by Demosthenes
Nevertheless, although matters were in this condition, as I have told you, we submitted to everything. Until when? Until Leocrates, who had been left by Leostratus in the house as a son, died without issue. But since he died without issue, we, who are nearest of kin to Archiades, claim to inherit the property; and we claim that the defendant cannot, in order to rob us of what is ours, give an adopted son to the dead man who was himself adopted. [25] For if Leocrates had himself adopted a son during his lifetime, even though the action was contrary to law, we should have made no protest; but since he had no son born to him, nor had adopted one during his lifetime, and as the law gives inheritances to the nearest of kin, how can it be other than right that we should not be robbed of this inheritance, to which we have a double title? [26] For we are nearest of kin to Archiades, to whom the property originally belonged, and also to the adopted Leocrates; for his father, seeing that he has returned to the Eleusinians, no longer retained his legal relationship, whereas we, to whose family he had come to belong, had the closest relationship, being children of that father’s first cousin. So, if you like, we claim the inheritance as kinsmen of Archiades, or, if you like it better, as kinsmen of Leocrates; for since he died without issue, no one is nearer of kin than we. [27] So far as you are concerned, Leostratus, the family has become extinct; for you sought to maintain a relationship with the property, not with those who adopted you. After the death of Leocrates, so long as no one laid claim to the estate, you sought to get no one adopted as a son to Archiades; but now that we have come forward as kinsmen, then you get one adopted, that you may get possession of the property. And you declare that Archiades, into whose house you were adopted, had no property, yet you file an affidavit of objections against us, seeking to exclude his acknowledged kindred. If there is nothing in the estate, wherein do you suffer loss, if we inherit this nothing? [28] But the fact is, men of the jury, that his impudence and greed are such that he thinks it is legitimate for him to return to the Eleusinians and retain the estate of his fathers, and at the same time to be master of that into which he was introduced by adoption, there being no son in the family. And all this he easily managed, for over us, who are poor men and men without influence, he has a great advantage, since he is able to spend what belongs to others. I consider, therefore, that it is your duty, men of the jury, to give aid to us who are not seeking to gain an advantage over others, but who are content if we are allowed to win our legal rights. [29] For what are we to do, men of the jury? When the adoption has been continued through three persons, and the one last left in the family has died without issue, are we not at the last to recover what is our own? Well then, having this just claim, we brought suit for the inheritance before the archon. But this fellow Leochares here, having lightly sworn a false affidavit, thinks that he has the right to rob us of the inheritance in defiance of all the laws. [30]
First, then, to prove that what we have stated about the adoptions and the pedigree of these men is true, and that the water-bearer does stand upon the tomb of Archiades, we wish to read to you these depositions. After that we will instruct you plainly regarding the remaining matters as well, and so convict our opponents of having sworn a false affidavit.
Take, please, the depositions of which I speak.” Depositions “ [31]
Such is the real meaning of this affair, men of the jury, and such the legal rights of inheritance, plainly stated; and you have also heard what amounts to a summary of all that has been done from the start. But I consider it necessary to tell you also of what they have done since the suit for the inheritance was instituted, and the manner in which they have treated us; for in my opinion no other people have ever in an inheritance suit been dealt with in a manner so contrary to law as we have been. [32] For when Leocrates died, and his funeral had taken place, and we went to take possession of his property, since he had died without issue and unmarried, Leostratus here ejected us, declaring that it belonged to him. Now his preventing us from performing any of the proper rites for the deceased is perhaps to be excused, seeing that he was his father, although the act was contrary to law; for it is proper that the care of the funeral should be committed to the natural father, but, next after him, also to us the members of the family to whom the deceased was related by virtue of the adoption. [33] But after the funeral rites were finished, what law will be found to justify him, when the family was extinct, in driving us, the nearest of kin, from the estate of the deceased? Because, they will say, he was father to the dead man. Yes, but he had returned to the family of his fathers, and was no longer master of the estate over which he had left his son in charge. Otherwise what is the use of the laws? [34] Well, after our ejectment had taken place （ to omit most of the details） we brought suit for the inheritance before the archon, inasmuch as the deceased had no son, as I stated, and had not adopted any according to the laws. After this, Leostratus here made a deposit for costs, as being the son of the aforesaid Archiades, not taking into account that he had returned to the Eleusinians, or that adopted children are made such, not by themselves but by those who adopt them. [35] But the truth is, I presume his one simple idea was that he must by fair means or foul lay claim to the property of others. And first he had the audacity to go and enroll himself on the assembly list of the Otrynians, although he was an Eleusinian, and managed to put this through; then, before his name was entered on the adult register of the Otrynians, he sought to claim a share in the public benefits in flagrant defiance of law, because of his greed for gain. [36] We, seeing what was going on, called witnesses and put a stop to it, holding the view that it was necessary that the right of inheritance should first be decided in your court before anyone should be named as the adopted son of Archiades. He was thwarted then, and convicted in the presence of many witnesses of fraudulent action, both in the matter of the list, and in the assembly for the election of the deme’s officers, yet nevertheless he persisted in trying to force his way in, and by his intrigues to prove himself stronger than your laws. What is the proof of this? [37] He got together some of the Otrynians with the demarch, and persuaded them at the opening of the adult register to inscribe his name. And after that on the occasion of the great Panathenaea at the time of the distribution, he came to get his admission fee, and when the other demesmen were receiving it, he demanded that it be given him also, and that he should be entered on the register under the name of Archiades. But when we entered a solemn protest, and all the others declared that what he was doing was an outrage, he went away without either having his name inscribed or receiving the admission fee. [38]
