The Soldier and the State

by Samuel P Huntington

  The unity of the Eisenhower Administration reflected a fairly profound development in politics and public opinion. Traditionally American liberalism was split between a Whig branch, reflecting the interests of business and the economically better-off groups of society, and the popular democratic branch of reform liberalism with its roots in the farmers, small business, and labor. While there was little fundamental ideological conflict between these two segments, there were differences of economic interest. In periods of economic distress the party of reform or popular liberalism was usually able to outvote its rival. Since 1932 this had been the means whereby the Democrats had maintained themselves in office. The Republicans, consequently, had to surmount the prevailing tendency to think in terms of a conflict between the interests of business and the interests of the people. The Eisenhower Administration achieved an identification of interest between business liberalism and popular liberalism by shifting the locus of controversy from domestic policy to foreign policy. In this area popular attitudes reinforced business interests. Business, instead of being the opponent of the popular will, became its champion. The split between the business and popular viewpoints on domestic affairs had made the Democratic Party the majority party so long as economic issues were preëminent. The unity of the business and popular viewpoints on foreign-defense policy gave the Republicans the majority when those problems came to the fore.

  DEFENSE LIBERALISM. The traditional proclivities of American liberalism manifested themselves in the Eisenhower Administration’s defense policies in a variety of ways. The foreign policy of the Administration was to be guided by “openness, simplicity, and righteousness.” 22 The liberal tendency to absolutize and dichotomize war and peace was reflected in the Administration’s hostility toward persistent limited involvements. The Korean War was brought to a close, and the “massive retaliation” policy was enunciated with the hope of averting further conflicts of this nature. In the spring of 1954 the Administration did consider intervention in Indochina but the opposition of Congress and the British caused it to abandon this proposal. Liberal optimism was reflected in the Administration’s evaluation of the strength of the Russian foe. Secretary Wilson and Deputy Secretary Kyes early indicated their disbelief of pessimistic service estimates and consistently maintained that American military forces were the best in the world, and that the United States had a long lead over the Russians in weapons technology. The Administration also tended to define the goals of American policy in more sweeping and universalistic terms than did its predecessor. The goal of the “liberation” of Eastern Europe was emphasized in the 1952 campaign, and even after coming into office, the Administration continued to stress the desirability of a “more dynamically anti-communist” policy. The leaders of the Defense Department tended to adhere to the liberal belief that domestic and economic solutions were applicable to the problems of military security. The same techniques, policies, and organization which produced success in business could also produce success in government. The traditional liberal hostility to military institutions and military force manifested itself in the Administration’s efforts to find substitutes for large military forces as a means to national security. In the Administration’s first year it was argued that a strong economy was our first line of defense and military forces should not be maintained which might threaten financial stability or national solvency. In the second year of the Administration the technological substitute was emphasized: American possession of a variety of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would justify a reduction in conventional military forces. In the Administration’s third year stress was placed upon the creation of a substantial reserve of citizen-soldiers as the alternative to a large standing army. Throughout this period the Administration gave high priority to a balanced budget and reduced taxes and, consequently, reduced military expenditures. It was here, of course, that in practical terms the business liberalism of the Administration most closely coincided with the popular desires of the people.

  The Eisenhower Administration expected the Joint Chiefs of Staff to share in this liberal philosophy. This meant that the qualifications of a desirable JCS member for the Eisenhower Administration differed considerably from those of one for the previous administration. The Truman Administration needed military leaders with the political prestige to carry the Administration’s policies. The Eisenhower Administration wanted agreement not advocacy from its military Chiefs. They were, in Secretary Wilson’s words, to be members of the team — not spokesmen for it. The initial appointments to the JCS in the spring of 1953 reflected this desire to secure men who would share the “new look” of the Administration rather than ones who would have political weight with Congress and the public. This same tendency was carried even further two years later with the selection of Rear Admiral Burke as Chief of Naval Operations. The Truman Administration probably could never have afforded politically to dip so low into the flag officer ranks. The appointment of the Chiefs for no specified term and the stated intention to review all appointments after two years indicated that the Administration was more interested in securing agreement than in enhancing the status of its military leaders. The Rockefeller Committee which drew up the reorganization plan for the Pentagon in the spring of 1953 emphasized the desirability of a unified civilian-military thinking. It was impossible, the Committee said, “to make a sufficiently clear distinction between military affairs, on the one hand, and on the other hand civilian affairs (such as political, economic, and industrial affairs) to serve as a practicable basis for dividing responsibility between military and civilian officers, or for establishing two parallel lines of command.” 23 The report also urged the Secretary of Defense to participate in meetings of the Joint Chiefs. Whereas the Truman Chiefs had argued that they spoke purely “from the military viewpoint,” a directive from Secretary Wilson in the summer of 1954 ordered the Chiefs in discharging their statutory responsibilities to “avail themselves of the most competent and considered thinking that can be obtained representing every pertinent point of view, including military, scientific, industrial and economic.” 24 The President reportedly declared that he wanted only unanimous decisions from the Joint Chiefs. Subsequently, when he found himself dissenting from the Administration viewpoint, General Ridgway charged that he had been subjected to “incessant pressure” to persuade him to “conform to a preconceived politico-military ‘party line.’ ” When the general refused to adjust his thinking, it was made clear to him that he was not to let his “nonconcurrence publicly be known.” 25

