In antiquity, taking benevolence as the foundation and employing righteousness to govern constituted "uprightness." However, when uprightness failed to attain the desired [moral and political] objectives, [they resorted to] authority. Authority comes from warfare, not from harmony among men. For this reason if one must kill men to give peace to the people, then killing is permissible. If one must attack a state out of love for their people, then attacking it is permissible. If one must stop war with war, although it is war it is permissible. 27(1)
It should be noted that the text warns equally strongly against becoming enthralled with war: "Thus even though a state may be vast, those who love warfare will inevitably perish. Even though calm may prevail under Heaven, those who forget warfare will certainly be endangered!"
Distinction of the Civilian and Martial Realms
Although the Ssu-ma Fa falls within the realist tradition, in delineating the distinction between the civilian and the martial it reflected the changing conditions of the Warring States period. Consciousness of this separation, which would become even more pronounced later in Chinese history, perhaps received impetus from the presence and growing influence of Confucian thought as popularized by the Master's true disciples and their immediate followers. In contrast to the unity of political and military functions that historically characterized the Shang and Early Chou eras, the contributors to the Ssu-ma Fa stressed that the military and civilian realms should be radically distinguished because of their contradictory values. The different realities are clearly perceived-perhaps emphasized-because of the growing influence of formalistic thinking about propriety and the proper forms of government that had developed extensively under the aegis of Chou civilization. As Liu Pang, founder of the Han dynasty, later discovered, he could conquer the world on horseback, but he could not maintain civilian rule without the li (forms of propriety) to establish his image, provide distinctions, and ensure order. The li created and sustained the separation necessary to elevate him above his uncouth former comrades.
Because the Chou dynasty could devote the resources necessary to nurturing intellectual pursuits during its initial period of peace and prosperity, warfare naturally became somewhat de-emphasized.ZS The products of peace were intellectual and formal; and although the basic martial values were never completely rejected, each realm was conceived as requiring a different orientation:
In antiquity the form and spirit governing civilian affairs would not be found in the military realm; those appropriate to the military realm would not be found in the civilian sphere. If the form and spirit [appropriate to the] military realm enter the civilian sphere, the Virtue of the people will decline. When the form and spirit [appropriate to the] civilian sphere enter the military realm, then the Virtue of the people will weaken.
In the civilian sphere words are cultivated and speech languid. In court one is respectful and courteous and cultivates himself to serve others. Unsummoned, he does not step forth; unquestioned, he does not speak. It is difficult to advance but easy to withdraw.
In the military realm one speaks directly and stands firm. When deployed in formation one focuses on duty and acts decisively. Those wearing battle armor do not bow; those in war chariots need not observe the forms of propriety [Ii]; those manning fortifications do not scurry. In times of danger one does not pay attention to seniority. Thus the civilian forms of behavior [li] and military standards [fa] are like left and right.29 (2)
The atmosphere of the court is severe, remote, and yet languid; that of the military is severe, stern, and active. The civilian atmosphere clearly stifles the martial spirit, whereas in the military the critical problem is forcing men to be active and courageous and then restraining any individual, disordered expression of these attributes.30
The list of important virtues on which government should rely remains essentially unchanged: benevolence, righteousness, faith, trust, loyalty, Virtue, courage, and wisdom. However, compared with the formalistic nature of combat in the Early Chou era, the Warring States mileau demanded severity and total commitment. Yet the Ssu-ma Fa records and thereby advocates restraints, the latter affecting battle strategy and measures in terms of both conceptualization and actual tactics. The ideals of antiquity required that formations not be attacked before they had been completed or attacks pressed home with ruthless swiftness. Rather, reaction and restraint were stressed, with the approach being responsive rather than aggressive. This civility is sometimes explained in terms of strategic considerations, but such justifications appear weak. In contrast with the other Seven Military Classics, a different spirit obviously pervades the Ssu-ma Fa; it even affects the contributors, who clearly rose to positions of power and influence through military achievements.
Perhaps the best example of this advocacy of restraint can be seen in the rules for pursuing a fleeing enemy, which were attributed to antiquity for authenticity:
In antiquity they did not pursue a fleeing enemy more than one hundred paces or follow a retreating enemy more than three days, thereby making clear their observance of the forms of proper conduct [li]. They did not exhaust the incapable and had sympathy for the wounded and sick, thereby making evident their benevolence. They awaited the completions of the enemy's formation and then drummed the attack, thereby making clear their good faith. They contended for righteousness, not profit, thereby manifesting their righteousness. Moreover, they were able to pardon those who submitted, thereby making evident their courage. They knew the end, they knew the beginning, thereby making clear their wisdom. These six virtues were taught together at appropriate times, being taken as the Tao of the people's guidelines. This was the rule from antiquity. (1)
In a similar passage the ideal is again expressed in terms of the li but with the ostensible purpose of avoiding ambushes and entrapment.31 However, traces of the new combat reality still creep in, as witnessed in such injunctions as "when following a fleeing army do not rest; if some of the enemy stop while others run off to the side, then be suspicious."
