by Demosthenes
[96] For instance, suppose that one of those decrees which have in fact been disallowed had never been impeached in this Court. It would certainly have been operative; nevertheless it would have been moved contrary to law. Or suppose that a decree, being impeached, was pronounced flawless, because the prosecutors, either collusively or through incompetence, had failed to make good their case: that failure does not make it legal. Then the jurors do not give conscientious verdicts? Yes, they do; I will explain how. They are sworn to decide to the best of an honest judgement; but the view that commends itself to their judgement is guided by the speeches to which they listen, and, inasmuch as they cast their votes in accordance with that view, they are true to their oath.
[97] πᾶς γὰρ ὁ μήτε δι᾽ ἔχθραν μήτε δι᾽ εὔνοιαν μήτε δι᾽ ἄλλην ἄδικον πρόφασιν μηδεμίαν παρ᾽ ἃ γιγνώσκει θέμενος τὴν ψῆφον εὐσεβεῖ: εἰ γὰρ ἠγνόησέν τι διδασκόμενος, τοῦ μὴ συνεῖναι δίκην οὐκ ὀφείλει δοῦναι: ἀλλ᾽ εἴ τις εἰδὼς ἐκείνους προδέδωκεν ἢ ἐξαπατᾷ, οὗτός ἐστ᾽ ἔνοχος τῇ ἀρᾷ. διόπερ καταρᾶται καθ᾽ ἑκάστην ἐκκλησίαν ὁ κῆρυξ, οὐκ εἴ τινες ἐξηπατήθησαν, ἀλλ᾽ εἴ τις ἐξαπατᾷ λέγων ἢ βουλὴν ἢ δῆμον ἢ τὴν ἡλιαίαν.
[97] Every man keeps his oath who does not, through spite or favour or other dishonest motive, vote against his better judgement. Suppose that he does not apprehend some point that is explained to him, he does not deserve to be punished for his lack of intelligence. The man who is amenable to the curse is the advocate who deceives and misleads the jury. That is why, at every meeting, the crier pronounces a commination, not upon those who have been misled, but upon whosoever makes a misleading speech to the Council, or to the Assembly, or to the Court.
[98] μὴ δὴ τοῦθ᾽ ὑμῖν ἐᾶτε λέγειν, ὡς γέγονεν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἔστι δίκαιον γίγνεσθαι, μηδ᾽ ὡς ἕτεροι δικάσαντες ἐκύρωσαν ἐκεῖνα, ἀλλ᾽ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀξιοῦτε διδάσκειν ὡς δικαιότερ᾽ ἡμῶν περὶ τοῦδε λέγουσιν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ δυνήσονται, οὐχὶ καλῶς ἔχειν ὑμῖν ἡγοῦμαι τὴν ἑτέρων ἀπάτην κυριωτέραν ποιήσασθαι τῆς ὑμετέρας αὐτῶν γνώμης.
[98] Do not listen to proof that the thing has happened, but only to proof that it ought to have happened. Do not let them tell you that those old decrees were upheld by other juries; ask them to satisfy you that their plea for this decree is fairer than ours. Failing that, I do not think that you ought to give greater weight to the delusions of others than to your own judgement.
[99] ἔτι τοίνυν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ καὶ σφόδρ᾽ ἀναιδὴς ὁ τοιοῦτος εἶναι λόγος, ὡς γέγονεν καὶ πρότερόν τισιν ἄλλοις τοιαῦτα ψηφίσματα. οὐ γὰρ εἴ τι πώποτε μὴ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ἐπράχθη, σὺ δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἐμιμήσω, διὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἀποφεύγειν σοι προσήκει, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον πολὺ μᾶλλον ἁλίσκεσθαι διὰ ταῦτα. ὥσπερ γάρ, εἴ τις ἐκείνων ἑάλω, σὺ τάδ᾽ οὐκ ἂν ἔγραψας, οὕτως, ἐὰν σὺ νῦν ἁλῷς, ἄλλος οὐ γράψει.
[99] Moreover, I cannot but think that there is something uncommonly impudent in such a plea as that other people have before now got decrees of this sort. — If, sir, an illegal act has already been done, and you have imitated that act, that is no reason why you should be acquitted. On the contrary, it is an additional reason why you should be convicted. If one of them had been found guilty, you would never have moved our decree and similarly another will be deterred, if you are found guilty today.
[100] ὡς μὲν τοίνυν οὐ παρὰ πάντας τοὺς νόμους φανερῶς γέγραφεν τὸ ψήφισμ᾽ Ἀριστοκράτης, οὐκ οἶμαι λέγειν αὐτὸν ἕξειν: ἤδη δέ τιν᾽ εἶδον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, γραφὴν ἀγωνιζόμενον παρανόμων τοῖς νόμοις μὲν ἁλισκόμενον, ὡς δὲ συμφέρονθ᾽ ὑμῖν γέγραφεν λέγειν ἐπιχειροῦντα καὶ ταύτῃ βιαζόμενον, εὐήθη μέν, οἶμαι, μᾶλλον δ᾽ ἀναιδῆ λόγον.
