by Demosthenes
Well then, that the affidavit is false, you have learned pretty definitely from the statements contained in it and from the arguments which you have heard. But that the laws also give us this inheritance as our right, men of the jury, I wish to prove in a few words — not as though this had not been made clear to you in what I said at the outset, but that you may the better bear in mind the justice of our case, and so meet the false statements of our opponents. [61]
To sum up the matter briefly, we, since we are the nearest of kin in the male line to Archiades, to whom this estate belonged, and since of the persons whom he adopted some have gone back to the family of their fathers, and the one last left had died without issue, — in these circumstances, we, I say, claim to inherit. [62] We are not depriving Leostratus of any property （ for these men hold what is their own） , but we claim the estate left by Archiades, which is ours according to the laws. For the law, men of the jury, ordains that males and the sons of males should have precedence; and such we are. Archiades had no children, and we are the ones nearest of kin to him. [63] Further, it is surely not just that an adopted son should bring other sons into a family by adoption; he may leave in it children born to him, but in default of these he must restore the inheritance to those related by blood. That is what the laws ordain.
For is it not plain that each one of you is excluded from the right of inheritance by direct descent, if this licence be granted to children by adoption? For you see that most people who adopt children do so through being cajoled by flattery and often in a spirit of contentiousness caused by family quarrels. But if an adopted son is to be permitted in defiance of the law to adopt whomsoever he pleases, inheritances will never be given to blood-relations. [64] It was to guard against this that the lawgiver forbade a person who was himself adopted to create a son by adoption. In what manner did he declare his view regarding this? When he says “ a man may return to his own family, leaving behind him a lawfully born son” he makes it plain, I take it, that it is not lawful for him to adopt; for it is impossible for a man to leave behind him a lawfully born son, unless he have a son born of his body. But you, Leostratus, claim the right to bring an adopted son into the inheritance of the dead man, who had himself been adopted into our family, just as though you were taking possession of your own property, and not that which the law declares shall be given to the nearest of kin. [65]
For ourselves, men of the jury, if the deceased had adopted anyone, even though the law does not allow it, we should have submitted; or, if he had left a will, we should also have been ready to abide by that; for from the beginning this has been our position; we made no objection to their holding the property and returning to their original family in whatever manner they pleased. [66] Now, however, that the affair has at length been exposed both by these men themselves and by the laws, we hold that it is right for us to inherit the estate of Archiades, and that the son to be adopted should come from us who have not been adopted before, and not from them. For it was just, in my opinion, that the lawgiver, as he laid upon the nearest of kin the duty of relieving the misfortunes of their relatives, and of giving in marriage their women-folk, so also has given to these same people as their due the right of inheriting and of sharing in the good things. [67] But that which is the most significant thing, and the thing best known to you, is this: the law of Solon does not allow an adopted son even to dispose by will of the property in the family into which he comes by adoption. And there is good reason for this, in my view; for a person who comes by legal adoption into possession of the property of another, ought not to deal with it as if it were his own private estate. No, he should act consistently with the laws, and do in each particular what the laws prescribe. [68] “All those who had not been adopted,” says the lawgiver,” at the time when Solon entered upon office, may bequeath their property by will, as they see fit,” thus indicating that those who were adopted might not so dispose of theirs, but that they might return to their families in their lifetime, leaving a lawfully born son in their place; otherwise, in case of death, they must give back the property to those who from the first were relatives of the adoptive father.