Importance of the People
As in all of the Seven Military Classics, the contributors stress that "aiding" the people provides the only justification for mobilizing forces. Moreover, sharing benefits while eliminating evil and hardship should be paramount among the government's objectives. Avoiding any disruption of seasonal agricultural activity must be an integral part of governmental efforts to secure the people's willing allegiance. Furthermore, military actions that might increase the suffering of the enemy's populace should also be avoided:
Neither contravening the seasons nor working the people to exhaustion is the means by which to love our people. Neither attacking a state in national mourning nor taking advantage of natural disasters is the means by which to love their people. Not mobilizing the army in either winter or summer is the means by which to love both our own people and the enemy's people. (1)
The proscription against mobilizing in winter is somewhat unusual because the fall was normally the time of military training, with campaigns extending into the winter-the season of withdrawal, death, and punishment.32
When advancing into enemy territory, actions that might inflame the people or cause them hardship and thereby antagonize them should be severely prohibited:
When you enter the offender's territory, do not do violence to his gods; do not hunt his wild animals; do not destroy earthworks; do not set fire to buildings; do not cut down forests; do not take the six domesticated animals, grains, or im- plements.33 When you see their elderly or very young, return them without harming them. Even if you encounter adults, unless they engage you in combat, do not treat them as enemies. If an enemy has been wounded, provide medical attention and return him. (1)
Because the sole justification for launching a sanctioned attack would be the eradication of governmental evil,34 any expedition to chastise wrongdoers must maintain an image congruent with its defining values and teachings. Accordingly, the Ssu-ma Fa stresses both the ceremonial, accusatory nature o
f the preparatory formalities35 and the vital necessity for all the soldiers' actions to be characterized by benevolence. In accord with the military writings of the age, these policies are formulated and directed toward minimizing the enemy's resistance. However, this spirit contrasts starkly with the authoritarian policies of those who advocated consciously employing warfare as the crucial means for enriching the state as well as with the brutality witnessed throughout the Warring States period when men, including those who made the fatal mistake of surrendering rather than fighting to the death, were slaughtered by the hundreds of thousands.
Warfare: General Principles and Elements
Training Is Primary
Training men for the army entails certain problems, as indicated by this perceptive passage:
In warfare: It is not forming a battle array that is difficult; it is reaching the point that the men can be ordered into formation that is hard. It is not attaining the ability to order them into formation that is difficult; it is reaching the point of being able to employ them that is hard. It is not knowing what to do that is difficult; it is putting it into effect that is hard. Men from each [of the four quarters] have their own nature. Character differs from region to region. Through teach-. ing they come to have regional habits, the customs of each state [thus] being different. [Only] through the Tao [Way] are their customs transformed. (4)
The two points made here are historically important. First, the ability to train men underlies their potential utilization in battle. Second, regional character differences will affect the outcome (which is why the T'ai Kung had advocated not disturbing local customs). This conscious observation of regionalism is one of the keystones of Chinese psychology, a kernel that later received extensive development.
All battlefield success results from measures previously implemented to train and prepare the troops. Once the requisite state of preparation is fully realized, factors that directly affect the battle can be considered. The general should restrict his tactics to the army's capabilities, attempt only what his men are willing to pursue,36 and try to force the enemy to undertake tasks for which it is incapable and unwilling. The soldiers' armor must be stalwart; the weapons must be of good quality, intermixed, and integrated. The formations must be capable of effectively utilizing the weapons and equipment.
Movement should be controlled and never allowed to become chaotic. The proper balance between exertion and exhaustion must be struck; otherwise there is equal danger of laxity and unwillingness stemming from too much rest, or inability resulting from being overtired. Quiet and control in the midst of turbulence are the keys to victory.37 Doubt must never be permitted to creep in.
The few concrete tactical suggestions that appear in the text are similar, sometimes even identical to those found in other works from the period. For example, the wise general always evaluates the enemy carefully and then attacks its weakness. He employs terrain to his advantage, such as by occupying and fortifying uphill positions, avoiding water and marshes, and being alert for ambushes when in confined areas. He should accord with Heaven, which is generally understood as consisting of the factors of climate, season, and weather but also as the auguries obtained before battle. This reflects Shang and Early Chou practices and beliefs.38
Spirit and Courage
The problems of motivating men, manipulating spirit, and fostering courage command extensive attention in the Ssu-ma Fa, and several observations are worth abstracting from the text for systematic consideration. Virtually every military thinker in Chinese antiquity devoted a few passages to the critical problem of attaining proper commitment and nurturing courage. In simple approaches either the positive effects of rewards or the negative effects of punishments were employed singly, whereas more sophisticated thinkers offered a number of positive methods to stimulate courage and to overcome fear without the greater fear of punishment and death as the sole motivator. Righteousness, beneficence, material welfare, and freedom from oppression constituted the fundamental, positive incentives-all to be thoroughly inculcated through instruction and teaching. These need not be discussed further.
