by Demosthenes
[84] πρῶτον μὲν γάρ, ‘ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ’ γράφων, οὐ προσέγραψ᾽ ἀδίκως οὐδὲ βιαίως οὐδ᾽ ὅλως οὐδέν. εἶτα πρὸ τοῦ δίκην ἀξιῶσαι λαβεῖν, εὐθὺς ἔγραψεν ἀγώγιμον εἶναι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὁ μὲν νόμος, ἐὰν μήτε δίκας ὑπόσχωσι παρ᾽ οἷς ἂν τὸ πάθος γένηται, μήτε τοὺς δεδρακότας ἐκδῶσι, κελεύει κατὰ τούτων εἶναι μέχρι τριῶν τὸ ἀνδρολήψιον:
[84] In the first place, when writing the words, “if any man shall kill,” he did not add “wrongfully,” or “violently,” or any qualification at all. Secondly he proposes that the culprit shall be liable to seizure instantly and before any claim of redress has been made. Furthermore, while the statute ordains that, if the persons in whose house the death took place will neither submit to trial nor give up the perpetrators, as many as three may be detained as hostages,
[85] ὁ δὲ τούτους μὲν ἀθῴους παρῆκε, καὶ οὐδὲ λόγον πεποίηται περὶ αὐτῶν οὐδένα, τοὺς δὲ τὸν ἤδη πεφευγότα （θήσω γὰρ οὕτω） κατὰ τὸν κοινὸν ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων νόμον, ὃς κεῖται τὸν φεύγοντα δέχεσθαι, ὑποδεξαμένους ἐκσπόνδους εἶναι γράφει, ἐὰν μὴ τὸν ἱκέτην ἔκδοτον διδῶσιν. οὐκοῦν καὶ τῷ μὴ προσθεῖναι πῶς, ἐὰν ἀποκτείνῃ, καὶ τῷ μηδεμίαν κρίσιν εἰπεῖν, καὶ τῷ μὴ δίκας αἰτεῖν, καὶ τῷ πανταχόθεν διδόναι λαβεῖν, καὶ τῷ τοὺς ὑποδεξαμένους, ἀλλὰ μὴ παρ᾽ οἷς ἂν τὸ πάθος γένηται κολάζειν, καὶ πᾶσιν οὑτωσὶ φανερῶς καὶ παρὰ τοῦτον εἴρηκε τὸν νόμον.
[85] Aristocrates dismisses those persons scot-free, and takes no account of them whatever, but proposes to put under a ban those who, in obedience to that common law of mankind which enjoins hospitality to a fugitive, have harbored the culprit, who, as I will assume, has already gone into exile, if they refuse to surrender their suppliant. Thus, by omitting to specify the mode of the homicide, by not providing for a trial, by omitting the claim of redress, by permitting arrest in any place whatsoever, by punishing those who harbor the fugitive, and by not punishing those in whose house the death took place, — in every respect I say that his proposal is in manifest contravention of this statute also.
[86] λέγε δὴ τὸν ἐφεξῆς.”Νόμος
μηδὲ νόμον ἐπ᾽ ἀνδρὶ ἐξεῖναι θεῖναι, ἐὰν μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν Ἀθηναίοις.”