Now do you not think that a man, who in defiance of your decree claimed the right to receive the admission fee before his name had been inscribed on the list of the Otrynians, belonging as he did to another deme, would lay claim to an inheritance in defiance of the laws? Or when a man, before the court has rendered its decision, schemes to get advantages so unjust, can you think it reasonable to assume that he relies upon the justice of his case? For he, who fraudulently claimed the right to receive the admission fee, has now obviously practised the same design regarding the inheritance. [39] Nay more, he even deceived the archon, when he made his deposit for costs to thwart us, and in his counter-statement declared that he was an Otrynian, when he was in fact a demesman among the Eleusinians. When, however, he failed in all these schemes, at the last election of officers the fellow got together some of the demesmen, and demanded that he be registered as the adopted son of Archiades. [40] Again we protested that the demesmen should give their votes only when the inheritance suit should have been decided, and not before; and to this they agreed, not on their own responsibility, but out of respect for the laws; for it seemed to them an outrageous thing that a man who had made a deposit for costs in an inheritance suit, should get himself adopted as a son while the matter was still undecided; but the thing which this fellow Leostratus contrived after this is the most outrageous of all. [41]
For when he failed to get his own name inscribed, he ent
ered his own son Leochares as an adopted son of Archiades, in defiance of all the laws, before the scrutiny of the deme had taken place. But Leochares had not yet been introduced to the clansmen of Archiades; yet when his name had been entered on the list of the deme, only then did Leostratus, by bringing influence to bear upon a certain member of the clan, get the name inscribed upon the clan register. [42] And after that, in his affidavit before the archon he inscribed Leochares as being the lawfully born son of the man who had been dead many years past — Leochares, who had been registered with the clan only a day or two before! So it results that they both lay claim to the inheritance; for Leostratus here made the deposit for costs in the inheritance suit as being the lawfully born son of Archiades, and Leochares here has filed the affidavit, as being the lawfully born son of the same father! [43] And in neither case is it to a living man, but to one that is dead, that each of them makes himself an adopted son! But in our opinion, men of the jury, you ought, when you shall have cast your vote concerning the present case, then, and not till then, to find from among us, who are nearest of kin, an adopted son for the deceased, in order that the family may not become extinct. [44]
First, men of the jury, to prove that Leostratus here has returned to the Eleusinians from the demesmen of Otrynê, leaving a lawfully born son in the family of Archiades; and that his father at an earlier date had done this same thing; and that the son so left has died without issue; and that the one who has now sworn the affidavit was enrolled among the demesmen before he had been enrolled among the members of the clan — to prove these facts the clerk shall read you the depositions of the members of the clan and of the deme; and in proof of all the other things I have mentioned which these men have done I shall produce testimony concerning each several fact.
Please call the witnesses to come forward.” Witnesses “ [45]
All the facts of the case, then, you have heard, men of the jury, all that took place at the first in connection with this inheritance, and all that occurred subsequently, as soon as we commenced our suit. It remains to speak of the affidavit itself and the laws in accordance with which we claim to inherit; and furthermore, if the water holds out and we shall not be troubling you too much, to refute the arguments which our opponents are going to advance, proving to you that they are neither just nor sound. And first let the clerk read the affidavit; and I beg you to give it close attention; for it is regarding this that your votes are presently to be cast.” Affidavit “ [46]
Well, then, the defendant has sworn, as you have heard, “ that the inheritance of Archiades is not open to litigation, since he has children lawfully born and rightfully established according to the statute.” Let us, then, inquire if there are any, or if the defendant has sworn to what is false. The aforesaid Archiades, whose estate is in question, adopted as his son the grandfather of the one who has now sworn this affidavit; he, leaving a lawfully born son, Leostratus, the father of the defendant, returned to the Eleusinians. [47] After this, Leostratus here himself returned to the house of his fathers, leaving a son in the adoptive house; and the son whom he left, and who was the last of all the adopted children, has died without issue, so that the house thereby becomes extinct and the inheritance has reverted again to those originally nearest of kin. [48] How, then, could Archiades still have any sons, as the affidavit claims, when it is admitted that his adopted children returned to their original family and the last one left has died without issue? It follows, then, of necessity that the family is extinct. But when the family is extinct, there cannot be lawfully born sons still living. The fellow, then, has sworn that non-existent persons exist, and has written in the affidavit “ since he has children,” alleging that he himself is one of them. [49] But surely, when he says “ lawfully born and rightfully established