[100] I say that I do not expect that Aristocrates will be able to deny that he has moved a decree in open violation of all the laws; but before now, men of Athens, I have seen a man contesting an indictment for illegal measures, who, though convicted by law, made an attempt to argue that his proposal had been to the public advantage, and insisted strongly on that point, — a simple-minded argument, surely, if it was not an impudent one.
[101] εἰ γὰρ καὶ κατὰ τἄλλα πάντα συμφέρει τὰ εἰρημένα, ᾗ γ᾽ ὀμωμοκότας κατὰ τοὺς νόμους δικάσειν ὑμᾶς ἀξιοῖ κυροῦν ἃ μηδ᾽ αὐτὸς ἔχει δικαίως δεῖξαι γεγραμμένα, ἀσύμφορ᾽ ἂν εἴη, εἴπερ τὸ εὐορκεῖν περὶ πλείστου πᾶσίν ἐστι ποιητέον: οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἔχει τιν᾽ ὅμως ἡ ἀναίδει᾽ αὕτη λόγον. τούτῳ τοίνυν οὐδ᾽ οὗτος ἐνέσται πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὁ λόγος: οὕτω γὰρ σφόδρ᾽ ἐναντίον ὂν τοῖς νόμοις τὸ ψήφισμα μᾶλλον ἀσύμφορόν ἐστιν ἢ παράνομον.
[101] Admit a man’s proposition to be in every other respect advantageous; it is still disadvantageous in so far as he begs you, who are sworn to give judgement according to law, to ratify a decree which he himself cannot prove to have been honestly drawn, seeing that every man is bound to set the highest value upon fidelity to his oath. At the same time the plea, though impertinent, has reason in it; but not a reason which Aristocrates will be able to submit to you. Entirely opposed as his decree is to the laws, it is not less pernicious than illegal.
[102] βούλομαι δ᾽ ἤδη καὶ τοῦθ᾽ ὑμῖν ἐπιδεικνύναι. ἵνα δ᾽ ὡς διὰ βραχυτάτου λόγου δῆλον ὃ βούλομαι ποιήσω, παράδειγμά τι γνώριμον πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ἐρῶ. ἴσθ᾽ ὅτι συμφέρει τῇ πόλει μήτε Θηβαίους μήτε Λακεδαιμονίους ἰσχύειν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν Φωκέας ἀντιπάλους, τοῖς δ᾽ ἄλλους τινὰς εἶναι: ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ ταῦθ᾽ οὕτως ἔχειν ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει μεγίστοις οὖσιν ἀσφαλῶς οἰκεῖν.
[102] That is the point which I wish now to make good to you; and, in order to do what I wish in as few words as possible, will cite an illustration that is well known to you all. You are aware that it is for the advantage of Athens that neither the Thebans nor the Lacedaemonians should be powerful; that the Thebans should be counterbalanced by the Phocians, and the Lacedaemonians by other communities; because, when that is the position of affairs, you are the strongest nation, and can dwell in security.
[103] τοῦτο τοίνυν νομίζετε ταὐτὸ καὶ τοῖς Χερρόνησον οἰκοῦσι τῶν πολιτῶν συμφέρειν, μηδέν᾽ εἶναι τῶν Θρᾳκῶν ἰσχυρόν: ἡ γὰρ ἐκείνων πρὸς ἀλλήλους ταραχὴ καὶ ὑποψία φρουρὰ Χερρονήσου μεγίστη τῶν πασῶν ἐστιν καὶ βεβαιοτάτη. τὸ τοίνυν ψήφισμα τουτὶ τῷ μὲν ἡγουμένῳ τῶν Κερσοβλέπτου πραγμάτων ἀσφάλειαν διδόν, τοῖς δὲ τῶν ἑτέρων βασιλέων στρατηγοῖς �
�όβον καὶ δέος μή τιν᾽ αἰτίαν ἔχωσι παριστάν, τοὺς μὲν ἀσθενεῖς, τὸν δ᾽ ἕν᾽ ὄντ᾽ ἰσχυρὸν καθίστησιν.
[103] You must, then, take the view that for those of our fellow-citizens who live in the Chersonese the same condition is advantageous, that is, that no one man shall be all-powerful among the Thracians. In fact the quarrels of the Thracians, and their jealousy of one another, afford the best and most trustworthy guarantee of the safety of the Chersonese. Now the decree before us, by offering security to the minister who controls the affairs of Cersobleptes, and by putting the commanders of the other kings in imminent fear of being accused of crime, makes those kings weak, and the king who stands by himself strong.
