Delphi Complete Works of Demosthenes

by Demosthenes

  [87] “But if at the time of the ninth presidency neither he nor his sureties shall have paid in the money, the man who gave sureties shall be imprisoned, and the property of the sureties shall be confiscated.” In this final clause, you will find, he has at last become the accuser of his own iniquities in the fullest sense. He did not forbid imprisonment on the broad ground that to imprison a free citizen is something shameful or terrible; but he stole from you your chance of catching your criminal in the place where he is, and so he left to you, who are the party aggrieved, the empty name of retribution, but robbed you of the reality. Without your consent he gave a discharge to people who forcibly appropriate your money; and he was within an ace of adding a clause enabling an action at law against the juries that had imposed the penalty of imprisonment.

  [88] ὃ δέ, πολλῶν ὄντων καὶ δεινῶν ὧν ἐν τῷ νόμῳ τέθηκε, μάλιστ᾽ ἄξιόν ἐστ᾽ ἀγανακτῆσαι, βούλομαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰπεῖν. δι᾽ ὅλου γὰρ τοῦ νόμου τῷ καταστήσαντι τοὺς ἐγγυητὰς ἅπαντα λέγει, τῷ δὲ μὴ καθιστάντι μήτε βελτίους μήτε χείρους, μηδ᾽ ὅλως προσέχοντι τὸν νοῦν ὑμῖν, οὐδεμίαν οὔτε δίκην οὔτε τιμωρίαν προσγέγραφεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἄδειαν πεποίηκε τοσαύτην ὅσην οἷόν τε γενέσθαι πλείστην. καὶ γὰρ τὸν χρόνον ὃν διώρισε, τὴν ἐνάτην πρυτανείαν, τῷ καταστήσαντι λέγει τοὺς ἐγγυητάς.

  [88] But of all the objectionable enactments of his law, that of which I will now speak deserves our most vehement indignation. From beginning to end it is addressed to delinquents who put in sureties; but there is neither prosecution nor penalty for the man who offers no sureties, good or bad, but simply defies you. For that man he has provided the fullest imaginable impunity. The days of grace, defined as extending to the ninth presidency, he offers to the man who has put in bail.

  [89] γνοίη δ᾽ ἄν τις ἐκεῖθεν: προσέγραψε δημοσίαν εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν τὴν τῶν ἐγγυητῶν, ἂν μή τις ἐκτείσῃ: τοῦ δὲ μὴ καταστήσαντος οὐκ ἔνι δήπουθεν ὑπάρχειν ἐγγυητάς. καὶ τοῖς μὲν προέδροις, οἳ κεκληρωμένοι καθίζουσιν ἐξ ὑμῶν, ἐπάναγκες ἐποίησεν, ὅταν καθιστῇ τις, δέχεσθαι: τοῖς δ᾽ ἀδικοῦσι τὴν πόλιν οὐδεμίαν προσέγραψεν ἀνάγκην, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ εὐεργέταις αἵρεσιν αὐτοῖς ἔδωκεν εἰ χρὴ δοῦναι δίκην ἢ μή.

  [89] You will see the point by observing that he adds a clause to the effect that the property of the sureties shall be confiscated, if they do not pay the debt in full. Yes, but suppose a man has not named any sureties, — then of course there are no sureties to punish. He compels the Commissioners, men chosen for that office by lot from the ranks of the citizens, to accept sureties whenever named; but on men who defraud the commonwealth he imposes no sort of compulsion, — he treats them as benefactors, and gives them the right to choose whether they will be punished or not.

  [90] καίτοι πῶς ἂν ἀσυμφορώτερος ὑμῖν τούτου γένοιτο νόμος ἢ κάκιον ἔχων; ὃς πρῶτον μὲν περὶ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος χρόνου κριθέντων ἐναντία τοῖς ὑφ᾽ ὑμῶν ἐγνωσμένοις προστάττει, δεύτερον δὲ περὶ τῶν μελλόντων κριθήσεσθαι προστιμᾶν κελεύων τοὺς δικαστὰς τοὺς ὀμωμοκότας, ἄκυρα τὰ προστιμήματα ποιεῖ, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐπιτίμους τοὺς ὀφείλοντας οὐ τὰ προσήκοντ᾽ ἐκτίνοντας καθίστησιν, ὅλως δ᾽ ἐπιδείκνυσι μάτην ὀμνύντας, τιμῶντας, δικάζοντας, ὀργιζομένους, ἅπαντα ποιοῦντας ὑμᾶς. ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ, εἰ Κριτίας ὁ γενόμενος τῶν τριάκοντ᾽ εἰσέφερεν τὸν νόμον, οὐκ ἂν ἄλλον τρόπον οἶμαι γράψαντ᾽ εἰσενεγκεῖν ἢ τοῦτον.

