Delphi Complete Works of Demosthenes

by Demosthenes

  Observe from and to what points he crossed the straits; it was from Abydus to Sestus. Do you suppose that the Abydenes and the Sestians would have admitted him, if they had not been privy to his fraud, when he sent you that letter? — Now read to the jury the letter itself. — Observe, men of Athens, with what extravagance of self-commendation he wrote to you, telling you he had done this, and undertaking to do that. — Read.” Letter “ [161]

  A beautiful letter, is it not, gentlemen? One for which you could not have been too grateful, — if only it had been true! But in fact he wrote it to deceive, when he had no expectation of an armistice; but when he had got his armistice, — read what he did then.” Letter”

  So, after the gentleman who undertook to recover our lost fortresses had passed the straits, the governor of Crithote informs us that our remaining possessions are in greater danger than ever. — Show me another letter, and then read a bit of it.” Letter”

  Read a passage from another.” Letter “ [162]

  You see how testimony comes in from every quarter that, when he crossed the straits, he was not marching to attack Cotys but to join Cotys in attacking us. Now here is just one letter more that you must read; but never mind the rest. For it has, I suppose, become quite clear now that he has cheated you. Read.” Letter”

  Stop. Now reflect how, after writing that he would recover the Chersonesus, he took the pay of your enemies, and tried to rob you of your remaining possessions there; and how, after writing that Alexander had sent envoys to him but that he had refused to see them, he was found behaving exactly like Alexander’s filibusters. So much for your single-minded well-wisher; the man who is incapable of writing lies or practising deceit! [163]

  Although, then, it is abundantly clear that there is not a sincere word in all his professions of attachment to Athens, yet, if it is not already clear from these facts, it will be more evident in the light of later events. Cotys, I am glad to say, — for he was your enemy, and a bad man, — was killed by Pytho; Cersobleptes, the present king, was a mere boy, and so were all the sons of Cotys; and Charidemus had got control of affairs, because he was on the spot and had a force at his back. Cephisodotus, the man to whom he sent the famous letter, had arrived in command of an army, and so had the galleys, which were to have rescued him, even without the consent of Artabazus, when his deliverance was in doubt. [164] Now what, men of Athens, was the conduct proper for a really single-minded and friendly person, after the arrival of a commander, — not one of those men whom he might have called jealous of himself, but the recipient of his letter, a man whom he had chosen out of all Athens as his special friend, — with Cotys in his grave, and himself in supreme power? Was it not to restore your territory there and then? To cooperate with you in establishing the king of Thrace? To embrace the opportunity of exhibiting his friendly disposition towards you I should say, yes. [165] Well, is that what he did? By no means. For seven whole months he persisted in making war on us, openly displaying his hostility and withholding even the language of goodwill. At the outset we took anchorage at Perinthus with only ten ships, having heard that he was in the neighborhood, and hoping to meet him and talk matters over. He waited till our men were having their breakfast, and then tried to take our ships, killed a number of our sailors, and hunted every man of them into the sea with his cavalry and light infantry. [166] Afterwards, when we set sail — ,no, it was not to attack any part of Thrace, or any fortress there. For this at least no man can say: “Ah, yes; he did do a little damage, — in self-defence, you know, and to protect himself.” That is not true; we never went to any place in Thrace; we went to Alopeconnesus, and that is in the Chersonesus and used to belong to you, — a headland running out towards Imbros, a long way from Thrace; a place swarming with robbers and pirates. [167] When we got there, and were besieging these gentry, he marched right across the Chersonesus, — your property, every yard of it, — attacked us, and tried to rescue the robbers and pirates. He took up his position, and persuaded or constrained your commander not to serve your interests, instead of letting himself be persuaded by him to carry out some part of his covenant and undertaking; and then he must needs draw up that convention with Cephisodotus, by which you were so deeply annoyed and exasperated that you dismissed your commander, and fined him five talents, and there was a majority of three votes only against a sentence of death. [168] Why, what a preposterous absurdity a man must account this, men of Athens, when for one and the same transaction he sees one man punished with such severity as a criminal, and another glorified as a benefactor from that day to this!