The concept of ch'i appears prominently in the Ssu-ma Fa, with much of the psychology of fear and courage being conceptualized in terms of ch'i. For example, in protracted conflicts courage suddenly becomes crucial:
In general, in battle one endures through strength and gains victory through spirit. One can endure with a solid defense but will achieve victory through being endangered. When the heart's foundation is solid, a new surge of ch'i will bring victory. (IV)
Accordingly, men who are doubtful, worried, afraid, or terrified destroy an army: "When men have minds set on victory, all they see is the enemy. When men have minds filled with fear, all they see is their fear" (4). Because the astute commander is advised to attack doubt and weakness in an ene- my,39 regaining control of the army's spirit is critical. Thus:
Positions should be strictly defined; administrative measures should be severe; strength should be nimble; the [soldiers'] ch'i should be constrained; and the minds [of the officers and people] should be unified. (4)
Among the several techniques advanced for "arousing the ch'i," ritual oath-taking and the final admonition of the troops ranked high in importance. Properly worded, the oath would invoke the state deities, glorify the cause, set out the objectives, condemn the enemy, and generally appeal to righteousness and similar moral values:
When the oath is clear and stimulating the men will be strong, and you will extinguish [the effects] of baleful omens and auspicious signs. ... Arouse the men's spirits with the fervor of righteousness; prosecute affairs at the right moment. (3)
The former great historical leaders apparently felt the oath would have maximum effect at particular moments, although there was considerable disagreement among them as to the appropriate timing of its administration in order to achieve the greatest psychological impact:
Shun made the official announcement of their mission within the state [capital] because he wanted the people to first embrace his orders. The rulers of the Hsia dynasty administered their oaths amidst the army for they wanted the people to first complete their thoughts. The Shang rulers swore their oaths outside the gate to the encampment for they wanted the people to first fix their intentions and await the conflict. [King Wu] of the Chou waited until the weapons were about to clash and then swore his oath in order to stimulate the people's will [to fight]. (2)
In the field, prior to a potentially decisive battle or in dire circumstances, visibly abandoning all hope of returning home and destroying supplies were commonly espoused measures, to which (as Sun-tzu also advocates) the Methods adds a farewell letter:
Writing letters of final farewell is referred to as "breaking off all thoughts of life." Selecting the elite and ranking the weapons is termed "increasing the strength of the men." Casting aside the implements of office and carrying only minimum rations is termed "opening the men's thoughts." (5)
In the Ssu-ma Fa rewards and punishments continue to provide the primary incentives and means for enforcement. The contributors accepted a version of the decline-from-Virtue theory that recognized the necessity for both rewards and punitive measures, which increased with the passage of time:
In antiquity the Worthy Kings made manifest the Virtue of the people and fully [sought out] the goodness of the people. Thus they did not neglect the virtuous nor demean the people in any respect. Rewards were not granted, and punishments were never even tried.
Shun neither granted rewards nor imposed punishments, but the people could still be employed. This was the height of Virtue.
The Hsia granted rewards but did not impose punishments. This was the height of instruction.
The Shang imposed punishments but did not grant rewards. This was the height of awesomeness.
The Chou used both rewards and punishments, and Virtue declined....
The Hsia bestowed rewards in court in order to make eminent the good. The Shang carried out execu
tions in the marketplace to overawe the evil. The Chou granted rewards in court and carried out executions in the marketplace to encourage gentlemen and terrify the common man. Hence the kings of all three dynasties manifested Virtue in the same way. (2)
Conceived in terms of military prowess and the need for conquest by arms:
The rulers of the Hsia rectified their Virtue and never employed the sharp blades of their weapons, so their weapons were not mixed together. The Shang relied on righteousness, so they first used the sharpness of weapons. The Chou relied on force, so they fully utilized the sharpness of their weapons. (2)
The normal admonitions about the timely imposition of punishments and granting of rewards found in the writings of the period are included. More important is the injunction to reinforce the effectiveness of the system with bold measures when combat must again be faced. An example of this advice, which is directed toward the commander, runs as follows:
If in warfare you are victorious, share the achievement and praise with the troops. If you are about to reengage in battle, then make their rewards exceptionally generous and the punishments heavier. If you failed to direct them to victory, accept the blame yourself. If you must fight again, swear an oath and assume a forward position. Do not repeat your previous tactics. Whether you win or not, do not deviate from this method, for it is termed the "True Principle." (4)
This accords with the general policy of visibly implementing rewards and punishments right after the men have prepared for battle:
After you have aroused [people's] ch'i [spirit] and moreover enacted governmental measures [such as rewards and punishments], encompass them with a benign countenance, and lead them with your speeches. Upbraid them in accord with their fears; assign affairs in accord with their desires. (3)
The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China Page 16