Socrates
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Conclusion
I have been describing in this chapter the transformation of the character Socrates in the elenctic dialogues into the Platonic Socrates of the “middle” dialogues, primarily the Republic. I am confident that by the time Plato wrote the Republic, with its tripartite soul, complex theory of virtue, sharp distinction between knowledge and opinion, theory of separate Forms, concept of the good and account of the philosopher-king, this transformation of the character Socrates into a spokesman for Plato had been completed. I am also confident that the Socrates of the Republic is far removed from the barren Socrates represented in the elenctic dialogues and in particular in the Apology. As I said at the outset of this chapter, however, Socrates, as he is characterized in the elenctic dialogues, is not simply barren. He is also fertile, with answers to the questions he raises for others. The roots of the theory of separate Forms, the signature doctrine of the Platonic Socrates, are to be found in the search for definitions of ethical terms in the elenctic dialogues. The key distinction between the Socratic and the Platonic theory of Forms lies in the concept of separation, which is introduced in the Cratylus, Phaedo, and Symposium and remains thereafter a key concept of Platonism. The Form of the good is to be found in the elenctic dialogues, and the good as the object of love is discussed in the Lysis. The Meno distinguishes between knowledge and right opinion, anticipating the Republic's fourfold classification of cognitive states. There are places in the elenctic dialogues, such as the Protagoras, where Socrates presents a theory of virtue, intellectualism, that differs from the theory presented in the Republic. In other elenctic dialogues, however, Socrates presents views that anticipate the Republic. The account of the happy life as the life of the wise person, whose soul is healthy and just, can be found in the Crito and Gorgias. The ideal of the philosopher-king is in essence the Socratic ideal of the moral expert. The ideal of the person who possesses the “royal art,” the political art that makes people happy, is found in the Euthydemus.
The ideas that distinguish the “middle” dialogues from the elenctic dialogues are not introduced all at once. The transformation of Socrates the barren inquirer into Socrates the confident theoretician is a gradual one, which has several landmarks. Throughout this transformation, however, there is a guiding principle that shapes the discussion: the ideal of a quest for wisdom, truth, and the best possible state of one's soul, to which Socrates exhorts the Athenians in the Apology. Throughout the elenctic dialogues Socrates carries on a search for wisdom, which he says is the only life worth living for people. I believe that this ideal of a philosophical life, a life of inquiry into wisdom, is something that Plato inherited from the historical Socrates. I also believe he inherited from the historical Socrates his elenctic method, however much he may have developed it and used it for his own purposes. How much more he may have inherited from Socrates is something that, as I said at the outset of this book, it is impossible to determine. It is possible that several of the theories introduced in the elenctic dialogues originate with Socrates; it is possible that all of them originate with Plato. It is possible that the gradual introduction into the elenctic dialogues of doctrines that foreshadow the doctrines of the Republic was part of a literary project that Plato conceived at the beginning of his career. It is also possible that Plato developed his various doctrines over a period of time. It is possible that he was influenced in this development by his encounter with Pythagorean philosophy on his first voyage to Sicily in 387. Where the truth lies in this controversy cannot be known.
It is possible that Plato began his career as a disciple of Socrates, and that he developed his own distinctive doctrines over time. I think it is clear, however, that the development of those doctrines began in the elenctic dialogues. If we think of Socrates not as the historical figure behind the dialogues but as the character in the elenctic dialogues, then Platonic doctrine, such as is found in the “middle” dialogues originates with Socrates in the elenctic dialogues. Charles Kahn has written that “the dialogues are all Platonic.”16 They are also, however, Socratic. They represent the thought of a character through which Plato presents his philosophical reflections to the world. The Socrates of the elenctic dialogues is not the Socrates of the Republic, though he is moving in the direction of that Socrates. The philosophy of Socrates, the character in the elenctic dialogues, is worthy of study, not simply as the anticipation of the philosophy of Plato, but for its own sake. Emerson said that “Socrates and Plato are the double star which the most powerful instruments will not entirely separate.”17 This is true; however, there is enough separation to create room for the philosophical study of the Socrates of the elenctic dialogues.