  To prove the truth of my narrative, you are, of course, my witnesses in regard to the fate of the commander; for it was you who tried him, cashiered him, reprimanded him;all this is within your knowledge. In respect of the incidents at Perinthus and Alopeconnesus, please call the ships’ captains as witnesses.” Witnesses “ [169]

  Thereafter, when Cephisodotus had been discharged from his command, and you held the view that the convention made with him was improper and unfair, Miltocythes, who had been consistently well-affected to you, was betrayed by Smicythion, and fell into the hands of our honest friend. Knowing that the man’s life would be spared if he were taken to Cersobleptes, — for killing one another is not customary among the Thracians, — Charidemus handed him over to your enemies the Cardians. They took Miltocythes and his son, put out in a ship to deep water, cut the boy’s throat, and then threw the father overboard, after he had witnessed the murder of his son. [170] These atrocities moved the whole population of Thrace to resentment; Berisades and Amadocus made a coalition; and Athenodorus, recognizing a favorable opportunity, formed alliance with them, and so was in a position to make war. Then Cersobleptes took fright, and Athenodorus proposed a convention, under which he compelled Cersobleptes to make a sworn engagement with you and with the other princes that the kingdom of Thrace should be held in common, and divided among the three, and that they should all restore to you your territory. [171] At the election of magistrates you appointed Chabrias to command in that campaign; but unluckily Athenodorus disbanded his army, because he had no money from you, and no resources for carrying on war; and Chabrias started on his expedition with only one ship. And how does this man Charidemus turn his coat? He repudiates his sworn covenant with Athenodorus, persuades Cersobleptes to disclaim it, and proposes new terms to Chabrias, — terms more monstrous than those made with Cephisodotus. Chabrias was obliged to acquiesce, I suppose because he had no force at his back. [172] When the news reached you, a great many speeches were made in the Assembly; the conventions were read and compared; and, without any respect for Chabrias’s good name or for any of his supporters, you in your turn cancelled the new convention, and resolved, on the motion of Glauco, to elect ten citizens as ambassadors. If Cersobleptes would abide by his covenant with Athenodorus, they were to make him renew his oath;if not, they were to accept the oaths of the two kings, and concert measures for making war on him. [173] The ambassadors took their departure; but by mere lapse of time the business came to such a pass, with these men dawdling and refusing to take any plain, honest action in your service, that we sent a relief expedition to Euboea, and Chares, on returning with his mercenaries, was sent out by you to the Chersonesus as plenipotentiary. So Charidemus once more drafts a new convention with Chares, supported by Athenodorus and the two kings: here it is, — the best and most equitable of the lot. He has convicted himself by his conduct of lying in wait for opportunities against Athens; there is no uprightness, no equity, in his policy. [174] When you see that he is your friend only on inducement, and that his estimate of your strength is the measure of his goodwill, do you really think it your duty to allow him to be powerful, — and powerful through you? If that is your opinion, it is wrong.

  To satisfy you that I am telling the truth, please take the letter that came after the first convention, and then the letter from Berisades. — You will be helped by these documents to a right conclusion.” Letter”

>   Read also the letter of Berisades.” Letter “ [175]

  The alliance with the two kings was concluded in this manner after the fraud effected by the convention with Cephisodotus. At that time Miltocythes had been got rid of, and Charidemus was known by his conduct to be an enemy of Athens; for surely a man who, having got into his power one known to him as the most loyal friend you had in all Thrace, put him into the hands of your enemies the Cardians, was ostentatiously displaying his great hostility towards you. — Read the convention which Cersobleptes made later, when he was afraid of war with the Thracians and with Athenodorus.” Convention “ [176]

