In the Arena

by Pete Hegseth

  Then, on November 4, 2008, Barack Obama was overwhelmingly elected our next president. And, over the course of two Obama administrations, our worst fears were realized. A Vets for Freedom radio ad we ran in 2008 foreshadowed this nightmare. As the pro-surge ad concluded, a young child—a daughter of an Iraq War veteran—left a chilling and prophetic message: “Please don’t leave this fight for me. . . .” That is precisely what Barack Obama and his coexist foreign policy have done. An unwillingness to finish an important war—for reasons of expediency, politics, and cowardice—has ensured, in terrible ways, that we have left the fight for the next generation. For your daughters and for our sons. George W. Bush and America’s Iraq War veterans didn’t leave the fight for the next generation—Barack Obama did.

  Look where the Middle East is today. The rise of the Islamic State and the chaos spreading across the region are directly tied to President Obama’s leave-at-any-cost strategy. Today we are sending more and more American military “advisers” back to Iraq and now Syria—countries and a region that are in infinitely worse shape than they were following the surge.

  The biggest lesson of Iraq is resolve, when it matters most. With resolve, even in our deepest and darkest moments America cannot be defeated, militarily or politically. Without resolve, even with every technical advantage and employing advanced weaponry we will remain vulnerable to nimble, persistent, and ideological enemies. America’s enemies, especially Islamists of all stripes, believe with great justification that America’s weakest link is our resolve—both on the battlefield and in the court of public opinion. Osama bin Laden called us a “paper tiger,” likely to flee from battles that got too messy or complicated. Bin Laden misjudged George W. Bush but had his successor pegged.

  Through the lens of two summers—one on the battlefield and another in Washington—I saw the true character of America and our 9/11 generation. I saw what is possible, in both places, when men and women demonstrate resolve, courage, and intellectual integrity. I saw why, as Roosevelt said, “it is right to prevail.” I’ve also seen what happens when political expediency and ideologically shallow arguments drive decision making. Unfortunately, the carnage that is Iraq and Syria today demonstrates that the latter group prevailed. We did not lose the war in Iraq, as some have suggested; we chose not to win, by handcuffing—and defeating—our warfighters and our country. It is a legacy the Coexist Left owns and ought to be utterly ashamed of.

  SIX

  Fight Hard: Learning the Right Lessons Since 9/11

  The good citizen will demand liberty for himself, and as a matter of pride he will see to it that others receive liberty which he thus claims as his own. Probably the best test of true love of liberty in any country is the way in which minorities are treated in that country. Not only should there be complete liberty in matters of religion and opinion, but complete liberty for each man to lead his life as he desires, provided only that in so he does not wrong his neighbor. . . .

  There is little place in active life for the timid good man. . . . The good citizen in a republic must first of all be able to hold his own. He is no good citizen unless he has the ability which will make him work hard and which at need will make him fight hard.

  —TEDDY ROOSEVELT, 1910

  How could I not work with people who came across the ocean to help save and rebuild my city?

  —LITTLE OMAR, SAMARRA, IRAQ, 2006

  The title of Teddy Roosevelt’s 1910 speech, “Citizenship in a Republic,” befits the content of his speech. The speech is largely about cultivating good and gutsy citizenship in order to maintain a robust and free republic. He alludes to foreign affairs only briefly, and mostly through the lens of domestic considerations. As such, nothing in the text is detailed—but instead based on principles that were evident during his presidency and colored his eventual agitation for American involvement in World War I. In the speech Teddy references, among other principles: patriotism, national sovereignty, international engagement, freedom promotion, military strength, and having the will to fight and win when necessary. The application of these principles is the difficult part—especially in challenging times.

