by Demosthenes
[21] And when I inquire whether or not the enactment of this decree is conducive to the public good, dismiss everything else and watch my reasoning on that point, — is it sound or unsound? Listen to me in that manner, and you will get a better understanding of what you ought to know, by looking at one question at a time, instead of inquiring into all the issues at once, while I shall have no difficulty in explaining what I mean. On every topic my remarks shall be brief.
[22] λαβὲ δὴ τοὺς νόμους αὐτοὺς καὶ λέγε, ἵν᾽ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐπιδεικνύω τούτων τὸ παράνομον.”Νόμος ἐκ τῶν Φονικῶν Νόμων τῶν ἐξ Ἀρείου Πάγου
δικάζειν δὲ τὴν βουλὴν τὴν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ φόνου καὶ τραύματος ἐκ προνοίας καὶ πυρκαϊᾶς καὶ φαρμάκων, ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ δούς.”
[22] Now take and read the actual statutes, that I may prove thereby the illegality of their proposal.”One of the Laws of the Areopagus Concerning Homicide
The Council of the Areopagus shall take cognizance in cases of homicide, of intentional wounding, of arson, and of poisoning, if a man kill another by giving poison.”
[23] ἐπίσχες. ἠκούσατε μὲν τοῦ τε νόμου καὶ τοῦ ψηφίσματος, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι: ὡς δ᾽ ἄν μοι δοκεῖτε τοὺς περὶ τοῦ παρανόμου λόγους αὐτοὺς ῥᾷστα μαθεῖν, τοῦθ᾽ ὑμῖν φράσω: εἰ σκέψαισθ᾽ ἐν τίνι τάξει ποτ᾽ ἔσθ᾽ ὑπὲρ οὗ τὸ ψήφισμ᾽ εἴρηται, πότερα ξένος ἢ μέτοικος ἢ πολίτης ἐστίν. εἰ μὲν δὴ μέτοικον φήσομεν, οὐκ ἐροῦμεν ἀληθῆ, εἰ δ᾽ αὖ ξένον, οὐχὶ δίκαια ποιήσομεν: τὴν γὰρ τοῦ δήμου δωρειάν, ἐν ᾗ πολίτης γέγονεν, κυρίαν αὐτῷ δίκαιόν ἐστιν εἶναι. ὡς ὑπὲρ πολίτου τοίνυν, ὡς ἔοικε, ποιητέον τοὺς λόγους.
[23] Stop there. You have heard the statute, men of Athens, and you have also heard the decree. Let me tell you how you will more readily grasp the arguments on the question of illegality. Consider the status of the person in whose favour the decree has been proposed: is he an alien, a resident alien, or a citizen? If we call him a resident alien, we shall not be telling the truth; and if we call him an alien, we shall be doing him wrong, for it is only fair to him to admit the validity of that grace of the people by which he was made a citizen. It seems, then, that we must treat him as a citizen in our arguments.
[24] θεάσασθε δὴ πρὸς Διὸς ὡς ἁπλῶς καὶ δικαίως χρήσομαι τῷ λόγῳ, ὃς εἰς μὲν ταύτην τίθεμαι τὴν τάξιν αὐτὸν ἐν ᾗ πλείστης ἂν τυγχάνοι τιμῆς, ἃ δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἡμῖν τοῖς γένει πολίταις ἐστίν, οὐδ᾽ ἐκείνῳ δεῖν οἶμαι γενέσθαι παρὰ τοὺς νόμους. τίν᾽ οὖν ἐστι ταῦτα; ἃ νυνὶ γέγραφ᾽ οὑτοσί. γέγραπται γὰρ ἐν μὲν τῷ νόμῳ ‘τὴν βουλὴν δικάζειν φόνου καὶ τραύματος ἐν προνοίας καὶ πυρκαϊᾶς καὶ φαρμάκων, ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ δούς.’
