"When the way by which we enter is constricted but the way out is distant; their weak forces can attack our strong ones; and their few can attack our many-this is terrain on which the cavalry will be exterminated.
"When there are great mountain torrents, deep valleys, tall luxuriant grass, forests and trees-these are conditions which will exhaust the cavalry.
"When there is water on the left and right, while ahead are large hills, and to the rear high mountains, and the Three Armies are fighting between the bodies of water while the enemy occupies both the interior and exterior ground-this is terrain that means great difficulty for the cavalry.
"When the enemy has cut off our supply lines, and if we advance we will not have any route by which to return-this is troublesome terrain for the cavalry.
"When we are sinking into marshy ground while advancing and retreating must both be through quagmires-this is worrisome terrain for the cavalry.
"When on the left there are deep water sluices, and on the right there are gullies and hillocks but below the heights the ground appears level-good terrain for advancing, retreating, and enticing an enemy-this terrain is a pitfall for the cavalry.
"These nine comprise fatal terrain for cavalry, the means by which the enlightened general will keep [the enemy] far off and escape and the ignorant general will be entrapped and defeated."
King Wu asked the T'ai Kung: "What about when infantry engage in battle with chariots and cavalry?"
The T'ai Kung said: "When infantry engage in battle with chariots and cavalry, they must rely on hills and mounds, ravines and defiles. The long weapons and strong crossbows should occupy the fore; the short weapons and weak crossbows should occupy the rear, firing and resting in turn. Even if large numbers of the enemy's chariots and cavalry should arrive, they must maintain a solid formation and fight intensely while skilled soldiers and strong crossbowmen prepare against [attacks from] the rear."
King Wu said: "Suppose there are no hills or mounds, ravines or defiles. The enemy arrives, and it is both numerous and martial. Their chariots and cavalry outflank us on both sides, and they are making sudden thrusts against our front and rear positions. Our Three Armies are terrified and fleeing in chaotic defeat. What should we do?"
The T'ai Kung said: "Order our officers and troops to set up the chevauxde-frise and wooden caltrops, arraying the oxen and horses by units of five in their midst, and have them establish a four-sided martial assault formation. When you see the enemy's chariots and cavalry are about to advance, our men should evenly spread out the caltrops and dig ditches around the rear, making them five feet deep and wide. It is called the `Fate of Dragon Grass.'
"Our men should take hold of the chevaux-de-frise and advance on foot. The chariots should be arrayed as ramparts and pushed forward and back. Whenever they stop set them up as fortifications. Our skilled soldiers and strong crossbowmen should prepare against the left and right flanks. Afterward, order our Three Armies to fervently fight without respite."
"Excellent," said King Wu.
Translator's Introduction, 111
1. Benevolence the Foundation, 126
2. Obligations of the Son of Heaven, 129
3. Determining Rank, 133
4. Strict Positions, 137
5. Employing Masses, 142
THE Ssu-ma Fa is a terse, enigmatic text dating from about the fourth century B.C. when it was probably compiled from materials dating back far into antiquity.' Virtually every account of its inception identifies it with the state of Ch'i, which historically was the fount of the famous military studies that received their initial impetus from the T'ai Kung, who had been enfeoffed as the first king of Ch'i a few years before his death. Traditionalists thus assert that the T'ai Kung's thoughts may form part of the early material or may have otherwise provided a foundation for the work.' Throughout the Spring and Autumn and the Warring States periods, military studies flourished in Ch'i as represented by Sun-tzu, Sun Pin, and Wei Liao-tzu; certain families (such as Sun, T'ien, and Ch'en) were particularly noteworthy. The renowned strategist Sun Pin may have been active at the time of the Ssu-ma Fa's compilation and may possibly have even been a contributor; in fact, he was a distant relative of Ssu-ma Jang-chu.3 Furthermore, the style and character of the writing reportedly identify it as a product of this era, the fourth century B.C. Apart from the two books by Sun-Tzu and Sun Pin, it has traditionally been accorded far more authenticity than any of the other military writings.
