by Demosthenes
[6] I am not ignorant that Charidemus is regarded by some as a benefactor of Athens. But if I can find ability to tell you what I mean, and what I know him to have done, I hope to prove that, so far from being our benefactor, he is particularly ill-disposed to us, and that exactly the wrong conception has been formed of his character.
[7] εἰ μὲν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο μέγιστον Ἀριστοκράτης ἠδίκει, τὸ τοιούτου, οἷον ἐγώ φημι δείξειν τὸν Χαρίδημον ὄντα, τοσαύτην πεποιῆσθαι πρόνοιαν ἐν τῷ ψηφίσματι ὥστ᾽ ἰδίαν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους, ἄν τι πάθῃ, τιμωρίαν αὐτῷ δεδωκέναι, ταῦτ᾽ ἂν ἤδη λέγειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐπεχείρουν, ἵν᾽ εἰδῆτε πολλοῦ δεῖν ἄξιον ὄντα τυχεῖν τοῦ ψηφίσματος αὐτὸν τουτουί. νυνὶ δ᾽ ἕτερον τούτου μεῖζον διὰ τοῦ ψηφίσματος ἔστ᾽ ἀδίκημα, ὃ δεῖ πρότερον καὶ μαθεῖν ὑμᾶς καὶ φυλάξασθαι.
[7] If, men of Athens, the most serious offence committed by Aristocrates had been that in his decree he was so solicitous for the safety of such a man as I undertake to prove Charidemus to be that he provided a special and illegal penalty, in case anything happened to him, I should have tried to deal with that point at once, for the purpose of proving that the man is very far from deserving the favour of this decree. There is, however, a much graver iniquity involved in the decree, of which you must first be informed, and against which you must take precaution.
[8] ἀνάγκη δὲ ἐστὶ πρῶτον ἁπάντων εἰπεῖν καὶ δεῖξαι τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ Χερρόνησον ὑμᾶς ἀσφαλῶς ἔχειν πεποιηκός: διὰ γὰρ τοῦ μαθεῖν τοῦτο καὶ τἀδίκημα σαφῶς ὄψεσθε. ἔστι τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο, τὸ τελευτήσαντος Κότυος Βηρισάδην καὶ Ἀμάδοκον καὶ Κερσοβλέπτην τρεῖς ἀνθ᾽ ἑνὸς γενέσθαι Θρᾴκης βασιλέας: συμβέβηκε γὰρ ἐκ τούτου αὑτοῖς μὲν ἀντιπάλους εἶναι τούτους, ὑμᾶς δ᾽ ὑπέρχεσθαι καὶ θεραπεύειν.
[8] It is essential that at the outset I should explain to you the circumstances to which you owe the secure possession of the Chersonese, for in the light of that knowledge you will get a clear perception of the wrong that has been committed. The circumstances, men of Athens, are these. On the demise of Cotys three persons instead of one became kings of Thrace — Berisades, Amadocus, and Cersobleptes; and the natural result was that they competed with one another and that they all flattered you and courted your favour.
[9] τοῦτο τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, βουλόμενοί τινες παῦσαι, καὶ καταλῦσαι μὲν τοὺς ἑτέρους βασιλέας, παραδοῦναι δ᾽ ἑνὶ τῷ Κερσοβλέπτῃ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἅπασαν, διαπράττονταί σφισι τοῦτο γενέσθαι τὸ προβούλευμα, τῷ μὲν ἀκοῦσαι κεχωρισμένον τοῦ τι τοιοῦτον δοκεῖν διαπράξασθαι, τῷ δ᾽ ἔργῳ πάντων μάλιστα τοῦτο περαίνοντες, ὡς ἐγὼ διδάξω.
[9] Well, men of Athens, certain persons who wanted to put a stop to that state of affairs, to get rid of the other kings, and to put Cersobleptes in possession of an undivided monarchy, contrived to equip themselves with this provisional resolution. If one listened only to the wording, they were far from appearing to pursue any such purpose; and yet such was in fact their main object, as I will proceed to explain.
