In the Arena

by Pete Hegseth

  AN EMERGING GLOBAL CIVILIZATION

  Teddy Roosevelt was an unapologetic advocate of American values and leadership, but he was also an internationalist—acknowledging in his Sorbonne speech that “[i]nternational law will, I believe, as the generations pass, grow stronger and stronger until in some way or other there develops the power to make it respected.” A few weeks later, while accepting the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo, Norway, Roosevelt even called for a “League of Peace” managed by great powers and dedicated to keeping peace . . . by force of arms if necessary. A student of history, Roosevelt knew that the arc of Western history—from the humanist Renaissance to the Protestant Reformation to the Treaty of Westphalia—had slowly evolved toward a managed international order biased in favor of Western ideas of representative governance, individual freedom, and free markets. He had no illusions about the fact that an increasingly interconnected world would include some global structures, but the nature, scope, and mandate of those structures were critically important to Teddy Roosevelt, and they are even more so to us today. The original concept of Roosevelt’s “League” was to protect national sovereignty, not attempt to supersede it.

  Nine months after America’s entry into World War I, and ten months before the war’s conclusion, President Woodrow Wilson laid out America’s terms for an enduring postwar peace in “Fourteen Points.” Wilson’s Fourteen Points for world peace, while never ratified by the U.S. Senate nor codified internationally, nonetheless served as the (failed) framework for postwar negotiations with Germany. The most prominent point was the fourteenth—an international League of Nations that would “[afford] mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.” Wilson sought an equal international body where disputes could be aired, debated, and hopefully resolved before bullets started flying. Roosevelt, acknowledging the laudable goal of a lasting peace (which he had proposed before Wilson), nonetheless forcefully opposed the League of Nations and the Fourteen Points, believing they would “simply add one more scrap to the diplomatic wastepaper basket [because] most of the fourteen points could be interpreted to mean anything or nothing.” As we say in the military, they briefed well—but had little connection to reality.

  Worse, Roosevelt believed a universal League of Nations—as envisioned by Wilson—would subjugate great powers, like the United States, France, and Great Britain, to equal footing with lesser, and less free, powers. Unchecked, loose interpretations of ambiguous mandates combined with a forum for lesser powers—and dictatorial regimes—could eventually become a powerful bludgeon against the free world. Roosevelt preferred a “compact by the allies and well behaved neutrals” that would “admit other nations only as their conduct . . . warrants it.” Such an arrangement—a loose compact of like-minded countries as opposed to an international mandate of any country—would ensure, as Roosevelt wrote, that “our territorial possessions, to our control of immigration and citizenship, to our fiscal policy, and to our handling of our domestic problems generally [would] not be brought before any international tribunal.” (I recommend such an arrangement in the next chapter.)

  Fast-forward one hundred years and we see that global institutions—like the United Nations and International Criminal Court (ICC)—have affirmed Roosevelt’s suspicions. These institutions, and a sprawling web of others like them, were started under the admirable auspices of peace, conflict resolution, and equal justice. And for most of the twentieth century, these institutions largely served Western interests, with the UN Security Council advancing democracy expansion and the ICC prosecuting tin-pot dictators and bloodthirsty war criminals. But this is not likely to be the case in the twenty-first century. These international institutions, conceived to protect and advance the Western order, are being gradually captured—and wielded—by a powerful new civilization that would like to hold the West, and especially America, to account for so-called sins of the past. Increasingly enabled, and thereby emboldened, by America’s current “coexist” foreign policy, a powerful global civilization is actively working to use international organizations to undermine the West’s dominant position, inadvertently opening the door to Islamists and Communist China to fully arrive on the scene.

  The emerging global civilization is a combination of two forces, one complacent and the other militaristic. Previous chapters highlighted a new generation of “citizens of the world” that manifests in a soft anti-Americanism and deference to all things international, diverse, and multicultural. “International feeling swamps . . . national feeling” for this group of postmodern do-gooders; they are not the problem, but they are a big part of the problem. Their naïveté (much like average Muslims who tolerate extreme views) unwittingly advances the real “foe of mankind” inside the global civilization—the globalists. Globalists are militant, anti-Western internationalist elites, largely from postmodern Europe, who are hell-bent on “coexisting.” Globalists believe, like Islamists, that Western-controlled international institutions simply advance new forms of Western economic, cultural, and political imperialism and colonialism. With the levers of international institutions at their fingertips, self-loathing globalists are gathering together lesser powers (regardless of regime type), cataloging Western “injustices,” and arming themselves with international “regulations” by which they can level the international playing field. Various international global climate change agreements (schemes) demonstrate this dynamic powerfully.