[24] Now I beg you to observe how candidly and honestly I am going to treat the question; for I assign him to that class which entitles him to the greatest respect, though I do deny his right to acquire illegally privileges not enjoyed by us who are citizens by birthright, — the privileges, I mean, which the defendant has specified in this decree. In the statute it is provided that the Council shall take cognizance of homicide, intentional wounding, arson, and poisoning, if a man kills another by giving him poison.
[25] καὶ προσειπὼν ὁ θεὶς τὸν νόμον ‘ἐὰν ἀποκτείνῃ,’ κρίσιν πεποίηκεν ὅμως, οὐ πρότερον τί χρὴ πάσχειν τὸν δεδρακότ᾽ εἴρηκεν, καλῶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦθ᾽ ὑπὲρ εὐσεβείας ὅλης τῆς πόλεως προϊδών. πῶς; οὐκ ἔνεστιν ἅπαντας ἡμᾶς εἰδέναι τίς ποτ᾽ ἐστὶν ὁ ἀνδροφόνος. τὸ μὲν δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτ᾽ ἄνευ κρίσεως πιστεύειν, ἄν τις ἐπαιτιάσηται, δεινὸν ἡγεῖτο, δεῖν δ᾽ ὑπελάμβανεν, ἐπειδήπερ ἡμεῖς τιμωρήσομεν τῷ πεπονθότι, πεισθῆναι καὶ μαθεῖν ἡμᾶς διδασκομένους ὡς δέδρακεν: τηνικαῦτα γὰρ εὐσεβὲς ἤδη κολάζειν εἰδόσιν εἶναι, πρότερον δ᾽ οὔ.
[25] The legislator, while he presumes the killing, has nevertheless directed a judicial inquiry before specifying what is to be done to the culprit, and thereby has shown a just respect, men of Athens, for the religious feeling of the whole city. I say of the whole city, because it is impossible that all of you should know who the manslayer is. He thought it scandalous to give credit to such accusations, when made, without a trial; and he conceived that, inasmuch as the avenging of the sufferer is in our hands, we ought to be informed and satisfied by argument that the accused is guilty, for then conscience permits us to inflict punishment according to knowledge, but not before.
[26] καὶ ἔτι πρὸς τούτῳ διελογίζετο, ὅτι πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτ᾽ ὀνόματα, οἷον ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ, ἐάν τις ἱεροσυλήσῃ, ἐάν τις προδῷ, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα πρὸ μὲν τοῦ κρίσιν γενέσθαι αἰτιῶν ὀνόματ᾽ ἐστίν, ἐπειδὰν δὲ κριθείς τις ἐξελεγχθῇ, τηνικαῦτ᾽ ἀδικήματα γίγνεται. οὐ δὴ δεῖν ᾤετο τῷ τῆς αἰτίας ὀνόματι τιμωρίαν προσγράφειν, ἀλλὰ κρίσιν. καὶ διὰ ταῦτα, ἄν τις ἀποκτείνῃ τινά, τὴν βουλὴν δικάζειν ἔγραψεν, καὶ οὐχ ἅπερ, ἂν ἁλῷ, παθεῖν εἶπεν.
[26] Moreover he argued that before the trial is held such expressions as “if a man kill,” “if a man rob a temple,” “if a man commit treason,” and the like, are merely phrases of accusation: they become definitions of crime only after trial and conviction. To a formula of accusation he thought it proper to attach not punishment, but only trial; and therefore, when enacting that, if one man killed another, the Council should take cognizance, he did not lay down what should be done to the culprit if found guilty.
[27] ὁ μὲν δὴ τὸν νόμον τιθεὶς οὕτως, ὁ δὲ τὸ ψήφισμα γράφων πῶς; ‘ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ’ φησὶν ‘Χαρίδημον.’ τὴν μὲν δὴ προσηγορίαν τοῦ πάθους τὴν αὐτὴν ἐποιήσατο, ‘ἄν τις ἀποκτείνῃ’ γράψας, ἥνπερ ὁ τὸν νόμον τιθείς: μετὰ ταῦτα δ᾽ οὐκέτι ταὐτά, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνελὼν τὸ δίκην ὑπέχειν ἀγώγιμον εὐθὺς ἐποίησεν, καὶ παραβὰς τὸ διωρισμένον ἐκ τοῦ νόμου δικαστήριον, ἄκριτον τοῖς ἐπαιτιασαμένοις παρέδωκεν ὅ τι ἂν βούλωνται χρῆσθαι τὸν οὐδ᾽ εἰ πεποίηκέ πω φανερόν.
