The Crusades and the Near East
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The assumption that Muslim public opinion only gradually became receptive to the idea of jihad is supported by additional texts that were inscribed in various districts of Syria and adjacent regions during the second quarter of the twelfth century.81 These texts include military titles such as: ‘the defender of religion’ (i.e., Islam) and ‘the tamer of the infidels and polytheists’.82 An inscription on the wall of a mosque in the Saruja market in Damascus reads:
Built during the days of our master, the most illustrious marshal, the grand seigneur, the supporter of religion (Zahir al-Din; although an epithet), the vigour of Islam, the upholder of the Caliphate, the noble of the (Muslim) community, the pride of the people, the firmness of the kings, the foundation of the officers, the commander of the armies, the defender of warriors.83
According to an inscription on the wall of a religious school in Damascus, it was constructed by ‘Mu‘in al-Din Unur, the majestic officer, the marshal of the armies, and the manumitted slave of Tughtegin, the champion of jihad, the combatant and warrior’.84 Similarly, a dedication at the entrance to the Bel Temple in Palmyra reads: ‘This building was ordered by the chamberlain, the grand seigneur, the one helped by Allah, the defender of religion (Nasir al-Din), the resource of Islam, the sword of the caliphate, the prop of the kingship, the auxiliary of the champions of jihad, the honour of the commanders, the glory of the armies.’85
An inscription at the al-Khidr Mosque in Busra (528/July 1134) conveys a similar message, stating that the renovation of the site was ordered by Gumushtakin (Gümüstekin, ‘silver auspicious’), ‘the spring of Islam, the trustworthy of the caliphate, the arm of the community, the sword of the people, the crown of the 37
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commanders, the glory of the armies, the auxiliary of the jihad fighters’.86
Gumushtakin also used similar titles and designations in an inscription above the window of a religious school he built in Busra.87
Expressions that illustrate the importance of a military role in the service of the Muslims and the Caliphate are visible on other public buildings as well. A religious school located on a street near the Great Mosque of Damascus was endowed by an officer who boasted that he had done so during the days of the courageous and fortunate ( alp qutlugh) ‘sword of Islam, the warrior for the cause of religion ( mujahid al-din)’.88 An inscription on the minaret of the Great Mosque in Hama states that the work was commissioned by the chamberlain Abu Ja‘far Muhammad, who with excessive pride declared himself ‘the defender of Islam, the director of armies’.89
These inscriptions and lapidaries reflect the thoughts and feelings of Muslims at the time and reflect the popularity that jihad had achieved. The Syrian Muslim elite regarded the act of leading an army against the Franks as a commendable deed that endowed one with high standing, both among the masses and within the religious establishment. At the same time, jihad ideology also eased agony and facilitated the endurance of lamentation and death.90 Examination of the chronology of these inscriptions reflects that the use of jihad slogans spread in southern Syria concurrently with the advance of the atabek al-Malik al-Mansur
‘Imad al-Din Zangi in northern Syria.91 Political developments encouraged him to interfere in Syria and seize Aleppo in 1128,92 and soon afterward he started to exert pressure on the rulers of Damascus.93
Muslim reactions at their zenith
Although the history of ‘Imad al-Din Zangi in Syria falls outside the realm of this chapter, it is nonetheless important to note that he made use of jihad slogans as he tried to expand his realm. Setting out from northern Iraq in spring 524/1130, Zangi invaded the territory of Antioch, routed the Franks, killed many of their knights, and captured the fortress of Atharib.94 The historian Ibn al-Athir, who was a great admirer of the Zangids, praised the decisiveness of his hero (‘the Martyr’), arguing that Zangi acted after he had witnessed the extreme hardship of the people of Aleppo and noting that he ordered his troops to be ruthless. Ibn al-Athir concluded his account by saying: ‘I passed over this terrain at night in the year 584/1188 and I was told: Until the present time many bones still remain here.’95
Yet, despite his image as an anti-Frankish mujahid, Zangi still signed a ceasefire agreement with the enemy. From the demolished fortress of Atharib, he travelled to the citadel of Harim. The prospects of a military conflict with the Artuqids of Mardin and Hisn Kayfa induced him to stop the anti-Frankish initiative and to conclude a hudna with the inhabitants of the town of Harim.96 Zangi had a similar reaction in the summer of the following year after returning to and besieging the castle of Ba‘rin (Barin).97 Initially, he refused the Franks’ offer to surrender on the 38
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condition that he grant them safe passage and permit them to return to their lands.