  While more benign in nature, the globalist pursuit of utopia—regardless of flag, freedom, or creed—ultimately seeks a similar end to that of Islamists and Chinese communists: the end of the modern nation-state system as the fundamental construct of global affairs, replaced with a top-down form of global governance. Islamists want a caliphate, communists want a Chinese Dream, and globalists want One World government. These three threats cannot “coexist” together forever, but currently constitute an alliance against their shared enemy: America. Globalists would like to eventually do away with state sovereignty, unilateral action, and any form of warfare (just or unjust), believing their perfected state of humanity will create a coerced condition of global consensus, mutual understanding, and economic fairness. In doing so, they can box in America—and everything that comes with it. They ignore the fallen nature of man, instead putting their faith—and fate—in the hands of postmodern, perfected men. Skinny jeans, neutral genders, and blue helmets are their uniform.

  Globalists don’t just believe that history is over; instead, like Islamists but with atheistic fervor, they believe they can usher in a perfected end to human governance and thereby history. They demand fellow adherents forsake clan, village, region, ethnic group, religion, and nationality. The European Union (EU) is an excellent example of the globalist worldview. As part of the post–Cold War I peace dividend—and partly in an attempt to check American hegemony—Europe voluntarily transformed itself into an anti-nation-state system, stripping economic, political, and geographic sovereignty away from individual countries and giving them an ill-defined and ambiguous form of governance with power concentrated in the hands of unaccountable EU bureaucrats. Just a few years removed, member states now have neither sovereignty nor a powerful civilization capable of projecting military might, preventing harmful Muslim mass immigration, or preserving cultural influence—and are thus relegating themselves to second-class international status. The outcome of the EU was not power, influence, or the perfection of human governance, but instead the massive transfer of power away from nation-states (the people) into the hands of unelected and unaccountable technocrats. For globalists, the instructions say to lather, rinse, and repeat across the twenty-first century.

  As Samuel Huntington points out, civilizations can be large or small, and while the global civilization is not currently large in number, their influence is vast. Opposing their agenda does not mean opposing all international institutions, but instead approaching international cooperation through a pro-freedom lens: encouraging
voluntary association and voluntary exchange with freedom-defending societies while opposing the globalist push for collective consensus and coercion. Good-faith, principled international engagement is a must of American foreign policy in the twenty-first century, but submitting the future and interests of the United States to unelected, unaccountable, and unaligned international bodies undermines our security and dilutes the special nature of our country. Principles we take for granted today—open markets, freedom of speech, equality under the law, religious liberty, and government by consent of the governed—are not the principles of globalists, so help us God (wait, they don’t believe in God).

  The balance Roosevelt tried to strike in his critique of Wilson’s Fourteen Points in 1918 was correct, and we need to find a way to reestablish a similar balance today—lest we cede the future to globalists, and by extension, Islamists and Chinese communists.

  • • •

  Other threats to freedom, of course, exist, like Vladimir Putin and his desire to reestablish Russian greatness (Cold War II). But understanding threats to freedom does not mean seeing a civilizational bogeyman behind every corner. America has never had permanent enemies, and we seek a just peace wherever possible. Two of today’s most powerful economies and former violent enemies—Germany and Japan—are living examples of America’s willingness to not only see past historical transgressions, but instead actively promote a prosperous future for former enemies. America seeks freedom, not perpetual enemies—another reason why America is a truly exceptional nation in human history.

  Iraq—and the war my generation fought on her soil—represents another such example. As it turns out, Francis Fukuyama—the aforementioned author of The End of History—also wrote extensively about the outcome in Iraq. After supporting the war initially as a means of freedom promotion, Fukuyama withdrew his support in 2006 and declared the war an inevitable disaster, saying, “Before the Iraq war, it was clear that if we were going to do Iraq properly, we would need a minimum commitment of five to ten years.” On these points, he was both wrong and right. He was right that Iraq would require a long-term commitment, but he was wrong that the war—as bad as it was in 2006—was bound to fail.

  The Iraq War in 2006—which I waged and witnessed at that time—was not going well. Violence was rising, Iraqi power-sharing failing, and domestic public support waning. The choice and potential outcomes for George W. Bush could not be starker: American retreat followed by violent Islamist chaos or resolute American commitment that would produce a long-term and contested outcome. If we left Iraq, we could cut our losses and violence would ensue; if we stayed, we might just muddle along. Or, if things really went our way, maybe victory was still possible. Nobody knew for certain, and the future of the Middle East hung in the balance. After invading the country, liberating oppressed minorities, and investing in a quasi-representative government, would America leave behind an Islamist hotbed in Iraq or stand resolute? The answer to this question ultimately determined whether Iraq would be a foe-turned-friend like Germany or Japan, or would contribute to the civilizational march of Islamists. The stakes of the Iraq War in 2006 (just like in 2011) were that high.