  [90] Could any conceivable statute be more unsound or more opposed to your interests? First, it enjoins the reversal of your judgements in cases long ago decided; and secondly, in cases still to be tried, while instructing sworn jurors to inflict penalties, it makes those penalties inoperative. Further, it enfranchises state-debtors who do not discharge their liabilities, and, in general, it makes an exhibition of you jurors as men whose oaths, whose penalties, whose verdicts, whose censures, whose acts, in short, are all utterly futile. For my part, I conceive that if the author of the statute had been Critias of the Thirty Tyrants, he would hardly have framed and introduced it in any other fashion than this.

  [91] ὅτι τοίνυν ὅλην συγχεῖ τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ καταλύει πάντα τὰ πράγμαθ᾽ ὁ νόμος, καὶ πολλὰς φιλοτιμίας περιαιρεῖται τῆς πόλεως, καὶ τοῦτο ῥᾳδίως ὑμᾶς νομίζω μαθήσεσθαι. ἴστε γὰρ δήπου τοῦθ᾽ ὅτι σῴζεται πολλάκις ἡμῶν ἡ πόλις διὰ τὰς στρατείας καὶ τὰς ναυτικὰς καὶ τὰς πεζάς, καὶ πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ πολλάκις ἤδη διεπράξασθε καὶ σώσαντές τινας καὶ τιμωρησάμενοι καὶ διαλλάξαντες.

  [91] I think that you will easily be convinced that this law upsets the constitution, throws public business into confusion, and denudes the commonwealth of many honorable ambitions. For you cannot be unconscious that our city has often owed her safety to the warlike adventures of our navy and our land forces; and that you have frequently performed glorious achievements in the deliverance, or the chastisement, or the reconciliation, of other cities. What do I infer?

  [92] πῶς οὖν ἀνάγκη τὰ τοιαῦτα διοικεῖν ἐστιν; διὰ ψηφισμάτων καὶ νόμων τοῖς μὲν εἰσφέρειν ἐπιτάττοντας, τοὺς δὲ τριηραρχεῖν κελεύοντας, τοὺς δὲ πλεῖν, τοὺς δ᾽ ἕκαστα ποιεῖν ὧν δεῖ. οὐκοῦν ταῦθ᾽ ὅπως γίγνηται δικαστήρια πληροῦτε καὶ καταγιγνώσκετε δεσμὸν τῶν ἀκοσμούντων. σκέψασθε δὴ τὸν τοῦ καλοῦ κἀγαθοῦ τούτου νόμον, ὡς λυμαίνεται ταῦτα καὶ διαφθείρει.

  [92] Such successes could only have been organized by the aid of those decrees and laws under which you levy contributions on some citizens, and require others to furnish war-galleys; bid some to serve in the navy, and others to perform their several duties. With that object, therefore, you impanel juries, and punish the insubordinate with imprisonment. Now mark how this gallant gentleman’s statute vitiates and makes havoc of all that business.

  [93] γέγραπται γὰρ δήπου ἐν τῷ νόμῳ αὐτοῦ, ‘καὶ εἴ τινι τῶν ὀφειλόντων προστετίμηται δεσμοῦ ἢ καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν προστιμηθῇ, εἶναι καταστήσαντι ἐγγυητάς, ἦ μὴν ἐπὶ τῆς ἐνάτης πρυτανείας ἐκτείσειν τὸ ἀργύριον, ἀφεῖσθαι τοῦ δεσμοῦ.’ τίς οὖν πόρος ἔσται; τίν᾽ ἀποσταλήσεται τρόπον ἡ στρατιά; πῶς τὰ χρήματ᾽ εἰσπράξομεν, ἂν ἕκαστος ὀφλισκάνων ἐγγυητὰς καθιστῇ κατὰ τὸν τούτου νόμον, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸ προσῆκον ποιῇ;

  [93] His clause reads, you remember: “if the penalty of imprisonment has been or shall hereafter be inflicted upon any
debtor, he shall, on nominating sureties on an undertaking to pay the money during the ninth presidency, be released from imprisonment.” Then where are our resources? How shall any expedition be dispatched? How shall we collect ways and means, if every defaulter nominates sureties under this man’s act instead of discharging his obligation?

