which I will show to be available for your needs. For of course you are aware that no one is exempt from the equipment of war-galleys or from the special contributions for war. So this person, whoever he may be, who owns much, contributes much to those objects; there is no getting out of it. And again, all would agree that the resources which the State can rely on for these objects should be as great as possible. For money spent by the chorus-masters affords those of us who are in the theater gratification for a fraction of a day; but money lavished on equipment for war gives security to the whole city for all time. [27] Therefore whatever you remit with one hand, you receive with the other; and you grant as an honor exemptions which even those who receive them cannot enjoy, if they have wealth sufficient for the equipment of a war-vessel. But although I suppose you all know that no one is exempt from the latter service, the clerk shall read to you the actual statute. Take the law about the trierarchy and read this clause only.”Law

  [And none shall be exempt from the trierarchy except the nine archons.]” [28]

  You see, Athenians, how explicitly the law lays down that none shall be exempt from the equipment of a war-galley except the nine archons. So those whose wealth falls short of the qualification for that service will contribute by groups to the special war-tax, but those who reach that qualification will be available both for the war-galleys and for the war-tax. Then what relief does your law, Leptines, afford to the main body of citizens, if from one or two tribes it provides a single contributor, who, having relieved one other citizen on one occasion, will thereafter be exempt? I can see no relief. On the other hand it taints the honor and credit of the whole State. Therefore, when the damage it will inflict is greater than the benefit it confers, ought it not to be repealed by this court? Such would be my verdict. [29]