by Demosthenes
[10] τότε Θεσπιάς τινων καὶ Πλαταιὰς ὑπισχνουμένων οἰκισθήσεσθαι, καὶ τοὺς μὲν Φωκέας τὸν Φίλιππον, ἂν γένηται κύριος, σώσειν, τὴν δὲ Θηβαίων πόλιν διοικιεῖν, καὶ τὸν Ὠρωπὸν ὑμῖν ὑπάρξειν, καὶ τὴν Εὔβοιαν ἀντ᾽ Ἀμφιπόλεως ἀποδοθήσεσθαι, καὶ τοιαύτας ἐλπίδας καὶ φενακισμούς, οἷς ὑπαχθέντες ὑμεῖς οὔτε συμφόρως οὔτ᾽ ἴσως καλῶς προεῖσθε Φωκέας, οὐδὲν τούτων οὔτ᾽ ἐξαπατήσας οὔτε σιγήσας ἐγὼ φανήσομαι, ἀλλὰ προειπὼν ὑμῖν, ὡς οἶδ᾽ ὅτι μνημονεύετε, ὅτι ταῦτ᾽ οὔτ᾽ οἶδα οὔτε προσδοκῶ, νομίζω δὲ τὸν λέγοντα ληρεῖν.
[10] at that time there were some who assured us that Thespiae and Plataea would be rebuilt, that Philip, if he gained the mastery, would protect the Phocians and break up Thebes into villages, and that you would retain Oropus and receive Euboea in exchange for Amphipolis. Led on by these false hopes and cajoleries, you abandoned the Phocians against your own interests and against justice and honor. But you will find that I neither took part in this deception, nor passed it over in silence, but spoke out boldly, as I am sure you remember, saying that I had neither knowledge nor expectation of such results and that all such talk was nonsense.
[11] ταῦτα τοίνυν ἅπανθ᾽, ὅσα φαίνομαι βέλτιον τῶν ἄλλων προορῶν, οὐδ᾽ εἰς μίαν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὔτε δεινότητ᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἀλαζονείαν ἐπανοίσω, οὐδὲ προσποιήσομαι δι᾽ οὐδὲν ἄλλο γιγνώσκειν καὶ προαισθάνεσθαι πλὴν δι᾽ ἃν ὑμῖν εἴπω, δύο: ἓν μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δι᾽ εὐτυχίαν, ἣν συμπάσης ἐγὼ τῆς ἐν ἀνθρώποις οὔσης δεινότητος καὶ σοφίας ὁρῶ κρατοῦσαν:
[11] Now all these instances, where I appear to have had a clearer foresight than the rest, I shall not refer to a single cause, men of Athens — my real or pretended cleverness; nor will I claim that my knowledge and discernment were due to anything else than two things, which I will mention. One, men of Athens, was good luck, which my experience tells me is worth all the cleverness and wisdom in the world.
[12] ἕτερον δέ, προῖκα τὰ πράγματα κρίνω καὶ λογίζομαι, καὶ οὐδὲν λῆμμ᾽ ἂν οὐδεὶς ἔχοι πρὸς οἷς ἐγὼ πεπολίτευμαι καὶ λέγω δεῖξαι προσηρτημένον. ὀρθὸν οὖν, ὅ τι ἄν ποτ᾽ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν ὑπάρχῃ τῶν πραγμάτων, τὸ συμφέρον φαίνεταί μοι. ὅταν δ᾽ ἐπὶ θάτερ᾽ ὥσπερ εἰς τρυτάνην ἀργύριον προσενέγκῃς, οἴχεται φέρον καὶ καθείλκυκε τὸν λογισμὸν ἐφ᾽ αὑτό, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτ᾽ ὀρθῶς οὐδ᾽ ὑγιῶς ὁ τοῦτο ποιήσας περὶ οὐδενὸς λογίσαιτο.