Notes
1 The story of the creation of three groups of dialogues based on stylistic distinctions and the modification of those groups by doctrinal considerations is told by Charles Kahn, in “On Platonic Chronology,” in Annas and Rowe, New Perspectives on Plato, Modern and Ancient (Washington, D.C.: Center for Hellenic Studies, 2002), 93–97. In this chapter I put “middle” in scare quotes to indicate that I am talking about those dialogues that are considered to be “middle” based on doctrinal, not stylistic considerations.
2 Vlastos, Socrates, 47–48.
3 I criticize this view, which I refer to as the “biographical hypothesis,” in “Why did Plato Write Socratic Dialogues?” in McPherran, ed. Wisdom, Ignorance and Virtue: New Essays in Socratic Studies (Edmonton: Academic Printing & Publishing, 1997), especially 111–114.
4 Vlastos, Socrates, 46.
5 W. K. C. Guthrie, trans., Plato: Protagoras and Meno (London: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1956), 24–25.
6 Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 59–65.
7 Robinson, Plato's Earlier Dialectic, 19.
8 I have argued that it does: see my “Socrates Metaphysician” and “Socratic Metaphysics.”
9 Allen “Plato's Earlier Theory of Forms,” 332–333.
10 Allen, Plato's ‘Euthyphro’ and the Earlier Theory of Forms, 151.
11 Ibid., 152.
12 Ibid., 152–153.
13 Vlastos, Socrates, 49.
14 Thus Penner: “On the question of the immortality of the soul, there is little interest in the Socratic dialogues.” “Socrates and the Early Dialogues,” 125.
15 By Penner “Socrates and the Early Dialogues” and “The Historical Socrates.”
16 “Did Plato Write Socratic Dialogues?” originally in Classical Quarterly 31 1981), 305–320; reprinted in Benson, ed. Essays on the Philosophy of Socrates (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 47.
17 “Plato; or, the Philosopher,” in The Complete Works, Vol. IV: Representative Men: Seven Lectures, number 2 (1904), quoted in Bartleby.com/90/0402, an electronic source.
9
Socrates’ Legacy
Throughout this book we have focused on Socrates as portrayed by one of his associates, Plato. In this chapter we shall look at Socrates as he has been portrayed by other authors throughout the centuries. Socrates has been seen by later writers in four basic ways: as a virtuous man, an exemplar of the philosophical life; as an ignorant inquirer (the barren Socrates); as an exemplar of wisdom (the fertile Socrates); and as a martyr. There are two periods in particular in the history of the West in which the philosophy of Socrates has been intensively studied: antiquity and the nineteenth century. Philosophy in antiquity was understood not only as an academic study but as a way of life, and the life of Socrates was seen by many philosophers as paradigmatic of that life. With the advent of Christianity the focus shifted somewhat to Socrates as a virtuous man and martyr. The cultural debate about Socrates in the Christian era was concerned with him not only as an individual but as a representative of ancient Greek philosophy and culture in general. The question raised in antiquity and debated into the modern age concerned the relation between classical culture and Christianity. In the nineteenth century Socrates became a c
rucial figure in philosophy in his own right once again, though the connection with Christianity was not lost. One focus of the portrayal of Socrates in the twentieth century has been his relationship to Athenian democracy.
This survey is highly selective; it does not attempt to tell the story of the cultural influence of Socrates in literature and the arts. This chapter will also not include the scholarly study of Socrates. Especially since the nineteenth century Socrates has been the subject of intense scrutiny by classical scholars. One project of these scholars has been the attempt to recover the historical Socrates from the testimony of his associates and later interpreters, to solve what is usually referred to as the “Socratic problem.” As I noted above, in Chapter 2, I do not believe this problem has a solution. This scholarly debate was not in general the primary concern of the philosophers I write about in this chapter, though some of the more recent philosophers do discuss it. The scholarly study of Socrates, and in particular the various attempts to solve the Socratic problem, from Friedrich Schleiermacher to Gregory Vlastos, is worth a volume in its own right.
