Delphi Complete Works of Demosthenes

by Demosthenes

  [13] it would have been my business to tender the challenge and to order them to open it, in order that, if the contents differed from the statements which these men had made in their deposition, I might have called a number of the bystanders as witnesses, and have used this fact as a proof that the rest of their story too was a fabrication; but, if the contents were the same, I might have required the one presenting it to give evidence himself. If he consented, I should have had a responsible witness, and, if he refused, this very fact again would have been a convincing proof for me that the affair had been concocted. And in the former case the result would have been that I had one person with whom to deal, whereas according to the depositions of these men I have many. Is there anyone among you who would have chosen the latter course? I think not one of you would have.

  [14] οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ κατ᾽ ἄλλου πιστεύειν ἐστὲ δίκαιοι. καὶ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅσοις μὲν πρόσεστιν ὀργὴ τῶν πραττομένων ἢ λῆμμά τι κέρδους ἢ παροξυσμὸς ἢ φιλονικία, ταῦτα μὲν ἄλλος ἂν ἄλλως πράξειε πρὸς τὸν αὑτοῦ τρόπον: ὅσοις δὲ τούτων μὲν μηδέν, λογισμὸς δ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ἡσυχίας τοῦ συμφέροντος, τίς οὕτως ἄφρων ὅστις ἂν τὰ συνοίσοντ᾽ ἀφείς, ἐξ ὧν κάκιον ἔμελλεν ἀγωνιεῖσθαι, ταῦτ᾽ ἔπραξεν; ἃ γὰρ οὔτ᾽ εἰκότ᾽ οὔτ᾽ εὔλογ᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἔπραξεν οὐδείς, ταῦθ᾽ οὗτοι μεμαρτυρήκασιν περὶ ἡμῶν.

  [14] Well then, you ought not to believe it of anyone else either. For, men of Athens, in all courses of action which involve anger or some getting of gain or exasperation or a spirit of jealousy, different persons will act in different ways in accordance with their several dispositions; but in all cases where none of these things is involved, but merely a calm calculation of one’s own interest, who would be so senseless as to dismiss what would help him and do what would make it more difficult for him to win his case? Yet a course of action which is neither natural nor reasonable, which, in short, no human being would have undertaken — this these witnesses have attributed to me.

  [15] οὐ τοίνυν μόνον ἐξ ὧν ἐμὲ μὴ ‘θέλειν τὸ γραμματεῖον ἀνοίγειν μεμαρτυρήκασι, γνοίη τις ἂν αὐτοὺς ὅτι ψεύδονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πρόκλησιν ὁμοῦ διαθήκῃ μαρτυρεῖν. οἶμαι γὰρ ἅπαντας ὑμᾶς εἰδέναι, ὅτι ὅσα μὴ δυνατὸν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἀγαγεῖν ἐστι τῶν πεπραγμένων, τούτων προκλήσεις ηὑρέθησαν.

  [15] Moreover, it is not only from what they have stated in their deposition regarding my refusal to open the document that one can tell that they are lying, but also from the fact that they have deposed at one and the same time both to a challenge and to a will. For I think you are all aware that challenges were devised for all transactions which it is impossible to bring before you;

  [16] οἷον βασανίζειν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐναντίον ὑμῶν: ἀνάγκη τούτου πρόκλησιν εἶναι. οἷον εἴ τι πέπρακται καὶ γέγονεν ἔξω που τῆς χώρας, ἀνάγκη καὶ τούτου πρόκλησιν εἶναι, πλεῖν ἢ βαδίζειν οὗ τὸ πρᾶγμ᾽ ἐπράχθη: καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων. ὅπου δ᾽ αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματ᾽ ἐφ᾽ αὑτῶν ἔστιν ὑμῖν ἐμφανῆ ποιῆσαι, τί ἦν ἁπλούστερον ἢ ταῦτ᾽ ἄγειν εἰς μέσον;

  [16] for instance, a man may not be put to torture in your presence — for this it is necessary that there be a challenge; again, if anything has been transacted and has taken place somewhere out of the country, it is necessary that for this too there should be a challenge to go by sea or land to the place where the thing was done; and so for other things of that sort. But in cases where it is possible to produce the things themselves before your eyes, what could be simpler than to produce them publicly?