Upon learning of the advance of a sizeable Frankish army, however, ‘circumstances forced him to grant the besieged their liberty98 and he contracted an alliance ( ‘ahd) with them upon the condition that they acknowledge his suzerainty (531/
1137)’.99 Several years passed before Zangi was able to achieve a major strategic victory in the long struggle with the Franks and their allies in northern Syria. The conquest of Edessa (538/1144) was a laudable compensation for past disappoint-ments, shocking both the Franks and the local Christian communities.100
Governing Aleppo and endeavouring to seize central and southern Syria, Zangi toiled hard to construct his image as an upstanding Muslim ruler motivated by a strong desire to establish justice and fight the Franks.101 He ordered inscriptions reflecting his self-image on several buildings. The earliest inscription in Damascus that mentions his name reads as follows: ‘it was constructed during the days of the champion of jihad, the fighter, combatant, defender of the community, subduer of polytheists, and the exterminator of the heretics’.102 In a tour inside the town of Baalbek, he is referred to as ‘the pillar of Islam, the commander of the warriors in the cause of Allah, the vanquisher of infidels and polytheists, the aid of the armies’.103 Similar jihadist titles were also employed by other officers in and around Damascus104 and were included in several inscriptions on buildings in Aleppo.105
These inscriptions serve as lucid indicators of the evolution of a new political discourse in Syria. However, it should also be noted that, in addition to such Islamic designations, the rulers of Syria used ancient Iranian and Turkish titles, such as pahlawan-i jihan (the paragon of the world), khusro-i iran (the Caesar of Iran), alp (the courageous warrior), inanj (the trustworthy), qutlugh (the auspicious) and tughril (falcon).106 This should not be interpreted as reflecting a weakened commitment to jihad or the cause of Islam, but rather as evidence of an emerging Islamic community that did not cut its ties with its pre-Islamic past.
In 1146, Zangi was murdered and his realm was divided among his sons, with Nur al-Din Mahmud inheriting Aleppo and northern Syria. He took to the battlefield soon after. His first goal was to force the Franks to withdraw from the territories they governed east of the Orontes River (al-‘Assi). Eager to report Nur al-Din’s achievements, Ibn al-Athir recounts a Frankish defeat at Yaghra.107 In this context, he quotes verses by Ibn al-Qaysarani (d. Damascus 548/1153): How should we not celebrate our praiseworthy (Mahmud) life, when the sultan is the praiseworthy (Mahmud [Nur al-Din]) / and the sword of
Islam is only turned aside when the carcass of the Unbelief [Franks] is cut in slices / Virtuous deeds are only found where the Light of Religion (Nur al-Din) is present / How many a battle has he, whose day is marked well by the infidel princes.108
Military achievements on the battlefield consolidated Nur al-Din’s position in Syria,109 and Muslim detachments from neighbouring districts joined him.110
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Following the Frankish fiasco at the gates of Damascus (1148),111 Nur al-Din was able to seize the city (549/1154), thus achieving one of his major goals in southern Syria.11
2 With a firm grip on the reins of government in Islamic Syria, Nur al-Din invested considerable resources in building a standing army and spent additional capital on religious buildings and socio-cultural networks.113 Pious foundations financed the religious establishment, which in turn expressed its vociferous support for Nur al-Din’s jihad policy and plans.
Literary sources, particularly those written by his admirers, describe Nur al-Din as a strict Muslim who fought tirelessly against the Franks and firmly established justice and Islamic norms. Archaeological findings from this period also support this image of the leader.114 Nur al-Din portrayed himself as the leader of the jihad and directed a well-orchestrated propaganda campaign against the Franks, with an idyllic image of Jerusalem presented as the goal and reward.115 Inquiry into the three public fields of building, internal political measures and propaganda shed important light on Nur al-Din’s policies and objectives. For example, inscriptions on the buildings constructed under his orders (a total of forty-two) served to spread his propaganda, his titles116 and his self-representation. In these inscriptions, Nur al-Din is described as the champion of jihad ( mujahid), the defender of Islam ( murabit), the knowledgeable (‘ alim), the just (‘ adil), the foundation ( rukn) of Islam, the partner ( qasim) of the Caliphate, the crown of the (Muslim) congregation ( taj al-milla), and additional glorifying titles.
