by Demosthenes
[2] For my own part, I shall forbear to retort that it is unjust to take away this privilege from all because you find fault with some; for that objection has already been partially stated, and you probably realize its force. But I should like to ask Leptines on what grounds, even if not some, but all the recipients had been to the last degree undeserving, he has meted out the same treatment to you as to them; for by the clause “none shall be exempt” he has taken away the privilege from those who now enjoy it, while by the addition “nor shall it be lawful hereafter to grant it” he takes away from you the right to bestow it. For surely he cannot mean that precisely as he thought the holders of this privilege unworthy, so he thought the people unworthy of the right to dispense its own favors to whomsoever it wishes.
[3] ἀλλὰ νὴ Δι᾽ ἐκεῖν᾽ ἂν ἴσως εἴποι πρὸς ταῦτα, ὅτι διὰ τὸ ῥᾳδίως ἐξαπατᾶσθαι τὸν δῆμον, διὰ τοῦθ᾽ οὕτως ἔθηκε τὸν νόμον. τί οὖν κωλύει πάντ᾽ ἀφῃρῆσθαι καὶ ὅλως τὴν πολιτείαν ὑμᾶς κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον; οὐ γὰρ ἔστ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ὅτου τοῦτ᾽ οὐ πεπόνθατε τῶν πάντων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ψηφίσματα πολλὰ πολλάκις ἐξαπατηθέντες κεχειροτονήκατε, καὶ συμμάχους ἤδη τινὰς ἥττους ἀντὶ κρειττόνων ἐπείσθηθ᾽ ἑλέσθαι, καὶ ὅλως ἐν οἶμαι πολλοῖς οἷς πράττετε καὶ τοιοῦτόν τι συμβαίνειν ἀνάγκη.
[3] But perhaps he may object here that he framed his law in this way because the people are so easily gulled. But by parity of reasoning why should you not be deprived of all your rights — of the whole constitution in fact? For there is no single — right which has not been abused in this way. You have often been deceived into passing decrees; you have sometimes been induced to choose weak allies rather than strong; and generally, I suppose, in many of your public proceedings the same thing is bound to happen.
[4] ἆρ᾽ οὖν θησόμεθα νόμον διὰ ταῦτα ‘μηδὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐξεῖναι τῇ βουλῇ μηδὲ τῷ δήμῳ μήτε προβουλεύειν μήτε χειροτονεῖν μηδέν;’ ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ οἶμαι: οὐ γάρ ἐσμεν ἀφαιρεθῆναι δίκαιοι περὶ ὧν ἂν ἐξαπατηθῶμεν, ἀλλὰ διδαχθῆναι πῶς τοῦτο μὴ πεισόμεθα, καὶ θέσθαι νόμον οὐχ ὃς ἀφαιρήσεται τὸ κυρίους ἡμᾶς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ δι᾽ οὗ τὸν ἐξαπατῶντα τιμωρησόμεθα.
[4] Shall we then make a law that hereafter neither Council nor Assembly shall be permitted to deliberate or to vote on any subject? Not so, in my opinion; for we ought not to be deprived of our rights, where we have been misled; we ought to be instructed how to avoid such mistakes, and we ought to make a law, not to strip us of our own authority, but to punish those who mislead us.
[5] εἰ τοίνυν τις ἐάσας ταῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὕτ᾽ ἐξετάσειεν, πότερόν ποτε λυσιτελέστερόν ἐστι κυρίους μὲν ὑμᾶς εἶναι τῆς δωρειᾶς, ἐξαπατηθέντας δέ τι καὶ φαύλῳ τινὶ δοῦναι, ἢ διὰ τοῦ παντελῶς ἀκύρους γενέσθαι μηδ᾽ ἂν ἄξιόν τιν᾽ εἰδῆτ᾽ ἐξεῖναι τιμῆσαι, εὕροιτ᾽ ἂν μᾶλλον ἐκεῖνο λυσιτελοῦν. διὰ τί; ὅτι ἐκ μὲν τοῦ πλείονας ἢ προσήκει τιμᾶν πολλοὺς εὖ ποιεῖν προκαλεῖσθ᾽ ὑμᾶς, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μηδενὶ μηδέν, μηδ᾽ ἂν ἄξιος ᾖ, διδόναι, πάντας ἀπείρξετε τοῦ φιλοτιμεῖσθαι.
[5] Now if, putting these considerations aside, you would examine the real problem, whether it is more advantageous that you should possess the power of bestowing this privilege, even though you are sometimes duped into bestowing it on a scoundrel, or that by being wholly dispossessed of it you should be unable to grant honors even where they are deserved, you would find the former course the more advantageous. And why? Because the result of rewarding too many citizens is to encourage many to do you good service, but the result of rewarding no one, even if deserving, is to discourage emulation in all.