ἔστι μὲν οὐκέτι τῶν φονικῶν ὅδ᾽ ὁ νῦν ἀνεγνωσμένος νόμος, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, οὐδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν δ᾽ ἧττον ἔχει καλῶς, εἴπερ καὶ ἄλλος τις. ὥσπερ γὰρ τῆς ἄλλης πολιτείας ἴσον μέτεστιν ἑκάστῳ, οὕτως ᾤετο δεῖν καὶ τῶν νόμων ἴσον μετέχειν πάντας ὁ θεὶς αὐτόν, καὶ διὰ ταῦτ᾽ ἔγραψεν ‘μηδὲ νόμον ἐπ᾽ ἀνδρὶ ἐξεῖναι θεῖναι, ἐὰν μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐφ᾽ ἅπασιν Ἀθηναίοις.’ ὁπότε τοίνυν τὰ ψηφίσματα δεῖν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ὁμολογεῖται γράφειν, ὁ γράφων ἰδίᾳ τι Χαριδήμῳ τοιοῦτον ὃ μὴ πᾶσι καὶ ὑμῖν ἔσται, σαφῶς καὶ παρὰ τοῦτον ἂν εἰρηκὼς εἴη τὸν νόμον. οὐ γὰρ δήπου, ἃ μηδὲ νομοθετεῖν ἔξεστιν, ταῦτ᾽ ἐν ψηφίσματι γράψας τις ἔννομ᾽ ἂν εἰρηκὼς εἴη.
[86] Read the next one.”Law
And it shall not be lawful to propose a statute directed against an individual, unless the same apply to all Athenians.”
The statute just read is not, like the others, taken from the Laws of Homicide, but it is just as good — as good as ever law was. The man who introduced it was of opinion that, as every citizen has an equal share in civil rights, so everybody should have an equal share in the laws; and therefore he moved that it should not be lawful to propose a law affecting any individual, unless the same applied to all Athenians. Now seeing that it is agreed that the drafting of decrees must conform to the law, a man who draws a decree for the special benefit of Charidemus, such as is not applicable to all the rest of you, must evidently be making a proposal in defiance of this statute also; of course what it is unlawful to put into a statute cannot legitimately be put into a decree.
[87] λέγε τὸν μετὰ ταῦτα νόμον. ἢ οὗτοι πάντες εἰσίν;”Νόμος
ψήφισμα δὲ μηδὲν μήτε βουλῆς μήτε δήμου νόμου κυριώτερον εἶναι.”
κατάθου. πάνυ μικρὸν ὑπείληφά μοι τὸν λόγον, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, καὶ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι περὶ τοῦ παρὰ τοῦτον εἰρῆσθαι τὸν νόμον τὸ ψήφισμα. ὃς γὰρ ὑπαρχόντων τοσούτων νόμων πάντας ὑπερβὰς τούτους γέγραφεν καὶ κατέκλεισ᾽ ἴδιον πρᾶγμα ψηφίσματι, τοῦτον τί τις ἄλλο ποιεῖν φήσει πλὴν ψήφισμα νόμου κυριώτερον ἀξιοῦν εἶναι;
[87] Read the next statute, — or is that all of them?”Law
No decree either of the Council or of the Assembly shall have superior authority to a statute.”
Put it down. — I take it, gentlemen, that a very short and easy argument will serve me to prove that this statute has been violated in the drafting of the decree. When there are so many statutes, and when a man makes a motion that contravenes every one of them, and incorporates a private transaction in a decree, how can anyone deny that he is claiming for his decree authority superior to that of a statute?
