Unfortunately, King Hui-who assumed power in 370 n.c.-was more successful in antagonizing people than in employing them, and he forfeited the services of many talented individuals, such as Lord Shang (who subsequently was instrumental in strengthening Ch'in). Instead of nurturing harmonious relations with his neighbors, he appears to have constantly annoyed them, greatly exacerbating the pressures and conflicts on all sides. Furthermore, he eventually lost the West Ho region, thereby opening the state to incursions by Ch'in, and was forced to move the capital to Ta-Jiang, thereafter calling the state Liang.
Two famous battles illustrate the nature of warfare in this period. The first, at Kui-ling, stemmed from King Hui's desire to recoup losses suffered at the hands of Ch'in in the west. Wei's army, under the command of P'ang Chuan, attacked Chao in the north. Finding itself hard-pressed, Chao requested aid from Ch'i, in the east, on the premise that as Chao presented a natural barrier and defense against Wei, it would be strategically advantageous for Ch'i to support Chao's efforts. Although the Ch'i ruler assented, Sun Pin-the famous strategist whose book has recently been rediscoveredadvised waiting for the two antagonists to exhaust themselves, thereby ensuring maximum gain with minimum risk and effort. In 352 B.C., under the command of T'ien Chi, Ch'i mobilized an army to effect an indirect strike at the Wei homeland, the critical city of Ta-liang, in accord with the principles of "first seize what they love," "attack vacuity," and "strike where undefended." P'ang Chuan, flushed with his victories in Chao, reacted as predicted, racing back to mount a counterattack. Ch'i then feigned concern and withdrew to its chosen battlefield to await the Wei army, thereby following a number of basic tactical principles from Sun-tzu and Sun Pin, such as "with ease await the tired." From its fortified positions and high terrain Ch'i was able to quickly defeat the exhausted Wei army, inflicting severe casualties at minimal cost.
Some years later, Wei found itself being increasingly squeezed by a newly vigorous Han, to the south, Ch'in, to the west, Ch'i, to the east, and Chao, to the north. King Hui embarked on a campaign against Han, which had become formidable through the administrative efforts of the famous theorist Shen Pu-hai and by forming an alliance with and returning to Chao the cities previously lost. P'ang Chuan, again entrusted with command, struck directly at the Han capital. Han, as Chao had before, sought aid from Ch'i, citing the benefits of mutual defense. Again Sun Pin advised waiting for the forces to decimate each other, further weakening Wei. Han mounted a total defensive effort but lost five major battles in succession and was forced to submit to Ch'in in a desperate effort to survive. Ch'i then sallied forth, following the previous strategy, with Sun Pin as strategist and T'ien Chi in command. P'ang Chuan immediately abandoned his campaign in Han, turning back toward his home state. Meanwhile, King Hui mobilized all his resources, placing his son in command of the home-defense troops, with the sole aim of seeking a decisive confrontation with Ch'i.
Under Sun Pin's direction the Ch'i armies, which were advancing into Wei, followed the dictum "be deceptive." P'ang Chuan arrogantly believed the men of Ch'i to be cowards who would flee rather than engage mighty Wei in battle. Therefore, Sun Pin daily reduced the number of cooking fires in the encampment to create a facade of ever-increasing desertion. He also effected a tactical withdrawal to further entice Pang Chuan into the favorable terrain at Ma-ling where the Ch'i commander concealed ten thousand crossbowmen among the hills. P'ang Chuan, apparently afraid that he would miss an opportunity to inflict a severe blow on the retreating Ch'i army, abandoned his heavy forces and supply train and rushed forth with only light units. Arriving at night, the combined Wei forces were ambushed as soon as they penetrated the killing zone. In addition to being decisively defeated by Ch'i's withering crossbow fire, 100,000 Wei soldiers needlessly perished because of their commander's character flaws and hasty judg- ment.57
Thereafter, Wei not only never regained its former power but also suffered numerous incursions by the now-unchecked mighty Ch'in, which would eventually subjugate all China. In 340 B.C. Wei was forced to cede 700 li to Ch'in after sustained defeats, and felt compelled to move its capital to Ta-1i- ang to avoid the incessant danger. Although a strong figure occasionally emerged to effect a temporary resurgence in Wei's strength, its territory continued to shrink until the state, together with the royal house, was finally extinguished in 225 B.C.
