by Demosthenes
[110] ἀκούω τοίνυν αὐτὸν καὶ τοιοῦτόν τιν᾽ ἐρεῖν λόγον, οἷον καὶ πρότερόν ποτ᾽ Ἀριστόμαχος παρ᾽ ὑμῖν ἐδημηγόρει, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ποτὲ Κερσοβλέπτης αἱρήσεται Χερρόνησον ἀποστερεῖν ἐπιχειρῶν ἐχθρὸς ὑμῖν εἶναι: οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰ λάβοι καὶ κατάσχοι, λυσιτελήσειν αὐτῷ. ἐκ μέν γ᾽ ἐκείνης οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπὲρ τριάκοντα τάλανθ᾽ ἡ πρόσοδος μὴ πολεμουμένης, εἰ πολεμήσεται δέ, οὐδὲ ἕν: ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἐμπορίων, ἃ τότ᾽ ἂν κλεισθείη, πλεῖν ἢ διακόσια τάλαντά ἐσθ᾽ ἡ πρόσοδος: ὥστε τί βουλόμενος μικρὰ λαμβάνειν καὶ πολεμεῖν ἂν ἕλοιτο, ἐξὸν τὰ πλείω καὶ φίλος εἶναι, θαυμάζειν φήσουσιν.
[110] I am informed that Aristocrates will also say something to the same effect as a speech once made in the Assembly by Aristomachus, — that it is inconceivable that Cersobleptes would ever deliberately provoke your enmity by trying to rob you of the Chersonesus, because, even if he should take it and hold it, it will be of no use to him. Indeed when that country is not at war, its revenue is no more than thirty talents, and when it is at war, not a single talent. On the other hand the revenue of his ports, which, in the event supposed, would be blockaded, is more than two hundred talents. They wonder, — as they will put it, — what he could possibly mean by preferring small returns and a war with you, when he might get larger returns and be your friend.
[111] ἐγὼ δ᾽ οὐκ ἀπορῶ μὲν εἰπεῖν πόλλ᾽ ἅ μοι δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ἄν τις ἰδὼν ἀπιστεῖν εἰκότως ἢ τούτοις πιστεύων ἐκεῖνον ἐᾶν μέγαν γίγνεσθαι: οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾽ ὃ μάλιστα πρόχειρον ἔχω, τοῦτ᾽ ἐρῶ. ἴστε δήπου Φίλιππον, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τουτονὶ τὸν Μακεδόνα, ᾧ πολὺ δήπου μᾶλλον ἐλυσιτέλει τὰς ἐξ ἁπάσης Μακεδονίας προσόδους ἀδεῶς λαμβάνειν ἢ μετὰ κινδύνων τὰς ἐξ Ἀμφιπόλεως, καὶ χρῆσθαι φίλοις αἱρετώτερον ἦν αὐτῷ τοῖς πατρικοῖς ὑμῖν ἢ Θετταλοῖς, οἳ τὸν πατέρ᾽ αὐτοῦ ποτ᾽ ἐξέβαλον.
[111] But I am at no loss for plenty of instances in the light of which a man might reasonably be skeptical, instead of putting his trust in those orators, and allowing Cersobleptes to become a potentate. However, I will be content with the instance that lies nearest to hand. Of course, gentlemen, you all know that Macedonian, Philip. It was certainly more profitable for him to draw the revenues of all Macedonia in safety, than the revenue of Amphipolis with risks attached; and more agreeable to have you, his hereditary friends, on his side, than the Thessalians who once ejected his own father.
[112] ἄνευ γὰρ τούτου κἀκεῖν᾽ ἔστιν ἰδεῖν: ὑμεῖς μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδένα προὐδώκατε πώποτε τῶν φίλων, Θετταλοὶ δ᾽ οὐδένα πώποθ᾽ ὅντιν᾽ οὔ. ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως οὕτως ἐχόντων τούτων μικρὰ λαμβάνειν καὶ τοὺς ἀπίστους φίλους καὶ τὸ κινδυνεύειν ἀντὶ τοῦ μετ᾽ ἀσφαλείας ζῆν ὁρᾶτε προῃρημένον αὐτόν.
