Delphi Complete Works of Demosthenes

by Demosthenes

  [123] For my part, I cannot see why everybody who has any sort of claim to be your benefactor should not expect to get this favour, if you bestow it upon Charidemus, — Simon, for example, if you want a name, or Bianor, or Athenodorus, or thousands more. No; if we make the same decree in favour of the whole company, we shall unconsciously make ourselves a bodyguard for every one of them, like jobbing mercenaries; but if we do it for one but not for another, those who are disappointed will have a right to complain.

  [124] φέρ᾽, ἐὰν δὲ δὴ καὶ Μενέστρατος ἡμᾶς ὁ Ἐρετριεὺς ἀξιοῖ ταὐτὰ καὶ αὑτῷ ψηφίσασθαι, ἢ Φάυλλος ὁ Φωκεὺς ἤ τις ἄλλος δυνάστης （πολλοῖς δὲ δήπου διὰ καιρούς τινας πολλάκις φίλοι γιγνόμεθα）, πότερον ψηφιούμεθα πᾶσιν ἢ οὔ; ψηφιούμεθα νὴ Δία. καὶ τί φήσομεν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καλόν, εἰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐπ᾽ ἐλευθερίᾳ προεστάναι φάσκοντες τοὺς ἰδίᾳ δυνάμεις ἐπὶ τοῖς πλήθεσι κεκτημένους δορυφοροῦντες φανούμεθα;

  [124] Now just suppose that Menestratus of Eretria were to require us to make the same decree for him, or Phayllus of Phocis, or any other autocrat, — and I need not say that we often make friends, to serve our occasions, with many such people, — are we to vote decrees for all of them, or are we not? You say, Yes. Then what decent excuse shall we have, men of Athens, if, while asserting ourselves as the champions of all Hellas in the cause of liberty, we make our appearance as yeomen of the guard to men who maintain troops on their own account to keep down the populace?

  [125] εἰ γάρ ἐστί τῳ δοτέον τι τοιοῦτον, ὡς ἔγωγ᾽ οὔ φημι, πρῶτον μὲν τῷ μηδὲν ἠδικηκότι πώποτε, δεύτερον δὲ μηδ᾽ ἂν ἀδικεῖν βούληται δυνησομένῳ, ἔπειθ᾽ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὅστις ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις ἔσται φανερὸς ὑπὲρ τοῦ μή τι παθεῖν ταῦθ᾽ εὑρισκόμενος, καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ ποιεῖν μετ᾽ ἀδείας ἑτέρους κακῶς, τούτῳ δοτέον. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ὁ Χαρίδημος οὔτε τῶν ἀναμαρτήτων ἐστὶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς οὔτε τῶν ἵνα μή τι πάθῃ ταῦθ᾽ εὑρισκομένων, ἐάσω: ἀλλ᾽ ὡς οὐδὲ πιστὸς εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον, ἀκούσατέ μου, καὶ σκοπεῖτε, ἂν ὑμῖν ὀρθῶς ἐξετάζειν δοκῶ.

  [125] If we ought, though I say we ought not, to grant such a favour to anyone, let it be even in the first instance to the man who has never done us wrong; secondly, to the man who will never have the power, though he have the will, to injure us; and finally the man who is known by everyone to be seeking it for his own protection, and not in the hope of maltreating his neighbors with impunity — it is to him truly that it should be given. I will spare you the proof that Charidemus is neither a man void of offence towards us, nor one who, for his own safety, tries to win your support; but I do ask you to listen to me when I declare that he is not even one who can be trusted for the future, and to consider carefully whether my argument is sound.

  [126] ἐγὼ νομίζω, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅσοι μὲν τῶν ἡμετέρων ἐθῶν καὶ νόμων ἐπιθυμηταὶ γενόμενοι πολῖται γενέσθαι ἐσπούδασαν, ἅμα τ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἂν τυγχάνειν τούτων καὶ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν οἰκεῖν καὶ μετέχειν ὧν ἐπεθύμησαν: ὅσους δὲ τούτων μὲν μηδενὸς μήτ᾽ ἐπιθυμία μήτε ζῆλος εἰσέρχεται, τὴν πλεονεξίαν δ᾽ ἀγαπῶσιν ἣν διὰ τοῦ δοκεῖν ὑφ᾽ ὑμῶν τιμᾶσθαι καρποῦνται, τούτους δ᾽ οἴομαι, μᾶλλον δ᾽ οἶδα σαφῶς, ὅταν ποτὲ μείζονος πλεονεξίας ἑτέρωθεν ἐλπίδ᾽ ἴδωσιν, οὐδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν ὑμῶν φροντίσαντας ἐκείνην θεραπεύσειν.