  These are the terms that Charidemus drafted, and this is the convention he signed. He swore the oath to which you have listened; but as soon as he saw that the forces of Athenodorus had been disbanded, and that Chabrias had come with only one galley, he did not give up to you the son of Iphiades; he did not fulfil any other of his sworn promises; he repudiated every other article of the convention, and drew up the convention I have here. — That is it; please take and read it.” Convention “ [177]

  Observe that he claimed the right to take the port-dues and the ten-per-cent customs-duties; that he again talked as though the whole country belonged to him, requiring that the duties should be under the control of his own custom-house officers; and that, though he had taken his oath to Athenodorus that he would surrender the son of Iphiades, the hostage whom he held on behalf of Sestus, he now does not even promise to surrender him. — Take the decree which the Athenians adopted in this emergency. Read it.” Decree “ [178]

  Here is the letter sent by Cersobleptes later, after the arrival of the ambassadors in Thrace, — he would agree to nothing that was fair; and here is the letter sent by the others. — Read this to the jury.” Letter”

  Now read the letter from the two kings. — Consider whether you really think that they are making no complaint.” Letter”

  Men of Athens, look at this see-saw of villainy and perfidy, and try to understand it. First he was maltreating Cephisodotus; then he stopped, because he was afraid of Athenodorus. Another time he tried to maltreat Chabrias; changed his mind, and agreed with Chares. He always acted inconsistently, ever like an honest, straightforward man. [179]

  Since that time, so long as you had forces in the Hellespont, he has continually flattered you and cozened you; but as soon as he found the Hellespont denuded of your forces, he tried to break and to dethrone the two kings, and to bring the whole kingdom under his own thumb, knowing by experience that, until he had ejected them, he could not possibly revoke any part of his agreement with you. [180] For the more expeditious fulfillment of this purpose, he procured from you a decree so worded that, if it had been ratified, as it would have been but for us and for this indictment, the two kings would have been iniquitously treated in the eyes of the world, the commanders of their armies, Bianor, Simon, Athenodorus, would have remained inactive through fear of the spiteful prosecution authorized by the decree, and the man who took advantage of this licence, and brought the whole kingdom into subjection, would have become and remained an enemy, and a powerful enemy, of Athens. [181]

  For a base of operations, — on which he has constantly kept his eyes, — he has the city of the Cardians. In all his conventions he has had that city reserved to himself, and in the end he openly stole it from you. Yet why should men who had entirely got rid of any unjust feelings toward us, and had resolved candidly and with entire sincerity to be friendly to us, have left themselves a convenient base of operations for a war against us? [182] I am sure that you all know, — those of you who have visited the place know for certain, and the rest by hearing their report, — that, the condition of Cardia being what it is, if the relations of Cersobleptes with the Thracians ever become favorable, he is able at twenty-four hours’ notice to invade the Chersonesus quite safely. Indeed by its situation the city of the Cardians occupies a position in the Chersonesus in relation to Thrace analogous to the position of Chalcis in Euboea in relation to Boeotia. Those of you who know its situation cannot be unaware of the advantage for the sake of which he has acquired it for himself, and has taken great pains to keep it out of our hands. [183] It is not your duty to help him to secure this advantage against yourselves; you must thwart him to the very best of your power, and consider how to prevent it, for he has made it quite clear that he is not the man to let slip any occasion whatsoever. In fact, when Philip came to Maroneia, he sent Apollonides to him, and gave pledges both to him and to Pammenes; and if Amadocus, who had control of the country, had not forbidden Philip to set foot there, there was nothing to prevent our being at war by this time with the Cardians and with Cersobleptes. — To prove that this statement of mine is true, take Chares’ letter.” Letter “ [184]