  [17] Ἀθήνησιν μὲν τοίνυν ὁ πατὴρ ἐτελεύτησεν οὑμός, ἐγίγνετο δ᾽ ἡ δίαιτ᾽ ἐν τῇ ποικίλῃ στοᾷ, μεμαρτυρήκασι δ᾽ οὗτοι παρέχειν τὸ γραμματεῖον Ἀμφίαν πρὸς τὸν διαιτητήν. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἀληθὲς ἦν, ἐχρῆν αὐτὸ τὸ γραμματεῖον εἰς τὸν ἐχῖνον ἐμβαλεῖν καὶ τὸν παρέχοντα μαρτυρεῖν, ἵν᾽ ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τοῦ τὰ σημεῖ᾽ ἰδεῖν οἱ μὲν δικασταὶ τὸ πρᾶγμ᾽ ἔγνωσαν, ἐγὼ δ᾽ εἴ τις ἠδίκει με, ἐπὶ τοῦτον ᾖα.

  [17] Well, my father died at Athens, the arbitration took place in the Painted Stoa, and these men have deposed that Amphias produced the document before the arbitrator. Then, if it was genuine, the document ought to have been put into the box, and the one producing it should have so testified, in order that the jurymen might have reached a decision in accordance with the truth and after an inspection of the seals; and I, on my part, if anyone was wronging me, might have proceeded against him.

  [18] νῦν δ᾽ εἷς μὲν οὐδεὶς ὅλον τὸ πρᾶγμ᾽ ἀνεδέξατο, οὐδὲ μεμαρτύρηκεν ἁπλῶς, ὡς ἄν τις τἀληθῆ μαρτυρήσειεν, μέρος δ᾽ ἕκαστος, ὡς δὴ σοφὸς καὶ διὰ τοῦτ᾽ οὐ δώσων δίκην, ὁ μὲν γραμματεῖον ἔχειν ἐφ᾽ ᾧ γεγράφθαι ‘διαθήκη Πασίωνος’, ὁ δὲ πεμφθεὶς ὑπὸ τούτου παρέχειν τοῦτο, εἰ δ᾽ ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος, οὐδὲν εἰδέναι.

  [18] But, as it is, no one person has taken the whole matter upon himself or given straightforward testimony, as one would do in testifying to the truth, but each has deposed to a part of the story, fancying that he is very clever and that for this reason he will escape punishment, — one of them deposing that he holds a document on which is written “the will of Pasio”; another that, being sent by the former person, he produced this document, but had no knowledge as to whether it was genuine or spurious.

  [19] οἱδὶ δὲ τῇ προκλήσει χρησάμενοι παραπετάσματι διαθήκας ἐμαρτύρησαν, ὡς ἂν μάλισθ᾽ οἱ μὲν δικασταὶ ταύτην τὴν διαθήκην ἐπίστευσαν τοῦ πατρὸς εἶναι, ἐγὼ δ᾽ ἀπεκλείσθην τοῦ λόγου τυχεῖν ὑπὲρ ὧν ἀδικοῦμαι, οὗτοι δὲ φωραθεῖεν τὰ ψευδῆ μεμαρτυρηκότες. καίτοι τό γ᾽ ἐναντίον ᾤοντο τούτου. ἵνα δ᾽ εἰδῆτε ταῦθ᾽ ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω, λαβὲ τὴν τοῦ Κηφισοφῶντος μαρτυρίαν.”Μαρτυρία

  Κηφισοφῶν Κεφαλίωνος Ἀφιδναῖος μαρτυρεῖ καταλειφθῆναι αὑτῷ ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς γραμματεῖον, ἐφ᾽ ᾧ ἐπιγεγράφθαι ‘διαθήκη Πασίωνος’.”

  [19] These men, who are here in court, using the challenge as a screen, deposed to a will in such a way that the jurymen believed this will to be my father’s, and I was debarred from obtaining a hearing regarding my wrongs, but in such a way also that they on their part would most clearly be convicted of having given false testimony. And yet this was the very opposite of what they intended.

  However, that you may know that I am speaking the truth in this, take the deposition of Cephisophon.”Deposition

  Cephisophon, son of Cephalion, of Aphidna, deposes that a document was left him by his father, on which was inscribed “the will of Pasio.”“

  [20] οὐκοῦν ἦν ἁ
πλοῦν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, τὸν ταῦτα μαρτυροῦντα προσμαρτυρῆσαι ‘εἶναι δὲ τὸ γραμματεῖον, ὃ αὐτὸς παρέχει, τοῦτο’, καὶ τὸ γραμματεῖον ἐμβαλεῖν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν οἶμαι τὸ ψεῦδος ἡγεῖτ᾽ ὀργῆς ἄξιον, καὶ δίκην ἂν ὑμᾶς παρ᾽ αὑτοῦ λαβεῖν, γραμματεῖον δ᾽ αὑτῷ καταλειφθῆναι μαρτυρῆσαι φαῦλον καὶ οὐδέν. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ δηλοῦν καὶ κατηγοροῦν ὅτι πᾶν τὸ πρᾶγμα κατεσκευάκασιν.