[10] ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἑνὸς τελευτήσαντος τῶν βασιλέων Βηρισάδου, παραβὰς τοὺς ὅρκους καὶ τὰς συνθήκας ἃς μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν ἐποιήσατο, Κερσοβλέπτης ἐξέφερεν πόλεμον πρός τε τοὺς Βηρισάδου παῖδας καὶ πρὸς Ἀμάδοκον, εὔδηλον ἦν ὅτι τοῖς μὲν Βηρισάδου παισὶν Ἀθηνόδωρος βοηθήσοι, τῷ δ᾽ Ἀμαδόκῳ Σίμων καὶ Βιάνωρ: ὁ μὲν γὰρ Βηρισάδου κηδεστής, οἱ δ᾽ Ἀμαδόκου γεγόνασιν.
[10] On the death of Berisades, one of the three kings, Cersobleptes, in violation of a sworn treaty concluded with you, began to levy war upon the sons of Berisades and upon Amadocus; and it was at once foreseen that Athenodorus would come to the aid of the sons of Berisades, and Simon and Bianor to that of Amadocus, the former being related by marriage to Berisades and the two latter to Amadocus.
[11] ἐσκόπουν οὖν τίν᾽ ἂν τρόπον ἡσυχίαν μὲν ἔχειν ἀναγκασθεῖεν οὗτοι, ἐρήμων δ᾽ ὄντων ἐκείνων ὁ Κερσοβλέπτῃ πράττων τὴν ἀρχὴν Χαρίδημος ἀσφαλῶς πάντα καταστρέψαιτο. εἰ πρῶτον μέν, ἄν τις αὐτὸν ἀποκτείνῃ, ψήφισμ᾽ ὑμέτερον γένοιτο, ἀγώγιμον εἶναι: δεύτερον δέ, εἰ χειροτονηθείη στρατηγὸς ὑφ᾽ ὑμῶν Χαρίδημος.
[11] Accordingly the persons I have mentioned began to consider by what means those commanders might be compelled to remain inactive, so that, the rival princes being friendless, Charidemus, who was striving to win the monarchy for Cersobleptes, might make himself master of the situation. The first plan was to get a decree enacted by you, making any man who should kill Charidemus liable to arrest; and the second was that Charidemus should receive from you a general’s commission.
[12] οὔτε γὰρ ὑμετέρῳ στρατηγῷ προχείρως ἐναντία θήσεσθαι τὰ ὅπλ᾽ ἔμελλ᾽ ὁ Σίμων οὐδ᾽ ὁ Βιάνωρ, πολῖται γεγενημένοι καὶ ἄλλως ἐσπουδακότες πρὸς ὑμᾶς: ὁ δὲ δὴ γένει πολίτης Ἀθηνόδωρος οὐδὲ βουλεύσεσθαι: οὔτε τὴν διὰ τοῦ ψηφίσματος αἰτίαν ὑποδύσεσθαι, ἣ πρόδηλος ἦν ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνους ἥξουσα, εἴ τι πάθοι Χαρίδημος. ἐκ δὲ τούτου τοῦ τρόπου τῶν μὲν ἐρήμων ὄντων βοηθῶν, αὑτοῖς δ᾽ ἀδείας δοθείσης, ῥᾳδίως ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκείνους καὶ κατασχήσειν τὴν ἀρχήν.
[12] For neither Simon nor Bianor, both of whom had been admitted to your citizenship, and who were, apart from that, thoroughly well affected towards you, was likely to take the field against a general of yours while Athenodorus, an Athenian citizen by birthright, would never dream of doing so, nor would he incur the criminal charge set up by the decree, which would certainly be brought against those commanders, if anything happened to Charidemus. By these means, the kings being denuded of allies, and impunity provide for themselves, they hoped easily to drive them out and seize the monarchy.
