Delphi Complete Works of Demosthenes

by Demosthenes

  I am well aware, men of Athens, that, although Aristocrates will be quite unable to disprove the charge of framing his decree in open defiance of the laws, he will make an attempt to shuffle away the most serious part of the accusation, — namely, that from beginning to end of his decree he does not order any trial of a very grave indictment. On that point I do not think I need say much; but I will prove clearly from the actual phrasing of the decree that he himself does not suppose that the man accused will get any trial at all. [91] The words are: “If any man kill Charidemus, he shall be liable to seizure; and if any person or any city rescue him, they shall be put under ban,” — not merely in case they refuse to give up for trial the man they have rescued, but absolutely and without more ado. And yet if he were permitting instead of disallowing a trial, he would have made the penal clause against the rescuers conditional upon their not giving up for trial the person rescued. [92]

  I dare say that he will use the following argument, and that he will try very hard to mislead you on this point. The decree, he will urge, is invalid because it is merely a provisional resolution, and the law provides that resolutions of the Council shall be in force for one year only; therefore, if you acquit him today, the commonwealth can take no harm in respect of his decree. [93] I think your rejoinder to that argument should be that the defendant’s purpose in drafting the decree was, not that it should be inoperative and have no disagreeable results, — for it was open to him not to draft it at all, if he had wished to consult the best advantage of the commonwealth; — but that you might be misled and certain people might be enabled to carry through projects opposed to your interests. That the decree has been challenged, that its operation has been delayed, and that it has now become invalid, you owe to us; and it is preposterous that the very reasons that ought to make you grateful to us should be available as reasons for acquitting our opponents. [94] Moreover the question is not so simple as some suppose. If there were no other man likely to propose decrees like his without regard to your interests, the matter might, perhaps, be a simple one. But in fact there are many such; and that is why it is not right that you should refuse to annul this decree. If it is pronounced flawless, who will not move decrees in future without misgiving? Who will refuse to put them to the vote? Who will impeach them? What you have to take into account is, not that this decree has become invalid by lapse of time, but that, if you now give judgement for the defendant, by that verdict you will be offering impunity to every man who may hereafter wish to do you a mischief. [95]

  It also occurs to my mind, men of Athens, that Aristocrates, having no straightforward or honest defence, nor indeed any defence at all, to offer, will resort to such fallacious arguments as this, — that many similar decrees have been made before now in favour of many persons. That is no proof, gentlemen, of the legality of his own proposal. There are many pretences by which you have often been misled. [96] For instance, suppose that one of those decrees which have in fact been disallowed had never been impeached in this Court. It would certainly have been operative; nevertheless it would have been moved contrary to law. Or suppose that a decree, being impeached, was pronounced flawless, because the prosecutors, either collusively or through incompetence, had failed to make good their case: that failure does not make it legal. Then the jurors do not give conscientious verdicts? Yes, they do; I will explain how. They are sworn to decide to the best of an honest judgement; but the view that commends itself to their judgement is guided by the speeches to which they listen, and, inasmuch as they cast their votes in accordance with that view, they are true to their oath. [97] Every man keeps his oath who does not, through spite or favour or other dishonest motive, vote against his better judgement. Suppose that he does not apprehend some point that is explained to him, he does not deserve to be punished for his lack of intelligence. The man who is amenable to the curse is the advocate who deceives and misleads the jury. That is why, at every meeting, the crier pronounces a commination, not upon those who have been misled, but upon whosoever makes a misleading speech to the Council, or to the Assembly, or to the Court. [98] Do not listen to proof that the thing has happened, but only to proof that it ought to have happened. Do not let them tell you that those old decrees were upheld by other juries; ask them to satisfy you that their plea for this decree is fairer than ours. Failing that, I do not think that you ought to give greater weight to the delusions of others than to your own judgement. [99] Moreover, I cannot but think that there is something uncommonly impudent in such a plea as that other people have before now got decrees of this sort. — If, sir, an illegal act has already been done, and you have imitated that act, that is no reason why you should be acquitted. On the contrary, it is an additional reason why you should be convicted. If one of them had been found guilty, you would never have moved our decree and similarly another will be deterred, if you are found guilty today. [100]