[6] πρὸς δὲ τούτῳ καὶ δι᾽ ἐκεῖνο, ὅτι οἱ μὲν ἀνάξιόν τινα τιμήσαντες εὐηθείας τινὰ δόξαν ἔχοιεν ἄν, οἱ δὲ τοὺς ἀγαθόν τι ποιοῦντας ἑαυτοὺς μὴ τοῖς ὁμοίοις ἀμειβόμενοι, κακίας. ὅσῳ δὴ κρεῖττον εὐήθη δοκεῖν ἢ πονηρὸν εἶναι, τοσούτῳ λῦσαι τὸν νόμον κάλλιον ἢ θέσθαι.
[6] There is also this other reason, that those who reward an undeserving individual may be credited with some degree of artlessness, but those who never requite their benefactors are charged with baseness. Just so far as it is better to be thought artless than unscrupulous, it is more honorable to repeal this law than to enact it.
[7] οὐ τοίνυν ἔμοιγ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἐκεῖν᾽ εὔλογον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, σκοπουμένῳ φαίνεται, καταμεμφόμενόν τινας ἐπὶ ταῖς ὑπαρχούσαις δωρειαῖς τοὺς χρησίμους ὄντας τῶν τιμῶν ἀποστερεῖν. εἰ γὰρ ὑπαρχουσῶν τούτων φαῦλοι καὶ ἀνάξιοί τινες κατὰ τὸν τούτων λόγον εἰσίν, τί χρὴ προσδοκᾶν ἔσεσθαι τότε, ὅταν παντελῶς μηδὲ πλέον μέλλῃ μηδὲν εἶναι τοῖς χρηστοῖς οὖσιν;
[7] Nor again, men of Athens, on reflection does it seem to me reasonable, when finding fault with some on the ground of the rewards they already enjoy, to rob useful citizens of their honors. For if, while these immunities exist, some of the recipients are, as our opponents say, worthless and unprofitable, what result are we to expect when there is no chance whatever of reward for the good citizens?
[8] ἔτι τοίνυν ὑμᾶς κἀκεῖν᾽ ἐνθυμεῖσθαι δεῖ, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν νῦν ὑπαρχόντων νόμων καὶ πάλαι κυρίων, οὓς οὐδ᾽ ἂν αὐτὸς οὗτος ἀντείποι μὴ οὐχὶ καλῶς ἔχειν, ἐνιαυτὸν διαλιπὼν ἕκαστος λῃτουργεῖ, ὥστε τὸν ἥμισύν ἐστ᾽ ἀτελὴς τοῦ χρόνου. εἶθ᾽ ἧς πᾶσι μέτεστι τὸ ἥμισυ καὶ τοῖς μηδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν ἀγαθὸν πεποιηκόσιν ὑμᾶς, ταύτης τοὺς εὖ ποιήσαντας, ὃ προστεθείκαμεν αὐτοῖς, τοῦτ᾽ ἀφελώμεθα; μηδαμῶς: οὔτε γὰρ ἄλλως καλὸν οὔθ᾽ ὑμῖν πρέπον.
[8] Then again, you must consider this point, that in accordance with the existing laws of long standing — laws of which Leptines himself cannot deny the soundness — there is an interval of a year between each public service, so that half the time a citizen is immune. And then, when all citizens, even those who have not benefited you in the least, enjoy a half share in that privilege, are we to take away from your real benefactors the addition that we made to it? Surely not; for that would be dishonorable and, in your case, especially unbecoming.
[9] πῶς γὰρ οὐκ αἰσχρόν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἀγορὰν ἀψευδεῖν νόμον γεγράφθαι, ἐφ᾽ οἷς οὐδέν ἐστι δημοσίᾳ βλάβος εἴ τις ψεύδεται, ἐν δὲ τῷ κοινῷ μὴ χρῆσθαι τῷ νόμῳ τούτῳ τὴν πόλιν τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιτάξασαν τοῖς ἰδιώταις, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀγαθόν τι πεποιηκότας ἐξαπατῆσαι, καὶ ταῦτ᾽ οὐ μικρὰν ζημία�
� ὀφλήσειν μέλλουσαν;
[9] When we have a law which forbids cheating in the marketplace, where a falsehood entails no public injury, is it not disgraceful that in public affairs the same state should not abide by the law which it enjoins on private individuals, but should cheat its benefactors, and that although it is itself likely to incur no small penalty?