The title, Ssu-ma Fa, might best be translated as The Methods of the Minister of War because the character fa-whose basic meaning is lawencompasses the concepts of "methods," standards, and techniques or art, as in Sun-tzu's Art of War. However, no single term adequately covers the scope of the content because the Ssu-ma Fa discusses laws, regulations, government policies, military organization, military administration, discipline, basic values, grand strategy, and strategy.
The origin of the military title Ssu-ma-which literally means "the officer in charge of horses" and which, because of the horse's vital importance to the military, eventually came to designate military matters in general-remains lost in antiquity. As an official title it apparently first appeared in the earliest dynasties of the Sage Emperors, and by the Chou dynasty it had been elevated to Ta Ssu-ma-"Great" Ssu-ma, or Minister of War. Liu Yin's intro duction to the Ssu-ma Fa provides a general appraisal of the minister's role and duties under the Chou dynasty:
The Minister of War controlled the government of the dependent states, administered the Six Armies, and pacified the peripheral territories. Thus he ranked among the six chief ministers of state. When in court he assisted the Son of Heaven in administering the government; when he went out he was the chief general of the army of rectification, settling the rebellious.4
According to the traditional view espoused by scholars such as Liu Yin, the central content of the Methods played a historically important role; it was supposedly instrumental in providing guidance to Duke Huan of Ch'i (reigned mid-seventh century B.C.) in his successful quest to become hegemon (pa)-the military ruler of the realm-on the pretext of assisting the rightful king of the declining Chou state. It is therefore equally associated with Duke Huan's famous adviser, Kuan Chung, to whom a complex, composite work on government, philosophy, and military matters-the Kuan- tzu-is attributed.' Subsequently, King Ching of the same state of Ch'i (who ruled from 547 to 490 B.C.) reportedly used the teachings to help him regain land previously lost to Ch'in and subjugate several feudal lords. At that time the work was untitled, but when a court assembly was convened under King Wei6 (reigned 378 to 342 B.C.) to gather and record all vital information on military matters, it came to be identified as The Methods of the Minister of War.
Another, somewhat disputed story associated with the book suggests that the famous general T'ien Jang-chu was instrumental in the great victories achieved under King Ching. Because he had held the post of Ssu-ma in the king's campaign, he was granted the privilege of assuming the title as a family surname. The book, when subsequently compiled under King Wei, included his ideas and thus acquired the title Ssu-ma Jang-chu Ping-fa (The Military Methods of Ssu-ma Jang-chu). His brief biography in the Shih chi' not only records these events but also illustrates the measures he felt were necessary to wrest immediate psychological control of the troops and create the awesomeness that would command obedience:
Ssu-ma Jang-chu was a descendant of T'ien Wan.8 During the time of Duke Ching9 of Ch'i, Chin attacked [the major cities of] A and P'in,10 and Yen invaded [the river district] Ho-shang.11 Ch'i's army suffered complete defeat, and Duke Ching was sorely troubled. Yen Ying then recommended Jang-chu, saying: "Even though Jang-chu is descended from T'ien's concubine, still, as a man, in civil affairs he is able to the masses, and in martial affairs he is able to overawe the enemy. I would like my Lord to test him." Duke Ching summoned Jang-chu and spoke with him about military affairs. He was greatly pleased with him and appointed him as General of the Army to lead the soldiers
in resisting the armies of Yen and Chin.
Jang-Chu said: "I was formerly lowly and menial. If my Lord pulls me out from amidst my village and places me above the high officials, the officers and troops will not be submissive, and the hundred surnames will not believe in me. Since the man is insignificant and his authority [ch'uan] light, I would like to have one of my Lord's favored ministers, someone whom the state respects, as Supervisor of the Army.12 Then it will be possible." Thereupon Duke Ching assented, having Chuang Ku go forth.