Nur al-Din reinforced his army by recruiting Kurds to join his Turkish soldiers.117 Investing considerable sums in religious institutions staffed by Iranians, he encouraged the migration of scholars and Sufis to his domain.118 In addition to the Islamic titles and warrior ranks, he held Persian and Turkish titles. The inscriptions also refer to him as the subduer of the heretics, the potentate ( shariyar) of Syria, the marshal of the armies ( isfah-salar), and a host of similar titles that stress his commitment to fighting the Franks and establishing an
‘Islamic’ order.119
Based on the details presented here, we can firmly conclude that Nur al-Din conceived of jihad not only as an anti-Frankish measure but as an instrument to fortify Sunni Islam. For Nur al-Din, jihad was an all-encompassing social, religious and military policy directed toward internal and external enemies alike.120 ‘Imad al-Din al-Isfahanai (1125–1200) praised Nur al-Din as a leader who did not dwell in cities during spring and summer but rather took to the fields to guard the frontiers and to protect against ‘evil’.121 Nonetheless, Nur al-Din’s policies were pragmatic. Despite his clear awareness of the importance of building up his self-image as a mujahid, his victories on the battlefield did not prevent him from signing an armistice and an accord of reconciliation ( muwada‘a) with the Franks.122 Truces with the Franks were envisioned as a conclusion of military manoeuvres.
Although with the death of Nur al-Din in Damascus in 569 (14 May 1174) his young son al-Malik al-Salih Isma‘il inherited the throne, the regent Shams al-Din Muhammad b. Abd al-Malik ibn al-Muqaddam served as the de facto ruler. One 40
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of the first external threats he faced was the Frankish siege of Banyas, and his solution was simple: he informed the enemy that Saladin would attack the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem and managed to conclude a ceasefire agreement, followed by a hudna.123 In this way, ‘Imad al-Din al-Isfahani explains, ‘the sincere intention to fight was replaced by shaking hands ( musafaha, or concord)’.124
Ibn al-Athir, who was not particularly fond of Saladin,125 recounted that the ruler of Egypt wrote to al-Malik al-Salih Isma‘il as follows:
The Syrian emirs only made peace with the Franks out of fear of him
[Saladin] and of Sayf al-Din Ghazi, the lord of Mosul for the latter had already taken the Jazira lands and they feared that he would cross into Syria. They considered making peace ( sulh) with the Franks better than having the one [Saladin] come from the west and the other [Sayf al-Din]
from the east, leaving them [Nur al-Nin’s officers] too busy to repel the Franks (569/1174).126
The history of Saladin is one of the most popular topics in any crusades bibliog-raphy,127 and for this reason we avoid dwelling on it excessively here. Instead, we present only a handful of accounts that clearly illuminate the complex policy of the Sultan, who alternated between temporary armistices and jihad.128 Saladin was determined to build his public image as a moralist ( Salah al-Dunya wal-Din means Righteousness of the World and of Faith) and as the victorious combatant who rescued Jerusalem from the hands of polytheists. He often represented himself as the unifier of belief and the subduer of worshippers of the Cross.129
In letters to the Caliph’s court in Baghdad (577/1181), Saladin presented himself as the true Muslim champion engaged on three fronts: against the infidel Franks in Jerusalem, against the heretical Assassins ( al-Hashashiya), and against the rulers of northern Iraq (Mosul). In these letters, Saladin claimed that the Franks were planning to attack northern Arabia,130 that the ruler of Mosul was intriguing with the Franks and with the Assassins, and that he himself detested the idea of concluding a hudna with them.131
Yet, practically, Saladin conducted a policy similar to that of Nur al-Din. In order to focus on his internal challenges and subdue his opponents, he also concluded several truces with the Franks132 and agreed to sign peace ( musalaha)133 and friendship contracts with them. In fact, until the second half of the 1180s, Saladin hardly fought the Franks at all.134 Even on the eve of Hattin, he signed two truces: the first with Raymond (1185) and the second with Guy de Lusignan (1186).135
Despite his awareness of the importance of propaganda and the construction of his image, Saladin never changed his policy of alternating fighting with truces, even after the conquest of Jerusalem. He appears not to have been puzzled by the fact that his inscriptions and the writings of his courtiers and admirers depicted him as an enthusiastic warrior for the cause of Islam. Similarly, the fact that he never fulfilled the obligation of pilgrimage to Mecca ( hajj) did not tarnish his image as a devout Muslim.