[10] οὐ γὰρ εἰ μὴ χρήματ᾽ ἀπόλλυτε μόνον σκεπτέον, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ καὶ δόξαν χρηστήν, περὶ ἧς μᾶλλον σπουδάζετ᾽ ἢ περὶ χρημάτων, καὶ οὐ μόνον ὑμεῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ πρόγονοι. τεκμήριον δέ: χρήματα μὲν γὰρ πλεῖστά ποτε κτησάμενοι πάνθ᾽ ὑπὲρ φιλοτιμίας ἀνήλωσαν, ὑπὲρ δὲ δόξης οὐδένα πώποτε κίνδυνον ἐξέστησαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἰδίας οὐσίας προσαναλίσκοντες διετέλουν. νῦν τοίνυν οὗτος ὁ νόμος ταύτην ἀντὶ καλῆς αἰσχρὰν τῇ πόλει περιάπτει, καὶ οὔτε τῶν προγόνων οὔθ᾽ ὑμῶν ἀξίαν. τρία γὰρ τὰ μέγιστ᾽ ὀνείδη κτᾶται, φθονεροὺς ἀπίστους ἀχαρίστους εἶναι δοκεῖν.
[10] For we must take account not only of loss of money, but of loss of good fame, which you are more anxious to keep than your money — yes, you and your ancestors also. The proof of this is that when they had accumulated vast sums, they spent all for honor, and when reputation was at stake, they never shrank from danger, but even lavished their private fortunes without stint. As it stands, then, this law reflects on your city not honor but disgrace, unworthy alike of your ancestors and of yourselves; for Athens is incurring the three worst reproaches — that men should think us envious, faithless, ungrateful.
[11] ὅτι τοίνυν οὐδ᾽ ἐστὶν ὅλως, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦ ἤθους τοῦ ὑμετέρου κύριον ποιῆσαι τοιοῦτον νόμον, καὶ τοῦτο πειράσομαι δεῖξαι διὰ βραχέων, ἕν τι τῶν πρότερον πεπραγμένων τῇ πόλει διεξελθών. λέγονται χρήμαθ᾽ οἱ τριάκοντα δανείσασθαι παρὰ Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐν Πειραιεῖ. ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ ἡ πόλις εἰς ἓν ἦλθεν καὶ τὰ πράγματ᾽ ἐκεῖνα κατέστη, πρέσβεις πέμψαντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰ χρήματα ταῦτ᾽ ἀπῄτουν.
[11] Next, men of Athens, that it is absolutely contrary to the national character to ratify such a law as this, I will also endeavor to show you briefly by an example of our conduct in the past. The Thirty Tyrants are said to have borrowed money from the Lacedaemonians for use against the patriots in the Piraeus. But when unity was restored to the State and those disputes were settled, the Lacedaemonians sent envoys to demand payment.
[12] λόγων δὲ γιγνομένων καὶ τῶν μὲν τοὺς δανεισαμένους ἀποδοῦναι κελευόντων, τοὺς ἐξ ἄστεως, τῶν δὲ τοῦτο πρῶτον ὑπάρξαι τῆς ὁμονοίας σημεῖον ἀξιούντων, κοινῇ διαλῦσαι τὰ χρήματα, φασὶ τὸν δῆμον ἑλέσθαι συνεισενεγκεῖν αὐτὸν καὶ μετασχεῖν τῆς δαπάνης, ὥστε μὴ λῦσαι τῶν ὡμολογημένων μηδέν. πῶς οὖν οὐ δεινόν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ τότε μὲν τοῖς ἠδικηκόσιν ὑμᾶς ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ ψεύσασθαι τὰ χρήματ᾽ εἰσφέρειν ἠθελήσατε, νῦν δ᾽ ἐξὸν ὑμῖν ἄνευ δαπάνης τὰ δίκαια ποιῆσαι τοῖς εὐεργέταις, λύσασι τὸν νόμον, ψεύδεσθαι μᾶλλον αἱρήσεσθε; ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἀξιῶ.
[12] When the question was discussed and some were for ordering the city-party, who were the real borrowers, to repay, while others claimed that the first sign of reconciliation should be the joint settlement of the debt, they say that the people chose to pay their contribution and bear their share of the loss, so that there should be no breach of the agreement. On that occasion, men of Athens, to avoid a breach of faith, you consented to pay money to those who had injured you, but now, when you might without any expense requite your benefactors by repealing this law, will it not be strange if you prefer to break your faith? I for one cannot approve of it.
[13] τὸ μὲν τοίνυν τῆς πόλεως ἦθος, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἄλλων πολλῶν καὶ ἐφ᾽ ὧν εἶπον ἴδοι τις ἂν τοιοῦτον, ἀψευδὲς καὶ χρηστόν, οὐ τὸ λυσιτελέστατον πρὸς ἀργύριον σκοποῦν, ἀλλὰ τί καὶ καλὸν πρᾶξαι. τὸ δὲ τοῦ θέντος τὸν νόμον, τὰ μὲν ἄλλ᾽ ἔγωγ᾽ οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ λέγω φλαῦρον οὐδὲν οὐδὲ σύνοιδα, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ νόμου σκοπῶν εὑρίσκω πολὺ τούτου κεχωρισμένον.