[88] βούλομαι τοίνυν ὑμῖν καὶ ἓν ἢ δύο ψηφίσματα δεῖξαι τῶν γεγραμμένων τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐεργέταις τῆς πόλεως, ἵν᾽ εἰδῆθ᾽ ὅτι ῥᾴδιόν ἐστι γράφειν τὰ δίκαια, ὅταν αὐτοῦ τις εἵνεκα τούτου γράφῃ, τοῦ τιμῆσαί τινα καὶ μεταδοῦναι τῶν ἡμῖν ὑπαρχόντων, καὶ μὴ διὰ τοῦ ταῦτα δοκεῖν ποιεῖν βούληται κακουργεῖν καὶ παρακρούεσθαι. λέγε τὰ ψηφίσματα ταυτί. ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα μὴ μακρὸν ὑμῖν ἀκούειν ᾖ, ἐξ ἑκάστου τῶν ψηφισμάτων αὐτὸ τοῦτ᾽ ἐξείλεκται περὶ οὗ τούτου κατηγορῶ. λέγε.”Ψηφίσματα”
[88] Now I wish to cite for your information one or two decrees drawn in favour of genuine benefactors of the commonwealth, to satisfy you that it is easy to frame such things without injustice, when they are drawn for the express purpose of doing honor to a man, and of admitting him to a share of our own privileges, and when, under the pretence of doing so, there is no malicious and fraudulent intention. — Read these decrees. — To save you a long hearing, the clauses corresponding to that for which I am prosecuting the defendant have been extracted from the several decrees.” Decrees”
[89] ὁρᾶθ᾽ ὅτι πάντες, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον γεγράφασιν. ‘ἔστω’ φησὶν ‘ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ ἡ αὐτὴ τιμωρία καθάπερ ἂν τὸν Ἀθηναῖον ἀποκτείνῃ,’ κυρίους μὲν ἐῶντες τοὺς περὶ τούτων ὑπάρχοντας ὑμῖν νόμους, σεμνοὺς δ᾽ ἀποφ
αίνοντες, οἵ γ᾽ ἐν δωρειᾶς ἐποιήσαντο τάξει τὸ τούτων μεταδοῦναι. ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ Ἀριστοκράτης, ἀλλὰ προπηλακίζει μὲν καθ᾽ ὅσον δύναται τούτους （ὡς γοῦν οὐδενὸς ἀξίων ἴδιόν τι γράφειν ἐπεχείρησεν）, μικρὰν δ᾽ ἀποφαίνει κἀκείνην τὴν δωρειὰν ᾗ τὴν πολιτείαν δεδώκατε τῷ Χαριδήμῳ. ὃς γάρ, ὡς ἀγαπώντων τοῦθ᾽ ὑμῶν καὶ προσοφειλόντων χάριν αὐτῷ, γέγραφεν καὶ πρὸς φυλάττειν ὑμᾶς ἐκεῖνον, ὅπως ἀδεῶς ὅ τι ἂν βούληται ποιῇ, πῶς οὐ τοῦθ᾽ ὃ λέγω διαπράττεται;
[89] You see, men of Athens, that they have all drawn them in the same fashion. For instance: “There shall be the same redress for him as if the person slain were an Athenian.” Here, without tampering with your existing laws respecting such offences, they enhance the dignity of those laws by making it an act of grace to allow a share in them to others. Not so Aristocrates: he does his very best to drag the laws through the mire; anyhow, he tried to compose something of his own, as though they were worth nothing; and he makes light even of that act of grace which you bestowed your citizenship upon Charidemus. For when he assumes that you still owe the man a debt of gratitude, and has proposed that you should protect him into the bargain, so that he may do just what he likes with impunity, does not such conduct merit my description?
[90] οὐκ ἀγνοῶ τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅτι ὡς μὲν οὐ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους φανερῶς γέγραφεν τὸ ψήφισμα Ἀριστοκράτης οὐχ ἕξει δεῖξαι, ὃ δὲ δεινότατον πάντων ἐστίν, τὸ μηδεμίαν κρίσιν ἐν παντὶ ποιῆσαι τῷ ψηφίσματι τοιαύτης αἰτίας, τοῦθ᾽ ὑφαιρεῖσθαι πειράσεται. ἐγὼ δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου πολλὰ μὲν λέγειν οὐκ οἶμαι δεῖν, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ψηφίσματος αὐτοῦ δείξω σαφῶς οὐδ᾽ αὐτὸν τοῦτον ἡγούμενον εἶναι κρίσιν οὐδεμίαν τῷ τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχοντι.
[90] I am well aware, men of Athens, that, although Aristocrates will be quite unable to disprove the charge of framing his decree in open defiance of the laws, he will make an attempt to shuffle away the most serious part of the accusation, — namely, that from beginning to end of his decree he does not order any trial of a very grave indictment. On that point I do not think I need say much; but I will prove clearly from the actual phrasing of the decree that he himself does not suppose that the man accused will get any trial at all.