  I say that I do not expect that Aristocrates will be able to deny that he has moved a decree in open violation of all the laws; but before now, men of Athens, I have seen a man contesting an indictment for illegal measures, who, though convicted by law, made an attempt to argue that his proposal had been to the public advantage, and insisted strongly on that point, — a simple-minded argument, surely, if it was not an impudent one. [101] Admit a man’s proposition to be in every other respect advantageous; it is still disadvantageous in so far as he begs you, who are sworn to give judgement according to law, to ratify a decree which he himself cannot prove to have been honestly drawn, seeing that every man is bound to set the highest value upon fidelity to his oath. At the same time the plea, though impertinent, has reason in it; but not a reason which Aristocrates will be able to submit to you. Entirely opposed as his decree is to the laws, it is not less pernicious than illegal. [102] That is the point which I wish now to make good to you; and, in order to do what I wish in as few words as possible, will cite an illustration that is well known to you all. You are aware that it is for the advantage of Athens that neither the Thebans nor the Lacedaemonians should be powerful; that the Thebans should be counterbalanced by the Phocians, and the Lacedaemonians by other communities; because, when that is the position of affairs, you are the strongest nation, and can dwell in security. [103] You must, then, take the view that for those of our fellow-citizens who live in the Chersonese the same condition is advantageous, that is, that no one man shall be all-powerful among the Thracians. In fact the quarrels of the Thracians, and their jealousy of one another, afford the best and most trustworthy guarantee of the safety of the Chersonese. Now the decree before us, by offering security to the minister who controls the affairs of Cersobleptes, and by putting the commanders of the other kings in imminent fear of being accused of crime, makes those kings weak, and the king who stands by himself strong. [104] And that you may not be quite surprised to hear that decrees made in Athens have so powerful an effect, I will remind you of a piece of history within the knowledge of all of you. After the revolt of Miltocythes against Cotys, when the war had already lasted a considerable time, when Ergophilus had been superseded, and Autocles was on the point of sailing to take command, a decree was proposed here in such terms that Miltocythes withdrew in alarm, supposing that you were not well disposed towards him, and Cotys gained possession of the Sacred Mountain and its treasures. Now observe that later, men of Athens, although Autocles was put on his trial for having brought Miltocythes to ruin, the time for indicting the author of the decree was past; and, so far as Athens was concerned, the whole business had come to grief. [105] Even so today, if you do not annul this decree, the kings and their commanders will be immensely discouraged. They will regard themselves as altogether slighted, and will imagine that your favour is inclining towards Cersobleptes. Now suppose that on this assumption they surrender their royalty, whenever Cersobleptes seizes opportunity and attacks them; and again observe what will happen. — [106] In heaven’s name, tell me this. If Cersobleptes attacks us, — and he is more likely than not to do so, wh
en he has the power, — shall we not have recourse to those kings? Shall we not try to reduce him through them? Very well; then suppose they reply: “Athenians, so far from helping us when we were ill-treated, you made us grievously afraid of defending ourselves, for you issued a decree that anyone who should kill the man who was working against your interests and ours alike, should be liable to seizure. Therefore you have no right to call upon us to help you in a matter which you mismanaged for us as well as for yourselves.” Tell me this, I say: will not they have the best of the argument? I think so. [107]