  Despite these various efforts by the Administration to insure a harmonious viewpoint, it took a while for the new Joint Chiefs to adjust their thinking to the new philosophy. Upon taking office in the summer of 1953 they were directed to formulate a “new look” military strategy taking into consideration both military factors and the new Administration’s fiscal policy. Despite this injunction they came up in the fall with virtually the same force level proposals as their Truman predecessors. The National Security Council, however, rejected these recommendations and directed the military to produce a strategic plan which would cost less money.26 This in itself, of course, did not transgress civil-military responsibilities, nor would the Joint Chiefs have abandoned a military role if they had simply complied with the directive and produced the best recommendations possible within the NSC budgetary limit. But the evidence suggests that some members of the Joint Chiefs went beyond this. They did not just accept the limits set by the political authorities; they also incorporated into their own thinking the assumptions which were uppermost in the minds of the political leaders. This was particularly true of the chairman of the JCS, Admiral Radford. To a lesser degree it was also true of Admiral Carney and General Twining. It was not true of General Ridgway who essayed a strictly professional role adhering to his independent military judgment yet accepting the subordination of this judgment to that of the President and his civilian advisers. Rejecting Bradley’s warning of the previous summer that militar
y men should not make economic and political judgments, Radford argued that the Joint Chiefs should begin with estimates of the total national income and then

  . . . make an assumption as to the amount that might be allotted for defense . . .

  Without any reservation, I subscribe to the theory that as military men, in trying to work out plans for the long pull . . . we must take economic factors into consideration . . .

  From figures that we obtained on prospective national income over the long pull, we eliminated the more or less fixed expenses, and within the remaining estimated amount, we did feel . . . that we came up with a military program which was adequate . . .27

  Subsequently, Admiral Radford indicated his complete support for the reduced budget of the “New Look,” a position which he took again the following year when the second stage of the Administration’s military reductions were before Congress. The Eisenhower Joint Chiefs also tended to adopt as a part of their thinking the assumptions advanced by Secretary Dulles as to the desirability of a more active anticommunist policy. In the spring of 1954, Admiral Radford urged intervention in the Indochinese War by carrier air strikes at the enemy forces attacking Dienbienphu.28In the fall of 1954 the Joint Chiefs (Ridgway dissenting) recommended that the United States intervene by bombing the Chinese mainland if necessary in order to defend the Nationalist held offshore islands (Quemoy) against Communist attack. Still later, after touring the Far East, Admiral Radford was apparently able to secure a partial and somewhat beclouded endorsement by the Administration of his position. At about the same time he indicated that he would support a blockade of the Chinese coast if this were necessary to secure the release of Americans held by the Communists.29

  The full extent to which Admiral Radford’s outlook deviated from the military ethic was revealed in the document on Militant Liberty which he sponsored.30 Prepared in the admiral’s office, this eighteen-page pamphlet attempted to state for the guidance of the Armed Forces “the principles upon which our nation was founded.” Defining the conflict between the Western and Soviet blocs in purely ideological terms, Militant Liberty drew a neat dichotomy between the two: the strength of Communism was the “Annihilated Conscience of the Individual”; the strength of the Free World was the “Sensitive Conscience of the Individual.” The nations of the world, it was argued, can be rated on a scale of from plus-one hundred to minus-one hundred, in terms of the extent to which they balance rights and responsibilities in six areas of human activity. Coming from any place outside of the Government of the United States, the pamphlet would be put down as the naïve, amusing, and harmless work of an eccentric. Issuing from the Pentagon, however, it was a warning symptom of the derangement of American civil-military relations: at one and the same time a measure of the civilian abdication and a devastating example of what can happen when generals and admirals follow fusionist advice to abandon their military knitting and venture into political philosophy.