[12] The second is this: on public questions my estimates and decisions are disinterested, and no one can show that my policy and my speeches have been in any way bound up with my private gain. Hence I always see accurately the advantageous course as suggested by actual circumstances. But the instant you throw money into one scale, its weight bears down the judgement with it; and for him that has once done this, accurate and sound calculation becomes utterly impossible.
[13] ἓν μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε πρῶτον ὑπάρχειν φημὶ δεῖν, ὅπως, εἴτε συμμάχους εἴτε σύνταξιν εἴτ᾽ ἄλλο τι βούλεταί τις κατασκευάζειν τῇ πόλει, τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν εἰρήνην μὴ λύων τοῦτο ποιήσει, οὐχ ὡς θαυμαστὴν οὐδ᾽ ὡς ἀξίαν οὖσαν ὑμῶν: ἀλλ᾽ ὁποία τίς ποτ᾽ ἐστὶν αὕτη, μὴ γενέσθαι μᾶλλον εἶχε τοῖς πράγμασι καιρὸν ἢ γεγενημένη νῦν δι᾽ ἡμᾶς λυθῆναι: πολλὰ γὰρ προείμεθα, ὧν ὑπαρχόντων τότ᾽ ἂν ἢ νῦν ἀσφαλέστερος καὶ ῥᾴων ἦν ἡμῖν ὁ πόλεμος.
[13] Now there is one precaution which I think essential. If anyone proposes to negotiate for our city an alliance or a joint contribution or anything of the sort, it must be done without detriment to the existing peace. I do not mean that the peace is a glorious one or even creditable to you, but, whatever we may think of it, it would better suit our purpose never to have made it than to violate it when made, because we have now sacrificed many advantages which would have made war safer and easier for us then than now.
[14] δεύτερον δ᾽, ὁρᾶν ὅπως μὴ προαξόμεθ᾽, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοὺς συνεληλυθότας τούτους καὶ φάσκοντας Ἀμφικτύονας νῦν εἶναι εἰς ἀνάγκην καὶ πρόφασιν κοινοῦ πολέμου πρὸς ἡμᾶς. ἐγὼ γάρ, εἰ γένοιθ᾽ ἡμῖν πρὸς Φίλιππον πάλιν πόλεμος δι᾽ Ἀμφίπολιν ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἔγκλημ᾽ ἴδιον, οὗ μὴ μετέχουσι Θετταλοὶ μηδ᾽ Ἀργεῖοι μηδὲ Θηβαῖοι, οὐκ ἂν ἡμῖν οἴομαι τούτων οὐδένας πολεμῆσαι,
[14] The second precaution, men of Athens, is to avoid giving the self-styled Amphictyons now assembled any call or excuse for a crusade against us. For if we should hereafter come to blows with Philip, about Amphipolis or in any private quarrel not shared by the Thessalians or the Argives or the Thebans, I do not believe for a moment that any of the latter would be dragged into the war, least of all —
[15] καὶ πάντων ἥκιστα （καί μοι μὴ θορυβήσῃ μηδεὶς πρὶν ἀκοῦσαι） Θηβαίους, οὐχ ὡς ἡδέως ἔχουσιν ἡμῖν, οὐδ᾽ ὡς οὐκ ἂν χαρίζοιντο Φιλίππῳ, ἀλλ᾽ ἴσασιν ἀκριβῶς, εἰ καὶ πάνυ φησί τις αὐτοὺς ἀναισθήτους εἶναι, ὅτι, εἰ γενήσεται πόλεμος πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτοῖς, τὰ μὲν κακὰ πάνθ᾽ ἕξουσιν αὐτοί, τοῖς δ᾽ ἀγαθοῖς ἐφεδρεύων ἕτερος καθεδεῖται. οὔκουν προοῖντ᾽ ἂν αὑτοὺς εἰς τοῦτο, μὴ κοινῆς τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τῆς αἰτίας οὔσης τοῦ πολέμου.
[15] hear me before you shout me down — least of all the Thebans. I do not mean that they regard us with favor or that they would not readily oblige Philip, but they do realize quite clearly, for all the stolidity that people attribute to them, that if they ever fight you, they will have to take all the hard knocks themselves, and someone else will sit quietly by, waiting for the spoils. Therefore they would never make such a sacrifice unless the war had a common cause and origin.