  Teddy Roosevelt lived in consequential times, as do we; times that challenge both the rigidity and elasticity of America’s core principles. Everybody is a patriot when times are good, but allegiance can fade when outcomes are murky; places like Valley Forge and the Argonne Forest remind us that commitment can be sustained, provided the public and her military are invested. International engagement is important, but not when it erodes sovereignty—where is that line in an interconnected world? Promoting freedom sounds good but proves perplexing across continents and cultures. Military might and a strong posture can prevent wars, but once you’re in them—fighting to win requires mustering finite national will, clear leadership, and a reticent citizenry. National security and foreign policy have always been more of an art than a science, requiring the “wise statesman” Teddy Roosevelt invoked. Roosevelt also understood that statesmen are often compelled to advocate for causes and positions that, in their time, are controversial, costly, or at cross-purposes with public opinion. Public opinion in a democracy, even with an engaged citizenry, is often shortsighted, fickle, and prone to advantageous political demagoguery. Foreign policy statesmen must cut through that, while making a compelling public case as to why certain enemies, certain engagements, and certain entanglements are necessary to advance American security and interest.

  In Teddy Roosevelt’s case, at the dawn of the twentieth century, his crucible was the rise of powerful American potential that was able to, for the first time, promote freedom in her neighborhood, block colonial meddling in the Western Hemisphere, and affect the outcome of a world war on the European continent. In the case of the 9/11 generation and the unfolding twenty-first century, the challenges are different: difficult wars and the growing threat of both violent and political Islamism, but also a rising China and the growth of international institutions that no longer serve Western interests and values. Confronting these threats will require the same principles that Teddy Roosevelt espoused, just in modern form. What should promoting American values, projecting American strength, cultivating free societies, and defeating determined enemies look like in the twenty-first century? Let’s start with a series of controversial case studies: the intersection of the three recent wars that have thus far consumed the first fifteen years of this new century: the Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya wars.

  IRAQ: SURGING TO “PREVAIL”

  When my mind goes back to Iraq—or anytime Gavin DeGraw’s song “Belief” hits my iTunes playlist—I often think of an Iraqi teenager named Little Omar. His full name was Omar Hamid Al Abassi, but we called him “Little Omar.” He was five foot two and maybe 120 pounds soaking wet. When the United States invaded in 2003, Little Omar’s religious leaders told him the Americans were here to “convert Muslims to Christianity,” “kill innocent civilians,” and “rape Iraqi women.” An impressionable and devout teenager, Little Omar said he was “brainwashed” to believe it was his Islamic duty to kill as many Americans as possible. So he joined the insurgency as a low-level fighter and attacked Americans when and where he could. Apparently and unfortunately he was aggressive and effective—which, after meeting him, did not surprise me. Shortly after my unit arrived in Samarra, his relative and tribal leader—Mr. Assad, whom I wrote about in the previous chapter—was fortuitously appointed the city council president. Little Omar reluctantly became one of his bodyguards, a position that brought him in proximity to U.S. forces. I’ll never forget the first time we met him: still a teenager, his eyes were filled with both fear and hate. We didn’t trust the new bodyguard, and the feeling was mutual. He was extremely hesitant to talk, selectively approaching our interpreters on the side to get the scoop on the Americans. After weeks of interactions—as he watched and listened quietly—he pulled aside our top interpreter and asked, “The Americans seem like such nice people. Are the Americans always like this?” A
few personal conversations later—about family, religion, and America—Little Omar was soon our most courageous ally, and informant.

  He reinfiltrated his former insurgent networks, this time with a GPS device. He handed over long lists of valuable information. He walked countless missions with us in a ski mask, pointing out insurgent hideouts and meeting places. One moment in particular sticks out when, in the early evening, my phone rang. Little Omar said he knew where the sniper was who had killed one of our soldiers—he was spending the night in a nearby mosque. Little Omar was still a new informant and any mosque is considered a sensitive site, so we pressed him to make sure his information was correct. An hour later I received another call. Little Omar was now at the mosque and with the sniper (a former friend), confirming the target and exact location inside the mosque. His only ask was that when we raided it, we treat him the same so we didn’t blow his cover. Later that night, the Samarra Iraqi police raided the mosque under the watchful eye of our Bravo Company. As my journal reads, they “found weapons and evidence galore” but not a single shot was fired. Why? Little Omar later told us that, while the sniper was sleeping, he had placed damaged rounds in the sniper’s weapon to make it inoperable. This was not the first time, nor the last, that Little Omar would put his life on the line for us.

