The Crime of Chernobyl- The Nuclear Gulag
Page 13
We had asked that the Mayor be invited because it was he who could give the order to distribute iodine in the town…But when I saw that they were afraid, I said: “Make it simple: add a solution of iodine to the drinking water supply where chlorine is added. Do the same thing in the dairies. The whole population will be protected automatically”. This is what we wrote to them, from the Academy. They were all sitting there, and it was the Prime Minister who needed to make the decision. I came in and he said to me in an irritable tone: “What is it you want to tell us?” I replied that they needed to evacuate a radius of 100 km at least, distribute preventive iodine, forbid the open air sale of food products, close the uncovered area of the market, cancel the May-Day parade, and… in short, I told them all the things they needed to do, and how I had dealt with the situation at the institute. On the top of the table I saw they had a map which they had marked with arrows, like a military operation, showing the spread of radioactivity. I told them that I had been there, what levels of radioactivity we had discovered, that in this area it was 28,000 μR/h, in this other area, 18,000, elsewhere nearly 30,000… On 29th April, near the building of the Central Committee of the Party and the Council of Ministers we measured a level of 800 μR/h.
Meanwhile the Minister of Health, Savchenko, telephoned Moscow to speak to Leonid Ilyin, who was radioprotection advisor to the government, and asked him to comment on my proposals. Ilyin’s response: “You don’t need to do anything” Turning to me, Savchenko said “The doctor says it’s not serious, and you’re sowing panic”. At that moment, the President said in a steely tone: “Comrade Nesterenko, you do what you think right at your Institute! But we’ll cope here without you!” I told him, “Mikhail Aleksevich, I have already given the necessary orders at the Institute. It’s part of my professional duties. I don’t need your authority there. They have already taken iodine as a preventive measure. “We’ll think about it” he said. They carried on with their discussion blocking me out. I left the room and I said to myself, “No, I’m not going to leave it at that!” I went back to the institute and wrote a memo to the government. I coded it, because we had already been told that all information about the radioactive contamination was secret.44 And I told the head of the main department at the institute: “Tomorrow morning, 30th April, Sliunkov should find this report on his table!” I wrote on the 30th April, then on 3rd May, then on 7th… wherever we travelled, the information we were receiving got worse, I was seeing a catastrophe and I continued to send them reports.
44 As Mikhail Gorbachev testified: “The accident had no precedent. It produced ten times more fallout than Hiroshima and contaminated millions of victims. It was a tragedy and I would have liked to have more knowledge of the situation, more time to react, and better warning. It is difficult to imagine, but at the beginning, no one had any idea, not even the scientists, of the scale of the disaster. They thought they could control the situation. And we, in the government, were unclear about what we should do . . . […] No one is safe”. Taken from an interview in the monthly Jonas, 24 August 2001. The disinformation continues. Politicians are prisoners of their ignorance locked in secrecy. (Author’s note)
It was difficult for anyone with a sane mind to imagine this degree of irresponsibility… When scientists do their work, they behave in a responsible way. But there was one thing we hadn’t taken into account. It’s like under socialism, when we thought we had got rid of material motives: “People should be morally responsible” I thought everyone would act responsibly in the development of these new technologies. Could you have imagined what they did at Chernobyl, when they blocked the security rods which were there for precisely that eventuality, to stop the process and avert disaster in the case of an accident like Chernobyl? We have a saying in this country: “There’s no defence against an idiot”. I repeat, I don’t think humanity has the maturity at present to deal with nuclear technology. I visited the areas around Chernobyl, and I saw so many children, we measured their levels, I remember…
While we were taking measurements, it was tragic, seeing the local people who had been directly in contact with radioactive sources. All my life I’ve been taught that you must only approach sources of radioactivity wearing special clothing, that you must protect people, that you need biological protection. People were walking along and getting irradiated. The fact is that we do not have sensory organs that can detect radiation. We saw that the people were completely defenceless. I got into very great conflicts with the authorities at this time.
When the documents from Chernobyl were declassified by the Supreme Soviet, V. Nesterenko published a selection of his reports to the government of Belarus and the USSR, chosen from about 1000 pages of copies that he saved from his archives, about the urgent measures that needed to be taken. Here is the first of these reports, published with a brief introduction, in the newspaper Rodnik, in July 1989.
For nothing is secret that will not be revealed.
Chernobyl
The documents tell the story
The disinformation surrounding Chernobyl and above all the eternally reiterated, and now familiar, fable about “the silence of Belarusian scientists” at the time of the tragic accident[…] have compelled me to publish these documents and prepare this material for the newspaper Rodnik.
It is not hard to guess, I assume, who and for what reason needs to shift the blame for their own faults onto innocent people. We are quite familiar with these games. But in this case the stakes are much too high. We are talking about the future of our nation, its very existence. This is precisely why I cannot allow myself to calmly observe the way today’s high level politicians distribute the winning cards in this game, how suddenly the trump card finds itself in the hands of their faithful ideological adepts, the guardians of power with their monopoly over the truth.