  In view of these facts you ought to distrust him, instead of losing your wits and giving him your attention as a benefactor. There is no reason why you should owe him gratitude for those deceitful professions of friendship which he offers under compulsion, nor for the small sums which he lays out for the benefit of your commanders and politicians, thereby contriving to get votes of thanks to himself submitted to you. You have far better cause to resent those efforts to do you harm, which we know him to be making in every place where he has won the power of acting as he pleases. [185] All other persons who have ever received any favour from you have been honored for benefits conferred on you; Charidemus is the one and only man who is honored for the impotence of his efforts to do you harm. Why, to such a fellow exemption from the punishment he had justly earned was a handsome gratuity! But that is not the view of the politicians; no, make him a citizen, dub him benefactor, — here are crowns and presents, — in return for those private doles of his! The rest of you are gulled, and sit there wondering what is going on. [186] And, to crown all, today they would have appointed his protectors by this resolution, if we had not laid the present indictment, and the commonwealth would have done duty as his hired servant and lackey, keeping guard over a Charidemus! A pretty business, is it not? Heaven help us! to think that a man, who once shouldered a pike for hire in the service of your enemies, should now be seen protected by your decree! [187]

  Now perhaps I may be asked for what reason I, who had such exact knowledge of these doings, and had given close attention to some of his misdeeds, let them all pass; why I did not object either when you made him a citizen or when you gave him a vote of thanks; why, in short, I found nothing to say at any time earlier than the passing of this decree. Men of Athens, I will tell you the whole truth. I knew that he was undeserving; I was present when he asked these favours; I made no objection. I admit it. [188] What was the reason? In the first place, men of Athens, I imagined that a great many men glibly telling lies about him would overpower one man, namely myself, telling the truth alone. Then as for the favours that he won by misleading you, I solemnly protest that it never entered my head to grudge him any one of them. I could not see that you would buffer any very grievous calamity, if you forgave a man who had done you much wrong, and so encouraged him to do you good service in future. Both these considerations applied to the grant of citizenship and to the grant of a crown. [189] But now, when I perceive that he is contriving a new plan by which, if only he can provide himself with agents here to mislead you on his behalf, our friends abroad, who are ready to serve you and to stop him from acting against you, — I mean such men as Athenodorus, Simon, Archebius of Byzantium, the two kings of Thrace, — will all find it out of their power to oppose or to thwart him, at such a time I come into court and denounce him. [190] I conceive that to speak against grants which he might accept without being likely to do serious injury to the State, is the act of one who has either a private grievance or the spirit of an informer, but that to set myself in opposition to a project by which he was concerting very serious detriment to the commonwealth is the act of an honest man and a patriotic citizen. That is why I was silent then and speak now. [191]

  There is another plea of the same s
ort by which they hope to lead you off the track. “Cersobleptes and Charidemus,” they will say, “did perhaps oppose Athens at a time when they were unfriendly; but now they are our friends, and wish to be useful friends. We really must not be vindictive. When we were rescuing the Lacedaemonians, we dismissed from our minds the injuries they had done to us as enemies; so too with the Thebans, and, quite recently, with the Euboeans.” [192] — But I hold that this plea would have been rightly offered, if they had offered it on some occasion when an expedition in relief of Cersobleptes and Charidemus had been proposed, and we were trying to block it. But, as we have here no such occasion and no such proposal, but only the argument of men trying to make Cersobleptes more powerful than he deserves by means of an immunity received from you by his generals, I regard their action as dangerous. It is not fair, men of Athens, that the pleas of men seeking deliverance should be offered to you in justification of men whose object is the power to do you wrong. [193] Apart from that, if he had injured you as an enemy, but had been reformed after claiming to be your friend, such an excuse might, perhaps, have been acceptable; but, inasmuch as that is not so, and as most of his deceptions fall after the date of his profession of friendship, you ought to distrust him for his later, if not to dislike him for his earlier, conduct. With regard, however, to not being “vindictive,” I have this to say. The vindictive man is the man who hunts up grievances in order to inflict injury; the man who bears them in mind in order to be on his guard and not suffer injury, is a reasonable man. [194]