[16] οὐδέ γ᾽ εἰ πάλιν πρὸς τοὺς Θηβαίους πολεμήσαιμεν δι᾽ Ὠρωπὸν ἤ τι τῶν ἰδίων, οὐδὲν ἂν ἡμᾶς παθεῖν ἡγοῦμαι: καὶ γὰρ ἡμῖν κἀκείνοις τοὺς βοηθοῦντας ἂν οἶμαι, εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν εἴ τις ἐμβάλοι, βοηθεῖν, οὐ συνεπιστρατεύσειν οὐδετέροις. καὶ γὰρ αἱ συμμαχίαι τοῦτον ἔχουσι τὸν τρόπον, ὧν καὶ φροντίσειεν ἄν τις, καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα φύσει τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν:
[16] If we went to war again with the Thebans about Oropus or for some other private reason, I do not think we should suffer, for both their allies and ours would, of course, offer support, if their own territory were invaded, but would not join either si
de in aggression. That is the way with every alliance worth considering, and such is the natural result.
[17] οὐκ ἄχρι τῆς ἴσης ἕκαστός ἐστιν εὔνους οὔθ᾽ ἡμῖν οὔτε Θηβαίοις, σῶς τ᾽ εἶναι καὶ κρατεῖν τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ σῶς μὲν εἶναι πάντες ἂν βούλοινθ᾽ ἕνεχ᾽ αὑτῶν, κρατήσαντας δὲ τοὺς ἑτέρους δεσπότας ὑπάρχειν αὑτῶν οὐδὲ εἷς. τί οὖν ἡγοῦμαι φοβερὸν καὶ τί φυλάξασθαι δεῖν ἡμᾶς; μὴ κοινὴν πρόφασιν καὶ κοινὸν ἔγκλημ᾽ ὁ μέλλων πόλεμος πρὸς ἅπαντας λάβῃ.
[17] No individual ally is so fond either of us or of the Thebans as to regard our security and our supremacy in the same light. Secure they would all have us, for their own sakes; that either nation should gain supremacy and be their master would suit none of them. What, then, is the danger that I think we must guard against? Lest the inevitable war should afford all states a common pretext and a common ground of complaint.
[18] εἰ γὰρ Ἀργεῖοι μὲν καὶ Μεσσήνιοι καὶ Μεγαλοπολῖται καί τινες τῶν λοιπῶν Πελοποννησίων, ὅσοι ταὐτὰ τούτοις φρονοῦσι, διὰ τὴν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους ἡμῖν ἐπικηρυκείαν ἐχθρῶς σχήσουσι καὶ τὸ δοκεῖν ἐκδέχεσθαί τι τῶν ἐκείνοις πεπραγμένων, Θηβαῖοι δ᾽ ἔχουσι μέν, ὡς λέγουσιν, ἀπεχθῶς, ἔτι δ᾽ ἐχθροτέρως σχήσουσιν, ὅτι τοὺς παρ᾽ ἐκείνων φεύγοντας σῴζομεν καὶ πάντα τρόπον τὴν δυσμένειαν ἐνδεικνύμεθ᾽ αὐτοῖς,
[18] For if the Argives and Messenians and Megalopolitans, and other Peloponnesians who side with them, quarrel with us because of our embassy to Sparta and because they think that we have some interest in Lacedaemonian policy; and if the Thebans are, as people admit, hostile and likely to be even more so, because we offer an asylum to their exiles and make no disguise of our hostility to them in every way;
[19] Θετταλοὶ δ᾽, ὅτι τοὺς Φωκέων φυγάδας σῴζομεν, Φίλιππος δ᾽, ὅτι κωλύομεν αὐτὸν κοινωνεῖν τῆς ἀμφικτυονίας, φοβοῦμαι μὴ πάντες περὶ τῶν ἰδίων ἕκαστος ὀργιζόμενος κοινὸν ἐφ᾽ ἡμᾶς ἀγάγωσι τὸν πόλεμον, τὰ τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων δόγματα προστησάμενοι, εἶτ᾽ ἐπισπασθῶσιν ἕκαστοι πέρα τοῦ συμφέροντος ἑαυτοῖς ἡμῖν πολεμῆσαι, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ Φωκέας.