The Military Writings
In order to appreciate the great value and inherent importance of the Chinese military classics, one should note several brief historical and political points. First, military works were not normally permitted in private hands, and their possession could be construed as evidence of a conspiracy. (Possession of the T'ai Kung's Six Secret Teachings-a book advocating and instructing revolution-would be particularly fatal.) Second, almost all these teachings were at first transmitted down through the generations, often orally and always secretly. Eventually they were recorded-committed to written form on bamboo slips-and sometimes became public knowledge. Government scribes and designated officials gathered the slips for state use, depositing them in imperial libraries, where they were so highly valued that they were exempted from the infamous book burnings of the Ch'in dynasty. Once stored away, they were accessible to a few professors of the classics, a restricted number of high officials, and the emperor himself. Even these privileged individuals might still be denied access to the critical writings, especially if they were related to the imperial family.
Even after the teachings were recorded in manuscript form on bamboo, silk, or eventually paper (after the Han dynasty), patriots sometimes felt compelled to remove them from public domain. General Chang Liang, who played a fundamental role in the overthrow of the tyrannical Ch'in dynasty and in the establishment of the Han, for example, supposedly had the sole copy of the Three Strategies of Huang Shih-kung, from which he had personally profited, buried with him in his casket. According to one tradition, however, the text resurfaced when his tomb was vandalized in the fourth century A.D. Another example is the well-known (although perhaps apocryphal) refusal of Li Wei-kung, a famous strategist and effective general, to provide the T'ang emperor with more than defensive knowledge and tactics. In the view of Li Wei-kung, strategies for aggressive action should not be disseminated because, with the empire already at peace, they could only aid and interest those who wanted to precipitate war and incite revolution.
The seven military books, as they have been traditionally arranged in the Seven Military Classics since the Sung dynasty, are
Sun-tzu's Art of War
Wu-tzu
The Methods of the Ssu-ma (Ssu-ma Fa)
Questions and Replies Between T'ang T'ai-tsung and Li Wei-kung
Wei Liao-tzu
Three Strategies of Huang Shih-kung
T'ai Kung's Six Secret Teachings
Although uncertainly abounds regarding the authorship and dates of several of the classics, as well as to what extent they are composite books drawing upon common ground and lost writings, the traditional order unquestionably is not chronological. Sun-tzu's Art of War has generally been considered the oldest and greatest extant Chinese military work, even though the purported author of the Six Secret Teachings-the T'ai Kung-was active hundreds of years earlier than the (possibly) historical Sun-tzu. Materials preserved in the Ssu-ma Fa reputedly extend back into the early Chou; the Wutzu may have been recorded by Wu Ch'i's disciples, although suffering from later accretions; and the Three Strategies probably follows the Wei Liao-tzu, yet traditionalists still associate it with the T'ai Kung. Accordingly, one possible order (with many caveats and unstated qualifications) might well be
Biographies of the purported authors, along with summary discussions of the evidence for ascribing dates of composition to particular periods, are found in the introductions to the individual translations. Much of the evi dence is tenuous and often circular, and the systematic study of the evolution of strategic thought and military concepts remains to be undertaken. However, the preceding sequence-
although possibly infuriating Sun-tzu advocates-seems sustainable in the light of both traditional textual scholarship and recent tomb discoveries. The relative order of books in the third period (which probably coincides with the latter half of the third century B.C.) remains to be defined.58 Although we recognize these chronological issues, for purposes of continuity in introducing essential historical material and developments, our order of presentation places the Six Secret Teachings first, discussing the T'ai Kung as an active participant in the great Chou drama that would affect and color Chinese history for three millennia. The Ssu-ma Fa, which makes frequent references to Chou practices, follows, and then the Art of War. The Wu-tzu, which might have been composed close to the time of the Art of War, completes the early Warring States works. Thereafter, the sequence continues in likely chronological order, with the Wei Liao-tzu, the Three Strategies, and finally the medieval Questions and Replies.