[112] Apart from that, it may be observed that you, Athenians, never yet betrayed any of your friends, while the Thessalians have betrayed every one of theirs. Nevertheless, in spite of all that, you see that he has deliberately chosen small gains, faithless friends, and big risks, in preference to a life of security.
[113] τί δή ποτ᾽ αἴτιον; οὐ γὰρ δὴ λόγον γε τὸ πρᾶγμ᾽ οὑτωσὶ πρόχειρον ἔχει. ὅτι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δυοῖν ἀγαθοῖν ὄντοιν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, τοῦ μὲν ἡγουμένου καὶ μεγίστου πάντων, τοῦ εὐτυχεῖν, τοῦ δ᾽ ἐλάττονος μὲν τούτου, τῶν δ᾽ ἄλλων μεγίστου, τοῦ καλῶς βουλεύεσθαι, οὐχ ἅμ᾽ ἡ κτῆσις παραγίγνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, οὐδ᾽ ἔχει τῶν εὖ πραττόντων οὐδεὶς ὅρον οὐδὲ τελευτὴν τῆς τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἐπιθυμίας: δι᾽ ὅπερ πολλοὶ πολλάκις μειζόνων ἐπιθυμοῦντες τὰ παρόντ᾽ ἀπώλεσαν.
[113] Now what can be the reason? For the logic of the thing is certainly not so very obvious. The truth is, men of Athens, that there are two things that are excellent for everybody: good luck, the chiefest and greatest of goods, and good counsel, inferior to good luck, but greater than any other; but men do not get both these good things at once, and no successful man sets any limit or end to his desire to get more. And that is why men, in the desire for more, so often throw away what they already have.
[114] καὶ τί δεῖ Φίλιππον λέγειν ἤ τιν᾽ ἄλλον; ἀλλ᾽ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτὸς ὁ Κερσοβλέπτου Κότυς, ἡνίκα μὲν στασιάζοι πρός τινας, πρέσβεις πέμπων ἅπαντα ποιεῖν ἕτοιμος ἦν, καὶ τότ᾽ ᾐσθάνετο ὡς ἀλυσιτελὲς τὸ τῇ πόλει πολεμεῖν: ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ ὑφ᾽ αὑτῷ τὴν Θρᾴκην ἔχοι, κατελάμβανε τὰς πόλεις, ἠδίκει, μεθύων ἐπαρῴνει μάλιστα μὲν εἰς αὑτόν, εἶτα καὶ εἰς ἡμᾶς, τὴν χώραν ἐποιεῖθ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ, τὸ πρᾶγμ᾽ ἀμήχανον ἦν. τῶν γὰρ ὑπὲρ τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἐπιχειρούντων οἷς οὐ χρὴ οὐ τὰ δυσχερέσταθ᾽ ἕκαστος εἴωθε λογίζεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἃ κατορθώσας διαπράξεται.
[114] But what need to name Philip, or any other man? Why, Cersobleptes’ own father, Cotys, whenever he had a quarrel on hand, used to send his ambassadors, and was ready to do anything, and then he could see that being at war with Athens was quite unprofitable. But, as soon as he had all Thrace at his command, he would occupy cities, do mischief, discharge his drunken fury, first on himself, and then on us; he must needs subjugate the whole country; there was no dealing with the fellow. For everybody who attempts improper enterprises for the sake of aggrandizement is apt to look, not to the difficulties of his task, but to what he will achieve if successful.