Telling lies about Chernobyl today makes the risk of another Chernobyl more likely. I therefore consider it my duty to make these documents public. I hope that everyone will then have the opportunity to find answers for themselves, without suggestions from others, to our eternal questions: “Whose fault was it?” and above all “What is to be done?”
V. Nesterenko
30th April 1986
To N.N. Sliunkov
Following a request from the Director of general epidemiological health of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Byelorussia, the Institute of Nuclear Energy at the Academy of Sciences of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Byelorussia undertook a spectrometric analysis of samples from the outside environment (soil, water, milk), given to us by the centre for Epidemiological Health at Minsk and by those territories close to the accident at the nuclear power station of Chernobyl in the Gomel region. The spectrometric and radiometric analyses of the soil in the villages and districts of Khoiniki, Narovlia and Bragin show that the inhabitants of these districts were exposed to increased levels of radioactivity from the moment of the accident up to the 30th April 1986. Our evaluations of the predicted radiation dose in these territories based on the results of soil sample analysis indicate that there could be considerable health consequences for the inhabitants.
In consideration of the estimated radiation dose of the inhabitants and the isotopes found in the soil samples, it appeared necessary to study and to put measures in place as soon as possible in order to:
1) distribute preventive iodine to the inhabitants of those regions of the Republic that have been exposed to radiation;
2) take health and hygiene measures to decontaminate skin, clothing, local amenities and housing;
3) limit the provision and sale of untreated food produce;
4) protect uncovered sources of drinking water;
5) organise health education for the population of the Republic;
6) conduct clean up operations in the towns of the Republic.
V.N.
Report of 7th May 1986
To N.N. Sliunkov
1) extend the evacuation zone to 50–70 km from the site of the accident […];
2) set up a team of radiobiologists to work with colleagues from the Institute of Biophysics of the USSR Ministry of Health to evaluate the radiation dose received by the population;
3) set up a commission made up of scientific representatives, specialists from agro-industry, from the Ministry of Health, Food Industry, Trade and Services in order to take all necessary measures to evaluate the radioactive contamination of cereals, vegetables and other local products of vegetable or animal origin and make recommendations on soil use in the future;
4) ask the Ministry of Health of the USSR to establish radiation monitoring levels for the post-accident period.
V.N.
3. HELL
V. Nesterenko.—During the night of 31st April and 1st May, I was called to the centre of communications at the Committee for State Security which is equipped with special telephone links, and at the other end of the phone was Valery Legasov. He was already at Chernobyl. I confirmed that using liquid nitrogen to put out the fire would not cause an explosion. “Perfect, a helicopter will come to fetch you. We will develop a plan together to put out the fire”. The helicopter landed near my datcha and I left. If, as believers say, hell exists, I’ve been there. We were suspended at an altitude of about 300 metres. In the cabin it measured about 100 R/h, an enormously high level. It was dawn, when the morning sun creates very clear contrasts. Visibility was good. I had the impression that about half of the graphite content of the reactor had escaped. Through the thick smoke we could only see the concrete walls, shining a little in the sun. The smoke was monstrous, a dark red colour rising up at least 100 metres. The helicopter circled round Block 4, we couldn’t circle directly above, of course—that would have meant certain death. The smoke fanned out so we were affected anyway also. At that time the cabins were not protected. I even tried to lean out to get a better view, and got my face burned by caesium. At that level, you can feel the radiation physically. When the radioactive particles touch the skin, it feels like an intense sun burn. We were all extremely tense, perhaps because of these unusual circumstances. When I tried to lean out, Legasov grabbed me by the neck: “What are you doing? Think of your son! He’s only 12!” Our families were friends. I said to him: “If something happens to us, the state will help him, won’t it?” And he grabbed me by the neck again and said “You’re joking!” Now, I see how the liquidators are being treated….Most of the people who were there with me are dead. Legasov has gone; Professor Karasev is no longer with us. They’re all dead.
We stayed above the reactor for about 15 minutes. Then we got ourselves decontaminated. They have to put a tube down into the trachea and wash the lungs, because obviously we had inhaled particles. The burns lasted three years. After that, the effects of radiation manifest themselves differently. In the stomach there are fermenting agents, digestive enzymes that break up different foods. Unfortunately some of those enzymes were destroyed. This was the case for most of the liquidators who received high doses of radiation. I know there are clinics in Germany and in Switzerland where you can have them restored. It takes about three months. But at the moment I can’t afford it. In spite of my various titles—Emeritus Professor, Doctor of Science and Technology, member of the Academy—and my allowance from the government for outstanding merit, I only get 85 dollars a month. As you can see, that sort of money wouldn’t even pay for a day in this type of clinic.
After flying over the reactor, we decided, with Legasov, to throw away the dosimeters that we had used because we had not kept to the recommended limits and the people who had let us stay out so long would have been punished. I think we received about 100 rem. All I know is that when I set out I weighed 84 kg and two months later I weighed no more than 61 kg.