APOLLODORUS AGAINST STEPHANUS 1
Translated by A. T. Murray
Having been overwhelmed by false testimony, men of Athens, and having been outrageously and cruelly treated by Phormio, I have come to win in your court a verdict against those responsible for the wrong. I beg and beseech and implore you all, in the first place to give me a favorable hearing （for it is a great thing for those who have met with misfortune, as I have done, to be able to tell others of what they have suffered, and to find in you listeners who are kindly disposed）; and in the second place, if I shall seem to you to be the victim of wrongdoing, to render me the aid which is my due. [2] I shall prove to you that this man Stephanus has both given false testimony, and has done this from a base desire for gain, and that he is convicted out of his own lips; so transparent is the case from every point of view. And I shall endeavor to relate to you in the fewest possible words all that has taken place between Phormio and myself from the first; and after hearing this you will be convinced both of the villainy of Phormio and that these men have borne false testimony. [3]
As for myself, men of the jury, a large property was left me by my father, and this was in the possession of Phormio, who furthermore had married my mother while I was out of the country on public business, serving as your trierarch. （How he managed it, perhaps it is not proper for a son fully to explain about his mother.） When I returned and learned of this and saw what had been done, although I was greatly incensed and took it much to heart, [4] I was unable to bring a private action （for there were no actions at that time, since you put off all such matters because of the war）, but I indicted him before the Thesmothetae on the charge of outrage. However, time passed and the indictment was evaded （seeing that actions were not being held）, and moreover children were born by my mother to Phormio, and after this （for the whole truth shall be told you, men of the jury）, many kindly overtures were made on the part of my mother, and pleas on behalf of this man Phormio, and many overtures on the part of Phormio himself that were both moderate and humble in their terms. [5] However, to make the story brief, men of Athens, he would not do one of the things to which he had agreed, and tried to withhold from me the money which he held as capital in the bank; so then I was compelled to enter suit against him at the earliest opportunity. Phormio on his part, seeing that everything would be brought to light, and that he would be proved to have acted toward me as the basest of humankind, contrived and concocted this plot in furtherance of which the defendant Stephanus gave this false testimony against me. In the first place, he entered a special plea in the suit in which he was defendant, claiming that the suit was not admissible; and then he produced false witnesses who stated that I had given him a release from my claims, and who deposed to a forged lease and to a will which never existed. [6] He had the advantage over me in being the first speaker, because this was a special plea and the case was not coming to trial upon the real issue, and by reading these documents and making other false statements which he thought would favor his case, he made such an impression on the jury that they refused to hear a single word from me. I was fined one-sixth of the amount claimed, was denied the right of a hearing, and was treated with such contumely as I doubt if any other man ever was, and I went from the court, men of Athens, taking the matter bitterly and grievously to heart. [7] Upon going over it in my own mind, however, I see that there was abundant excuse for those who gave that verdict （for I do not know what other vote I could myself have given, if I had known nothing of the facts and had heard the testimony）, but that our anger should fall upon these men who by giving false testimony were responsible for this result. Of the others who have given testimony I shall speak when I proceed against them, but regarding the testimony of the defendant Stephanus I shall try to instruct you at once. [8]
Take the deposition itself, and read
it, please, that from its very language I may prove my point.
Read; and do you check the water.”Deposition
Stephanus, son of Menecles, of Acharnae, Endius, son of Epigenes, of Lamptrae, Scythes, son of Harmateus, of Cydathenaeum depose that they were present before the arbitrator Teisias, of Acharnae, when Phormio challenged Apollodorus, if he declared that the document which Phormio put into the box was not a copy of the will of Pasio, to open the will of Pasio, which Amphias, brother-in-law of Cephisophon, submitted to the arbitrator; and that Apollodorus refused to open it; and that the document in question was a copy of the will of Pasio.” [9]
You have heard the deposition, men of the jury, and I think that even if you have noticed nothing else, this at least must have seemed strange to you, that it begins with a challenge and ends with a will. However, I on my part, count it right, when I shall have shown what may be called the main substance of the testimony to be false, then, and not till then, to say something also about matters of that sort. [10] Well, then, it is deposed by them that Phormio challenged me to open the will which Amphias, brother — in — law of Cephisophon, submitted to the arbitrator Teisias; and that I refused to open it; and that the will to which they themselves deposed was a copy of that original; and then follows a copy of the will. [11] Now as to whether Phormio tendered me this challenge or not, and whether the will is genuine or spurious I say nothing as yet; I will discuss these matters before you presently; but I will take up the testimony they have given, that I refused to open the document. I would have you look at the matter in this way — what reason would anyone have had for refusing to open it? In order, one may say, that the will might not be shown to the jury. [12] Well and good. If they had not deposed to the will as well as to the challenge, there would have been some reason in my refusing to open the document; but since they deposed to both, and the jurymen were going to hear the will in any case, what advantage was there for me in refusing? None, assuredly. Quite the contrary, men of Athens; even if these men had tendered no challenge, but had merely talked of the matter, and someone had delivered a document to them as a will, [13] it would have been my business to tender the challenge and to order them to open it, in order that, if the contents differed from the statements which these men had made in their deposition, I might have called a number of the bystanders as witnesses, and have used this fact as a proof that the rest of their story too was a fabrication; but, if the contents were the same, I might have required the one presenting it to give evidence himself. If he consented, I should have had a responsible witness, and, if he refused, this very fact again would have been a convincing proof for me that the affair had been concocted. And in the former case the result would have been that I had one person with whom to deal, whereas according to the depositions of these men I have many. Is there anyone among you who would have chosen the latter course? I think not one of you would have. [14] Well then, you ought not to believe it of anyone else either. For, men of Athens, in all courses of action which involve anger or some getting of gain or exasperation or a spirit of jealousy, different persons will act in different ways in accordance with their several dispositions; but in all cases where none of these things is involved, but merely a calm calculation of one’s own interest, who would be so senseless as to dismiss what would help him and do what would make it more difficult for him to win his case? Yet a course of action which is neither natural nor reasonable, which, in short, no human being would have undertaken — this these witnesses have attributed to me. [15]