[115] ἐγὼ δὴ δεῖν ὑμᾶς οἶμαι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον βεβουλεῦσθαι, ὅπως, ἂν μὲν ἃ χρὴ περὶ ὑμῶν γιγνώσκῃ Κερσοβλέπτης, μηδὲν ὑφ᾽ ὑμῶν ἀδικήσεται, ἂν δ᾽ ἀλόγως ἀδικεῖν ἐπιχειρῇ, μὴ μείζων ἔσται τοῦ δίκην δοῦναι. ἀναγνώσομαι δ᾽ ὑμῖν τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἥν, ὅτ᾽ ἀφειστήκει Μιλτοκύθης, Κότυς ἔπεμψεν, καὶ ἣν ὅτε πᾶσαν ἔχων τὴν ἀρχὴν πέμψας Τιμομάχῳ τὰ χωρί᾽ ὑμῶν ἐξεῖλεν.”Ἐπιστολαί”
[115] My own opinion, then, is that your policy should be fashioned in such a way that, if Cersobleptes’ views in regard to you are what they should be, he shall not be unjustly treated by you, but that, if he is so unreasonable as to treat you unjustly, he may not be too strong to be punished. I will read to you the letter which Cersobleptes sent at the time of the revolt of Miltocythes, and also that which, when the whole kingdom was his, he sent to Timomachus before seizing your outposts.” Letters”
[116] τοῦτ᾽, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸ παράδειγμ᾽ ἑορακότες, ἂν ἐμοὶ πεί�
�ησθε, κἀκεῖν᾽ εἰδότες, ὅτι Φίλιππος, ὅτε μὲν Ἀμφίπολιν ἐπολιόρκει, ἵν᾽ ὑμῖν παραδῷ πολιορκεῖν ἔφη, ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ ἔλαβεν, καὶ Ποτείδαιαν προσαφείλετο, ἐκείνην τὴν πίστιν βουλήσεσθ᾽ ἔχειν, ἥνπερ φασὶ πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους ποτ᾽ εἰπεῖν Φιλοκράτην τὸν Ἐφιάλτου.
[116] Here is a warning, men of Athens, which, if you will be guided by me, you will bear in mind; and, remembering also that, when Philip was besieging Amphipolis, he pretended to be doing so in order to hand the place over to you, but that, when he had got it, he annexed Potidaea into the bargain, you will sh to have the same sort of assurance that, according to the story, Philocrates, son of Ephialtes, once opposed to the Lacedaemonians.
[117] καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνόν φασιν, ἐξαπατώντων τι τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ προτεινόντων πίστιν ἥντινα βούλεται λαμβάνειν, εἰπεῖν ὅτι πίστιν ἂν οἴεται γενέσθαι μόνην, εἰ δείξειαν ὅπως, ἂν ἀδικεῖν βούλωνται, μὴ δυνήσονται, ἐπεὶ ὅτι γ᾽ ἀεὶ βουλήσονται εὖ εἰδέναι: ἕως ἂν οὖν δύνωνται, πίστιν οὐκ εἶναι. ταύτην, ἂν ἐμοὶ χρῆσθε συμβούλῳ, φυλάξετε τὴν πίστιν πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν Θρᾷκα, καὶ μὴ βουλήσεσθ᾽ εἰδέναι τιν᾽ ἄν, εἰ πάσης ἄρξειε Θρᾴκης, πρὸς ὑμᾶς σχοίη γνώμην.
[117] It is said that, when the Lacedaemonians were trying to overreach him, and offered any assurance he was willing to accept, Philocrates replied that the only possible assurance would be that they should satisfy him that, if they had a mind to injure him, they would not have the power; “for,” he added, “I am quite certain that you will always have the mind, and there can be no assurance so long as you have the power.” That, — if you will let me advise you, — is the sort of assurance that you will hold against this Thracian. If he ever became master of all Thrace, you need not inquire what his sentiments toward you would be.
[118] ὅτι τοίνυν ὅλως οὐδ᾽ ὑγιαινόντων ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπων τοιαῦτα γράφειν ψηφίσματα καὶ διδόναι τισὶ τοιαύτας δωρειάς, καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἐκ πολλῶν ῥᾴδιον γνῶναι. ἴστε γὰρ δήπου πάντες, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦθ᾽ ὁμοίως ἐμοί, ὅτι τὸν Κότυν ποτ᾽ ἐκεῖνον ἐποιήσασθε πολίτην, δῆλον ὡς κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον εὔνουν ἡγούμενοι. καὶ μὴν καὶ χρυσοῖς στεφάνοις ἐστεφανοῦτε, οὐκ ἄν, εἴ γ᾽ ἐχθρὸν ἡγεῖσθε.