[13] The instance I have quoted, men of Athens, as well many others, will show what our national character is — truthful, honest, and, where money is concerned, not asking what pays best, but what is the honorable thing to do. But as to the character of the proposer of this law, I have no further knowledge of him, nor do I say or know anything to his prejudice; but if I may judge from his law, I detect a character very far removed from what I have described.
[14] φημὶ τοίνυν ἐγὼ κάλλιον εἶναι τοῦτον ὑμῖν ἀκολουθῆσαι περὶ τοῦ λῦσαι τὸν νόμον ἢ ὑμᾶς τούτῳ περὶ τοῦ θέσθαι, καὶ λυσιτελέστερον εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ τούτῳ τὴν πόλιν πεπεικέναι Λεπτίνην ὅμοιον αὐτῇ γενέσθαι δοκεῖν ἢ αὐτὴν ὑπὸ τούτου πεπεῖσθαι ὁμοίαν εἶναι τούτῳ: οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰ πάνυ χρηστός ἐσθ᾽, ὡς ἐμοῦ γ᾽ ἕνεκ᾽ ἔστω, βελτίων ἐστὶ τῆς πόλεως τὸ ἦθος.
[14] I say, then, that it would be more honorable for Leptines to be guided by you in repealing the law than for you to be guided by him in ratifying it, and it would be more profitable for you, as well as for him, that Athens should persuade Leptines to assume a likeness to herself than that she should be persuaded by Leptines to be like him; for even if he is a really good man — and he may be, for aught I know — he cannot excel her in character.
[15] νομίζω τοίνυν ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἄμεινον ἂν περὶ τοῦ παρόντος βουλεύσασθαι, εἰ κἀκεῖνο μάθοιτε, ὅτι ᾧ μόνῳ μείζους εἰσὶν αἱ παρὰ τῶν δήμων δωρειαὶ τῶν παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν διδομένων, καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἀφαιρεῖται νῦν τῷ νόμῳ. τῇ μὲν γὰρ χρείᾳ τῇ τῶν εὑρισκομένων τὰς δωρειὰς οἱ τύραννοι καὶ οἱ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας ἔχοντες μάλιστα δύνανται τιμᾶν: πλούσιον γὰρ ὃν ἂν βούλωνται παραχρῆμ᾽ ἐποίησαν: τῇ δὲ τιμῇ καὶ τῇ βεβαιότητι τὰς παρὰ τῶν δήμων δωρειὰς εὑρήσετ᾽ οὔσας βελτίους.
[15] Moreover, gentlemen, I think that you would come to a sounder judgement in this matter if you would observe this further truth, that the present law removes just the one advantage which the rewards of a democracy have over those of other constitutions. For in the material value to the recipients of the rewards bestowed, a tyranny or an oligarchy has an immense advantage in that they can make anyone they choose instantaneously rich; but in honor and in security of possession you will find that the gift
s of a democracy are to be preferred.
[16] τό τε γὰρ μὴ μετ᾽ αἰσχύνης ὡς κολακεύοντα λαμβάνειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ἰσηγορίᾳ δοκοῦντ᾽ ἄξιόν τινος εἶναι τιμᾶσθαι τῶν καλῶν ἐστι, τό θ᾽ ὑπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἑκόντων θαυμάζεσθαι τοῦ παρὰ τοῦ δεσπότου λαμβάνειν ὁτιοῦν κρεῖττον εἶναι δοκεῖ. παρὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκείνοις μείζων ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ μέλλοντος φόβος τῆς παρούσης χάριτος, παρὰ δ᾽ ὑμῖν ἀδεῶς ἃν λάβῃ τις ἔχειν ὑπῆρχε τὸν γοῦν ἄλλον χρόνον.
[16] For not the receipt of a flatterer’s pay with its taint of shame, but to be honored, where speech is free, as one who is deemed worthy — that is true glory; and to enjoy the willing admiration of equals seems better than to accept the richest gift from a tyrant’s hand. For in those communities the fear of tomorrow outweighs the favor of today, but in your city a man could keep what he won without fear of loss, at any rate in time past.
[17] ὁ τοίνυν τὴν πίστιν ἀφαιρῶν τῶν δωρειῶν νόμος, οὗτος, ᾧ μόνῳ κρείττους εἰσὶν αἱ παρ᾽ ὑμῶν δωρειαί, τοῦτ᾽ ἀφαιρεῖται. καίτοι τῶν ἁπασῶν ἧς ἄν τινος πολιτείας τὸ κομίζεσθαι τοὺς εὔνους τοῖς καθεστῶσιν χάριν ἐξέλῃς, οὐ μικρὰν φυλακὴν αὐτῶν ταύτην ἀφῃρηκὼς ἔσει.