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Commerce and collaboration
In the preceding sections, I have shown that the Zangid and Ayyubid concept of jihad did not indicate an endless struggle between Islam and the Franks, but rather referred to an ongoing political rivalry for hegemony against an enemy who was envisioned by the Muslims not as an invader but rather as a competitor, with whom a limited truce could be signed but no permanent peace established.136 The commercial relations between the Latin Kingdom, the trading nations of southern Europe and the forces that ruled over the Islamic Near East between the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries shed important light on this uneasy reality in the Eastern Mediterranean.
The Franks’ arrival in the Levant brought warfare to Anatolia, Syria and Egypt, but the emergence of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem also encouraged an increased presence of Western European merchants.137 Foreign merchants carried out business transactions in ports and cities in Muslim-ruled Egypt and Syria.138
Amalfians,139 Venetians, Pisans, Genoese and other nationalities resided in inns ( fondaco/ fondaci) built in Muslim ports.140 Moreover, the Muslim authorities granted special privileges to these institutions and the merchants who occupied them. An early example of this dynamic is the history of the Pisan merchants in Egypt, who possessed an inn in Alexandria and obtained a permission to establish a second in Cairo.141 In response to the Latin Kingdom’s siege and conquest of Ashkelon (‘Asqalan) in 1153, the Fatimids arrested them,142 only to release them one year later.143 An 1173 treaty between Saladin and Pisa reconfirmed the presence of the Pisan merchants in Egypt. In a letter to Baghdad written in 1182
on Saladin’s behalf, al-Qadi al-Fadil informed the caliphal court that the Venetian, Pisan and Genoese armies raided the Muslims from time to time, seizing them and the merchandise they carried, but that ‘nowadays they bring to our land weapons for the jihad and materials much needed for war’.144 Two years later, Venice obtained an inn in Alexandria. Western inns were
also established in Syrian cities.
Such commercial relations between Muslims and Europeans illuminate the complex reality in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Near East during this period. Travel and trade continued side by side with Muslim–Frank ideological division and confrontation. Armistice agreements ended bloody fighting, and pragmatism was often favoured by the opponents.145 In successive accounts, Ibn al-Qalanisi recounts two early examples of these conditions:
In this year news arrived that a company of travelling merchants, chaf-ing at their prolonged inaction, lost patience and set out from Tinnis, Damietta and Old Cairo with a great quantity of merchandise and
moneys. The Fatimid–Egyptian fleet was unable to go to sea, but they took upon themselves the risk and set sail. They fell in with some
Frankish vessels and were captured, and merchandise and capital to the value of more than a hundred thousand dinars were seized by their
captors, who held them as prisoners and tormented them, until they
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ransomed themselves by all that remained of their deposits at Damascus and elsewhere.
On returning from Sidon, Baldwin marched to Ascalon, and made an
attack upon it. Its governor Shams al-Khilafa opened negotiation with him, and a settlement was reached between them, the terms of which
were that on receipt of a sum of money from the governor, Baldwin
would retire and refrain from molesting Ascalon. Now Shams al-Khilafa was more desirous of trading than of fighting, and inclined to peaceful and friendly relations and securing the safety of travelers, and he levied from the people of Tyre seven thousand dinars, to be paid to him in the space of a year and three months. When the news of this reached al-Afdal, the ruler of Egypt disapproved the governor’s action and bore him a