Moreover, it is not only from what they have stated in their deposition regarding my refusal to open the document that one can tell that they are lying, but also from the fact that they have deposed at one and the same time both to a challenge and to a will. For I think you are all aware that challenges were devised for all transactions which it is impossible to bring before you; [16] for instance, a man may not be put to torture in your presence — for this it is necessary that there be a challenge; again, if anything has been transacted and has taken place somewhere out of the country, it is necessary that for this too there should be a challenge to go by sea or land to the place where the thing was done; and so for other things of that sort. But in cases where it is possible to produce the things themselves before your eyes, what could be simpler than to produce them publicly? [17] Well, my father died at Athens, the arbitration took place in the Painted Stoa, and these men have deposed that Amphias produced the document before the arbitrator. Then, if it was genuine, the document ought to have been put into the box, and the one producing it should have so testified, in order that the jurymen might have reached a decision in accordance with the truth and after an inspection of the seals; and I, on my part, if anyone was wronging me, might have proceeded against him. [18] But, as it is, no one person has taken the whole matter upon himself or given straightforward testimony, as one would do in testifying to the truth, but each has deposed to a part of the story, fancying that he is very clever and that for this reason he will escape punishment, — one of them deposing that he holds a document on which is written “the will of Pasio”; another that, being sent by the former person, he produced this document, but had no knowledge as to whether it was genuine or spurious. [19] These men, who are here in court, using the challenge as a screen, deposed to a will in such a way that the jurymen believed this will to be my father’s, and I was debarred from obtaining a hearing regarding my wrongs, but in such a way also that they on their part would most clearly be convicted of having given false testimony. And yet this was the very opposite of what they intended.
However, that you may know that I am speaking the truth in this, take the deposition of Cephisophon.”Deposition
Cephisophon, son of Cephalion, of Aphidna, deposes that a document was left him by his father, on which was inscribed “the will of Pasio.”“ [20]
It was a simple thing, men of the jury, for the one who gave this testimony to add “and this is the document which the deponent exhibits,” and to put the document into the box. But, I presume, he thought that this falsehood would deserve your indignation, and that you would punish him for it, whereas to testify that a document had been bequeathed to him was a trifling matter and one of no consequence. And yet it is this very thing that makes the whole matter clear, and proves that they have concocted it. [21] For if the inscription on the will had been “the property of Pasio and Phormio” or “in the matter of Phormio,” or something of that sort, he would naturally have kept it for him; but if, as he has testified, the inscription was “the will of Pasio,” I should certainly have appropriated it, knowing that I was about to go to law, and knowing further that, if its contents were as represented, it was prejudicial to my interests; for I was the heir, and if the will was my father’s, it belonged to me, as did also all the rest of my father’s estate. [22] Well then, by its having been produced to Phormio, by its having been inscribed “the will of Pasio,” and yet ignored by me, it is proved that the will is a forgery and that the testimony of Cephisophon is false. But no more of Cephisophon; it is not with him that I have to do at present, and he has given no testimony as to the contents of the will. [23] And yet, men of Athens, I would have you consider how strong a proof this also is that these men have given false testimony. For when the witness who stated that he had the document in his own possession did not dare to say that the one produced by Phormio was a copy of the one in his own keeping; and when these men cannot state that they were present in the first instance or that they saw the document opened before the arbitrator, but have themselves actually deposed that I refused to open it, to have testified now that the one is a copy of the other, is not this to have accused themselves of falsifying? [24]
More than all this, men of Athens, any man by examining the wording of the deposition can see that it is nothing but a contrivance of theirs to the end that rightly or wrongly it may appear that my father made this will.
But take the deposition itself, and read, stopping wherever I bid yo
u, that from its own wording I may prove my point.”Deposition
. . . depose that they were present before the arbitrator Teisias, when Phormio challenged Apollodorus, if he declared that the document was not a copy of the will of Pasio . . .” [25] Stop reading. Bear in mind that the words are “of the will of Pasio.” Now persons who wished to bear witness to the truth — assuming that it is absolutely established that the challenge was tendered, which it was not — ought to have given their testimony in the following way.
Read the deposition again from the beginning.”Deposition
. . . depose that they were present before the arbitrator Teisias . . .”
We do depose; for we were present. Read on.”
. . . when Phormio challenged Apollodorus . . .”
This, too, they might properly have stated, assuming that he really tendered the challenge.”
. . . if he declared that the document was not a copy of the will of Pasio . . .” [26]
Stop right there. There is not a person in the world, I presume, who would have proceeded to give this testimony, unless he had been present when my father drew up the will. Instead, he would have said at once, “How do we know if there is any will of Pasio’s?” — and he would have demanded that Phormio write, as in the beginning of the challenge: “If I declared that the document was not a copy of the will which Phormio stated that Pasio had left,” — not “of the will of Pasio.” For this was to testify that there was a will （which was their intention）, the other that Phormio said that there was. And, I take it, there is a world of difference between a thing’s being so, and Phormio’s saying that it is. [27]