[104] ἵνα δὲ μὴ πάνυ θαυμάζητ᾽ εἰ τὰ παρ᾽ ὑμῖν ψηφίσματα τηλικαύτην ἔχει δύναμιν, γεγονὸς καὶ ὃ πάντες ἐπίστασθε πρᾶγμ᾽ ὑμᾶς ὑπομνήσω. ὅτε Μιλτοκύθης ἀπέστη Κότυος, συχνὸν ἤδη χρόνον ὄντος τοῦ πολέμου, καὶ ἀπηλλαγμένου μὲν Ἐργοφίλου, μέλλοντος δ᾽ Αὐτοκλέους ἐκπλεῖν στρατηγοῦ, ἐγράφη τι παρ᾽ ὑμῖν ψήφισμα τοιοῦτον, δι᾽ οὗ Μιλτοκύθης μὲν ἀπῆλθε φοβηθεὶς καὶ νομίσας ὑμᾶς οὐ προσέχειν αὐτῷ, Κότυς δ᾽ ἐγκρατὴς τοῦ τ᾽ ὄρους τοῦ ἱεροῦ καὶ τῶν θησαυρῶν ἐγένετο. καὶ γάρ τοι μετὰ ταῦτ᾽, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, Αὐτοκλῆς μὲν ἐκρίνεθ᾽ ὡς ἀπολωλεκὼς Μιλτοκύθην, οἱ δὲ χρόνοι κατὰ τοῦ τὸ ψήφισμ᾽ εἰπόντος τῆς γραφῆς ἐξεληλύθεσαν, τὰ δὲ πράγματ᾽ ἀπωλώλει τῇ πόλει.
[104] And that you may not be quite surprised to hear that decrees made in Athens have so powerful an effect, I will remind you of a piece of history within the knowledge of all of you. After the revolt of Miltocythes against Cotys, when the war had already lasted a considerable time, when Ergophilus had been superseded, and Autocles was on the point of sailing to take command, a decree was proposed here in such terms that Miltocythes withdrew in alarm, supposing that you were not well disposed towards him, and Cotys gained possession of the Sacred Mountain and its treasures. Now observe that later, men of Athens, although Autocles was put on his trial for having brought Miltocythes to ruin, the time for indicting the author of the decree was past; and, so far as Athens was concerned, the whole business had come to grief.
[105] εὖ τοίνυν ἴσθ᾽ ὅτι καὶ νῦν, εἰ μὴ λύσετε τὸ ψήφισμα τοδί, καὶ τοῖς βασιλεῦσι θαυμαστὴ γενήσεται δι᾽ αὔτ᾽ ἀθυμία καὶ τοῖς στρατηγοῖς αὐτῶν: ὅλως γὰρ ἡγήσονται παρεῶσθαι μὲν αὐτοί, πρὸς Κερσοβλέπτην δ᾽ ἀποκλίνειν ὑμᾶς. εἰ δ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ ταῦτα γνῶναι παραχωρήσονται τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐπὶ καιροῦ τινος αὐτοῖς ἐπιθεμένου τοῦ Κερσοβλέπτου, πάλιν ὁρᾶτε τί συμβήσεται.
[105] Even so today, if you do not annul this decree, the kings and their commanders will be immensely discouraged. They will regard themselves as altogether slighted, and will imagine that your favour is inclining towards Cersobleptes. Now suppose that on this assumption they surrender their royalty, whenever Cersobleptes seizes opportunity and attacks them; and again observe what will happen. —
[106] φέρε γὰρ πρὸς θεῶν, ἂν ἡμᾶς ἀδικῇ Κερσοβλέπτης, ὃ μᾶλλον ἐλπὶς ἢ μὴ δυνηθέντα ποιῆσαι, οὐκ ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνους ἴμεν καὶ δι᾽ ἐκείνων ἀσθενῆ ποιεῖν αὐτὸν ζητήσομεν; ἂν οὖν εἴπωσ᾽ ἡμῖν ὅτι ‘ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐ μόνον ἡμῖν ἀδικουμένοις οὐκ ἐβοηθήσατε, ἀλλὰ καὶ φόβον, ἂν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἀμυνώμεθα, θαυμαστὸν παρεστήσατε, ψήφισμα ποιησάμενοι, τὸν ἐναντία τοῖς ὑμῖν συμφέρουσι καὶ ἡμῖν πράττοντ᾽ ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ, ἀγώγιμον εἶναι: οὔκουν ἐστὲ δίκαιοι βοηθοὺς καλεῖν ἡμᾶς, ἐφ᾽ οἷς καὶ περὶ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ περὶ ἡμᾶς κακῶς ἐβουλεύσασθε,’ εἰπέ μοι, ταῦτ᾽ ἐὰν λέγωσιν, οὐ δικαιότερ᾽ ἡμῶν ἐροῦσιν; ἔγωγ᾽ οἶμαι.