  [20] It was a simple thing, men of the jury, for the one who gave this testimony to add “and this is the document which the deponent exhibits,” and to put the document into the box. But, I presume, he thought that this falsehood would deserve your indignation, and that you would punish him for it, whereas to testify that a document had been bequeathed to him was a trifling matter and one of no consequence. And yet it is this very thing that makes the whole matter clear, and proves that they have concocted it.

  [21] εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπῆν ἐπὶ τῆς διαθήκης ‘Πασίωνος καὶ Φορμίωνος’, ἢ ‘πρὸς Φορμίωνα’, ἢ τοιοῦτό τι, εἰκότως ἂν αὐτὴν ἐτήρει τούτῳ: εἰ δέ, ὥσπερ μεμαρτύρηκεν, ἐπῆν ‘διαθήκη Πασίωνος’, πῶς οὐκ ἂν ἀνῃρήμην αὐτὴν ἐγώ, συνειδὼς μὲν ἐμαυτῷ μέλλοντι δικάζεσθαι, συνειδὼς δ᾽ ὑπεναντίαν οὖσαν, εἴπερ ἦν τοιαύτη, τοῖς ἐμαυτῷ συμφέρουσιν, κληρονόμος δ᾽ ὢν καὶ ταύτης, εἴπερ ἦν τοὐμοῦ πατρός, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν πατρῴων ὁμοίως;

  [21] For if the inscription on the will had been “the property of Pasio and Phormio” or “in the matter of Phormio,” or something of that sort, he would naturally have kept it for him; but if, as he has testified, the inscription was “the will of Pasio,” I should certainly have appropriated it, knowing that I was about to go to law, and knowing further that, if its contents were as represented, it was prejudicial to my interests; for I was the heir, and if the will was my father’s, it belonged to me, as did also all the rest of my father’s estate.

  [22] οὐκοῦν τῷ παρέχεσθαι μὲν Φορμίωνι, γεγράφθαι δὲ Πασίωνος, εἰᾶσθαι δ᾽ ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν, ἐξελέγχεται κατεσκευασμένη μὲν ἡ διαθήκη, ψευδὴς δ᾽ ἡ τοῦ Κηφισοφῶντος μαρτυρία. ἀλλ᾽ ἐῶ Κηφισοφῶντα: οὔτε γὰρ νῦν μοι πρὸς ἐκεῖνόν ἐστιν οὔτ᾽ ἐμαρτύρησεν ἐκεῖνος περὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς διαθήκαις ἐνόντων οὐδέν.

  [22] Well then, by its having been produced to Phormio, by its having been inscribed “the will of Pasio,” and yet ignored by me, it is proved that the will is a forgery and that the testimony of Cephisophon is false. But no more of Cephisophon; it is not with him that I have to do at present, and he has given no testimony as to the contents of the will.

  [23] καίτοι καὶ τοῦτο σκοπεῖτε, ὅσον ἐστὶ τεκμήριον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦ τούτους τὰ ψευδῆ μεμαρτυρηκέναι. εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν αὐτὸς ἔχειν τὸ γραμματεῖον μαρτυρῶν οὐκ ἐτόλμησεν ἀντίγραφ᾽ εἶναι ἃ παρείχετο Φορμίων τῶν παρ᾽ αὑτῷ μαρτυρῆσαι, οὗτοι δ᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὡς παρῆσαν ἔχοιεν ἂν εἰπεῖν, οὔτ᾽ ἀνοιχθὲν εἶδον πρὸς τῷ διαιτητῇ τὸ γραμματεῖον, ἀλλὰ καὶ μεμαρτυρήκασιν αὐτοὶ μὴ ‘θέλειν ἔμ᾽ ἀνοίγειν, ταῦθ᾽ ὡς ἀντίγραφ᾽ ἐστὶν ἐκείνων μεμαρτυρηκότες τί ἄλλ᾽ ἢ σφῶν αὐτῶν κατήγοροι γεγόνασιν ὅτι ψεύδονται;

  [23] And yet, men of Athens, I would have you consider how strong a proof this also is that these men have given false testimony. For when the witness who stated that he had the document in his own possession did not dare to say that the one produced by Phormio was a copy of the one in his own keeping; and when these men cannot state that they were present in the first instance or that they saw the document opened before the arbitrator, but have themselves actually deposed that I refused to open it, to have testified now that the one is a copy of the other, is not this to have accused themselves of falsifying?