  [126] In my judgement, men of Athens, everyone who desires to become an Athenian citizen, because he has fallen in love with our customs and laws, will make his home in our midst, as soon as he receives our franchise, and will enjoy his share in the advantages he coveted. But as for those who are not moved by any desire or emulation of those institutions, but value only the advantage they derive from the credit of being distinguished by you, I fancy, indeed I am quite certain, that as soon as they discern a prospect of larger advantage elsewhere, they will devote their attention to that prospect, without the least concern for you.

  [127] οἷον, ἵν᾽ εἰδῆτε καὶ ὑμεῖς πρὸς ὃ ταῦτ᾽ ἐγὼ βλέπων λέγω, Πύθων οὑτοσί, ὅτε μὲν Κότυν εὐθὺς ἀπεκτονὼς οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς ἡγεῖτ᾽ ἀπελθεῖν ὅποι τύχοι, ἦλθεν ὡς ὑμᾶς καὶ πολιτείαν ᾔτησεν καὶ πάντων ἐποιήσατο πρώτους ὑμᾶς, ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ οἴεται τὰ Φιλίππου πράγματα συμφέρειν αὑτῷ μᾶλλον, οὐδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν ὑμῶν φροντίσας τἀκείνου φρονεῖ. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν, οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, παρὰ τούτοις τοῖς ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν προαιρέσει ζῶσιν οὐδὲν οὔτε βέβαιον οὔθ᾽ ὅσιον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τούτων, ὅστις εὖ φρονεῖ, φυλαττόμενον περιεῖναι, μὴ προπιστεύσαντα κατηγορεῖν.

  [127] For example, to make clear to you my purpose in saying this, when that man Pytho, having just killed Cotys, did not think it safe to take his chance of a place of refuge, he came to you, applied for your citizenship, and thought you the finest people in the world. But now that he thinks relations with Philip more advantageous to him, he takes Philip’s side, without the slightest regard for you. No, men of Athens; when men give their lives to the pursuit of their own ambitions, I say that there is no stability and no honesty to be found in them. Every sensible man must get the better of such people by wary conduct: he should not begin by trusting and end by denouncing them.

  [128] εἰ τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοὐναντίον ἢ τἀληθὲς ὑπάρχει, θείημεν τὸν Χαρίδημον αὐτὸν καὶ γεγενῆσθαι περὶ ἡμᾶς σπουδαῖον καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἔσεσθαι, καὶ μηδέποτ᾽ ἄλλην γνώμην ἢ ταύτην σχήσειν, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἔχει καλῶς ταῦτ᾽ αὐτῷ ψηφίσασθαι. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπ᾽ ἄλλο τι ταύτην τὴν ἄδειαν ἐλάμβανε, τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ψηφίσματος, ἢ τὰ Κερσοβλέπτου πράγματα, ἧττον ἂν ἦν δεινόν: νῦν δέ, ὑπὲρ οὗ καταχρήσεται τῇ διὰ τοῦ ψηφίσματος πλεονεξίᾳ, οὐκ ἀξιόπιστον οὔθ᾽ ἡμῖν οὔτ᾽ ἐκείνῳ λογιζόμενος αὐτὸν εὑρίσκω.

  [128] Athenians, if we should assume, — though it is the reverse of the truth, — that Charidemus himself has been, is still, and will remain devoted to us, and that he will never entertain any other sentiment, it is not a whit the more wise to pass such decrees for him. If he had accepted the security offered by the decree for any other purpose than the interests of Cersobleptes, the danger would have been less; but, in fact, I find on a calculation of probabilities that the man for whose benefit he will turn to account the advantage given by the decree is himself equally unworthy of his confidence and of ours.

  [129] σκέψασθε δ᾽ ὡς δικαίως ἕκαστ᾽ ἐξετάζω, καὶ σφόδρα γ᾽ εἰκότως δεδιώς. ἐγὼ σκοπῶ
Κότυν, ὅτι κηδεστὴς ἦν Ἰφικράτει τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὅνπερ Χαριδήμῳ Κερσοβλέπτης, καὶ τὰ πεπραγμέν᾽ ὁρῶ πολλῷ μείζονα καὶ χάριτος πλείονος ἄξι᾽ ὑπὲρ Κότυος Ἰφικράτει ἢ ὑπὲρ Κερσοβλέπτου Χαριδήμῳ.

  [129] Observe how honestly I examine the several points, and how entirely reasonable are my apprehensions. I look at Cotys, and I find that he was related by marriage to Iphicrates in the same degree as Cersobleptes to Charidemus; and that the achievements of Iphicrates on behalf of Cotys were far more important and meritorious than anything that Charidemus has done for Cersobleptes. Let us consider it in this way.