  [94] ἐροῦμεν νὴ Δία τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ‘Τιμοκράτους νόμος ἐστὶ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν: ἀναμείνατ᾽ οὖν τὴν ἐνάτην πρυτανείαν: εἶτα τότ᾽ ἔξιμεν:’ τοῦτο γὰρ λοιπόν. ἂν δ᾽ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἀμύνεσθαι δέῃ, ἆρά γ᾽ οἴεσθε τοὺς ἐχθροὺς τὰς τῶν παρ᾽ ἡμῖν πονηρῶν διαδύσεις καὶ κακουργίας ἀναμενεῖν; ἢ τὴν πόλιν, αὑτὴν ἐμποδίζοντας νόμους εἰ θήσεται καὶ τἀναντία τῶν συμφερόντων λέγοντας, δυνήσεσθαί τι ποιῆσαι τῶν δεόντων;

  [94] I presume that our reply to the Hellenic world will be: “We have a law here, — the statute of Timocrates. Kindly wait till the ninth presidency; then after that we will start.” No other excuse is left. And if you have to fight in self-defence, do you really think that the enemy will wait for the evasions and rogueries of every scoundrel in Athens? If our city enacts laws for her own discomfiture, laws exactly contrary to her own interests, do you think she will ever be able to play her true part in the world?

  [95] ἀλλ᾽ ἀγαπητόν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ πάντων καλῶς ἐχόντων ἡμῖν καὶ μηδενὸς ὄντος τοιούτου νόμου, κρατοῖμεν τῶν ἐχθρῶν καὶ ταῖς ὀξύτησι δυναίμεθα καὶ τοῖς τοῦ πολέμου καιροῖς ἀκολουθεῖν καὶ μηδενὸς ὑστερίζειν. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ φαίνει τοιοῦτον τεθηκὼς νόμον ὃς τὰ τοιαῦτα λυμαίνεται δι᾽ ὧν ἡ πόλις καὶ σεμνὴ καὶ λαμπρὰ παρὰ πᾶσι καθέστηκεν, πῶς οὐχὶ δικαίως ὁτιοῦν ἂν πάθοις;

  [95] Men of Athens, we may well be satisfied if, with everything in good order, and with no such law as this, we hold advantage over our enemies, keep pace with the swift emergencies and sudden chances of warfare, and are never behindhand. — But if you, sir, distinguish yourself as the author of a law that makes havoc of everything by which our city has earned the respect and admiration of the world, is there any punishment that you do not deserve to suffer?

  [96] ἔτι τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὴν διοίκησιν ἀναιρεῖ, τήν θ᾽ ἱερὰν καὶ τὴν ὁσίαν. ὡς δέ, ἐγὼ φράσω. ἔστιν ὑμῖν κύριος νόμος, καλῶς εἴπερ τις καὶ ἄλλος κείμενος, τοὺς ἔχοντας τά θ᾽ ἱερὰ καὶ τὰ ὅσια χρήματα καταβάλλειν εἰς τὸ βουλευτήριον, εἰ δὲ μή, τὴν βουλὴν αὐτοὺς εἰσπράττειν χρωμένην τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς τελωνικοῖς.

  [96] Moreover, men of Athens, the law shatters our financial system, both sacred and civil; and I will tell you how. You have a law in operation, as good a law as ever was enacted, that holders of sacred or civil moneys shall pay the money in to the Council house, and that, failing such payment, the Council shall recover the money by enforcing the statutes applicable to tax-farmers;

  [97] διὰ τοίνυν τοῦ νόμου τούτου διοικεῖται τὰ κοινά: τὰ γὰρ εἰς τὰς ἐκκλησίας καὶ τὰς θυσίας καὶ τὴν βουλὴν καὶ τοὺς ἱππέας καὶ τἄλλα χρήματ᾽ ἀναλισκόμενα, οὗτός ἐσθ᾽ ὁ νόμος ὁ ποιῶν προσευπορεῖσθαι. οὐ γὰρ ὄντων ἱκανῶν τῶν ἐκ τῶν τελῶν χρημάτων τῇ διοικήσει, τὰ προσκαταβλήματ᾽ ὀνομαζόμενα διὰ τὸν τοῦ νόμου τούτου φόβον καταβάλλεται.

  [97] and on that law the administration of the treasury depends. That is the law that ensures the supplementary supply for the expenses of meetings of the Assembly, religious services, the Council, the cavalry, and so forth, because the revenue from taxation is not sufficient for current expenses, and what we call the supplementary payments are made under the constraint of that law.

  [98] πῶς οὖν οὐχ ἅπαντ᾽ ἀνάγκη καταλυθῆναι τὰ τῆς πόλεως, ὅταν αἱ μὲν τῶν τελῶν καταβολαὶ μὴ ὦσ᾽ ἱκαναὶ τῇ διοικήσει, ἀλλ᾽ ἐνδέῃ πολλῶν, καὶ μηδὲ ταῦτ᾽ ἀλλ᾽ ἢ περὶ λήγοντα τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν ᾖ λαβεῖν, τὰ δὲ προσκαταβλήματα τοὺς μὴ τιθέντας μὴ ᾖ κυρία δεῖν ἡ βουλὴ μηδὲ τὰ δικαστήρια, ἀλλὰ καθιστῶσιν ἐγγυητὰς ἄχρι τῆς ἐνάτης πρυτανείας;

  [98] It follows that the whole business of the State must go to rack and ruin when, the payments on account of taxation being insufficient, there is a large deficiency, when that deficiency cannot be made up until towards the end of the year, and when, as regards the supplementary payments, neither the Council nor the law-courts have authority to imprison defaulters, if they put in sureties until the ninth presidency.