according to the statute,” he is quibbling and defying the laws. For the “ lawfully born” exists, when it is born of the body; and the law bears testimony to this, when it says, “ Lawfully born are children of a woman whom her father or brother or grandfather has given in marriage.” But “ rightfully established” the lawgiver understood of adoptions, considering that when a man, being childless and master of his property, adopts a son, this action ought to be rightful. Well, our opponent says that Archiades had no son of the body, but in the affidavit he has sworn to the words “ since there are lawfully born children,” thus making a sworn statement that is contrary to the truth. [50] He admits that he is an adopted son, yet it is manifest that he was not adopted by the dead man himself; so how can you claim that this status is “ rightfilly established according to the statute” ? Because, he will say, he was registered as the son of Archiades. Yes, by the arbitrary act of these men, and that only the other day, when the suit for the estate had already been instituted. Surely it is not right for a man to regard as evidence his own illegal act. [51] For is it not an outrageous thing, men of tlie jury, that he should state — as he will presently in his speech — that he is an adopted son, while in his affidavit he did not dare to write this? Or that, while in the affidavit the protest is made as though for a son of the body, the speech that will presently be made will be on behalf of an adopted son? If they are going to make their defence conflict with the affidavit, surely either what they say, or what they swore, is false. It was with good reason that they did not add to the affidavit mention of the adoption, for in that case they would have had to add the words “ adopted by so-and-so.” But Archiades never did adopt them; they adopted themselves, in order to rob us of the inheritance. [52]
Now is not their next proceeding absurd as well as outrageous? — that Leostratus here should have made his deposit for costs in the inheritance suit before the archon, as being the son of Archiades （ while he was an Eleusinian, and Archiades of the deme Otrynê） , but that someone else should have sworn the affidavit, as you see for yourselves, alleging that he, too, was a son of Archiades? To which of the two should you pay attention, as telling the truth? [53] This very thing is the strongest proof of the falsehood of the affidavit — that it is not the same person who makes the claim about the same matter. And this is not strange for, I fancy, when Leostratus here made his deposit in the inheritance suit against us, the one who has now sworn the affidavit had not yet registered himself as a member of the deme. We should therefore be most cruelly treated if you should believe an affidavit made after the suit was begun. [54]
Nay more, Leochares has in the affidavit sworn to facts actually older than himself. For how could a person who was not yet a member of the house of Archiades when this suit for the inheritance was instituted, know anything about these matters? Moreover, if he had sworn it of himself alone, there would have been some sense in his action; he would have written what was false, but nevertheless his statement would have concerned one of an age to know. But as it is, he has written that the aforesaid Archiades had lawfully born sons, meaning, of course, his own father and the one made such by the original adoption, not taking cognizance of the fact that they had returned to their original family. It follows, then, of necessity that he has sworn to events older than himself, and not to things which have happened in his own day. Are you, then, to credit one who has dared a thing like that, as though he were speaking the truth? [55] Ah, but he will say that he has heard from his father the facts to which he has sworn. But the law does not admit hearsay evidence, save in the case of deceased persons; whereas this fellow has dared to swear to acts done by his father, while that father is still alive. Then again, why did Leostratus here inscribe on the affidavit the name, not of himself, but of the defendant? For the older facts should have been sworn to by the older man. It was, he might say, because I have had this youth adopted as son to Archiades. [56] Well then, you who had him adopted and concocted the whole affair ought to have rendered an account of it, and made yourself responsible for what you have done. You ought absolutely to have done so. But you evaded this, and wrote over the affidavit the name of your son here, who knew nothing of the matter. You see, then, men of the jury,
that the statements in the affidavit are false, and they are admitted by these men themselves to be so. Why, it would even be right for you to refuse to listen to this man Leostratus, when he presently undertakes to make statements to which he did not venture to swear in the affidavit. [57]
Furthermore, that affidavits of objection are of all forms of trial the most unjust, and that those having recourse to them are most deserving of your resentment, one can see very clearly from the following facts. In the first place, they are not necessary as the other forms of procedure are, but they are instituted by the will and desire of the one swearing to them. If in the matter of disputed claims there is no other way of getting a judgement than by such an affidavit, it is perhaps necessary to make one. [58] But, if it is possible without an affidavit of objections to obtain a hearing before all tribunals, is not the use of one a mark of recklessness and utter desperation? For the lawgiver did not make it obligatory on the contending parties, but granted them the privilege of putting in such an affidavit, if they chose, as though he were testing the character of each one of us, to see how we stand with reference to a reckless procedure. [59] Further, if it rested with those who file these affidavits, there would be neither courts of justice nor trials; for the nature of affidavits of objections is to bIock all these things and to prevent all cases from being brought into the court-room — at least so far as the will of the one swearing the affidavit goes. Therefore I think we should regard such people as the common enemies of all men, and that they should never receive any indulgence when they are on trial before you; for each one of them comes into court, not under compulsion, but having chosen to incur the risk of the oath. [60]