Translator's Introduction, 23
I Civil Secret Teaching 40
1. King Wen's Teacher, 40
2. Fullness and Emptiness, 42
3. Affairs of State, 43
4. The Great Forms of Etiquette, 44
5. Clear Instructions, 45
6. Six Preservations, 45
7. Preserving the State's Territory, 46
8. Preserving the State, 47
9. Honoring the Worthy, 48
10. Advancing the Worthy, 50
11. Rewards and Punishments, 51
12. The Tao of the Military, 51
II Martial Secret Teaching 53
13. Opening Instructions, 53
14. Civil Instructions, 54
15. Civil Offensive, 56
16. Instructions on According with the People, 57
17. Three Doubts, 58
III Dragon Secret Teaching 60
18. The King's Wings, 60
19. A Discussion of Generals, 62
20. Selecting Generals, 63
21. Appointing the General, 64
22. The General's Awesomeness, 65
23. Encouraging the Army, 66
24. Secret Tallies, 67
25. Secret Letters, 68
26. The Army's Strategic Power, 68
27. The Unorthodox Army, 70
28. The Five Notes, 72
29. The Army's Indications, 73
30. Agricultural Implements, 74
IV Tiger Secret Teaching 76
31. The Army's Equipment, 76
32. Three Deployments, 79
33. Urgent Battles, 80
34. Certain Escape, 80
35. Planning for the Army, 82
36. Approaching the Border, 83
37. Movement and Rest, 83
38. Gongs and Drums, 84
39. Severed Routes, 85
40. Occupying Enemy Territory, 86
41. Incendiary Warfare, 87
42. Empty Fortifications, 88
V Leopard Secret Teaching 89
43. Forest Warfare, 89
44. Explosive Warfare, 89
45. Strong Enemy, 91
46. Martial Enemy, 91
47. Crow and Cloud Formation in the Mountains, 92
48. Crow and Cloud Formation in the Marshes, 93
49. The Few and the Many, 94
50. Divided Valleys, 95
VI Canine Secret Teaching 96
51. Dispersing and Assembling, 96
52. Military Vanguard, 96
53. Selecting Warriors, 97
54. Teaching Combat, 98
55. Equivalent Forces, 99
56. Martial Chariot Warriors, 100
57. Martial Cavalry Warriors, 100
58. Battle Chariots, 101
59. Cavalry in Battle, 102
60. The Infantry in Battle, 104
THE Six Secret Teachings purportedly records the T'ai Kung's political advice and tactical instructions to Kings Wen and Wu of the Chou dynasty in the eleventh century B.c. Although the present book evidently dates from the Warring States period (as is discussed at the end of this introduction), some scholars believe it reflects the tradition of Ch'i military studies' and therefore preserves at least vestiges of the oldest strata of Chinese military thought. The historic T'ai Kung, to whom the Six Secret Teachings is nominally attributed, has been honored throughout Chinese history to be the first famous general and the progenitor of strategic studies. In the T'ang dynasty he was even accorded his own state temple as the martial patron and thereby attained officially sanctioned status approaching that of Confucius, the revered civil patron.2
A complete work that not only discusses strategy and tactics but also proposes the government measures necessary for forging effective state control and attaining national prosperity, the Six Secret Teachings is grounded onor perhaps projected back into-monumental historical events. The Chou kings presumably implemented many of these policies, thereby enabling them to develop their agricultural and population bases, gradually expand their small border domain, and secure the allegiance of the populace until they could launch the decisive military campaign that defeated the powerful Shang dynasty and overturned its six-hundred-year rule.