[19] and if the Thessalians dislike us because we protect the Phocian fugitives, and Philip because we are trying to exclude him from the Amphictyonic Council; then I am afraid that these separate powers, having each a private grudge, may make common cause against us on the strength of the Amphictyonic decrees, and may then be tempted to go beyond what their several interests require, as they were in the case of the Phocians.
[20] ἴστε γὰρ δήπου τοῦθ᾽ ὅτι νῦν Θηβαῖοι καὶ Φίλιππος καὶ Θετταλοί, οὐχὶ ταὔθ᾽ ἕκαστοι μάλιστ᾽ ἐσπουδακότες, ταὐτὰ πάντες ἔπραξαν: οἷον Θηβαῖοι τὸν μὲν Φίλιππον παρελθεῖν καὶ λαβεῖν τὰς παρόδους οὐκ ἐδύναντο κωλῦσαι, οὐδέ γε τῶν αὑτοῖς πεπονημένων ὕστατον ἐλθόντα τὴν δόξαν ἔχειν:
[20] For of course you realize that in the present case the Thebans and Philip and the Thessalians have acted in complete unison, though with widely different aims. The Thebans, for instance, were powerless to prevent Philip from pressing on and seizing the passes, or from coming in at the finish and usurping the credit of their previous exertions.
[21] νυνὶ γὰρ Θηβαίοις πρὸς μὲν τὸ τὴν χώραν κεκομίσθαι πέπρακταί τι, πρὸς δὲ τιμὴν καὶ δόξαν αἴσχιστα: εἰ γὰρ μὴ παρῆλθε Φίλιππος, οὐδὲν ἂν αὐτοῖς κέρδος εἶναι. ταῦτα δ᾽ οὐκ ἐβούλοντο, ἀλλὰ τῷ τὸν Ὀρχομενὸν καὶ τὴν Κορώνειαν λαβεῖν ἐπιθυμεῖν, μὴ δύνασθαι δέ, πάντα ταῦθ᾽ ὑπέμειναν.
[21] Hence today the Thebans have been partially successful in recovering territory, but have failed lamentably to win honor and glory; for they would presumably have gained nothing if Philip had not passed Thermopylae. That was not what they wanted, but they put up with it all because they had the will, though not the power, to grasp Orchomenus and Coronea.
[22] Φίλιππον τοίνυν τινὲς μὲν δήπου τολμῶσι λέγειν ὡς οὐδ᾽ ἐβούλετο Θηβαίοις Ὀρχομενὸν καὶ Κορώνειαν παραδοῦναι, ἀλλ᾽ ἠναγκάσθη: ἐγὼ δὲ τούτοις μὲν ἐρρῶσθαι λέγω, ἐκεῖνο δ᾽ οἶδ᾽, ὅτι οὐ μᾶλλόν γε ταῦτ᾽ ἔμελ᾽ αὐτῷ ἢ τὰς παρόδους λαβεῖν ἐβούλετο καὶ τὴν δόξαν τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ δοκεῖν δι᾽ αὑτὸν κρίσιν εἰληφέναι, καὶ τὰ Πύθια θεῖναι δι᾽ αὑτοῦ, καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἦν ὧν μάλιστ᾽ ἐγλίχετο.
[22] Now some people actually go so far as to say that Philip was compelled, against his real wishes, to hand over Orchomenus and Coronea to the Thebans. For my part I wish them joy of their opinion. I only know this, that Philip was less interested in those towns than desirous to secure the pass, to win for himself the credit of finishing off the Sacred War, and to preside at the Pythian games. That was the summit of his ambition.