[13] καὶ ὅτι ταῦθ᾽ οὕτως ᾤοντο καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἦν τὸ κατασκεύασμ᾽ αὐτοῖς, τὰ πραχθέντ᾽ αὐτὰ κατηγορεῖ. ἅμα γὰρ τῷ πολέμῳ τ᾽ ἐνεχείρουν αὐτοὶ καὶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἧκεν Ἀριστόμαχος πρεσβευτὴς παρ᾽ αὐτῶν ὁ Ἀλωπεκῆθεν οὑτοσί, ὃς ἄλλα τ᾽ ἐδημηγόρει παρ᾽ ὑμῖν ἐπαινῶν καὶ διεξιὼν τὸν Κερσοβλέπτην καὶ τὸν Χαρίδημον, ὡς φιλανθρώπως ἔχουσι πρὸς ὑμᾶς,
[13] Of such intentions and of such artifices they are accused by the evidence of facts; for, at the moment when they began hostilities, Aristomachus of Alopece visited you as their ambassador, and in his oration before the assembly, not content with commending Cerso
bleptes and Charidemus and enlarging on their generous sentiments towards you,
[14] καὶ μόνον ἀνθρώπων ἂν ἔφη Χαρίδημον Ἀμφίπολιν κομίσασθαι τῇ πόλει δύνασθαι, καὶ παρῄνει στρατηγὸν χειροτονῆσαι. ἡτοίμαστο δ᾽ αὐτοῖς τοῦτο τὸ προβούλευμα καὶ προδιῴκητο, ἵν᾽ εἰ πεισθείητ᾽ ἐκ τῶν ὑποσχέσεων καὶ τῶν ἐλπίδων ἃς ὑπέτειν᾽ ὁ Ἀριστόμαχος, εὐθὺς ἐπικυρώσειεν ὁ δῆμος καὶ μηδὲν ἐμποδὼν εἴη.
[14] he declared that Charidemus was the only man in the world who could recover Amphipolis for Athens, and advised you to appoint him as general. But this preliminary resolution had already been drafted and preconcerted by them, in order that, if you should be captivated by the promises and expectations which Aristomachus held out to you, it might be ratified there and then by the Assembly, and no impediment might remain.
[15] καίτοι πῶς ἂν τεχνικώτερον ἢ κακουργότερον συμπαρεσκεύασαν ἄνθρωποι, ὅπως οἱ μὲν ἐκπεσοῦνται τῶν βασιλέων, εἷς δ᾽ ὃν αὐτοὶ βούλονται πᾶσαν ὑφ᾽ αὑτῷ ποιήσεται τὴν ἀρχήν, ἢ τοὺς μὲν τοῖν δυοῖν βοηθήσαντας ἂν εἰς φόβον καὶ συκοφαντίας εὐλάβειαν καθιστάντες, ἣν εἰκὸς προσδοκᾶν ἐκείνους ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς ἐλθεῖν ἂν διὰ τοῦ ψηφίσματος τουτουί, τῷ δ᾽ ἑνὶ πράττοντι τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ πάντα τἀναντία τοῖς ὑμῖν συμφέρουσι κατασκευάζοντι τοσαύτην ἐξουσίαν διδόντες τοῦ ταῦτ᾽ ἀδεῶς πράττειν;
[15] Yet what more ingenious and cunning device could these men have concocted to obtain the expulsion of the other kings, and the subjection of the whole realm to the monarch whom they preferred, than when they intimidated the commanders who would otherwise have supported the two rivals, and put them on their guard against that spiteful accusation which they might reasonably expect to encounter by the operation of this decree; and when on the other hand they conferred upon the man who was scheming to get the monarchy for one king, and was laying plans entirely opposed to your interests, such ample licence to proceed without fear?
[16] οὐ τοίνυν μόνον ἐκ τούτων δῆλόν ἐσθ᾽ ὅτι τούτων ἕνεκ᾽ ἐρρήθη τὸ προβούλευμ᾽ ὧν λέγω, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ψηφίσματος αὐτοῦ μαρτυρία τίς ἐστ᾽ εὐμεγέθης. ‘ἂν γὰρ ἀποκτείνῃ τις Χαρίδημον’ γράψας καὶ παραβὰς τὸ τί πράττοντ᾽ εἰπεῖν, πότερ᾽ ἡμῖν συμφέροντ᾽ ἢ οὔ, γέγραφ᾽ εὐθὺς ‘ἀγώγιμον ἐκ τῶν συμμάχων εἶναι.’