  [24] ἔτι τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς γέγραπταί τις ἂν ἐξετάσας τὴν μαρτυρίαν γνοίη παντελῶς τοῦτο μεμηχανημένους αὐτούς, ὅπως δικαίως καὶ ἀδίκως δόξει ταῦθ᾽ ὁ πατὴρ οὑμὸς διαθέσθαι. λαβὲ δ᾽ αὐτὴν τὴν μαρτυρίαν, καὶ λέγ᾽ ἐπισχὼν οὗ ἄν σε κελεύω, ἵν᾽ ἐξ αὐτῆς δεικνύω.”Μαρτυρία

  μαρτυροῦσι παρεῖναι πρὸς τῷ διαιτητῇ Τεισίᾳ, ὅτε προὐκαλεῖτο Φορμίων Ἀπολλόδωρον, εἰ μή φησιν ἀντίγραφα εἶναι τῶν διαθηκῶν τῶν Πασίωνος—”

  [24] More than all this, men of Athens, any man by examining the wording of the deposition can see that it is nothing but a contrivance of theirs to the end that rightly or wrongly it may appear that my father made this will.

  But take the deposition itself, and read, stopping wherever I bid you, that from its own wording I may prove my point.”Deposition

  . . . depose that they were present before the arbitrator Teisias, when Phormio challenged Apollodorus, if he declared that the document was not a copy of the will of Pasio . . .”

  [25] ἐπίσχες.ἐνθυμεῖσθ᾽ ὅτι ‘τῶν διαθηκῶν’ γέγραπται ‘τῶν Πασίωνος’. καίτοι χρῆν τοὺς βουλομένους τἀληθῆ μαρτυρεῖν, εἰ τὰ μάλιστ᾽ ἐγίγνεθ᾽ ἡ πρόκλησις, ὡς οὐκ ἐγίγνετο, ἐκείνως μαρτυρεῖν. λέγε τὴν μαρτυρίαν ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς πάλιν.”Μαρτυρία

  μαρτυροῦσι παρεῖναι πρὸς τῷ διαιτητῇ Τεισίᾳ—”Μαρτυροῦμεν: παρῆμεν γὰρ δή: λέγε.”

  ὅτε προὐκαλεῖτο Φορμίων Ἀπολλόδωρον—”Καὶ τοῦτο, εἴπερ προὐκαλεῖτο, ὀρθῶς ἂν ἐμαρτύρουν.”

  εἰ μή φησιν ἀντίγραφα εἶναι τῶν διαθηκῶν τῶν Πασίωνος—”

  [25] Stop reading. Bear in mind that the words are “of the will of Pasio.” Now persons who wished to bear witness to the truth — assuming that it is absolutely established that the challenge was tendered, which it was not — ought to have given their testimony in the following way.

  Read the deposition again from the beginning.”Deposition

  . . . depose that they were present before the arbitrator Teisias . . .”

  We do depose; for we were present. Read on.”

  . . . when Phormio challenged Apollodorus . . .”

  This, too, they might properly have stated, assuming that he really tendered the challenge.”

  . . . if he declared that the document was not a copy of the will of Pasio . . .”

  [26] ἔχ᾽ αὐτοῦ.οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἷς ἔτι δήπου τοῦτ᾽ ἐμαρτύρησεν, εἰ μή τις καὶ παρῆν διατιθεμένῳ τῷ πατρὶ τῷ ἐμῷ: ἀλλ᾽ εὐθὺς ἂν εἶπε ‘τί δ᾽ ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν εἴ τινές εἰσι διαθῆκαι Πασίωνος;’ καὶ γράφειν ἂν αὐτὸν ἠξίωσεν, ὥσ
περ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς προκλήσεως ‘εἰ μή φημ᾽ ἐγὼ ἀντίγραφα εἶναι τῶν διαθηκῶν’, οὕτως ‘ὧν φησι Φορμίων Πασίωνα καταλιπεῖν’, οὐ ‘τῶν Πασίωνος’. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἦν εἶναι διαθήκας μαρτυρεῖν, ὅπερ ἦν τούτοις βούλημα, ἐκεῖνο δὲ φάσκειν Φορμίωνα: πλεῖστον δὲ δήπου κεχώρισται τό τ᾽ εἶναι καὶ τὸ τοῦτον φάσκειν.

  [26] Stop right there. There is not a person in the world, I presume, who would have proceeded to give this testimony, unless he had been present when my father drew up the will. Instead, he would have said at once, “How do we know if there is any will of Pasio’s?” — and he would have demanded that Phormio write, as in the beginning of the challenge: “If I declared that the document was not a copy of the will which Phormio stated that Pasio had left,” — not “of the will of Pasio.” For this was to testify that there was a will （which was their intention）, the other that Phormio said that there was. And, I take it, there is a world of difference between a thing’s being so, and Phormio’s saying that it is.