[118] That it is entirely the act of insane men to compose such decrees, or to bestow such favours as this, may easily be learned from many examples. I am sure, men of Athens, that you all know as well as I do that you once admitted Cotys over yonder to your citizenship, evidently because you regarded him at the time as a sincere well-wisher. Indeed, you decorated him with golden crowns; and you would never have done that, if you had thought him your enemy.
[119] ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως, ἐπειδὴ πονηρὸς καὶ θεοῖς ἐχθρὸς ἦν καὶ μεγάλ᾽ ὑμᾶς ἠδίκει, τοὺς ἀποκτείναντας ἐκεῖνον Πύθωνα καὶ Ἡρακλείδην, τοὺς Αἰνίους, πολίτας ἐποιήσασθ᾽ ὡς εὐεργέτας καὶ χρυσοῖς στεφάνοις ἐστεφανώσατε. εἰ δὴ τότε, ὅθ᾽ ὑμῖν οἰκείως ἔχειν ὁ Κότυς ἐδόκει, ἔγραψέ τις, ἄν τις ἀποκτείνῃ Κότυν, ἔκδοτον αὐτὸν εἶναι, πότερ᾽ ἐξέδοτ᾽ ἂν τὸν Πύθωνα καὶ τὸν ἀδελφόν, ἢ παρὰ τὸ ψήφισμα τοῦτο πολίτας ἐποιεῖσθε καὶ ὡς εὐεργέτας ἐτιμᾶτε;
[119] Nevertheless, when he was a wicked, unprincipled man, and was doing you serious injury, you treated the men who put him to death, Pytho and Heracleides of Aenos, as benefactors, made them citizens, and decorated them with crowns of gold. Now suppose that, at the time when the disposition of Cotys was thought to be friendly, it had been proposed that any one who killed Cotys should be given up for punishment, would you have given up Pytho and his brother? Or would you, in defiance of the decree, have given them your citizenship, and honored them as benefactors?
[120] τί δ᾽; Ἀλέξανδρον ἐκεῖνον τὸν Θετταλόν, ἡνίκ᾽ εἶχε μὲν αἰχμάλωτον δήσας Πελοπίδαν, ἐχθρὸς δ᾽ ὡς οὐδεὶς ἦν Θηβαίοις, ὑμῖν δ᾽ οἰκείως διέκειθ᾽ οὕτως ὥστε παρ᾽ ὑμῶν στρατηγὸν αἰτεῖν, ἐβοηθεῖτε δ᾽ αὐτῷ καὶ πάντ᾽ ἦν Ἀλέξανδρος, πρὸς Διὸς εἴ τις ἔγραψεν, ἄν τις ἀποκτείνῃ Ἀλέξανδρον, ἀγώγιμον εἶναι, ἆρ᾽ ἂν ὧν μετὰ ταῦθ᾽ ὕβρισεν καὶ προὐπηλάκισεν ἀσφαλὲς ἦν τῳ παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ δίκην πειρᾶσθαι λαβεῖν;
[120] Again, there was Alexander of Thessaly. At the time when he had imprisoned Pelopidas, and was holding him captive, when he was the most bitter enemy of the Thebans, when his feelings towards you were so fraternal that he applied to you for a commander, when you gave aid to his arms, when it was Alexander here and Alexander there, — why, gracious heavens! if anybody had moved that whoever killed Alexander should be liable to seizure, would it have been safe for any man to try to give him due punishment for his subsequent violence and brutality?