  Just like my first impressions of Little Omar—which were incomplete and superficial—the conventional wisdom on the Iraq war is ass-backward. The lesson of Little Omar is that he was not a permanent enemy; he was instead a potential ally, a conclusion we drew only after further engagement, investigation, and review of the conventional wisdom. Likewise, the invasion of Iraq was not a mistake; leaving the battlefield precipitously was the real mistake—based on surface-level perceptions and a willful blindness to facts on the ground. Just as it took time and effort to build a relationship with Little Omar, it also took time, effort—and blood—to forge a stable and governable Iraq. Even if our intelligence at the outset of the war was not fully correct, abandoning the Iraq War—not entering it—was the largest strategic blunder of the Obama administration, the ramifications of which America will be dealing with indefinitely. Our eventual strategic defeat in Iraq, which came squarely as a result of Barack Obama’s policy of disengagement and retreat, came at terrible costs—in American security, in credibility, and, most important, in lost opportunity.

  American retreat was the single largest ingredient in the rise of the most bloodthirsty and powerful Islamic movement in modern history, leading to an Islamic State caliphate hell-bent on striking the United States, exporting their apocalyptic ideology around the globe, and unleashing a humanitarian and refugee crisis of biblical proportions. This was Al Qaeda in Iraq’s goal as well, before they were soundly defeated during and after the surge. The disintegrated security situation in Iraq following our hasty withdrawal under Obama in 2011 also served to amplify the consequences of incoherent U.S. policy in Syria and Libya during the so-called Arab Spring. The chaos in Iraq and Syria today is also directly tied to region-wide chaos, accelerating a regional power struggle between (former) Arab Sunni allies and an ambitious—and eventually nuclear—Iran. On a global scale, because America didn’t follow through on a difficult war in Iraq following a successful surge strategy, we will remain heavily invested there—and less capable of checking global threats like China and Russia. We left chaos behind in Iraq and as a result are far less capable or credible there . . . or anywhere else.

  But as bad as the Islamic State is today, the lost opportunity of what we gave up in Iraq (tomorrow) is worse. Understanding the full extent of this lost opportunity starts with understanding what Iraqis, enabled by American troops, had achieved in Iraq by the time Barack Obama took office. Thanks to a military and political shift of massive proportions, the environment in Iraq following the surge was nothing short of a geopolitical game changer. Iraq in 2008, 2009, and 2010 was the type of Middle Eastern country that—in the rearview mirror in 2016—America would love to have. It was allied, largely peaceful, and increasingly prosperous. In a post-surge Iraq, Al Qaeda was defeated, Iran was increasingly marginalized, Sunni-Shia political progress was developing (not perfect, but moving in the right direction), and the Iraqi economy was hitting its stride. Iraq was not, and never would be, a Western-style democracy, but it was—as Commanding General David Petraeus called it: an “Iraqracy”—Iraqi-style democracy.

  And it wasn’t the first time a functioning “Iraqracy” had taken shape, against all odds, inside this notoriously fractious state. Following the Persian Gulf War in 1991, Iraqi Kurds—mostly Muslim, but also including a diverse group of Christians and other minorities—were protected by an American-enforced northern no-fly zone, thereby given a de facto opening for post-authoritarian self-governance. The prospect of life without Saddam Hussein was a monumental moment for Iraqi Kurds, and elections were quickly held. But long-standing intra-Kurdish tensions simmered (also stoked by neighbors), and the political process broke down and descended into civil war. Eventually, after years of war and following American mediation, the sides brokered a settlement that eventually led to a largely united Iraqi Kurdistan. (Sounds a bit like Iraq in 2008, doesn’t it?) Today the Kurdish region of Iraq stands alone as a pocket of stability, cooperation—and yes, democracy—in the Middle East. It took years and bloodshed, but the evolution of a diverse Iraqi Kurd population that included Sunni, Shia, Christian, and other sects toward pluralism, tolerance, and peace demonstrates what is possible in the Middle East. This lesson in “Iraqracy” also demonstrates what is possible if the United States uses military and diplomatic might in the right place at the right time and is willing to stick with that commitment over the long haul.