  [99] τὰς δ᾽ ὀκτὼ τί ποιήσομεν; εἰπέ, Τιμόκρατες: οὐ σύνιμεν καὶ βουλευσόμεθ᾽ ἄν τι δέῃ; εἶτ᾽ ἔτι δημοκρατησόμεθα; οὐ δικάσει τὰ δικαστήρια τά τ᾽ ἴδια καὶ τὰ δημόσια; καὶ τίς ὑπάρξει τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις ἀσφάλεια; οὐκ εἴσεισιν ἡ βουλὴ καὶ διοικήσει τὰ ἐκ τῶν νόμων; καὶ τί λοιπὸν ἔσθ᾽ ἡμῖν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ καταλελύσθαι; ἀλλὰ νὴ Δί᾽ ἀμισθεὶ ταῦτα ποιήσομεν. καὶ πῶς οὐ δεινόν, εἰ διὰ τὸν νόμον, ὃν σὺ τέθηκας μισθὸν λαβών, ἄμισθος ὁ δῆμος καὶ ἡ βουλὴ καὶ τὰ δικαστήρι᾽ ἔσται;

  [99] What are we to do for the first eight ? Tell us this, Timocrates: are we never to meet and deliberate? If so, shall we still be living under popular government? Shall there be no sessions of the courts, civil or criminal? If so, what security will there be for complainants? Shall the Council not attend at their office to transact their legal business? If so, what remains but complete disorganization? You nay reply that we shall go on without payment of fees. Then is it not monstrous that the Assembly, the Council, and the law-courts must go unpaid for the sake of a statute which you were paid to introduce?

  [100] χρῆν γὰρ τοῦτό γέ σ᾽, ὦ Τιμόκρατες, προσγράψαι τῷ νόμῳ, οὗπερ ἐποίεις κατὰ τῶν τελωνῶν καὶ τῶν ἐγγυητῶν τὰς πράξεις κατὰ τοὺς ὑπάρχοντας νόμους, ‘καὶ εἰ κατά τινων ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ νόμῳ ἢ ψηφίσματι τὰς αὐτὰς εἴρηται πράξεις ὧν ὀφείλουσιν εἶναι ἃς περὶ τῶν τελωνῶν, καὶ κατὰ τούτων εἶναι τὰς πράξεις κατὰ τοὺς ὑπάρχοντας νόμους.’

  [100] You ought at least to have added a clause, as you did in dealing with the tax-farmers and their sureties, that “if in any other statute or decree it is provided that the debts of any defaulter may be recovered as in the case of tax-farmers, recovery from such defaulters shall be effected in accordance with the existing laws.”

  [101] νῦν δὲ κύκλῳ φεύγων τοὺς νόμους τοὺς τελωνικούς, ὅτι τὸ ψήφισμα τὸ Εὐκτήμονος εἴρηκε πράττειν τοὺς ὠφληκότας κατὰ τούτους τοὺς νόμους
, διὰ ταῦτ᾽ οὐ προσέγραψε τοῦτο. ἐκ δὲ τούτου τοῦ τρόπου τὴν μὲν ὑπάρχουσαν τιμωρίαν λύσας κατὰ τῶν τὰ τῆς πόλεως ἐχόντων, ἑτέραν δ᾽ οὐ γράψας πάντα τὰ πράγματ᾽ ἀναιρεῖ, δῆμον, ἱππέας, βουλήν, ἱερά, ὅσια: ἀνθ᾽ ὧν, ἄνπερ ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, σωφρονῆτε, κολασθεὶς καὶ δοὺς ἀξίαν δίκην τοῖς ἄλλοις παράδειγμα γενήσεται μὴ τιθέναι τοιούτους νόμους.

  [101] — But in fact he went out of his way to avoid the statutes of tax-farming; and, because Euctemon’s decree did authorize recovery from losers of suits according to those statutes, for that very reason he omitted to add the clause. In that manner, by cancelling the existing punishment of public defaulters without substituting any other, he makes havoc of all our business, — the Assembly, the cavalry, the Council, the sacred funds, the civil revenue. And for that offence, men of Athens, if you are wise men, he will be chastised and treated as he deserves, and so made an example to deter others from bringing in such laws.