[121] τί δὲ τἄλλα λέγοι τις ἄν; ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μάλιστα δοκῶν νῦν ἡμῖν ἐχθρὸς εἶναι Φίλιππος οὑτοσί, εἰ τότε, ὅτ᾽ Ἀργαῖον κατάγοντας λαβὼν τῶν ἡμετέρων τινὰς πολιτῶν ἀφῆκε μὲν αὐτούς, ἀπέδωκε δὲ πάνθ᾽ ὅσ᾽ ἀπώλεσαν αὐτοῖς, πέμψας δὲ γράμματ᾽ ἐπηγγέλλεθ᾽ ἕτοιμος εἶναι συμμαχίαν ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν πατρικὴν φιλίαν ἀνανεοῦσθαι, εἰ τότ᾽ ἠξίωσε τυχεῖν τούτων καί τις ἔγραψε τῶν ἀφεθέντων ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ Φίλιππον, ἀγώγιμον εἶναι, καλήν γ᾽ ὕβριν ἦμεν ἂν ὑβρισμένοι.
[121] But why need one talk about the other instances? Take Philip, who is now accounted our very worst enemy. At the time when, having caught some of our citizens in the act of trying to restore Argaeus, he released them and made good all their losses, when he professed in a written message that he was ready to form an alliance with us, and to renew his ancestral amity, if at that time he had asked us for this favour, and if one of the men he had released had proposed that “whoever shall kill Philip” should be liable to seizure, a fine insult we should have had to swallow!
[122] ἆρά γ᾽ ὁρᾶτε καὶ καταμανθάνετ᾽, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστου τούτων ἡλίκην ἂν ὠφληκότες ἦτε παράνοιαν, εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἐτυγχάνετ᾽ ἐψηφισμένοι; ἔστι γὰρ οὐχ ὑγιαινόντων, οἶμαι, ἀνθρώπων, οὔθ᾽ ὅταν τιν᾽ ὑπειλήφωσι φίλον, οὕτω πιστεύειν ὥστε, ἂν ἀδικεῖν ἐπιχειρῇ, τὸ ἀμύνασθαι σφῶν αὐτῶν ἀφελέσθαι, οὔθ᾽ ὅταν ἐχθρόν τιν᾽ ἡγῶνται, οὕτως αὖ μισεῖν ὥστε, ἂν παυσάμενος βούληται φίλος εἶναι, τὸ ποιεῖν ἐξεῖναι ταῦτα κωλῦσαι: ἀλλ᾽ ἄχρι τούτο�
� καὶ φιλεῖν, οἶμαι, χρὴ καὶ μισεῖν, μηδετέρου τὸν καιρὸν ὑπερβάλλοντας.
[122] Do you not see, gentlemen, do you not understand, how you would have been chargeable with sheer lunacy in every one of these instances, if you had carried by vote any such resolution as this? I say it is not the part of sane men either to put such confidence in a man, whenever they imagine him to be friendly, as to deprive themselves of all defence against possible aggression, or, on the other hand, when they regard anyone as an enemy, to hate him so fiercely that, if he ever wants to reform and be their friend, they have taken it out of his power to do so. But we should, I think, carry both our friendship and our hatred only so far as not to exceed the due measure in either case.
[123] οὐ τοίνυν ἔγωγ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἐκεῖν᾽ ἰδεῖν δύναμαι, ὡς οὐχὶ πάντες ἄνθρωποι τούτων ἀξιώσουσι τυχεῖν, ὅσοις πέρ ἐστι καὶ ἡτισοῦν εὐεργεσίας πρόφασις πρὸς ὑμᾶς, εἰ Χαριδήμῳ δώσετε, οἷον, εἰ βούλεσθε, Σίμων, Βιάνωρ, Ἀθηνόδωρος, ἄλλοι μυρίοι. εἰ μὲν τοίνυν πᾶσι ψηφιούμεθα ταῦτα, λήσομεν, ὡς ἔοικε, μισθοφόρων ἔργον ἀνθρώπων ποιοῦντες τὴν ἑκάστου σωτηρίαν τούτων δορυφοροῦντες: εἰ δὲ τῷ μέν, τοῖς δ᾽ οὔ, δικαίως ἐγκαλοῦσιν οἱ μὴ τυχόντες.