Jang-chu, who had already taken his leave, made an agreement with Chuang Ku, saying: "Tomorrow at midday we shall meet at the army's gate." Jang-chu raced ahead to the army, set up the gnomon,13 and let the water [drip in the water clock], awaiting Ku. Ku, who had always been arrogant and aristocratic, assumed that since the general had already reached the army while he was [only] the Supervisor, it was not extremely urgent. His relatives from all around, who were sending him off, detained him to drink. Midday came and Ku had not arrived. Jang-chu then lay down the standard, stopped the dripping water, and went into [the encampment]. He advanced the army [and] took control of the soldiers, clearly publicizing the constraints and bonds.14 When the constraints had been imposed it was already evening, and then Chuang Ku arrived.
Jang-chu said: "How is it that you arrive after the appointed time?" Ku acknowledged his fault, saying: "High officials and relatives saw the simple one off, thus he was detained." Jang-chu said: "On the day a general receives the mandate [of command] he forgets his home; when he enters the army and takes control of the drumsticks and urgently beats the drum he forgets himself. At present enemy states have already deeply invaded [our land]; within the state there is unrest and movement. Officers and soldiers lie brutally cut down and exposed at the borders. Our ruler does not sleep soundly nor enjoy the sweet taste of his food. The fate of the hundred surnames hangs on you, so what do you mean by being seen off?"
He summoned the provost marshal and inquired: "What is the army's law regarding those who arrive after the appointed time?" The reply: "They should be decapitated!" Chuang Ku was terrified, and he ordered a man to race back and report it to Duke Ching, asking to be saved. He had already left but not yet returned, whereupon [Jang-chu] beheaded Ku in order to publicize [the enforcement of discipline] within the Three Armies.15 All the officers within the Three Armies shook with fear.
Somewhat later the emissary that Duke Ching had dispatched, bearing a tally to pardon Ku, raced into the army. Jang-chu said: "When the general is with the army, there are orders of the ruler which are not accepted."16 He asked the provost marshal: "What is the law regarding racing into the army?" The provost marshal said: "He should be beheaded." The emissary was terrified. Jang-chu said: "We cannot slay the ruler's emissary." Then he beheaded the [emissary's] attendant, severed the carriage's left stanchion, and beheaded the horse on the left in order to instruct the Three Armies. He dispatched the Duke's emissary to return and report and then moved [the army] out.
The officers and soldiers next encamped, dug wells, lit the cook fires, and prepared their drink and food. He asked about those with illness, had physicians prescribe medicine, and personally looked after them. In all cases when he took the emoluments of office and his rations, he presented them to the officers and troops; he himself divided all rations equally with the officers and troops. He compared the strong and weak among them17 and only after three days took control of the soldiers. The sick all sought to go on the march, fighting fervently to go into battle on his behalf. Chin's army heard of it, abandoned their position, and departed. Yen's army heard of it, crossed over the river, and dispersed. Thereupon he pursued and attacked them, subsequently retaking all the territory within the borders of the old fief, returning with the soldiers. Before he reached the state capital he disbanded the units, released them from military constraints,18 swore a covenant, and thereafter entered the city. Duke Ching and the high officials greeted him in the suburbs, rewarding the troops and completing the rites, only afterward returning to rest. After that he interviewed Jang-chu and honored him as Great Master of the Horse [Ta Ssu-ma]. The T'ien clan daily grew more honored in Ch'i.
After this, subordinates of the high officials Pao, Kao, and Kuo harmed him, slandering him to Duke Ching.19 Duke Ching forced Jang-chu to retire. Chu fell extremely ill and died. From this the followers of T'ien Ch'i and T'ien Pao bore a grudge against Kao, Kuo, and the others. Later [along] with T'ien Ch'ang they killed Duke Chien and completely exterminated the Kao and Kuo clans. Subsequently, Ch'ang's great-grandson T'ien Ho was thereby able to establish himself as King Wei of Ch'i. In employing the army to effect Ch'i's awesomeness he greatly imitated Jang-chu's methods, and the feudal lords all paid court to Ch'i.
King Wei of Ch'i had the high officials seek out and discuss the strategy of the ancient Ssu-mas, appending Jang-chu's [methods] within them. Thus [the book] is called the Military Methods of Ssu-ma Jang-chu.