Beginning with Plato, each of the authors I shall discuss used Socrates for his own purposes. Because Socrates left no written legacy, he could be molded to fit the concerns of other philosophers. This is not to say that if Socrates had left a written legacy, all controversy over the interpretation of his philosophy would have ceased. That is simply not the way things are in philosophy. Still, the fact that Socrates did not leave a written record of his philosophical teachings has made it easier for subsequent writers to use Socrates in service of their own philosophies.
Xenophon's Socrates
Before turning to the reception of Socrates in later Greek and Roman philosophy it is necessary to discuss Xenophon's portrait of Socrates. As was mentioned in Chapter 2, Xenophon wrote four works featuring Socrates: an Apology and Symposium, thought to be indebted to Platonic models, the Oeconomicus, a treatise on estate management, and the Memorabilia, his major Socratic work.1 Xenophon may have written these works in part to correct the portrait of Socrates offered by Plato. Plato's Socrates, as we have seen, was the practitioner of the elenchus, who refuted his interlocutors and left them in a state of perplexity. Xenophon's Socrates practices the elenchus also, but only as the first stage of the educational process. When a person has become a Socratic associate, Xenophon's Socrates replaces the elenchus with more constructive educational methods. These are not devoid of philosophical interest; in Memorabilia IV.VI Xenophon's Socrates offers definitions of several of the terms Plato's Socrates had sought to define without success in his elenctic dialogues. Xenophon's Socrates is interested, not in refutation, but in producing young men who are kalos kagathos, admirable and good. There is a story in Diogenes Laertius (2.48) of Socrates accosting Xenophon in the streets of Athens and asking him if he knows where a number of different foods can be found. Finally, Socrates asks Xenophon if he knows where young men become admirable and good, and when Xenophon replies that he does not, Socrates says, “follow me and learn.” Xenophon's Socrates uses irony considerably less frequently than does Plato's.2 He is also unaware of the Platonic Socrates’ profession of ignorance. Xenophon's Socrates admits to being an expert in the education of youth, a subject he has devoted his life to (Xenophon, Apology 20–21). What Xenophon's Socrates and Plato's have in common is their depiction of Socrates as a man who excelled all others in virtue, who led an exemplary life.
The Reception of Socrates in the Ancient World
Socrates acquired a preeminent status in antiquity, due in large part to the depiction of him in the works of Plato and Xenophon. This is not to say that there was no criticism of Socrates. Criticism began, of course, with the first portrait of Socrates in history: Aristophanes’ Clouds. Plato's Apology was written in part to counteract Aristophanes’ depiction of Socrates. Sometime after 390 a certain Polycrates wrote a pamphlet purporting to contain Anytus’ prosecution speech at Socrates’ trial. The pamphlet is now lost, but it is thought that the opening chapters of Book I of Xenophon's Memorabilia respond to the charges of Polycrates. This pamphlet may have been the origin of the political interpretation of the trial, for Polycrates accused Socrates of having educated Alcibiades and Critias (Xenophon, Memorabilia I.II.12).
It became fashionable in the years following the rise of various ancient schools of philosophy for doxographers, writers who recorded the opinions of various philosophers, to trace the lineage of these schools back to Socrates. Two schools resisted this genealogy. The Pyrrhonian skeptics saw Pyrrho (c. 365–c. 275) as the originator of their philosophy. The Epicureans saw Epicurus (341–270) in the same way. The Epicureans had little good to say about any rival philosophers; they wanted all the credit for any philosophical truth to go to their master. They thought it necessary not only to build him up, but to run down all of his rivals, including Socrates. “The Epicureans displayed a hostility to Socrates that is virulent even by the extreme standards of ancient polemic.”3 Aristotle himself was not critical of Socrates, but his followers “were either silent about Socrates, … or determinedly malevolent. Aristoxenus, according to Porphyry, is said to have written a life of Socrates that was more vicious than the accusations of Meletus and Anytus.”4 The reasons for the hostility of the Aristotelians are something of a mystery.