  [130] σκεψώμεθα δ᾽ οὑτωσί. ἴστε δήπου τοῦτ᾽, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅτι χαλκῆς εἰκόνος οὔσης παρ᾽ ὑμῖν Ἰφικράτει καὶ σιτήσεως ἐν πρυτανείῳ καὶ δωρειῶν καὶ τιμῶν ἄλλων, δι᾽ ἃς εὐδαίμων ἐκεῖνος ἦν, ὅμως ἐτόλμησεν ὑπὲρ τῶν Κότυος πραγμάτων ἐναντία τοῖς ὑμετέροις στρατηγοῖς ναυμαχεῖν, καὶ περὶ πλείονος ἐποιήσατο τὴν ἐκείνου σωτηρίαν ἢ τὰς ὑπαρχούσας ἑαυτῷ παρ᾽ ὑμῖν τιμάς: καὶ εἰ μὴ μετριωτέραν ἔσχετε τὴν ὀργὴν ὑμεῖς τῆς ἐκείνου προπετείας, οὐδὲν ἂν αὐτὸν ἐκώλυεν ἀθλιώτατον ἀνθρώπων ἁπάντων εἶναι.

  [130] No doubt you remember, men of Athens, that Iphicrates was a very fortunate man, with his bronze effigy, his free board at the Town Hall, and other grants and distinctions. Nevertheless he had the courage to fight a battle at sea against our commanders in defence of Cotys, setting a higher value on the salvation of that king than upon all the honors he enjoyed in your city. If your resentment had not been more restrained than his impetuosity, nothing could have saved him from being the most miserable of mankind.

  [131] ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως ὁ Κότυς, ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου σωθεὶς καὶ λαβὼν ἔργῳ τῆς ἐκείνου φιλίας πεῖραν, ἐπειδὴ βεβαίως ἡγήσατο σῶς εἶναι, οὐχ ὅπως ἀποδώσει χάριν ἐσπούδασεν αὐτῷ καὶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς δι᾽ ἐκείνου τι φιλάνθρωπον ἔπραξεν, ἵνα συγγνώμης ἐπὶ τοῖς πεπραγμένοις τύχῃ, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἠξίου μὲν αὐτὸν συμπολιορκεῖν τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν ὑμετέρων χωρίων,

  [131] In spite of that, when Cotys, who owed his deliverance to Iphicrates, and had had practical experience of his loyalty, believed himself to be permanently out of danger, he took no pains to reward him, and never showed you any civility through his agency in the hope of winning forgiveness for his past conduct. On the contrary, he claimed his help in besieging the rest of your strongholds,

  [132] οὐκ ἐθέλοντος δ᾽ ἐκείνου, λαβὼν αὐτὸς τήν τε βαρβαρικὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου συνειλεγμένην, καὶ τὸν Χαρίδημον τοῦτον προσμισθωσάμενος, προσέβαλλε τοῖς ὑμετέροις χωρίοις, καὶ εἰς τοῦτο κατέστησε τὸν Ἰφικράτην ἀπορίας, ὥστ᾽ ἀπελθόντ᾽ εἰς Ἄντισσαν οἰκεῖν καὶ πάλιν εἰς Δρῦν, ἡγούμενον ὡς μὲν ὑμᾶς οὐχὶ καλῶς ἔχειν ἐλθεῖν, οὓς ὑστέρους ἐπεποίητο τοῦ Θρᾳκὸς καὶ τοῦ βαρβάρου, παρ᾽ ἐκείνῳ δ᾽ οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι μένειν, ὃν οὕτως ὀλιγωροῦνθ᾽ ἑώρα τῆς ἑαυτοῦ σωτηρίας.

  [132] and, on his refusal, he made an attack in person on the strongholds, taking with him the forces collected by Iphicrates as well as his barbarian troops, and engaging the services of Charidemus. He reduced Iphicrates to such helplessness that he withdrew to Antissa, and afterwards to Drys, and lived there; for he did not think he could honorably return to you, whom he had slighted for the sake of a Thracian and a barbarian. On the other hand, he thought it dangerous to remain at the court of a king whom he had found so negligent of his safety.

  [133] ἂν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ Κερσοβλέπτης ἐκ τῆς τῷ Χαριδήμῳ νῦν ἀδείας κατασκευαζομένης αὐξηθεὶς ὀλιγωρῇ μὲν ἐκείνου, νεωτερίζῃ δέ τι καὶ κινῇ πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἐξαρκεῖ τοῦθ᾽ ὑμῖν, ἐὰν Χαρίδημος ἐξαπατηθῇ, τὸν Θρᾷκ᾽ ἰσχυρὸν ἐφ᾽ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς κατεσκευακέναι; ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἀξιῶ. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο νομίζω δίκαιον, εἰ μὲν αἰσθάνεται ταῦτα καὶ προορᾷ Χαρίδημος, εἶθ᾽ ὅπως τοιούτων ψηφισμάτων τεύξεται διαπράττεται,

  [133] Now suppose, men of Athens, that Cersobleptes also, having his power enhanced by the immunity that is being procured for Charidemus, should disdain that man, and initiate plots and disturbances against you, — are you content, as long as Charidemus is misled, to have furnished the Thracian with strength to fight you? I hope not! Here is the view that I think the just one: if Charidemus makes it his business to get these decrees, after perceiving and foreseeing that peril, you must distrust him as an intriguer.