  The reality of Iraq following the surge—from those who witnessed it—is that it was a massive and missed opportunity to defeat and discredit Islamists, support the development of quasi-stable, quasi-democratic, and multiethnic governance in the Middle East, and demonstrate a decent economic and societal future for average Iraqis. Before the war, Iraq had the human and historical seeds needed for modern progress: a literate populace, a history of multiethnic tolerance, the structures for central governance, a technocratic class, oil resources, modern infrastructure, and a functioning military. After years of “woulda, coulda, and shoulda” in Iraq, the sheer courage of our troops before, during, and after the 2007 surge finally unleashed this imperfect potential . . . only for the Obama administration to squander it. Imagine—to quote John Lennon—an allied, stable, quasi-democratic country in the heart of the Arab world today. Imagine that country partnering with the United States, eventually recognizing Israel’s right to exist, providing a buffer to Iran, and fighting Al Qaeda (because the Islamic State doesn’t exist, or is contained to Syria). Imagine a stable Iraq where my kids—and yours—won’t have to return to fight. Imagine.

  But don’t just take my word for it. Here is Vice President Joe Biden in February 2010 on the prospects for a good outcome in Iraq:

  I am very optimistic about Iraq. I think it’s gonna be one of the great achievements of this [Obama] administration. You’re gonna see 90,000 American troops come marchin’ home by the end of the summer. You’re gonna see a stable government in Iraq that is actually movin’ toward a representative government. I’ve been there 17 times now. I go about every two months, three months. I know every one of the major players in all the segments of that society. It’s impressed me. I’ve been impressed, how they have been deciding to use the political process, rather than guns, to settle their differences.

  In 2010, even the Obama administration saw Iraq as a success. But they still didn’t have a correct understanding of why Iraqis were using “the political process, rather than guns.” Political progress didn’t happen magically or because of meetings—it happened at the ends of M-4 and AK-47 rifles. American and Iraqi military progress, along with powerful strategic alliances with Sunni tribes and Shia leaders, had created the space for political progress, and Iraqis had taken advantage of it. (
This is especially true and remarkable given that from 2005 to 2008, Iraq was a flytrap for the world’s most violent Islamists.) But progress was far from perfect, requiring continued—if substantially reduced—American military and diplomatic oversight. Americans didn’t have to stay in Iraq to “nation build,” but instead to ensure Iraqi military and political leaders were able to cohere and mature long enough to build their own nation, an investment that would bear incalculable returns. By 2010 that could be done with far fewer troops and far less money than at any time previously in the war.

  Instead, Obama’s policy of unilaterally declaring victory and then unconditionally withdrawing managed to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory in Iraq—eroding a hard-won peace and undercutting the most consequential foreign policy endeavor of the post-9/11 generation. Regardless of how they spin it, the Obama administration—hell-bent on a complete withdrawal—did not want a status of forces agreement that would allow a contingent of U.S. troops to remain in Iraq. It was never a priority, and they found every excuse to abandon the agreement (contrast that with the Iranian nuclear talks, where they humped the legs of the Iranians while agreeing to extraconstitutional secret side deals in order to get a deal).

  The arc of Iraqi prime minister Nouri Al Maliki’s leadership also tells the story powerfully. Emboldened by the game-changing progress of the surge, in 2008 Maliki—a Shia—proactively led a multiethnic Iraqi Army against Shia militias in Baghdad’s Sadr City and then down to Basra to confront Shia militias. He oversaw some of the first truly free elections, with Iraqis holding up a purple finger: one man, one woman, one vote. And yet, just a few years later, with the Obama administration contemptuously racing for the exits with no plan in place, Maliki sought greater alignment with a neighboring benefactor—Iran, and thus increasingly marginalized his potential Sunni partners.