The Six Secret Teachings is the only military classic written from the perspective of revolutionary activity because the goal of the Chou was nothing less than a dynastic revolution. Attaining this objective required perfecting themselves in the measures and technologies of the time and systematically developing policies, strategies, and even battlefield tactics not previously witnessed in Chinese history. The Chou kings were compelled to ponder employing limited resources and restricted forces to attack a vastly superior, well-entrenched foe whose campaign armies alone probably outnumbered the entire Chou population. In contrast, many of the other strategic writings focus on managing military confrontations between states of comparable strength, with both sides starting from relatively similar military and government infrastructures. Furthermore, although nearly all the military texts adhere to the basic concept of "enriching the state (through agriculture) and strengthening the army," many tend to emphasize strategic analysis and battlefield tactics rather than the fundamental measures necessary to create even the possibility of confrontation.3
The epoch-making clash between the Chou and Shang dynasties, as envisioned by the Chou and idealistically portrayed in later historical writings, set the moral tone and established the parameters for the dynastic cycle concept. The archetypal battle of virtue and evil-the benevolent and righteous acting on behalf of all the people against a tyrant and his coterie of parasitic supporters-had its origin with this conflict. The Shang's earlier conquest of the Hsia, although portrayed as having been similarly conceived, occurred before the advent of written language and was only a legend even in antiquity. However, the Chou's determined effort to free the realm from the yoke of suffering and establish a rule of Virtue and benevolence became the inspirational essence of China's moral self-perception. As dynasties decayed and rulers became morally corrupt and increasingly ineffectual, new champions of righteousness appeared who confronted the oppressive forces of government, rescued the people from imminent doom, and returned the state to benevolent policies. Moreover, in the view of some historians, the Shang-Chou conflict marked the last battle between different peoples because starting with the Chou dynasty, military engagements within China were essentially internal political clashes.' However, confrontations between inhabitants of the agrarian central states and the nomadic steppe peoples continued throughout Chinese history, reflecting in part the self-conscious identity emphasized by the people of the central states in contrast with their "barbarian" neighbors.
As portrayed in such historical writings as the Shih chi,' and in accord with good moral tradition and the plight of the people, the Shang had ascended to power by overthrowing the last evil ruler of the previous dynasty-the Hsia.6 After generations of rule, the Shang emperors-due perhaps to their splendid isolation and constant indulgence in myriad pleasures-are believed to have become less virtuous and less capable
.' Their moral decline continued inexorably until the final ruler, who history has depicted as evil incarnate. The many perversities attributed to him included imposing heavy taxes; forcing the people to perform onerous labor services, mainly to provide him with lavish palaces and pleasure centers; interfering with agricultural practices, thereby causing widespread hunger and depriva tion; indulging in debauchery, including drunkenness, orgies, and violence; brutally murdering innumerable people, especially famous men of virtue and loyal court officials; and developing and inflicting inhuman punishments. However, as the following brief excerpt from the Shang Annals in the Shih chi records, the king was also talented, powerful, and fearsome:
In natural ability and discrimination Emperor Chou was acute and quick; his hearing and sight were extremely sensitive; and his physical skills and strength surpassed other men. His hands could slay a fierce animal; his knowledge was sufficient to ward off criticism; and his verbal skills [were] sufficient to adorn his errors. He boasted to his ministers about his own ability; he was haughty to all the realm with his reputation; and [he] believed that all were below him. He loved wine, debauched himself in music, and was enamored of his consorts. He loved Ta Chi, and followed her words.8 Thus he had Shih Chuan create new licentious sounds, the Pei-li dance [of licentious women], and the [lewd] music of "fluttering down." He made the taxes heavier in order to fill the Deer Tower with coins, and stuffed the Chu-ch'iao storehouses with grain. He increased his collections of dogs, horses, and unusual objects, overflowing the palace buildings. He expanded the Sha-ch'iu garden tower, and had a multitude of wild animals and flying birds brought there. He was disrespectful to ghosts and spirits. He assembled numerous musicians and actors at the Sha-ch'iu garden; [he] made a lake of wine and a forest of hanging meat, and had naked men and women pursue each other in them, conducting a drinking feast throughout the night. The hundred surnames looked toward him with hatred, and some of the feudal lords revolted.9
The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China Page 4