  Again, it cannot possibly be alleged that it was natural that you should be hoodwinked and misled. For even though you had no other basis of calculation, even though you were unable of yourselves to grasp the state of affairs, you had before your eyes the example of those people at Olynthus. What has Philip done for them? And how are they treating him? He restored Potidaea to them, not at a time when he was no longer able to keep them out, as Cersobleptes restored the Chersonesus to you; no, — after spending a great deal of money on his war with you, when he had taken Potidaea, and could have kept it if he chose, he made them a present of the place, without even attempting any other course. [108] Nevertheless, although so long as they saw that he was not too powerful to be trusted, they were his allies and fought us on his account, when they found that his strength had grown too great for their confidence, they did not make a decree that whosoever should kill any man who had helped to consolidate Philip’s power should be liable to seizure in the country of their allies. [109] No, indeed; they have made friendship, and promise to make alliance, with you, — you who of all men in the world would be most delighted to kill Philip’s friends or even Philip himself. When mere Olynthians know how to provide for the morrow, will not you, who are Athenians, do likewise? It is discreditable that you, who have a reputation for superior ability in political deliberation, should be convicted of a duller perception of your own advantage than Olynthians. [110]

  I am informed that Aristocrates will also say something to the same effect as a speech once made in the Assembly by Aristomachus, — that it is inconceivable that Cersobleptes would ever deliberately provoke your enmity by trying to rob you of the Chersonesus, because, even if he should take it and hold it, it will be of no use to him. Indeed when that country is not at war, its revenue is no more than thirty talents, and when it is at war, not a single talent. On the other hand the revenue of his ports, which, in the event supposed, would be blockaded, is more than two hundred talents. They wonder, — as they will put it, — what he could possibly mean by preferring small returns and a war with you, when he might get larger returns and be your friend. [111]

  But I am at no loss for plenty of instances in the light of which a man might reasonably be skeptical, instead of putting his trust in those orators, and allowing Cersobleptes to become a potentate. However, I will be content with the instance that lies nearest to hand. Of course, gentlemen, you all know that Macedonian, Philip. It was certainly more profitable for him to draw the revenues of all Macedonia in safety, than the revenue of Amphipolis with risks attached; and more agreeable to have you, his hereditary friends, on his side, than the Thessalians who once ejected his own father. [112] Apart from that, it may be observed that you, Athenians, never yet betrayed any of your friends, while the Thessalians have betrayed every one of theirs. Nevertheless, in spite of all that, you see that he has deliberately chosen small gains, faithless friends, and big risks, in preference to a life of security. [113] Now what can be the reason? For the logic of the thing is certainly not so very obvious. The truth is, men of Athens, that there are two things that are excellent for everybody: good luck, the chiefest and greatest of goods, and good counsel, inferior to good luck, but greater than any other; but men do not get both these good things at once, and no successful man sets any limit or end to his desire to get more. And that is why men, in the desire for more, so often throw away what they already have. [114] But what need to name Philip, or any other man? Why, Cersobleptes’ own father, Cotys, whenever he had a quarrel on hand, used to send his ambassadors, and was ready to do anything, and then he could see that being at war with Athens was quite unprofitable. But, as soon as he had all Thrace at his command, he would occupy cities, do mischief, discharge his drunken fury, first on himself, and then on us; he must needs subjugate the whole country; there was no dealing with the fellow. For everybody who attempts improper enterprises for the sake of aggrandizement is apt to look, not to the difficulties of his task, but to what he will achieve if successful. [115] My own opinion, then, is that your policy should be fashioned in such a way that, if Cersobleptes’ views in regard to you are what they should be, he shall not be unjustly treated by you, but that, if he is so unreasonable as to treat you unjustly, he may not be too strong to be punished. I will read to you the letter which Cersobleptes sent at the time of the revolt of Miltocythes, and also that which, when the whole kingdom was his, he sent to Timomachus before seizing your outposts.” Letters “ [116]

  Here is a warning, men of Athens, which, if you will be guided by me, you will bear in mind; and, remembering also that, when Philip was besieging Amphipolis, he pretended to be doing so in order to hand the place over to you, but that, when he had got it, he annexed Potidaea into the bargain, you will sh to have the same sort of assurance that, according to the story, Philocrates, son of Ephialtes, once opposed to the Lacedaemonians. [117] It is said that, when the Lacedaemonians were trying to overreach him, and offered any assurance he was willing to accept, Philocrates replied that the only possible assurance would be that they should satisfy him that, if they had a mind to injure him, they would not have the power; “for,” he added, “I am quite certain that you will always have the mind, and there can be no assurance so long as you have the power.” That, — if you will let me advise you, — is the sort of assurance that you will hold against this Thracian. If he ever became master of all Thrace, you need not inquire what his sentiments toward you would be. [118]