[23] Θετταλοὶ δέ γ᾽ οὐδέτερ᾽ ἐβούλοντο τούτων, οὔτε Θηβαίους οὔτε τὸν Φίλιππον μέγαν γίγνεσθαι （ταῦτα γὰρ πάντ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς ἡγοῦντο）, τῆς πυλαίας δ᾽ ἐπεθύμουν καὶ τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς, πλεονεκτημάτων δυοῖν, κύριοι γενέσθαι: τῷ δὲ τούτων γλίχεσθαι τάδε συγκατέπραξαν. τῶν τοίνυν ἰδίων ἕνεχ᾽ εὑρήσεθ᾽ ἕκαστον πολλὰ προηγμένον ὧν οὐδὲν ἐβούλετο πρᾶξαι. τοῦτο μέντοι, τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν φυλακτέον ἡμῖν.
[23] But the Thessalians aimed at the aggrandizement neither of Thebes nor of Philip, because they felt that all that would tell against them; but they were anxious to control the council at Thermopylae and the Delphian temple — two clear gains for them; and it was this ambition that led them to join in the war. So you will find that each of these powers was induced for private reasons to do much that it did not wish. That, however, is emphatically what we must avoid.
[24] τὰ κελευόμεν᾽ ἡμᾶς ἄρα δεῖ ποιεῖν ταῦτα φοβουμένους; καὶ σὺ ταῦτα κελεύεις; πολλοῦ γε καὶ δέω. ἀλλ᾽ ὡς οὔτε πράξομεν οὐδὲν ἀνάξιον ἡμῶν αὐτῶν οὔτ᾽ ἔσται πόλεμος, νοῦν δὲ δόξομεν πᾶσιν ἔχειν καὶ τὰ δίκαια λέγειν, τοῦτ᾽ οἶμαι δεῖν ποιεῖν. πρὸς δὲ τοὺς θρασέως ὁτιοῦν οἰομένους ὑπομεῖναι δεῖν καὶ μὴ προορωμένους τὸν πόλεμον, ἐκεῖνα βούλομαι λογίσασθαι. ἡμεῖς Θηβαίους ἐῶμεν ἔχειν Ὠρωπόν: καὶ εἴ τις ἔροιθ᾽ ἡμᾶς, κελεύσας εἰπεῖν τἀληθῆ, διὰ τί; ἵνα μὴ πολεμῶμεν, φαῖμεν ἄν.
[24] “Must we then,” you ask, “do as we are told for
fear of the consequences? Do you of all men advise that?” Far from it. No, I think we ought so to act as to do nothing unworthy of Athens and yet avoid war; we ought to show to all men our good sense and the justice of our claims. To those who think we ought boldly to risk everything, and who do not foresee the inevitable hostilities, I suggest the following consideration. We are allowing the Thebans to keep Oropus; and if anyone should ask us to tell him candidly why we do so, we should have to answer, “In order to avoid war.”
[25] καὶ Φιλίππῳ νυνὶ κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας Ἀμφιπόλεως παρακεχωρήκαμεν, καὶ Καρδιανοὺς ἐῶμεν ἔξω Χερρονησιτῶν τῶν ἄλλων τετάχθαι, καὶ τὸν Κᾶρα τὰς νήσους καταλαμβάνειν, Χίον καὶ Κῶν καὶ Ῥόδον, καὶ Βυζαντίους κατάγειν τὰ πλοῖα, δῆλον ὅτι τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς εἰρήνης ἡσυχίαν πλειόνων ἀγαθῶν αἰτίαν εἶναι νομίζοντες ἢ τὸ προσκρούειν καὶ φιλονικεῖν περὶ τούτων. οὐκοῦν εὔηθες καὶ κομιδῇ σχέτλιον, πρὸς ἑκάστους καθ᾽ ἕν᾽ οὕτω προσενηνεγμένους περὶ τῶν οἰκείων καὶ ἀναγκαιοτάτων, πρὸς πάντας περὶ τῆς ἐν Δελφοῖς σκιᾶς νυνὶ πολεμῆσαι.