More common than such criticism is the high status of Socrates among his associates and in other, later schools of philosophy. During Socrates’ lifetime a number of philosophers became his associates. These have become known as “the Socratic circle.” Some of these associates wrote dialogues in which Socrates is the leading character. Apart from the works of Plato and Xenophon, these dialogues are now lost, except for a few fragments.5 Plato was not the inventor of the Socratic dialogue, though his dialogues became the best-known and most read examples of that genre. (The preservation of Plato's dialogues may be due to their literary and philosophical quality, but it no doubt helped that Plato founded a school, the Academy, in which those dialogues were not only studied but preserved for posterity.) In the first generation following the death of Socrates the leading figure among these associates was Antisthenes (c. 445–c. 365). Antisthenes saw Socrates as an example of moral strength, a quality that was preeminent for Xenophon as well. There seems to have been a debate within the Socratic circle concerning the human good, with Antisthenes championing moral strength and self-sufficiency and Aristippus (c. 435–c. 356) defending pleasure. Antisthenes was quoted as saying, “I would rather go mad than enjoy pleasure.”6 Doxographers traced the Cynic school back to Socrates by way of Antisthenes; Plato is alleged to have referred to the Cynic Diogenes of Sinope as “Socrates gone mad” (Diogenes Laertius 6.54). Aristippus was thought to be the founder of the Cyrenaic school of philosophy, which held that the immediate experience of pleasure was the good. It may seem surprising that two philosophers with such different, mutually opposed views of the good should have been Socrates’ associates, but it should not be. We can see some evidence for each view in the discussion of hedonism in Plato's Protagoras and the arguments against hedonism in the Gorgias. It is likely that Socrates encouraged debate among his associates. It is possible that, as the portrait of Socrates as barren suggests, he refrained from stating his own view. We do not know the extent to which these two philosophers attributed their views to Socrates, but part of the reason that Socrates played such a powerful role in ancient and modern philosophy is that he is not identified with either of these philosophical doctrines.
For the Stoics, Socrates’ exemplary life stemmed from his philosophical principles. The Stoic Socrates was an intellectualist. He held that virtue was knowledge and that virtue was sufficient for a good life. The Stoics took seriously the Socratic argument in the Euthydemus and Meno that there is no good except virtue, the nature of which is wisdom.7 They constructed a picture of the person who lived such a life, who infallibly made the correct moral choices: they referred to this person as “the sage.” The sage, thought the Stoics, was the on
ly sane person in a world of madness. Who could live up to this impossibly high standard? The Stoics, modestly, did not put forward Zeno of Citium (c. 334–c. 262), the founder of their school, or Chrysippus of Soli (c. 279–c. 206), its greatest early proponent, as candidates for the sage. If anyone qualified, they thought, it was Socrates. The doxographic tradition derived Stoicism from Socrates by way of the Cynic philosophers, but a more direct route seems possible. It seems that Zeno began his career as a philosopher by reading Xenophon's Memorabilia, which led him to study in the Academy. The Stoics were so favorably disposed toward Socrates that it is said that they were willing to be called “Socratics.”8 Epictetus (c. 55–135 CE) shows the influence of Socrates most clearly. As Long writes, “no other philosopher is named nearly as often … it is Socrates who primarily authorizes everything Epictetus is trying to give his students in terms of philosophical methodology, self-examination, and a life model for them to imitate.”9 As Epictetus himself writes, “Socrates became fully perfect … by not paying attention to anything but his reason in everything that he met with. You, even if you are not yet Socrates, ought to live as someone wanting to be Socrates” (Handbook, 51).10