The Grand Historian comments: "I have read the Ssu-ma Ping-fa. It is vast, expansive, deep, and far-reaching. Even the Three Dynasties, in their campaigns of rectification, still could not exhaust its meaning. Its language as well deserves some praise. [However,] how could one such as Jang-chu, commanding the army in a minor way on behalf of a small country, have the leisure to realize the Military Methods of the Ssu-ma? The world already has numerous copies of the Ssu-ma Ping-fa. For this reason I have not discussed it but have written Jangchii's biography."
The Grand Historian's comments eventually stimulated historical doubts about Jang-chii's possible role in the book, even though the biography clearly indicates that his thoughts were merely appended among those of the early Masters of the Horse. (However, a different account found in the histories suggests that this general was evil and dissolute, hardly a figure of any merit. Any work he might have penned has subsequently been lost.20) Regardless of its evolution, the book apparently assumed what was essentially its final form about the middle of the fourth century s.c.-the approximate time of Mencius's youth, more than one hundred years after the death of Confucius (551-479 B.C.), and contemporary with the probable composition of Sun-tzu's Art of War or perhaps Sun Pin's work.
The condition and even the authenticity of the text have been matters of scholarly debate for some centuries. Unfortunately, all editions presently available-including the one translated here from the Seven Military Classics-appear to be merely remnants of an original, extensive work. Only 5 chapters remain out of 155 purportedly extant in the Han dynasty,21 although they seem to have been faithfully transmitted since the T'ang dynasty. Ch'ing dynasty textual specialists particularly attacked the work as spurious, largely on the basis of the great discrepancy in the number of chapters and the book's failure to include all the fragments preserved in other writings and in various commentaries. However, recent studies have advanced arguments to sustain the claim that at the least, the modern text represents original material-even though much has been lost-and that the central kernel reports practices that date from before the Western Chou era supplemented by paragraphs dating from the Warring States period.22 Although further discussion must be left to the notes, if the Shih chi account is historically valid, the disjointed, particularized character of the individual paragraphs would be appropriate to such a book. The numerous concrete statements-all focusing on aspects of military affairs-having been rescued from the mists of time by the compilers, could never be reformed and integrated to constitute the systematized work of a single author.23
Scope and Nature of The Methods
In the Later Han dynasty, Pan Ku, author of the History of the Former Han Dynasty, classified the Ssu-ma Fa under the section on li-"rites," or forms of propriety-when organizing his bibliographical essay. This may have been because the work was viewed as emphasizing administration, organization, and discipline rather than strategy and battlefield tactics. Within the context of Confucianism's ascending influence and the growing domination of orthodox thought in the Later Han as well as the i
mportance being ascribed to the major works on ritual such as the Li chi and Chou li (Rites of Chou, with which the Ssu-ma Fa has some similarities), the book may naturally have been regarded as an exposition on the military forms of the ancient dynasties-including the Early Chou-and categorized accordingly.24
Even if the collected fragments are included, the Ssu-ma Fa cannot be considered a complete work because it rarely discusses tactics or any other aspect of battlefield command. Rather, it contains a variety of specific teachings-frequently couched in difficult, terse language-for initiating military activities, mastering military administration, and managing military campaigns. Limited discussions of strategy and tactics such as those typical of the Six Secret Teachings appear only in the last three chapters and are frequently passages common to the Six Secret Teachings or Sun-Tzu's Art of War. Equally absent are details about government and the implementation of moral measures, even though both are strongly advocated in the first two sections (leading to a theory that these two chapters preserve truly ancient, Sagely portions of the "original" text and the remaining three incorporate the cruder ideas of Ssu-ma Jang-chu himself).25
Warfare and Fundamental Values
As a book that focuses on military administration, the Ssu-ma Fa naturally postulates that warfare is vital to the state and essential to pacifying the realm. According to the conceptualization of righteousness that was becoming more prevalent in this period, warfare provides the necessary means for chastising the evil and rescuing the oppressed. Moreover, despite advocating righteousness and humane government, the Ssu-ma Fa expresses the startling realization that the conscious exploitation of force is the foundation of political power.26 As depicted from within the usual historical framework characterizing the drastic decline from Virtue, the argument runs:
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