[16] Nor is it only these considerations that prove that such was the purpose for which the resolution was moved: the decree itself supplies evidence of great weight. After drafting the words “if any person put Charidemus to death,” and omitting any proviso of what Charidemus might be doing, whether for or against your advantage, the mover forthwith added, “he shall be liable to seizure and removal from the territory of our allies.”
[17] οὐκοῦν τῶν μὲν ἐχθρῶν ὁμοίως ἡμῖν τε κἀκείνῳ οὐδέποτ᾽ εἰς τοὺς ἡμετέρους ἥξει συμμάχους οὐδείς, οὔτ᾽ ἀποκτείνας ἐκεῖνον οὔτε μή, ὥστ᾽ οὐ κατὰ τούτων γέγραφεν ταύτην τὴν τιμωρίαν. τῶν δ᾽ ἡμετέρων μὲν φίλων, ἐκείνου δέ, ὅταν ἐγχειρῇ τι πράττειν ἐναντίον ὑμῖν, ἐχθρῶν, τούτων δή τίς ἐστιν ὁ τοῦτο τὸ ψήφισμα φοβηθεὶς ἂν καὶ φυλαξάμενος μὴ δι᾽ ἀνάγκην ἡμῖν εἰς ἔχθραν ἐλθεῖν. ἔστι τοίνυν οὗτος Ἀθηνόδωρος, Σίμων, Βιάνωρ, οἱ Θρᾴκης βασιλεῖς, ἄλλος ὅστις ἂν εἰς εὐεργεσίας μέρος καταθέσθαι βούλοιτο τὸ πράττειν ὑπεναντί᾽ ἐκεῖνον ἐγχειροῦνθ᾽ ὑμῖν ἐπισχεῖν.
[17] Now no man who is an enemy of ours as well as of Charidemus will ever enter allied territory, whether he has put him to death or not, and therefore it is not against such men that this retribution has been directed. The man who will be alarmed by this decree, and will be on his guard against be coming our certain enemy, is one who is a friend of ours, and also an enemy of his, if he should attempt anything inimical to us. And that man is Athenodorus, or Simon, or Bianor, kings of Thrace, or any other man who may wish to lay you under obligation by restraining Charidemus when he is trying to act in opposition to you.
[18] ὧν μὲν τοίνυν ἕνεκ᾽ ἐρρήθη τὸ προβούλευμα, ἵνα κυρώσειεν ὁ δῆμος ἐξαπατηθείς, καὶ δι᾽ ἃ τὴν γραφὴν ἐποιησάμεθ᾽ ἡμεῖς ταυτηνί, βουλόμενοι κωλῦσαι, ταῦτ᾽ ἐστίν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι. δίκαιον δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἴσως ἔμ᾽ ὑπεσχημένον τρί᾽ ἐπιδείξειν, ἓν μὲν ὡς παρὰ τοὺς νόμους τὸ ψήφισμ᾽ εἴρηται, δεύτερον δ᾽ ὡς ἀσύμφορόν ἐστι τῇ πόλει, τρίτον δ᾽ ὡς ἀνάξιος τυχεῖν τούτων ᾧ γέγραπται, πάντων αἵρεσιν ὑμῖν δοῦναι τοῖς ἀκουσομένοις, τί πρῶτον ἢ τί δεύτερον ἢ τί τελευταῖον βουλομένοις ἀκούειν ὑμῖν ἐστιν.