  [134] ὡς ἐπιβουλεύοντι μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν αὐτῷ, εἰ δὲ λέληθεν αὐτόν, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον εὔνουν τις αὐτὸν ὑπείληφεν εἶναι, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον προϊδέσθαι καὶ ὑπὲρ αὑτοῦ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου. ἔστι γὰρ φίλων ἀγαθῶν οὐ τὰ τοιαῦτα χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς εὔνοις, ἐξ ὧν κἀκείνοις καὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἔσται τις βλάβη, ἀλλ᾽ ὃ μὲν ἂν μέλλῃ συνοίσειν ἀμφοῖν, συμπράττειν, ὃ δ᾽ ἂν αὐτὸς ἄμεινον ἐκείνου προορᾷ, πρὸς τὸ καλῶς ἔχον τίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ τὴν ἤδη χάριν τοῦ μετὰ ταῦτα χρόνου παντὸς περὶ πλείονος ἡγεῖσθαι.

  [134] On the other hand, if he has failed to discern the peril, the more you credit him with good intentions, the more forethought you should exercise for his sake as well as your own. Honest friends should not bestow upon their well-wishers such favours as will bring disaster to both alike, but should rather cooperate in any action that tends to their common advantage; and when a man is more far-sighted than his friend, he should order things for the best, and not treat the gratification of the moment as of more value than all future time.

  [135] οὐ τοίνυν οὐδ᾽ ἐκεῖνο λογιζόμενος δύναμαι κατιδεῖν, ὡς, εἰ καὶ βάρβαρος καὶ ἄπιστος ὁ Κερσοβλέπτης, ὅμως προνοηθείη γ᾽ ἂν μὴ τὰ τηλικαῦτ᾽ ἀδικῆσαι Χαρίδημον. ὅταν γὰρ πάλιν ἐξετάσω ἡλίκων Κότυς Ἰφικράτην ἀποστερήσειν μέλλων οὐδὲν ἐφρόντισεν, παντελῶς τούτῳ γ᾽ οὐδὲν ἂν ἡγοῦμαι μελῆσαι τῶν ἀπολουμένων Χαριδήμῳ.

  [135] Moreover, I cannot discover on reflection that Cersobleptes, though both barbarous and faithless, is likely to take any pains not to injure Charidemus so seriously; for when I look backwards and observe the advantages of which Cotys was going to deprive Iphicrates without the slightest consideration for him, I really cannot think that Cersobleptes would trouble himself about the losses that will fall on Charidemus.

  [136] ὁ μέν γ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τιμάς, σίτησιν, εἰ
κόνας, πατρίδ᾽ ἣ ζηλωτὸν αὐτὸν ἐποίησεν, ὀλίγου δέω λέγειν πάνθ᾽ ὧν ἄνευ ζῆν οὐκ ἄξιον ἦν Ἰφικράτει, νομίζων ἀποστερήσειν οὐκ ἐπεστράφη: οὗτος δ᾽ ὡς ἀληθῶς τίνος ἂν καὶ λόγον σχοίη μὴ τίνος Χαρίδημον ἀποστερήσῃ; οὐδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν ἐστι γὰρ παρ᾽ ὑμῖν αὐτῷ, οὐ παῖδες, οὐκ εἰκών, οὐ συγγενεῖς, οὐκ ἄλλ᾽ οὐδέν.

  [136] Cotys expected to rob Iphicrates of honors, of maintenance, of statues, of the country that made him a man to be envied, I may almost say of everything that made life worth living; yet he had no scruple. But, really, what is there of which this man should be anxious not to deprive Charidemus? He has no possessions whatsoever in your city, — neither children, nor a statue, nor kindred, nor anything else.

  [137] καὶ μὴν εἰ μήτε φύσει πιστὸς ὁ Κερσοβλέπτης, ἔκ τε τῶν γεγενημένων πρότερον δικαίως ἄπιστος, μηδέν τε τοιοῦτον ὑπάρχει τοῖς πράγμασιν δι᾽ ὃ κἂν παρὰ γνώμην καὶ φύσιν προνοηθείη τι τοῦ Χαριδήμου, τίνος εἵνεχ᾽ ἁπλῶς καὶ κομιδῇ τετυφωμένως οὕτως, ἃ βούλεται διαπράξασθαι, συλλάβωμεν αὐτῷ, καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ὄντα; ἐγὼ μὲν οὐχ ὁρῶ.