The reactor burned for ten days. I was in no doubt about the seriousness and the scale of the accident. As the person in charge of radiological situations at the Academy of Sciences, I immediately assigned more than 1,200 of my colleagues at the Institute to evaluate the contamination and to establish maps of the radioactivity. In the months following my first letter to Sliunkov, the 1000 pages of reports to the government were of a similar nature: “We measured the radioactivity in such and such a place; here are the results; we propose the following measures…”
It had almost no effect. Only one of Nesterenko’s recommendations was implemented: they washed the streets before the May-Day parade. While transcribing the above, a thought came to me spontaneously. Imagine if Nesterenko, who has battled in this human desert between East and West for twenty years, had simply never existed. Would these 2 million Belarusian peasants, including 500,000 children, even exist for us, for the world, to remind us about what has happened, what is to come, for historical memory? Without this witness, who, with his high level of expertise, dared to defy the nuclear powers, these children, these women, these men would have been ignored, annulled, “disappeared” one by one in silence. Annihilated by the lobby of deceit, that is preparing more destruction of normal life on Earth, a destruction that is statistically probable. “We’re all going to die, so what’s new?” This is the implicit calculation of indifferent officials towards the human guinea pigs. They arrive for a few days, are paid a great deal of money, then leave, having delivered their scientific verdict to passive, complicit governments. It would be up to us alone to transform this demented dream into a nightmare for the nuclear lobby. But, in the words of Doctor Zatkhei, the activist from Poliske45, “People are too slow to realise the seriousness of the situation”.
45 See page 24.
V. Nesterenko.—What really changed my life was the shock of seeing children contaminated. We had been insisting since the beginning of May on their evacuation. But it was only after the 10th May that they started the evacuation. I am thinking again of one of those night-time meetings in the room at the Central Committee office, where I and the president of the Academy were insisting that measures be taken, that the children be evacuated, and no-one supported us. Soon after that, I went to Khoiniki to see what was going on there. On my return, the president of the Academy had brought together all the institute directors to hear my report. As I was recounting what was happening there, I actually broke down. I started to cry because I felt that my words were falling on deaf ears, nobody would do anything. But I think my anguish must finally have got through because around the 10th May, things started to move.
On one of my missions, I found myself at Gomel, when they were evacuating the children. What I saw shook me so decisively that it changed the course of my life. At that point, it was no longer possible to leave either Kiev or Gomel. People were quite literally hurling themselves onto whatever transport was available, to get out of town. Parents and children had been taken to the station where convoys of trains were waiting. I do not know how they got them there; they probably had to use force. Children were being snatched from their mothers, thrown into the train, sent off to unknown destinations in the Urals, in Bashkiria, or Udmurtia. They loaded tens of thousands of children into these trains, and then they left. It brought back my childhood memories of the war: the Germans were retreating and they used terrified women and children to protect their troops… they put them… in front of the tanks, (he represses a sob) so that our planes did not bomb them. They were crying and screaming….In the end, the Germans were surrounded but our forces bombed nevertheless, and a huge number of people were killed. It took a week to bury them. At Gomel I relived this scene: children were being grabbed, loaded onto trains, and sent off, amidst sobbing, screaming, and hysterical cries for help. That was just my first experience…
Later, there was another. A never ending line of coaches was passing by on the ring road in the town near the datcha where we lived. I got in my car and drove to the nearby sanatorium, where the coaches had stopped. The children were getting out, ex
hausted. You can imagine, after a journey of six or eight hours, without anything to eat or drink, dressed any old how, completely done in, worn out. I watched them coming towards me. When I measured their levels, I found they had all been irradiated…
The third time that I got upset was when I had been called in by the president of the Academy, to examine children sent to a pioneer camp at Rakov, not far from the institute. Each child was carrying a toy and wearing clothes that we had to monitor with the dosimeter for radioactivity: everything was contaminated; it all had to be thrown out. We bought them new clothes. We had to take all of it away and throw it in the container for radioactive waste. At that moment, I thought that if this technology caused so much suffering to hundreds of thousands of people, it had no right to exist.
It is not possible to employ scientists of a sufficiently high quality at every nuclear power station to ensure that all regulations are followed. At Chernobyl, if they had not blocked the security systems, this accident would never have happened. But it did happen. There is nowhere in the world where man’s moral conscience is equal to the challenge posed by such dangerous technology.
From 1989 to 1993, I presided over the joint, independent expert committee of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, which brought together 200 scientists, doctors, geneticists, agricultural specialists, physicists and radioprotection specialists, a group which was to distance itself from the international committee of experts. The latter had claimed in its conclusions to the International Chernobyl Project, that the accident had had no significant health consequences. Hans Blix, the director of the IAEA, had stated that humanity could tolerate an accident like Chernobyl every year. What blasphemy given that in Belarus alone, 2 million people, including 500,000 children, out of a total population of 10 million, live in areas contaminated by Chernobyl and the government still cannot guarantee their safety. So long as we are unable to deal with the consequences of Chernobyl, we have no right to continue to develop atomic energy.