[91] γέγραφεν γὰρ ‘ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ Χαρίδημον, ἀγώγιμος ἔστω, ἐὰν δέ τις ἀφέληται ἢ πόλις ἢ ἰδιώτης, ἔκσπονδος ἔστω,’ οὐκ ‘ἐὰν μὴ παράσχῃ εἰς κρίσιν τὸν ἀφαιρεθέντα,’ ἀλλ᾽ ὅλως εὐθύς. καίτοι εἴ γ᾽ ἐδίδου κρίσιν καὶ μὴ ἀφῃρεῖτο, τότ᾽ ἂν προσέγραψεν κατὰ τῶν ἀφελομένων τὴν τιμωρίαν, ὁπότ᾽ εἰς τὴν κρίσιν μὴ παρέσχον ὃν ἐξείλοντο.
[91] The words are: “If any man kill Charidemus, he shall be liable to seizure; and if any person or any city rescue him, they shall be put under ban,” — not merely in case they refuse to give up for trial the man they have rescued, but absolutely and without more ado. And yet if he were permitting instead of disallowing a trial, he would have made the penal clause against the rescuers conditional upon their not giving up for trial the person rescued.
[92] οἶμαι τοίνυν αὐτὸν κἀκεῖνον ἐρεῖν τὸν λόγον, καὶ σφόδρα ταύτῃ ζητήσειν ἐξαπατᾶν ὑμᾶς, ὡς ἄκυρόν ἐστι τὸ ψήφισμα: προβούλευμα γάρ ἐστιν, ὁ νόμος δ᾽ ἐπέτεια κελεύει τὰ τῆς βουλῆς εἶναι ψηφίσματα, ὥστε κἂν αὐτοῦ νῦν ἀποψηφίσησθε, ἥ γε πόλις φλαῦρον οὐδὲν πείσεται κατὰ τὸ ψήφισμα τοῦτο.
[92] I dare say that he will use the following argument, and that he will try very hard to mislead you on this point. The decree, he will urge, is invalid because it is merely a provisional resolution, and the law provides that resolutions of the Council shall be in force for one year only; therefore, if you acquit him today, the commonwealth can take no harm in respect of his decree.
[93] ἐγὼ δὲ πρὸς ταῦτ᾽ οἶμαι δεῖν ὑμᾶς ἐκεῖν᾽ ὑπολαμβάνειν, ὅτι τὸ ψήφισμα τοῦθ᾽ οὗτος ἔγραψεν οὐχ ἵν᾽ ὄντος ἀκύρου μηδὲν ἀηδὲς ὑμῖν συμβῇ （τὴν ἀρχὴν γὰρ ἐξῆν αὐτῷ μὴ γράφειν, εἴ γε τὸ βέλτιστον τῇ πόλει σκοπεῖν ἐβούλετο） ἀλλ᾽ ἵν᾽ ἐξαπατηθέντων ὑμῶν διαπράξαιντό τινες τἀναντία τοῖς ὑμῖν συμφέρουσιν. οἱ δὲ γραψάμενοι καὶ χρόνους ἐμποιήσαντες καὶ δι᾽ οὓς ἄκυρόν ἐστιν, ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν. ἄτοπον δὴ γένοιτ᾽ ἄν, εἰ ὧν ἡμῖν χάριν εἰκὸς ὑπάρχειν, ταῦτα τούτοις εἰς σωτηρίαν ὑπάρξειεν.
[93] I think your rejoinder to that argument should be that the defendant’s purpose in drafting the decree was, not that it should be inoperative and have no disagreeable results, — for it was open to him not to draft it at all, if he had wished to consult the best advantage of the commonwealth; — but that you might be misled and certain people might be enabled to carry through projects opposed to your interests. That the decree has been challenged, that its operation has been delayed, and that it has now become invalid, you owe to us; and it is preposterous that the very reasons that ought to make you grateful to us should be available as reasons for acquitting our opponents.