  The history books of World War I always remember President Woodrow Wilson “making the world safe for democracy,” but they fail to mention his shortsighted insistence just three months earlier that “peace without victory” was still possible—an utterance Teddy Roosevelt knew was nonsense. In the face of even the most forceful and evident threats, men will always hesitate, equivocate, and look for the exits—look at President Obama today as a tragic example. Fights like World War I, World War II, and the first Cold War look clear in retrospect but were highly contested in their times. A certain subset of Americans, like Wilson, have always been—and will always be—“too proud to fight,” either outright opposing necessary fights from the outset, or quickly jumping ship at the first sign of resistance. Like Teddy Roosevelt’s vigorous defense of France and the free world during World War I, my experience in the Iraq War—both on the battlefield and at home—forged an experiential belief in the powerful, principled, and resolute application of American power. We could have finished our victory in Iraq, but instead we chose to leave early and lose—to horrific consequence.

  Like the trajectory of the Iraq War, the fragile moments in history where Wilson’s “peace without victory” clash with Roosevelt’s “total victory” are where wars are won or lost—and dangerous ideologies either defeated or emboldened. Like the Iraq War in 2006 and 2011—two defining decision points—the future will see many more of these moments, with ruthless Islamists, Chinese nationalists, and browbeating globalists. Only American power—unapologetically and shrewdly applied—has the ability to ensure the free world gets stronger and more secure in these moments. We must learn the lessons of the past, but we also cannot shrink from the world just because our past isn’t perfect. We cannot do it alone, but without America leading the way—serving as the free world’s sheriff with a shiny golden badge seen by all—the twenty-first century will be neither free, prosperous, nor peaceful.

  A PRESCRIPTION

  Advancing Citizenship in a Republic

  As a conservative who subscribes to the founding premise of our country, there are many policies I believe America needs today—many of which have been mentioned in these pages. I believe our government needs to be drastically smaller, our tax code simpler, our spending constrained and debt slashed, our border secured, our legal immigration protected from manipulation, our health care privatized, our VA overhauled, our energy resources maximized, our students afforded real school choice, our unborn babies protected, and our Second Amendment rights ardently protected. I also love the idea of fighting for an Article 5 “Convention of States,” a constitutional path whereby state legislatures—The People—can rein in our federal government to its original and limited purpose.

  But this book is not a catchall for every conservative prescription, and is not meant to spell out a comprehensive governing philosophy. Instead, my aim is to heed the words of Teddy Roosevelt and reinvigorate good citizenship, ensure equal opportunity, and reinforce American leadership. Doing those things—the basic blocking and tackling of our republic—will help ensure America remains the freest, strongest, and most prosperous country in the world. In that spirit, below are fifteen brief policy suggestions (five per section) that I believe would place America on the path to leading yet another century.

  GOOD CITIZENSHIP

  1. Teach Citizenship and the Constitution. In order to graduate, high school students—public school, private school, or home school—should have to pass the same basic civics test that immigrants are required to pass in order to become new U.S. citizens. Moreover, America’s founding documents—Declaration, Constitution, Bill of Rights, Federalist Papers, etc.—should form the basis for national civics educational parameters that prepare students for the mandatory test. Such a curriculum would have to be closely guarded and based on original texts, lest it be captured by revisionist agendas. Other efforts—like celebrating and promoting Freedom Day (April 13) and Constitution Day (September 17)—should be accelerated as a means to further educate students and Americans about the constitutional source of our exceptional nation . . . and the simple and powerful importance of patriotism.

  2. A Common Language. Assimilation to American life is a fundamental tenet of perpetuating good citizenship; moreover, assimilation ensures that no matter race, creed, or country of origin, new immigrants are set up to succeed in America. In addition to immersion in U.S. history and civics, new immigrants should be encouraged, incentivized, and ultimately pressured to learn and use the English language. Not only is English the language of America; it is the language of our commerce, our politics, and our media. It is the language of equal opportunity, just as it is the language of our common civic discourse. Citizens who don’t learn English will always be at a disadvantage, which puts America at a disadvantage. Our country must remain a melting pot, not a
tossed salad of multiculturalism.

  3. Select(ive) Service. Today, male U.S. citizens from ages eighteen to twenty-five are required to register with the Selective Service for possible conscription into the military. Most don’t think twice about the box-checking exercise and therefore remain detached from the concept of service to our country. I don’t believe in universal national service because it would be used to massively grow government and pursue all kinds of social agendas. But what if, instead, we made the Selective Service process substantive and meaningful? Why not create an alternate list of able-bodied Americans, male and female, who are willing to serve, especially in times of need? After high school, and before they turn twenty-five, these youth would sign up for a one-time basic military training and then maintain annual fitness standards. This “Minutemen Corps” would not only be prepared to support national emergencies, but, more important, would put “skin in the game” for a large swath of able-bodied, young Americans. In times of war or urgent need, these Americans could be mobilized for active military service. Signing up for this Minutemen Corps would be voluntary but membership would come with substantial educational and employment preferences, student loan forgiveness, and tax benefits.