  IMPLEMENTATION. The political strength of the Eisenhower Administration, the popularity of its civilian leaders, and the popularity of its policies made it unnecessary for the Joint Chiefs to become involved in the public advocacy of policy on anything like the scale of their predecessors. Whereas the Truman Administration had encouraged its military leaders to speak out on policy questions, the Eisenhower Administration preferred silence. It rebuffed military chiefs such as Admiral Carney when they did speak out of turn and instituted elaborate clearance procedures for statements and articles issuing from the military. The Administration felt little need or desire for the military leaders to plead for Administration policies before the public. During his last two years as Chairman of the JCS during the Truman Administration (January 1951-January 1953), General Bradley made fifty-seven public appearances before Congress, civilian groups, and over radio and television in which he discussed important issues of military policy. In contrast, Admiral Radford, in his first two years as JCS Chairman (August 1953-August 1955), made only thirty-nine such statements.* General Bradley delivered the classic exposition of the Truman military policy in his “Gibraltar” speech and frequently made broad statements on foreign policy. The classic formulation of the military policy of the Eisenhower Administration, on the other hand, was not made by a general nor even by the Secretary of Defense, but rather by Secretary Dulles in his “massive retaliation” speech. The rejoinder to Democratic attacks upon this policy was also made by the Secretary at a press conference and in an article in Foreign Affairs and by Vice President Nixon in a national radio address. The only significant contribution of the Joint Chiefs to the debate were the qualifying remarks made by Admiral Radford in a speech on March 9, 1954 and at a military budget hearing before the Senate Appropriations Committee two days after the Vice President’s talk. The Indochinese crisis followed a similar pattern. Although Admiral Radford was a prime mover in the development of policy, he played only a minor role in its public announcement. The lead was taken initially by the President in his statements on March 24 and April 7 and by Secretary Dulles in his New York speech of March 29. The Vice President again played a key role with his famous “off the record” talk to the newspaper editors on April 16. When intervention was finally rejected, it was Dulles who signaled the change in the Administration’s intentions. Radford’s one significant public statement came in a speech on April 15 which, however, only repeated what the President and the Secretary of State had already said, and which was quickly forgotten with the Vice President’s more extreme pronouncement the following day.

  The Administration’s failure to utilize the military leaders for purposes of advocacy reflected its lack of need for political support from this source. Bradley was a strong ally for Truman, but what need did Eisenhower have for Radford? The Administration also in many respects paid a more respectful attention to the views of Congress on defense policy matters such as Indochina and Formosa, and consequently was less in need of means of persuading Congress to validate its own viewpoint. At times the Eisenhower Chiefs made speeches on policy and argued for Administration programs before Congressional committees. But these roles were considerably less important for them than for their predecessors.

  CONCLUSION

  The patterns of civil-military relations in the two administrations reflected differing efforts to ease the tension between military professionalism and liberal politics. So long as basic American attitudes toward war and the military continue in their traditional mold, the Joint Chiefs will be pushed toward either an advocatory political role, a substantive political role, or some combination of the two. Since it is unlikely that the military themselves will possess again the prestige and popularity which they did immediately after World War II, it is unlikely that any subsequent administration will be able to utilize their political support to the extent that the Truman Administration did. But if the party in power does attempt to follow a conservative and unpopular line, whatever aid the military can contribute will certainly be invoked in merchandising that policy to the public. If a more popular policy is followed, on the other hand, the Joint Chiefs will be expected to adhere to the prevailing views. Inevitably, the Chiefs must be either representatives of public opinion or pleaders before it.

  * These include: formal, public congressional hearings: Bradley, 18-Radford, 16; addresses before nonmilitary groups: Bradley, 26-Radford, 23; additional radio and TV appearances: Bradley, 13-Radford, none. Compiled from public documents and information supplied by General Bradley and Admiral Radford.

  15

  The Separation of Powers and Cold War Defense

  THE IMPACT OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS

  The continued high level of defense activities required by the Cold War intensified the impact of the separation of powers on civil-military relations in three ways. First, it enhanced the role of Congress with respect to both military policy and military administration. Second, it shifted the focus of congressional-military relations from the supply units of the military departments to the professional
heads of the services and thereby heightened the tension between the separation of powers and military professionalism. Third, it tended to produce a pluralistic or balanced national military strategy.

  THE SEPARATION OF POWERS VERSUS THE SEPARATION OF FUNCTIONS

  THE CHANGE IN CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST. The increased importance of military affairs during the Cold War necessarily and legitimately resulted in increased congressional involvement in military policy and military administration. Prior to 1940 Congress had little concern with military policy as such. It viewed the activities of the War and Navy Departments from a relatively limited, narrow perspective. Congressional interest focused upon the location of Army posts and Navy yards, military construction, military procurement, and, in general, upon where and to whom military expenditures were made rather than for what they were made. Sectional, economic, and local interests were the motivating factors in congressional concern with military matters. Debates on military appropriations were lightly attended and discussion frequently ran far afield on topics quite unrelated to military spending.1 Congressional consideration of major issues of military policy was limited to occasional bills on Army organization such as the National Defense Acts of 1916 and 1920 and to major authorizations of naval construction such as those of 1916, 1934, and 1938. Apart from these instances, however, Congress gave little attention to military policy for the simple reason that military policy was not politically significant enough to warrant its attention.

  In the ten years following World War II, however, Congress was almost constantly occupied with major substantive issues of military policy: selective service, universal military training, the size of the active forces, the composition of the reserve forces, the organization of the defense establishment, the conditions of service for officers and enlisted men. Each year, in addition, the annual appropriations for the armed services raised the most significant issues of military policy, and the annual authorizations for military and naval construction and for military assistance necessitated important decisions. The transformation of military affairs into an area of vital public concern made it impossible to maintain the constitutional division of function which assigned to the President the authority of the English king to command and administer the military forces and gave to Congress the authority of the English Parliament to determine their existence, size, and composition.