[94] ἔτι τοίνυν οὐδ᾽ ἁπλοῦν τοῦθ᾽ οὕτως ἐστίν, ὥς τις οἴεται. εἰ μὲν γὰρ μηδεὶς ἄλλος ἦν ὅστις ἔμελλεν ὁμοίως τούτῳ τῶν συμφερόντων ὑμῖν ὀλιγωρήσας γράφειν, ἴσως ἂν ἦν τοῦτο: νῦν δ᾽ ὄντων οὐκ ὀλίγων οὐχὶ καλῶς ἔχει μὴ λῦσαι τὸ ψήφισμ᾽ ὑμῖν. τίς γὰρ οὐ γράψει θαρρῶν πάλιν, ἡνίκ᾽ ἂν ᾖ τοῦτ᾽ ἀποπεφευγός; τίς δ᾽ οὐκ ἐπιψηφιεῖ; τίς δὲ γράψεται; οὐ τοίνυν τοῦτο σκεπτέον, εἰ τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ἄκυρον τοῖς χρόνοις, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνο, ὅτι τῇ περὶ τούτου ψήφῳ, νῦν ἐὰν ἀποψηφίσησθε, τοῖς ἀδικεῖν βουλομένοις αὖθις ὑμᾶς ἄδειαν δώσετε.
[94] Moreover the question is not so simple as some suppose. If there were no other man likely to propose decrees like his without regard to your interests, the matter might, perhaps, be a simple one. But in fact there are many such; and that is why it is not right that you should refuse to annul this decree. If it is pronounced flawless, who will not move decrees in future without misgiving? Who will refuse to put them to the vote? Who will impeach them? What you have to take into account is, not that this decree has become invalid by lapse of time, but that, if you now give judgement for the defendant, by that verdict you will be offering impunity to every man who may hereafter wish to do you a mischief.
[95] οὐ τοίνυν οὐδ᾽ ἐκεῖνό μ᾽, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, λέληθεν, ὅτι ἁπλῆν μὲν οὐδὲ δικαίαν οὐδ᾽ ἡντινοῦν ἀπολογίαν Ἀριστοκράτης ἕξει λέγειν, �
�αραγωγὰς δέ τινας τοιαύτας ἐρεῖ, ὡς ἄρα πολλὰ τοιαῦτ᾽ ἤδη γέγονε ψηφίσματα πολλοῖς. ἔστι δ᾽ οὐδέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο σημεῖον τοῦ τοῦτον ἔννομ᾽ εἰρηκέναι: πολλαὶ γὰρ προφάσεις εἰσὶν δι᾽ ἃς πολλάκις ὑμεῖς ἐξηπάτησθε.
[95] It also occurs to my mind, men of Athens, that Aristocrates, having no straightforward or honest defence, nor indeed any defence at all, to offer, will resort to such fallacious arguments as this, — that many similar decrees have been made before now in favour of many persons. That is no proof, gentlemen, of the legality of his own proposal. There are many pretences by which you have often been misled.
[96] οἷον εἴ τι τῶν ἑαλωκότων ψηφισμάτων παρ᾽ ὑμῖν μὴ ἐγράφη, κύριον ἂν δήπουθεν ἦν: καὶ μὴν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους γ᾽ ἂν εἴρητο. καὶ εἴ τί γε γραφὲν ἢ καθυφέντων τῶν κατηγόρων ἢ μὴ δυνηθέντων μηδὲν διδάξαι ἀπέφυγεν, καὶ τοῦτ᾽ οὐδὲν κωλύει παράνομον εἶναι. οὐκ ἄρ᾽ εὐορκοῦσιν οἱ δικάσαντες αὐτό; ναί. πῶς; ἐγὼ διδάξω. γνώμῃ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ δικάσειν ὀμωμόκασιν, ἡ δὲ τῆς γνώμης δόξα ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἂν ἀκούσωσι παρίσταται: ὅτε τοίνυν κατὰ ταύτην ἔθεντο τὴν ψῆφον, εὐσεβοῦσιν.