[106] In heaven’s name, tell me this. If Cersobleptes attacks us, — and he is more likely than not to do so, when he has the power, — shall we not have recourse to those kings? Shall we not try to reduce him through them? Very well; then suppose they reply: “Athenians, so far from helping us when we were ill-treated, you made us grievously afraid of defending ourselves, for you issued a decree that anyone who should kill the man who was working against your interests and ours alike, should be liable to seizure. Therefore you have no right to call upon us to help you in a matter which you mismanaged for us as well as for yourselves.” Tell me this, I say: will not they have the best of the argument? I think so.
[107] καὶ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἐκεῖνό γ᾽ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι νὴ Δί᾽ εἰκότως ἐφενακίσθητε καὶ παρεκρούσθητε. εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν εἴχετε τῶν ἄλλων λογίσασθαι, μηδ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν οἷοί τ᾽ ἦτε ταῦτα συνεῖναι, ἦν ἰδεῖν παράδειγμα Ὀλυνθίους τουτουσί, οἳ τί πεποιηκότος αὐτοῖς Φιλίππου πῶς αὐτῷ χρῶνται; ἐκεῖνος ἐκείνοις Ποτείδαιαν οὐχὶ τηνικαῦτ᾽ ἀπέδωκεν, ἡνίκ᾽ ἀποστερεῖν οὐκέθ᾽ οἷός τ᾽ ἦν, ὥσπερ ὑμῖν Κερσοβλέπτης Χερρόνησον: ἀλλὰ πρὸς ὑμᾶς πολεμῶν χρήματα πόλλ᾽ ἀναλώσας, ἑλὼν καὶ δυνηθεὶς ἂν αὐτὸς ἔχειν, εἴπερ ἐβουλήθη, παρέδωκεν καὶ οὐδ᾽ ἐπεχείρησεν ἄλλο ποιεῖν οὐδέν.
[107] Again, it cannot possibly be alleged that it was natural that you should be hoodwinked and misled. For even though you had no other basis of calculation, even though you were unable of yourselves to grasp the state of affairs, you had before your eyes the example of those people at Olynthus. What has Philip done for them? And how are they treating him? He restored Potidaea to them, not at a time when he was no longer able to keep them out, as Cersobleptes restored the Chersonesus to you; no, — after spending a great deal of money on his war with you, when he had taken Potidaea, and could have kept it if he chose, he made them a present of the place, without even attempting any other course.
[108] ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως ἐκεῖνοι, τέως μὲν ἑώρων αὐτὸν τηλικοῦτον ἡλίκος ὢν πιστὸς ὑπῆρχεν, σύμμαχοί τ᾽ ἦσαν καὶ δι᾽ ἐκεῖνον ἡμῖν ἐπολέμουν, ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ εἶδον μείζω τῆς πρὸς αὑτοὺς πίστεως γιγνόμενον, τοσοῦτ᾽ ἀπέχουσι τοῦ ψηφίσασθαι, ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ τινὰ τῶν ἐκείνῳ συγκατεσκευακότων τὴν ἀρχήν, ἐκ τῶν ἑαυτῶν συμμάχων ἀγώγιμον εἶναι,
[108] Nevertheless, although so long as they saw that he was not too powerful to be trusted, they were his allies and fought us on his account, when they found that his strength had grown too great for their confidence, they did not make a decree that whosoever should kill any man who had helped to consolidate Philip’s power should be liable to seizure in the country of their allies.
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sp; [109] ὥσθ᾽ ὑμᾶς, οὓς ἴσασιν ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων ἥδιστ᾽ ἂν καὶ τοὺς ἐκείνου φίλους καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν Φίλιππον ἀποκτείναντας, φίλους πεποίηνται, φασὶ δὲ καὶ συμμάχους ποιήσεσθαι. εἶτ᾽ Ὀλύνθιοι μὲν ἴσασι τὸ μέλλον προορᾶν, ὑμεῖς δ᾽ ὄντες Ἀθηναῖοι ταὐτὸν τοῦτ᾽ οὐχὶ ποιήσετε; ἀλλ᾽ αἰσχρὸν τοὺς τῷ περὶ πραγμάτων ἐπίστασθαι βουλεύσασθαι δοκοῦντας προέχειν ἧττον Ὀλυνθίων τὸ συμφέρον εἰδότας ὀφθῆναι.
[109] No, indeed; they have made friendship, and promise to make alliance, with you, — you who of all men in the world would be most delighted to kill Philip’s friends or even Philip himself. When mere Olynthians know how to provide for the morrow, will not you, who are Athenians, do likewise? It is discreditable that you, who have a reputation for superior ability in political deliberation, should be convicted of a duller perception of your own advantage than Olynthians.