[18] Such, men of Athens, are the purposes for which the provisional resolution was moved, in the hope that it would be ratified by a deluded Assembly; and such the reasons why we, desiring to frustrate its ratification, have brought this present indictment. As I have undertaken to prove three propositions, — first that the decree is unconstitutional, secondly that it is injurious to the common weal, and thirdly that the person in whose favour it has been moved is unworthy of such privilege, — it is, perhaps, fair that I should allow you, who are to hear me, to choose what you wish to hear first, and second, and last.
[19] ὅ τι δὴ βούλεσθε, ὁρᾶτε, ἵνα τοῦτο λέγω πρῶτον ὑμῖν. περὶ τοῦ παρανόμου βούλεσθε πρῶτον; τοῦτο τοίνυν ἐροῦμεν. ἃ δὴ δέομαι καὶ ἀξιῶ παρὰ πάντων ὑμῶν τυχεῖν, δίκαια, ὥς γ᾽ ἐμαυτὸν πείθω: μηδεὶς ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῷ διεψεῦσθαι τοῦ Χαριδήμου καὶ νομίζειν εὐεργέτην εἶναι φιλονικῶν δυσχερέστερον τοὺς περὶ τῶν νόμων λόγους ἀκούσῃ μου, μηδ᾽ ἀποστερήσῃ διὰ τοῦτο μήθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν τοῦ θέσθαι τὴν ψῆφον εὔορκον μήτ᾽ ἐμὲ τοῦ διδάξαι περὶ πάντων ὑμᾶς ὡς βούλομαι. ἀλλὰ ποιησάσθω τὴν ἀκρόασιν ὡδί: καὶ σκοπεῖσθ᾽ ὡς δίκαι᾽ ἐρῶ:
[19] Consider what you prefer, that I may begin with that. — You wish me to deal first with the illegality? Very well; I will do so. There is a favour which I not only ask but claim from you all, — with justice, as I am inclined to think. I beg that none of you, men of Athens, taking a partisan view, because you have been deceived in Charidemus and look on him as a benefactor, will give an unfriendly hearing to my remarks on the point of law. Do not, for that reason, rob yourselves of the power to cast an honest vote, and me of the right to present my whole case as I think fit. You must listen to me in the manner following, — and observe how fairly I will put it.
[20] ὅταν μὲν λέγω
περὶ τῶν νόμων, ἀφελὼν ὅτῳ τὸ ψήφισμ᾽ εἴρηται καὶ ποίῳ τινί, σκοπείσθω πότερον παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ἢ κατ᾽ αὐτοὺς εἴρηται, καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο: ὅταν δ᾽ ἐλέγχω τὰ πεπραγμένα καὶ διεξίω τὸν τρόπον ὃν πεφενάκισθ᾽ ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, τὰς πράξεις σκοπείσθω, πότερον γεγονυίας ἢ ψευδεῖς ἐρῶ:
[20] When I am discussing the point of law, you must disregard the person, and the character of the person, in whose favour the decree has been proposed, and attend to the question whether it is legal or illegal, — that and that alone. When I am bringing the man’s deeds home to him, and relating in what fashion you have been overreached by him, you must look only at the transactions, — do I relate them accurately or untruly?
[21] ὅταν δ᾽ ἐξετάζω περὶ τοῦ συμφέρειν ἢ μὴ τῇ πόλει ταῦτα ψηφίσασθαι, πάντα τἄλλ᾽ ἀφεὶς τοὺς λογισμοὺς ὁράτω τοὺς περὶ τούτων, πότερ᾽ ὀρθῶς ἔχοντας ποιοῦμαι ἢ οὔ. ἐὰν γὰρ τοῦτον ἔχοντες τὸν τρόπον ἀκροάσησθέ μου, αὐτοί τ᾽ ἄρισθ᾽ ἃ προσήκει συνήσετε, χωρὶς ἕκαστα σκοποῦντες καὶ οὐχ ἅμα πάνθ᾽ ἁθρό᾽ ἐξετάζοντες, κἀγὼ ῥᾷσθ᾽ ἃ βούλομαι δυνήσομαι διδάξαι. ἔσονται δὲ βραχεῖς περὶ πάντων οἱ λόγοι: