The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China

by Ralph D Sawyer

  Accordingly, after studying the nature of the concept in the Seven Military Classics, especially in the Art of War, two equally important factors appear to be integrated within this concept and should be expressed by any translation: first, the strategic advantage conveyed by superior position, and second, the power of the forces involved. ("Power" refers to the army's overall capability in all aspects-including endurance, spirit, discipline, equipment, command, and physical condition-rather than strength of numbers alone.) Obviously, as the commentator Chiang Pai-li has noted, strategic advantage has a pronounced temporal character; therefore, it should not be confined to exploiting the advantages of terrain, as it is usually characterized.

  Strategic advantage in essence is a comparative term, not an absolute one, although a vast force will naturally possess great power. (In an extreme case the advantages of terrain perhaps become negligible. A minimal force, such as a platoon or company, represents one extreme, a vast army the other.) Accordingly, we have chosen to translate the term shih as "strategic configuration of power" and will use this meaning throughout except where a different sense, such as shape or circumstances, seems to have been intended. Although "strategic power" is basically an acceptable abridgement and perhaps is adequate in itself, "configuration" will generally be added as a reminder that the power results from configuring the military's armed might in accord with and to the exploitation of the terrain in order to gain a strategic advantage. However, when the term is conjoined with others-such as "military" or "army"-or the text would read awkwardly, "strategic power" will be used by itself, with "configuration" understood. Finally, in the context of confined battlefield situations, where "strategic" is inappropriate in scope, ship is translated as "tactical configuration of power" or "tactical power."

  Insofar as two military forces may be described comparatively, there are some difficulties, and the question might be posed: Does ship exist in the absence of an enemy? Is it inappropriate to refer to the shih of an army if the two forces are equally matched and poised across a valley, with both-in their static positions-enjoying equal positional advantage relative to a potential battlefield between them and each other? Because Sun-tzu refers to shih chun, "strategic power that is equal," the term would seem to refer to a general evaluation versus terrain-and thus configuration of powerrather than specifically confined to being defined relative to an enemy's position and deployment. ("Ch'uan," which is discussed below, refers to this relative imbalance of forces.) To facilitate such inquiry, which we intend to address in a separate article, "shih" will generally be added parenthetically whenever the term is translated.

  (It should also be noted that shih and hsing-central concepts in the Art of Warare also found in an important verse of the Tao Te Ching, which can be translated as follows: "The Tao gives them birth, Te [Virtue] nurtures them, things give them form [hsing], shih [power] completes them" [Verse 51].)

  38. Hsing primarily means shape or form and thus should generally refer to the disposition of the troops or the configuration of forces. However, it also appears in other uses, such as situation or context, and may be nearly synonymous with shih at times. We will normally translate the term as "disposition of forces" when it appears alone to avoid confusion with "configuration of power." When in compound use, such as hsing shih-translated by Yates as "form and positional advantage"-the meaning of the two terms probably melds more than previously acknowledged (except perhaps in the Han shu classification). In such cases we will normally translate as "configuration of forces and strategic power," with appropriate annotations at each appearance.

  39. Ch'uan is another difficult term to isolate and define precisely, and the classical commentators assign a wide range of meanings to it. Virtually everyone agrees that in ancient times it referred to the "weight of a steelyard" and thus meant "to weigh" (cf. Kalgren, GSR, entry 158/0). With reference to its use in the Mohist classics, Graham, for example, defines it as the "'weighing' (of benefit and harm)," and "'positional advantage' used for leverage" (Disputers of the Tao, pp. 145, 157, 209, and 164). Duyvendak notes it implies the "deciding influence and authority" (The Book of Lord Shang, note 1, p. 260). Other translators assign a wide range of equivalents, such as "power," "authority," "circumstances," and "expediency." (See, for example, Rickert, Guanzi, p. 45, where he notes its closeness to ship, suggests that translation of "political power," and comments that it can also refer to whatever might be expedient.) The classical Chinese commentators tend to stress the sense of weighing, of balancing forces, as well as its meaning of "authority." However, ch'uan is also set off against cheng-that is, the "expedient" (associated with the exercise of power, particularly military power) compared with the "upright" or "correct," the measures of proper government and the civil. (See, for example, T'ao Hsi-sheng, Ping-fa san-shu, pp. 5-6.) In some usages, the simple equivalent of "authority" is clearly adequate; however, in others the term appears to refer to the strategic imbalance of power or the strategic advantage obtained from such an imbalance and will therefore be translated as "strategic (im)balance of power." Within limited battlefield contexts, in parallel with the translation for shih, ch'uan is rendered as "tactical balance of power."

  Notes to the Text

  Insofar as the Art of War has been the most studied of the Seven Military Classics, numerous editions and commentaries are readily available, with additional modern works appearing annually. Therefore, in contrast to the notes for the other translations, in general only a single reference or two-if any-is provided for the commentators' views. Scholars with expertise in the relevant languages can easily refer to the passages in such standard works as the Shih-chia chu, Shih-i-chia chu, or those listed in the abbreviations at the beginning of the notes to the Art of War.

  The discovery of the Han dynasty bamboo slips (hereafter abbreviated BS) has occasioned close scrutiny of the traditionally transmitted texts, including the Sung/Ming Seven Military Classics edition. However, although many contemporary scholars uncritically accept the BS as preserving the original text of the Art of War, many questions remain. A more balanced view is provided by Chu Chun and is cited in the notes as appropriate. Variations in meaning caused by character differences are also noted, but not simple differences caused by the presence or absence of connectives or particles or minor inversions in textual order. Furthermore, given the fragmentary nature of the text, phrases and sentences missing in the BS are not cited unless they radically affect the meaning.

  1. "Estimations" in the sense of objectively estimating the relative strength and weakness of oneself and the enemy for a series of factors. Although twelve such factors are discussed in this chapter, as noted in the translator's introduction there are several tens of paired factors that could be employed equally well in making such determinations.

  The character translated as "estimations"-chi-also has the meaning "plans," leading some to translate the title as "Initial Plans," or "First Plans."

  2. It is frequently assumed that the factors to be compared are the seven enumerated several paragraphs below because the five that immediately follow are already subsumed under "structure it according to [the following] five factors" (cf. ST SCC, p. 2; and STPF CS, p. 30). However, it seems clear that the "five factors" define the domain for comparative calculations.

  Historically, some commentators did not accept the addition of "affairs" following the world "five," the correctness of which has been sustained by the BS. '-h also lack "factors." (Cf. Ch'en Ch'i-t'ien, Sun-tzu ping-fa chiao-Aih, Chung-hua chU, Taipei, 1955, p. 65. Chu Chun [STPF SY, pp. 2-3] belies. `ac`-)rs" should not be excised, despite its absence in the BS.)

  3. Not the metaphysical Tao of the Taoists but the Tao of government, understood as legal and administrative measures and policies. Liu Yin (SWTCC WCCS, I:2A) understands it in terms of the usual array of Confucian virtues. However, Kuan Feng has observed that the concept is never made explicit in the Art of War. See Kuan Feng, "Sun-tzu chun-shih che-hsueh ssu-hsiang yen-chiu," Che-hsueh y
en-chiu 1957, No. 2, p. 72.

  4. The character translated as "ruler"-shang-may also be understood as "superiors," and the commentators espouse both possibilities. Although Liu Yin is somewhat amb;-ralent (SWTCC WCCS, I:2A), the translation follows STPF CS, p. 30; and SS AS, p. 26.

  5. "Thus" is added from the bamboo slips, although it is implied in any case. The BS conclude the sentence with the phrase "the people will not deceive/contravene him" rather than the traditional "not fear danger." However, Chu Chun believes the traditional reading is preferable (STPF SY, p. 3). Note that the term "deceive" also occurs in the famous sentence somewhat later: "Warfare is the Tao of deception."

  Commentators who stress the Legalism in Sun-tzu's thought understand the sentence as "they will die for him, they will live for him." They especially cite Sun-tzu's directive to the commanding general to manipulate his troops in combat like sheep, keeping them ignorant (cf. STPF CS, pp. 30-34). Although Sun-tzu does not advocate positive measures directed to fostering the people's welfare-such as are found in the other Military Classics-he does discuss gaining the allegiance of the masses before they can be employed, not impoverishing them, and the importance of benevolence in a commander. Most scholars thus have understood the ideal as being exemplified historically by King Wu of the Chou, who had garnered the willing support of the people. (For further discussion, see Wu Shu-p'ing, "Ts'ung Lin-i Han-mu chu-chien Wu-wen k'an Sun Wu to Fa-chia ssu-hsiang," WW 1975, No. 4, pp. 6-13.)

  6. The BS add: "according with and going contrary to, [the basis of] victory in warfare." Neither STPF CS nor STPF SY includes it. (STPF HC, p. 150.)

  7. Terrain classification is one of the keystones of Sun-tzu's strategic analysis, as will become clear from the extensive materials in Chapters eight, ten, and eleven (where these terms are further defined).

  The BS add "high or low" at the start of the classifications (STPF SY, p. 3).

  8. These terms are variously understood by the commentators. "The Tao of command" may refer to the exercise of command or to the establishment of military hierarchy, the chain of command. "Management of logistics" probably encompasses everything from the types and nature of the army's equipment to the provision and management of that equipment in campaigns. r summaries, see SS AS, p. 27; STPF SY, pp. 9-10; and ST SCC, p. 8.)

  Wu Ju-sung also equates the' -is" with the last ;ur items in the series of questions for comparative evaluation: the ale ntation of laws and orders, strong forces, well-trained officers and troops, and clear rewards and punishments (See STPF CS, pp. 37-38).

  9. "Forces" could also be translated as "weapons and masses" rather than understood as "army masses" or "infantry and masses." However, "masses" emphasizes the contrast with the next criterion for evaluation, the trained "officers and troops" (cf. STPF SY, p. 11; STPF CS, p. 30).

  10. Ch'en Hao early interpreted this passage as referring to Sun Wu himself staying or leaving, rather than retaining or dismissing a general. In addition, he identifies the "general" as the king of Wu, because he frequently commanded the army himself, and interprets Sun-tzu's statement as a barb to gain employment (SWT SCC, pp. 11-12. Cf. SS AS, p. 34. However, "retaining him" as a translation seems more reasonable than the sense of "remaining with him").

  Liu Yin (SWTCC WCCS, I:6B) makes an odd distinction between the first "general" in the sentence, which he believes refers to the Grand General in his consultations with the ruler, and the second general, which he sees as referring to any subordinate general appointed to implement the chosen strategy (also see STPF SY, p. 12).

  11. Liu Yin believes this should refer to the subordinate generals entrusted with field command, "listening to the estimations" and resulting plans (SWTCC WCCS, 1:6), but others believe it refers to the king of Wu-the "you" in the translation (cf. SS AS, p. 35, ST SCC, p. 12). Shih is discussed in the introductory notes.

  12. This is also understood as "outside the normal realm of tactics," using the unorthodox (cf. ST SCC, p. 12; SS AS, p. 36).

  13. The imbalance of power should be created with the objective of facilitating and attaining the "gains to be realized." Merely creating an imbalance of power would be pointless, and such an imbalance is already inherently dependent on the advantages one possesses (cf. STPF SY, pp. 13-14, for a similar view and an example). Ch'iian is discussed in the introductory notes.

  14. The term "deception" here inadequately conveys both the positive and negative aspects of the matter. We prefer to translate as "deception and artifice" because much craft is involved in not only concealing appearance, which is the simplest form of deception, but also in creating false impressions.

  The fourteen sentences that follow should be understood as tactical principles flowing from this realization. They are also believed to reflect or to be a distillation of tactical experience gained through combat situations in the Spring and Autumn period (STPF CS, pp. 39-40).

  15. Translators often take this as "when you are nearby make it appear as if you are distant," but this would clearly be contrary to reality. It would be impossible for the enemy not to know-through reconnaissance and observation-an army's actual position, although attempts were initiated routinely to diminish the accuracy of such per ceptions (such as by dragging brush and increasing or reducing the number of cook fires at night). More likely, the position to which the army is about to move, an objective that is about to be attacked, is intended as translated (following Liu Yin, SWTCC WCCS, I:9A. Compare ST SCC, p. 14). Chu Chun notes this might also be understood temporally, as immediate future and some distant time (STPF SY, p. 14).

  16. Two readings of these laconic sentences are possible. The critical question is whether the first term in each of them and the several that follow below should be read in the light of the Tao of Warfare and thus as explications of craft and deception and ways to manipulate the enemy, as Sun-tzu discusses extensively, or simply as a series of individual items. In the latter case, it is possible that they were simply conjoined hererather than being the product of Sun Wu's systematic analysis-from preexisting rubrics about military action. It is tempting to read them all in parallel, with the first term always describing an aspect of the enemy and the second an action to be applied, but in our opinion the imposition of such parallelism-which is frequently invalid even for two phrases within a single short sentence-is too artificial.

  Accordingly, for the first sentence, one reading would be that "If the enemy [desires] profit, entice them"-understanding "with the prospect of profit," which is somewhat redundant. The translation emphasizes the active approach because we should assume that armies will generally move for tactical advantage. At the same time we must remember that a frequently discussed (and readily exploitable) flaw in some commanding generals is greed.

  For the second sentence, two additional renderings are variously suggested: "If they are disordered, seize them," and "Show [apparent] disorder [in your own forces] and seize them." The commentators cite a number of historical examples in support of the latter, but the former has adherents as well, and decisive evidence for a definitive reading is lacking. (Measures such as enticing them with profits, sowing rumors, and fostering their licentiousness would all cause the sort of disorder that could easily be capitalized on.) The translation follows Liu Yin. (SWTCC WCCS, 1:9B. Cf. ST SCC, p. 15. Also note the extensive analysis, with examples of these and the following sentences, in Tzu Yu-ch'iu, ed., Mou-lueh k'u, Lan-t'ien ch'u-pan-she, Peking, 1990, pp. 70-76.)

  The term "take them" is said to indicate an easy victory rather than a difficult conflict (cf. ST SCC, p. 15).

  17. The "substantial" and the "vacuous" (or empty) form a correlative pair that is closely identified with Sun-tzu's thought, although the terms may have predated him. One of his fundamental principles is exploiting voids, weaknesses, fissures, and vacuities. The opposite, the "substantial" (shih)-corresponding roughly to strong, wellorganized, disciplined, expertly commanded, entrenched forces-is generally to be avoided rather than attacked with ineffectual and wasteful fro
ntal assaults. (Wang Chien-tung, STPF WC, p. 31, notes the phrase can also be understood as "be substantial and prepare for them," although this appears less appropriate.) The theme of Chapter 6 is "Vacuity and Substance."

  18. The military thinkers generally advocate fostering and exploiting anger because it blinds the general to the realities of the battlefield and takes away the troops' judgment. Consequently, suggestions that jao means "avoid them" are probably not accurate, even though Sun-tzu does recommend avoiding an army when it is at the peak of its fervor. (An alternative translation would be "anger and perturb them.")

  19. Again, two readings are possible, the alternative being "if they are humble/ lowly, make them arrogant" (cf. Tau, ed., Mou-lueh k'u, pp. 71-73; STPF SY, p. 15). The translation follows Liu Yin, SWTCC WCCS, 1:10B-11A. Logically, if they are "humble" they already lack combative spirit, and it would be foolish to raise their anger to no purpose. (On the other hand, they may also simply be restrained and composed.)

  20. The text appears to suggest the general cannot transmit or divulge his determinations with regard to these factors before the battle. However, it may also entail the idea that they cannot be rigidly or arbitrarily determined before the situation develops. Commentators embrace both views (cf. ST SCC, pp. 20-21; STPF CS, p. 31).