[27] So much for the legislator; but what of the author of the decree? “If any man kill Charidemus,” he says. So he defines the injury in the same phrase, “if any man kill,” as the legislator; but the sequel is not the same. He struck out submission to trial, and made the culprit liable to immediate seizure; he passed by the tribunal appointed by law, and handed over to the accusers, to be dealt with as they chose, a man untried, a man whose guilt is not yet proven.
[28] καὶ λαβοῦσιν ἐκε�
�νοις ἐξέσται στρεβλοῦν, αἰκίσασθαι, χρήματα πράξασθαι. καίτοι πάντα ταῦτ᾽ ἀπείρηκεν ἄντικρυς καὶ σαφῶς ὁ κάτωθεν νόμος μηδὲ τοὺς ἑαλωκότας καὶ δεδογμένους ἀνδροφόνους ἐξεῖναι ποιεῖν. λέγε δ᾽ αὐτοῖς αὐτὸν τὸν νόμον τὸν μετὰ ταῦτα.”Νόμος
τοὺς δ᾽ ἀνδροφόνους ἐξεῖναι ἀποκτείνειν ἐν τῇ ἡμεδαπῇ καὶ ἀπάγειν, ὡς ἐν τῷ α ἄξονι ἀγορεύει, λυμαίνεσθαι δὲ μή, μηδὲ ἀποινᾶν, ἢ διπλοῦν ὀφείλειν ὅσον ἂν καταβλάψῃ. εἰσφέρειν δ᾽ ἐς τοὺς ἄρχοντας, ὧν ἕκαστοι δικασταί εἰσι, τῷ βουλομένῳ. τὴν δ᾽ ἡλιαίαν διαγιγνώσκειν.”
[28] When they have got him, they are to be allowed to torture him, or maltreat him, or extort money from him. Yet the next ensuing statute directly and distinctly forbids such treatment even of men convicted and proved to be murderers. Read to the jury the statute that follows.”Law
It shall be lawful to kill murderers in our own territory, or to arrest them as directed on the first turning-table, but not to maltreat or amerce them, on penalty of a payment of twice the damage inflicted. The Archons, according to their several jurisdictions, shall bring cases into court; for any man who so desires and the court of Heliaea shall adjudicate.”
[29] ἠκούσατε μὲν τοῦ νόμου, σκέψασθε δ᾽, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ θεωρήσατε ὡς καλῶς καὶ σφόδρ᾽ εὐσεβῶς ἔθηκε ὁ τιθεὶς τὸν νόμον. ‘τοὺς ἀνδροφόνους’ φησίν. πρῶτον μὲν δὴ τοῦτον ἀνδροφόνον λέγει, τὸν ἑαλωκότ᾽ ἤδη τῇ ψήφῳ. οὐ γάρ ἐστ᾽ οὐδεὶς ὑπὸ ταύτῃ τῇ προσηγορίᾳ, πρὶν ἂν ἐξελεγχθεὶς ἁλῷ.
[29] You have heard the law, men of Athens; and I beg you to examine it and observe how admirably and most righteously it is framed by the legislator. He uses the term “murderers”; but in the first place you see that by murderer he means a man found guilty by verdict; for no man comes under that designation until he has been convicted and found guilty.