  That it is entirely the act of insane men to compose such decrees, or to bestow such favours as this, may easily be learned from many examples. I am sure, men of Athens, that you all know as well as I do that you once admitted Cotys over yonder to your citizenship, evidently because you regarded him at the time as a sincere well-wisher. Indeed, you decorated him with golden crowns; and you would never have done that, if you had thought him your enemy. [119] Nevertheless, when he was a wicked, unprincipled man, and was doing you serious injury, you treated the men who put him to death, Pytho and Heracleides of Aenos, as benefactors, made them citizens, and decorated them with crowns of gold. Now suppose that, at the time when the disposition of Cotys was thought to be friendly, it had been proposed that any one who killed Cotys should be given up for punishment, would you have given up Pytho and his brother? Or would you, in defiance of the decree, have given them your citizenship, and honored them as benefactors? [120] Again, there was Alexander of Thessaly. At the time when he had imprisoned Pelopidas, and was holding him captive, when he was the most bitter enemy of the Thebans, when his feelings towards you were so fraternal that he applied to you for a commander, when you gave aid to his arms, when it was Alexander here and Alexander there, — why, gracious heavens! if anybody had moved that whoever killed Alexander should be liable to seizure, would it have been safe for any man to try to give him due punishment for his subsequent violence and brutality? [121] But why need one talk about the other instances? Take Philip, who is now accounted our very worst enemy. At the time when, having caught some of our citizens in the act of trying to restore Argaeus, he released them and made good all their losses, when he professed in a written message that he was ready to form an alliance with us, and to renew his ancestral amity, if at that time he had asked us for this favour, and if one of the men he had released had proposed that “whoever shall kill Philip” should be liable to seizure, a fine insult we should have had to swallow! [122] Do you not see, gentlemen, do you not understan
d, how you would have been chargeable with sheer lunacy in every one of these instances, if you had carried by vote any such resolution as this? I say it is not the part of sane men either to put such confidence in a man, whenever they imagine him to be friendly, as to deprive themselves of all defence against possible aggression, or, on the other hand, when they regard anyone as an enemy, to hate him so fiercely that, if he ever wants to reform and be their friend, they have taken it out of his power to do so. But we should, I think, carry both our friendship and our hatred only so far as not to exceed the due measure in either case. [123]

  For my part, I cannot see why everybody who has any sort of claim to be your benefactor should not expect to get this favour, if you bestow it upon Charidemus, — Simon, for example, if you want a name, or Bianor, or Athenodorus, or thousands more. No; if we make the same decree in favour of the whole company, we shall unconsciously make ourselves a bodyguard for every one of them, like jobbing mercenaries; but if we do it for one but not for another, those who are disappointed will have a right to complain. [124] Now just suppose that Menestratus of Eretria were to require us to make the same decree for him, or Phayllus of Phocis, or any other autocrat, — and I need not say that we often make friends, to serve our occasions, with many such people, — are we to vote decrees for all of them, or are we not? You say, Yes. Then what decent excuse shall we have, men of Athens, if, while asserting ourselves as the champions of all Hellas in the cause of liberty, we make our appearance as yeomen of the guard to men who maintain troops on their own account to keep down the populace? [125] If we ought, though I say we ought not, to grant such a favour to anyone, let it be even in the first instance to the man who has never done us wrong; secondly, to the man who will never have the power, though he have the will, to injure us; and finally the man who is known by everyone to be seeking it for his own protection, and not in the hope of maltreating his neighbors with impunity — it is to him truly that it should be given. I will spare you the proof that Charidemus is neither a man void of offence towards us, nor one who, for his own safety, tries to win your support; but I do ask you to listen to me when I declare that he is not even one who can be trusted for the future, and to consider carefully whether my argument is sound. [126]