Delphi Complete Works of Demosthenes

by Demosthenes

  Again, with regard to the absence of honors at Thebes, I think I can express the truth thus. The Thebans, men of Athens, plume themselves more on brutality and iniquity than you on humanity and love of justice. If a prayer may be allowed, may they never cease to withhold honor and admiration from those who do them service, or to deal with kindred states in the same way （For you remember how they treated Orchomenus.） And never may you cease to do the opposite, honoring your benefactors and winning your rights from your fellow-citizens by debate and in harmony with the laws! [110] And in general, I think that then only ought you to praise the habits and character of other nations and decry your own, when it is possible to prove that they are more prosperous than you. As long as you （thank Heaven!） are more prosperous than they, in public policy, in internal harmony, and in every other way, why should you belittle your national institutions and imitate theirs? Even if theirs could be proved superior in theory, yet the good fortune that you have enjoyed under your own institutions makes it worth your while to retain them. [111] Besides all this, if I must say what I think is right, I would put it in this way. It is not right, Athenians, to cite the laws of the Lacedaemonians or of the Thebans in order to undermine the laws established here; it is not right that you should want to put a man to death for transplanting to Athens any of the institutions that have made those nations great, and yet lend a willing ear to those who propose to destroy the institutions under which our democracy has flourished. [112]

  Then they have another argument ready; that even at Athens in former generations men who had rendered great services met with no recognition of this sort, but were content with an inscription in the Hermes-Portico. Perhaps indeed the inscription will be read to you. But in my opinion, Athenians, this argument is in many ways prejudicial to the State, besides being unjust. [113] For if anyone says that even these men deserved no honor, let him say who does deserve it, if there is no one either before or after them. If he shall say “no one,” I should be very sorry for our city, if no one in the course of its history has proved worthy of reward. Again, if while admitting their merit he points out that they got nothing by it, assuredly he accuses the city of ingratitude. But that is not the truth or anything like it; but whenever a man maliciously gives a wrong twist to his arguments, I think they must appear hateful. [114] I, however, will explain the case to you, as truth and justice demand. There were, men of Athens, plenty of zealous citizens in former generations, and our city even then honored its good men; only honors then, like everything else, reflected the temper of the times, just as they now reflect the temper of today. And why do I say this? Because for myself I should be inclined to assert that they did get from the State everything that they wished. [115] What is my evidence? Lysimachus, only one of the worthies of that day, received a hundred roods of orchard in Euboea and a hundred of arable land, besides a hundred minas of silver and a pension of four drachmas a day. And the decree in which these gifts are recorded stands in the name of Alcibiades. For then our city was rich in lands and money, though now — she will be rich some day; for I must put it in that way to avoid anything like obloquy. Yet today who, think you, would not prefer a third of that reward to mere immunity? To prove the truth of my words, please take the decree. “ Decree “ [116]

  Now this decree, Athenians, proves that your ancestors, like yourselves, were accustomed to honor good men; if they used different methods from ours today, that is another matter. So even if we should admit that neither Lysimachus nor anyone else gained anything from our ancestors, does that make it any fairer in us to rob the men whom we have just rewarded? [117] For there is nothing outrageous in withholding what one never dreamed of giving; but it is an outrage to give and afterwards take back one’s gift, with no fault alleged. Prove to me that our ancestors ever took back the gifts they had bestowed, and you too have my leave to do the same, though the disgrace remains none the less; but if no one can cite an instance from the whole course of our history, why is such a precedent to be set in our generation? [118]

  Again, men of Athens, you must also consider well and carefully the fact that you have come into court today, sworn to give your verdict according to the laws, not of Sparta or Thebes, nor those of our earliest ancestors, but those under which immunities were granted to the men whom Leptines is now trying to rob by his law; and where there are no statutes to guide you, you are sworn to decide according to the best of your judgement. So far, so good. Then you must apply these principles to the law as a whole. [119] Is it right, Athenians, to honor your benefactors? It is. Well then, is it right to allow a man to keep what has once been given him? It is. Then, to observe your oaths, act on that principle yourselves; resent the imputation that your ancestors acted otherwise; and as for those who cite such instances, alleging that your ancestors rewarded no man for great benefits received, look upon them as both knaves and dullards — knaves, because they falsely charge your ancestors with ingratitude; fools, because they do not see that were the charge proved to the hilt, it would better become them to deny than to repeat it. [120]

  Now I expect that another argument of Leptines will be that his law does not deprive the recipients of their inscriptions and their free maintenance, nor the State of the right to confer honor on those who deserve it, but that it will still be in your power to set up statues and grant maintenance and anything else you wish, except this one privilege. But with respect to the powers that he will pretend to leave to the State, I have just this to say. As soon as you take away one of the privileges you have already granted, you will shake the credit of all the rest. For how can the grant of a statue or of free maintenance be more indefeasible than that of an immunity, which you will seem to have first given and then taken away? [121] Further, even if this difficulty were not likely to arise, I cannot think that it is well to bring the State into this dilemma, that it must either put all citizens on an equality with its greatest benefactors, or to avoid this must treat some with ingratitude. Now as for great benefactions, it is not well that you should have many opportunities of receiving them, nor is it perhaps easy for an individual to confer them; [122] but the humbler duties to which one can rise in time of peace and in the civil sphere — loyalty, justice, zeal and the like — it is, in my opinion, both well and necessary that they should be rewarded. Grants ought, therefore, to be so apportioned that each man may receive from the people the exact reward that he deserves. [123] And then again, with regard to what he will say about leaving their honors to those who have received them, some would have a perfectly plain and straightforward answer, when they claim their right to all their rewards, because they were granted for the same service, but the others will reply that the man who says that he leaves them anything is mocking them. For if a man has been thought to deserve immunity and has received that from you as his sole reward, be he foreigner or citizen, what reward has he left, Leptines, if that is taken from him? None whatever! Then you have no right to rob some because you arraign the worthlessness of the others, or to rob one class of their sole reward because you say that you are going to leave the other class something. [124] To put it plainly, the danger is not that of doing a greater or less injustice to one member of the whole body, but that of rendering precarious the honors with which we reward men’s services, nor is immunity the main topic of my speech, but the evil precedent which this law will establish, so that there will be no security for the nation’s gifts. [125]

  Again, the most unscrupulous argument that they have framed, as they think, to persuade you to withdraw the immunities, is one which I had better explain for fear you should be their innocent dupes. They are going to claim that all such payments are religious dues, and that of course it is monstrous that anyone should be exempt from the dues of religion. For my part, I see no unfairness in such exemption, if the people have bestowed it; the really monstrous thing is the course which they propose, if that is to be their argument. [126] For if by appealing to the name of the gods they try to justify a robbery which t
hey cannot justify otherwise, will not that be most impious and monstrous conduct? In my opinion, whenever a man appeals solemnly to the gods, his conduct ought to be clearly such as would not appear base even if supported only by human authority. Now that there is a difference between exemption from religious duties and exemption from public services, and that the defendants are trying to deceive you by transferring the name of public services to religious acts, I shall adduce Leptines himself as my witness. For the first clause of the law says [127] “Leptines proposed that, to the end that the wealthiest citizens may perform the public services, none shall be immune save and except the descendants of Harmodius and Aristogiton.” But if immunity from religious duties were the same as immunity from public services, what was the object of that clause? For immunity from religious duties has never been granted even to the persons here named. To prove that this is so, please take and read the copy of the inscription and then the beginning of the law of Leptines.” Copy of Stela Inscription “ [128]

  You hear the copy of the inscription, men of Athens, ordering them to be immune, save from religious duties. Now read the beginning of the law of Leptines.” Law”

  Good; stop there. After the words “to the end that the wealthiest citizens may perform the public services,” he added “no one shall be immune save and except, the descendants of Harmodius and Aristogiton.” Why so, if to pay for a religious rite is to perform a public service? For if that is his meaning, his own drafting will be found to contradict the inscription. [129] Now I should like to put a question to Leptines. When you say that the public services come under the head of religious dues, in what, according to you, did the immunity consist, which our ancestors then granted and you now leave untouched? For by the old laws they are not immune from all the special war-taxes or from the equipment of war-galleys; and they enjoy no immunity from the state services, since they are included in the religious duties. [130] And yet the inscription says that they shall be immune. From what? From the tax on resident aliens, since nothing else is left? Of course not. It is from the regularly recurring services, as the inscription shows, as your law further specifies, and as all history witnesses. During all that length of time no tribe has ever ventured to nominate one of these descendants as chorus-master, and no one nominated has ever ventured to challenge them to an exchange of property. If Leptines dares to deny it, you must pay no heed to him. [131]

  Again, perhaps they will say in their haphazard style that some citizens, by claiming to be Megarians and Messenians, at once gain immunity, whole crowds at a time, to say nothing of slaves and jailbirds like Lycidas and Dionysius; such are the examples they select. When they hold such language, deal with them thus. Tell them, if they are speaking the truth, to produce the decrees which contain these men’s immunity; for no one in your city enjoys immunity unless granted by some decree or law. [132] Many such men, however, have been proclaimed Friends of the State here at the instance of your politicians Lycidas, for example. But it is one thing to be a Friend of the State and another to enjoy immunity. Be not misled by them. Because slaves, like Lycidas and Dionysius and perhaps one other, were made Friends of the State by men who are readily bribed to propose such decrees, they must not try to take away the gifts that you have justly bestowed on men of a different class — mentorious, freeborn, munificent benefactors. [133] On this principle, what a gross insult it would be to Chabrias, if politicians of that stamp, not content with making his slave, Lycidas, a Friend of your State, should make the slave an excuse for taking back rewards conferred on the master, and that on a false plea! For neither Lycidas nor anyone else enjoys immunity as a Friend of the State, unless such immurity has been expressly conferred by the people. The men in question have not received it; I defy the defendants to prove it. If they have the effrontery to assert it, they will be acting dishonorably. [134]

  I now come to speak of a matter about which I feel bound, Athenians, to warn you most seriously. For even if one could admit the truth of all that Leptines will say in praise of his law, it would be impossible under any circumstances to wipe out one disgrace which his law, if ratified, will bring upon our city. To what do I refer? To the reputation of having cheated our benefactors. [135] Now I think you would all agree that this is a distinct disgrace; how much worse in you than in others, hear me explain. You have an ancient law, one held in great respect, that if anyone deceives the people by false promises, he shall be brought to trial, and if convicted shall be punished with death. And are you not then ashamed, Athenians, to find yourselves doing the very thing for which you punish other men with death? Nay, but in everything it is right to take heed against doing whatever seems or is dishonorable, but especially in cases where a man is seen to be indignant with others. For there is no room left even for hesitation in avoiding acts which a man’s own judgement has already condemned. [136]

  Then there is another precaution that you must take — to do nothing as a community which you would shun as individuals. Not a man among you would take away from another his own personal gifts, nor even dream of doing so. Then do not so in your public capacity, but tell the official defenders of this law that [137] if they say that any of the recipients of these rewards is undeserving, or holds them under false pretences, or is open to any other charge, they should indict him under the amended law which we are now proposing, either when we have carried it through, as we guarantee and assert that we will, or when they have themselves carried it, that is, as soon as the legislative commission has been appointed. But each defender of this law, it seems, has a personal enemy, whether Diophantus or Eubulus or someone else. [138] If they hang back and refuse to take this step, then consider, men of Athens, whether it is to your credit that you should be known to have taken away from your benefactors what not one of these men ventures to take from his personal enemy, and that you should pass a law to rob collectively of their rewards men who have served you well and whom no one dreams of indicting, when the handful of unworthy recipients, if there are any, could be dealt with just as effectively, if these men would impeach them and bring them to trial one by one. For it passes my comprehension how the present arrangement can consort with your honor and your dignity. [139]

  Again, we must not deviate from this principle, that it was fair to investigate their merits at the time of conferring the reward, when none of these men opposed the vote, but after that to let the reward stand, unless you have received any subsequent wrong at their hands. If they allege that （for they cannot prove it）, it must be shown that the men were punished at the time of the alleged wrongs. But if you ratify this law, though no such wrong was committed, it will seem that you have taken away their reward because you were envious, not because you found them rascals. [140] Every reproach, I might almost say, should be avoided, but this above all, men of Athens. Why? Because in every way envy is the mark of a vicious nature, and the man who is subject to it has no claim whatever to consideration. Moreover there is no reproach more alien to our city than the appearance of envy, averse as she is from all that is disgraceful. [141] See what strong evidence we have of this. In the first place, you alone of all mankind publicly pronounce over your dead funeral orations, in which you extol the deeds of the brave. Such, however, is the practice of men who admire bravery, not of men who envy the honors that bravery wins. Next, you have from time immemorial given the richest rewards to those who win crowns in the athletic games; nor, because such honors are necessarily confined to a few, have you grudged or stinted the honors of the victors on that account. Beside these notable instances, no one, I think, has ever surpassed our State in generosity; such a superabundance of rewards has she heaped on those who serve her well. [142] All these, men of Athens, are proofs of justice, of virtue, of magnanimity. Then do not now destroy the very qualities on which throughout its history our city’s reputation is founded; do not, in order that Leptines may vent his spite on men whom he dislikes, rob both yourselves and your city of the fair fame that has been yours in every age; do not
suppose that anything else is at stake in this trial save the honor of Athens, whether it is to stand unimpaired as of old, or to pass into neglect and degradation. [143]

  But of all the astonishing features of Leptines’ law, what astonishes me most is his ignorance of the fact that just as a man who assigns heavy penalties for offences would be unlikely to have contemplated an offence himself, so one who abolishes the rewards for benefactions will not himself be likely to have contemplated a good deed. Now if, as is just possible, he did not know this, he will at once confess it by allowing you to repeal the law which embodies his own error, but if he shows himself obstinate and eager to ratify the law, I for one cannot praise him, though I refrain from censure. [144] Then be not stubborn, Leptines; do not insist on a course which will not add to your own reputation or that of your supporters, especially as this trial no longer endangers you. For owing to the death of the father of Apsephion here, Bathippus, who indicted Leptines when he was still liable, the legal period has elapsed, and now our whole concern is with the law, and its proposer runs no risk. [145]