[30] ποῦ τοῦτο δηλοῖ; ἔν τε τῷ προτέρῳ νόμῳ καὶ τούτῳ. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ἐκείνῳ γράψας ‘ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ,’ τὴν βουλὴν δικάζειν εἶπεν, ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τὸν ἀνδροφόνον προσειπών, ἃ χρὴ πάσχειν εἴρηκεν: οὗ μὲν γὰρ ἦν αἰτία τὸ πρᾶγμα, τὴν κρίσιν εἴρηκεν, οὗ δ᾽ ὁ ἁλοὺς ἔνοχος τῷ προσρήματι τούτῳ καθέστηκεν, τὴν τιμωρίαν ἔγραψεν. περὶ μὲν δὴ τῶν ἑαλωκότων ἂν λέγοι. λέγει δὲ τί;
[30] That is made clear both in the earlier statute and in this one; for in the former, after the words “if any man kill,” the legislator directs the Council to take cognizance, and here, after designating the man as “the murderer,” he has directed what is to be done to him. That is to say, when it is a question of accusation, he has ordered a trial, but when the culprit, being found guilty, is liable to this designation, he has specified the penalty. Therefore he should be speaking only of persons found guilty. Well, what does he direct? That it shall be lawful to kill them and to put them under arrest.
[31] ‘ἐξεῖναι ἀποκτείνειν καὶ ἀπάγειν.’ ἆρ᾽ ὡς αὑτόν; ἢ ὡς ἂν βούληταί τις; πολλοῦ γε καὶ δεῖ. ἀλλὰ πῶς; ‘ὡς ἐν τῷ α ἄξονι εἴρηται’ φησίν. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν τί; ὃ πάντες ἐπίστασθ᾽ ὑμεῖς. οἱ θεσμοθέται τοὺς ἐπὶ φόνῳ φεύγοντας κύριοι θανάτῳ ζημιῶσαί εἰσι, καὶ τὸν ἐκ τῆς ἐκκλησίας πέρυσιν πάντες ἑωρᾶθ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων ἀπαχθέντα.
[31] Does he say that they are to be taken to the house of the prosecutor, or as he pleases? No, indeed. How are they to be arrested? “As directed on the first turning-table,” is the phrase; and you all know what that means. The judicial archons are there authorized to punish with death persons who have gone into exile on a charge of murder. Only last year you all saw the culprit who was arrested by them in the Assembly. It is to the archons, then, that the murderer is to be taken on arrest;
[32] ὡς τούτους οὖν ἀπάγειν λέγει. διαφέρει δὲ τί τοῦτο τοῦ ὡς αὑτὸν ἄγειν; ὅτι ὁ μὲν ἀπάγων, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς τοὺς θεσμοθέτας, τοὺς νόμους κυρίους ποιεῖ τοῦ δεδρακότος, ὁ δ᾽ ὡς αὑτὸν ἄγων ἑαυτόν. ἔστι δ᾽ ἐκείνως μέν, ὡς ὁ νόμος τάττει, δοῦναι δίκην, οὕτω δέ, ὡς ὁ λαβὼν βούλεται. πλεῖστον δὲ δήπου διαφέρει τὸν νόμον κύριον τῆς τιμωρίας ἢ τὸν ἐχθρὸν γίγνεσθαι.
[32] and that differs from being taken to the house of the prosecutor in this respect, men of Athens, — that the captor who carries a man to the judges gives control of the malefactor to the laws, while the captor who takes him home gives such control to himself. In the former case punishment is suffered as the law enjoins; in the latter, as the captor pleases; and of course it makes a vast difference whether the retribution is controlled by the law or by a private enemy.
[33] ‘λυμαίνεσθαι δὲ’ φησὶ ‘μή, μηδὲ ἀποινᾶν.’ ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐστὶν τί; τὸ μὲν δὴ μὴ λυμαίνεσθαι γνώριμον οἶδ᾽ ὅτι πᾶσιν μὴ μαστιγοῦν, μὴ δεῖν, μὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιεῖν λέγει, τὸ δὲ μηδ᾽ ἀποινᾶν μὴ χρήματα πράττεσθαι: τὰ γὰρ χρήματ᾽ ἄποιν᾽ ὠνόμαζον οἱ παλαιοί.
[33] “Not to maltreat or amerce,” says the statute. What does that mean? Every one, I am sure, understands that not to maltreat means that there is to be no scourging, no binding nor anything like that, and that not to amerce means not to extort blood-money, for the ancients called fining amercement.
[34] ὁ μὲν δὴ νόμος οὕτως τὸν ἀνδροφόνον καὶ τὸν ἑαλωκότ᾽ ἤδη διώρισεν ὡς κολαστέον καὶ οὗ, τὴν τοῦ πεπονθότος εἰπὼν πατρίδα, καὶ περὶ τοῦ μηδέν᾽ ἄλλον τρόπον ἢ τοῦτον μηδ᾽ ἄλλοθι πλὴν ἐνταῦθ᾽ ἄντικρυς εἴρηκεν. ὁ δὲ τὸ ψήφισμα γράφων, πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, διώρισεν, ὅς γε πάντα τούτοις τἀναντί᾽ εἴρηκεν: γράψας γὰρ ‘ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ Χαρίδημον,’ ‘ἀγώγιμος ἔστω’ φησὶν ‘πανταχόθεν.’
[34] Note that in this manner the law lays down not only how the murderer or convict is to be punished, but also where, for it specifies the country of the person injured, and it directly prescribes that the penalty is to be inflicted in that way and in no other, in that place and in no other. Yet the author of the decree is far indeed from making this distinction, — his proposals are exactly contrary. After the words, “if anyone shall kill Charidemus,” he adds, “he shall be liable to seizure everywhere.” —
[35] τί λέγεις; τῶν νόμων οὐδὲ τοὺς ἑαλωκότας διδόντων ἀπάγειν πλὴν ἐν τῇ ἡμεδαπῇ, σὺ γράφεις ἄνευ κρίσεώς τιν᾽ ἀγώγιμον ἐκ τῆς συμμαχίδος πάσης; καὶ οὐδ᾽ ἐν τῇ ἡμεδαπῇ ἄγειν κελευόντων τῶν νόμων, σὺ δίδως ἄγειν πανταχόθεν; καὶ μὴν
ἔν γε τῷ ποιεῖν ἀγώγιμον πάνθ᾽ ὅσ᾽ ἀπείρηκεν ὁ νόμος δέδωκας, χρήματα πράξασθαι, ζῶντα λυμαίνεσθαι, κακοῦν ἔχοντα, αὐτὸν ἀποκτιννύναι.
[35] What do you mean, sir? The laws do not allow even convicted criminals to be arrested elsewhere than in our own country, and do you propose that a man shall be liable to seizure without trial in any allied territory? And when the laws forbid seizure even in our own territory, do you permit seizure? Indeed, in making a man liable to seizure you have permitted everything that the law has forbidden, — extortion of blood-money, maltreatment and misusage of a living man, private custody and private execution.
[36] πῶς οὖν ἄν τις μᾶλλον ἐλεγχθείη παράνομ᾽ εἰρηκὼς ἢ πῶς δεινότερ᾽ ἂν γράφων ἢ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον; ὃς δυοῖν ὑποκειμένων ὀνομάτων, κατὰ μὲν τῶν ἐν αἰτίᾳ, ‘ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ,’ κατὰ δὲ τῶν ἑαλωκότων, ‘ἐάν τις ἀνδροφόνος ᾖ,’ ἐν μὲν τῇ προσηγορίᾳ τὸ τοῦ τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχοντος ἔλαβες ὄνομα, τὴν δὲ τιμωρίαν, ἣν οὐδὲ κατὰ τῶν ἐξεληλεγμένων διδόασιν οἱ νόμοι, ταύτην κατὰ τῶν ἀκρίτων ἔγραψας, καὶ τὸ μέσον τούτων ἐξεῖλες. μέσον γάρ ἐστιν αἰτίας καὶ ἐλέγχου κρίσις, ἣν οὐδαμοῦ γέγραφ᾽ οὗτος ἐν τῷ ψηφίσματι.